601) SCSL-03-01-T (20119 — 20230) 20119

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Freetown – Sierra Leone

Before: Justice Teresa Doherty, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate Judge

Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel

Date filed: 22 September 2008

THE PROSECUTOR **Against** **Charles Ghankay Taylor**

Case No. SCSL-03-01-T

PUBLIC
PROSECUTION REPLY TO "PUBLIC WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX A DEFENCE OBJECTION TO 'PROSECUTION NOTICE UNDER RULE 92*BIS* FOR THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE RELATED TO *INTER ALIA* KONO DISTRICT' AND OTHER ANCILLARY RELIEF"

Office of the Prosecutor:
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Prosecution files this Reply to the "Public with Confidential Annex A Defence Objection to 'Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence Related to *inter alia* Kono District' and Other Ancillary Relief".[1]

2. As noted by the Prosecution previously, Rule 92*bis* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("**Rules**") does not preclude the Prosecution from filing a reply to any objections filed by the Defence under Rule 92*bis*(C). In this regard, it is to be noted that while the Objections are dated 12 September 2008, service of the filing was not made until 15 September 2008.

3. In relation to the issues raised in the Objections, the Prosecution replies as set out below.

II. REPLY

Rule 92ter

4. The Defence continue to ignore the clear purpose of Rule 92*ter* and this Chamber's recent ruling on this point.[2] The plain language of the rule makes it clear that it is to be used when the party putting forward the witness' evidence intends to rely on prior testimony and to elicit additional testimony not previously elicited. This is not what the Prosecution proposes with these witnesses. Furthermore, Rule 92*bis* is a Rule with an independent application; it is not a default or fall back position taken only when there is no agreement between the parties, as the Defence seems to suggest. Finally, this Chamber has held that notices such as that filed on 28 August 2008[3] are properly made under Rule 92*bis*.[4]

Admissibility under Rule 92bis

5. Objections to portions of the prior testimony sought to be introduced into evidence are without merit.[5] Contrary to the jurisprudence and its own apparent acceptance of that jurisprudence[6], the Defence assertions continue to characterize evidence of the acts of others, in particular subordinates, as evidence of the acts and conduct of the Accused.[7] The

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[1] *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-01-03-T-589, "Public with Confidential Annex A Defence Objection to 'Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence Related to *inter alia* Kono District' and Other Ancillary Relief," 12 September 2008 ("**Objections**").
[2] Objections, paras. 10 & 11.
[3] *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-01-03-T-571, "Public with Confidential Annexes D to G Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence Related to *inter alia* Kono District", 28 August 2008 ("**Notice**").
[4] *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-01-03-T-556, "Decision on Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence Related to *Inter Alia* Kenema District And on Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of the Prior Testimony of TF1-036 into Evidence", 15 July 2008 ("***Taylor* Rule 92*bis* Decision**"), p. 5.
[5] Objections, para. 5.
[6] Objections, paras. 13, 17.
[7] At para. 17, the Objections acknowledge that "there remains a distinction between (a) acts and conduct of those others who commit the crimes for which the indictment alleges that the accused is individually responsible, and (b)

Objections simply repeat the same arguments[8] previously rejected by this Court.[9]

"Linkage" information / information which goes to proof of the acts and conduct of the Accused

6. As stated in the Notice, the testimonies of TF1-072, TF1-074, TF1-076, and TF1-077 (**"Witnesses"**) do not contain evidence which goes to proof of the acts and conduct of the Accused. The link between the "Acts and Conduct of the Accused" "tick box" in the Defence Annex and the corresponding testimony does not withstand scrutiny. None of the 13 portions identified as being "Acts and Conduct of the Accused" are actually evidence of the acts and conduct of the Accused as defined by the jurisprudence. At no point is any reference made to the Accused either by name or by reference to his position. Instead, they relate to the acts and conduct of others. There is, therefore, no merit to the Defence's claim that the Annex "lists those portions of the relevant transcripts which contain information going to proof of the acts and conduct of the accused"[10] and no legal basis on which these portions should be excluded from admission under Rule 92*bis*. The Defence's submissions on this point are wrong and create confusion. Evidence concerning the acts and conduct of subordinates and individuals other than the Accused *may* be considered by a Chamber to be evidence relating to those who are sufficiently proximate to the Accused or which goes to a critical element of the Prosecution's case, but it is not evidence which goes to the acts and conduct of the Accused.

7. The Defence erroneously argues that the Witnesses' testimonies contain evidence which is sufficiently proximate to the Accused to warrant cross-examination and that the evidence should be excluded if such cross-examination is not ordered.[11] First, the evidence is not sufficiently proximate to the Accused. Save for the references to Johnny Paul Koroma and Sesay, the subordinates referred to are not high ranking rebel commanders taking direct

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the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment which establish his responsibility for the acts and conduct of those others. The first is admissible under Rule 92*bis*, the latter is not."

[8] See *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-T-449, "Public with Confidential Annex A Defence Objection to Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of the Prior Testimony of TF1-036 into Evidence", 31 March 2008, paras. 9 to 17; *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-01-03-T-456, "Public with Confidential Annex Defence Objection to Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence related to *inter alia* Kenema District", 4 April 2008, paras. 11 to 19; and *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-01-03-T-579, "Public with Confidential Annex A Defence Objection to 'Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence Related to *inter alia* Kono District – TF1-218 & TF1-304'", 9 September 2008, paras. 10 to 24.

[9] The submissions made by the Defence in the above listed objections that certain evidence should not be admitted under Rule 92*bis* were not accepted in the *Taylor* Rule 92*bis* Decision.

[10] Objections, para. 14.

[11] Objections, paras. 12 – 19.

orders from the Accused.[12] Of course, all elements are critical to the Prosecution's case in the sense that, absent stipulation or judicial notice, the Prosecution must prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. An element critical to the Prosecution case cannot be meant in that sense or no evidence could ever be admitted under Rule 92*bis* as amended. In the more general sense, i.e., evidence which by itself is critical to proof of the Accused's guilt, the evidence being offered pursuant to Rule 92*bis* is not, of itself, of that nature.

8. Finally, assuming *arguendo*, the testimonies do contain evidence which might be considered proximate to the Accused, cross-examination or exclusion are not the only options. Rule 92*bis* does not expressly allow cross-examination and it has been described as a "back-up arrangement".[13] Instead, a more detailed consideration and assessment of the evidence is required - such as whether it has been sufficiently tested[14] and whether the opposing party has made a showing of good cause as to why further cross-examination is required in the interests of justice.[15]

Relevant evidence

9. The Defence argues that certain portions of the evidence are not relevant[16], erroneously arguing that evidence falling outside specified time limits must be excluded except for that which falls within Rule 93(A). First, the Objections misstate that the indictment alleges terrorizing the civilian population of Kono between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 December 1998. In fact, at paragraph 5, the Indictment alleges that the burning of civilian property and the other crimes alleged were committed as part of a campaign to terrorize the civilian population of Sierra Leone. It is the burnings and the other crimes which are given specific time limits, and the time periods alleged for a number of those crimes within Kono District are much wider than those referred to in the Objections. Secondly, the Defence argument ignores that evidence relevant to contextual elements, such as the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, is admissible whether it occurs within or outside the time limits alleged for specific crimes. This is also true for

[12] The subordinates identified by the Defence in the Annex are Officer Med, Colonel Gibbo, Major Tactical, Fa Gaima, Osman, Savage and Small Mosquito.
[13] As described by Judge Shahabuddeen at para. 6 of his Separate Opinion Appended to the Appeals Chamber Decision in *Prosecutor v. Milosović*, IT-02-54-AR73.5, "Admissibility of Evidence-In-Chief in the Form of Written Statements", 31 October 2003.
[14] For example, by the cross-examination of witnesses giving similar evidence in these proceedings or by the cross-examination of the witnesses at issue in other proceedings.
[15] See *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-1125, "Decision on Sesay Defence Motion and Three Defence Applications to Admit 23 Witness Statements under Rule 92*bis*", 15 May 2008, para. 40 on this issue.
[16] Objections, para. 20.

evidence which is, of itself or cumulatively with other evidence in the case, relevant to prove intent, awareness, knowledge, or reasonable foreseeability. Such evidence is admissible whether or not it is considered Rule 93(A) evidence.

10. Despite this general argument as to relevance, only one portion of evidence is identified as "Irrelevant".[17] The Prosecution acknowledges that the cover page of the copy of the exhibit provided in Annex E refers to AFRC Defence Exhibit No. 2 when it should have referred to No. 8. However, it is clear from the body of the Notice,[18] the copy of the exhibit provided[19] and the reference in the relevant transcript[20] that AFRC Defence Exhibit No. 8 is the exhibit which the Prosecution seeks to have admitted. AFRC Defence Exhibit No. 8 is *per se* relevant as the exhibit was tendered and referred to during the testimony of TF1-074.[21] Indeed, Defence Counsel tendered the exhibit. As the exhibit might be viewed as evidence undermining the credibility of the witness, the Prosecution included it less there be a claim that it was trying to remove exculpatory material. Therefore, if the Trial Chamber finds the exhibit not relevant, then, of course, the Prosecution has no objection to its being redacted or disregarded.

Evidence susceptible of corroboration

11. The Defence claims that portions of the Witnesses' testimonies refer to deceased persons and letters[22] and thus should be excluded as it is "not susceptible of confirmation."[23] This assertion is without merit. First, the Defence misstates the evidence. There is no indication in any of the testimonies that the persons referred to in those rows designated "not susceptible of confirmation" are now dead.[24] Additionally, the Defence claims that two letters, one received by TF1-074 himself and one which was read in his presence,[25] are also "not susceptible of confirmation." Yet the witness had first hand knowledge of the contents of both letters. Second, even if the evidence did confirm that a source is now dead or that the letters were never perceived first hand by the witness, the Defence misinforms

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[17] Annex to Objections, row 19.
[18] Notice, paras. 12, 29.
[19] Notice, Annex E – see copy of AFRC Defence Exhibit No. 8. It is clearly marked at the top of the copy provided that it is AFRC Defence Exhibit No. 8.
[20] *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Transcript, 5 July 2005, p. 42.
[21] It is apparent from reading the testimony of TF1-074 that the document is first referred to at page 38 of the AFRC Trial Transcript dated 5 July 2005 and then admitted into evidence on page 42.
[22] Objections, para. 21.
[23] Id.
[24] Objections, Annex A, rows 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14.
[25] See Objections, Annex A, rows 2 and 9.

itself as to the meaning of the term susceptible of confirmation. As noted by the Appeals Chamber in the CDF trial:

> "Rule 92*bis* permits facts that are not beyond dispute to be presented to the court in a written or visual form that will require evaluation in due course. [...]. The weight and reliability of such 'information' admitted via Rule 92*bis* will have to be assessed in light of all the evidence in the case."[26]

This Trial Chamber has also considered the issue and found that "reliability of the evidence is something to be considered by the Trial Chamber at the end of the trial when weighing and evaluating the evidence as a whole, in light of the context and nature of the evidence itself, including the credibility and reliability of the relevant evidence."[27] In relation to hearsay, the Defence's argument ignores the well established principle that the SCSL's Rules are broad and there is no exclusion of hearsay evidence. Indeed, Rule 92*bis* itself deals with hearsay evidence.[28]

12. The Defence claim that a copy of AFRC Defence Exhibit No. 8 was not provided[29] is without merit as a copy was provided in Confidential Annex E.[30]

Opinion or conclusion evidence

13. In paragraph 5b) of the Objections, the Defence states without argument that some of the evidence can be considered the Witnesses' own opinions or conclusions. To the extent this is correct, not all opinion or conclusory evidence given by a fact witness is inadmissible. In the Annex, the Defence identify only one portion of evidence as being "Opinion or Conclusion" evidence[31]: the testimony of TF1-074 that he saw AFRC soldiers who came from Koidu.[32] However, during this witness' testimony he states that the AFRC soldiers told him that they were looking for the youths that burned some of their companions in Koidu.[33] From this evidence, TF1-074 reasonably formed the opinion or conclusion that

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[26] *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR73-398, "Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against 'Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence", 16 May 2005, para. 27.
[27] *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, "Decision on Prosecution Tender for Admission into Evidence of Information Contained in Notice Pursuant to Rule 92*bis*", 18 November 2005, page 3.
[28] As noted by Judge Shahabuddeen at para. 6 of his Separate Opinion Appended to the Appeals Chamber Decision in *Prosecutor v. Milosović*, IT-02-54-AR73.5, "Admissibility of Evidence-In-Chief in the Form of Written Statements", 31 October 2003.
[29] Annex to Objections, page 3, row 11.
[30] Notice, pg. 18605-18610. See acknowledgement of typographical error in para. 10 above, mitigated by references to correct exhibit number in Notice, provision of correct copy of exhibit and references in relevant transcript.
[31] Annex to Objections, page 2 – TF1-074, 5 July 2005, p. 24 ln. 9.
[32] *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Transcript, 5 July 2005, pg. 23 ln. 29 – pg. 24 ln. 7.
[33] *Ibid.*

these soldiers came from Koidu. Where, as in TF1-074's case, the opinion is rationally based on a witness' perception, (i.e. the witness perceived with his senses the matters on which his opinion is based and there is a rational connection between the opinion and his perceptions), such evidence is admissible. This evidence is based on first hand knowledge and is an opinion or conclusion which a normal person would form from observed facts; it is not such that can only be based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.

14. There is, therefore, no legal basis on which the portion of evidence identified as being opinion evidence which should be excluded from admission under Rule 92*bis*.

Request to cross-examine

15. The Objections regarding cross-examination are erroneous.[34]

16. First, as noted at paragraph 8 above, cross-examination has been described as a "back-up arrangement". Second, the Defence argument that "[t]he right of cross examination is the Defence's absolute prerogative in each case"[35] overstates the right invoked. When granted, the right to cross-examine is not without limits. The jurisprudence establishing conditions which would allow for cross-examination under Rule 92*bis* are proof of those limits, contrary to what the Defence appears to argue at paragraph 23. Nor does the Defence have the right to cross-examine on irrelevant matters, nor to conduct an unduly cumulative examination of a witness. The ICTY imposes limits on the time allowed and the subject matter of cross-examination where witnesses are being called for such under Rule 92*bis*.[36]

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[34] Objections, paras. 22 – 24.

[35] Objections, para. 23.

[36] See *Prosecution v. Milošević*, IT-02-54-T, "Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Admission of a Transcript and Statement Pursuant to Rules 92bis(D) and 89(F) for Witness B-1805", 12 January 2004, p. 3 order 2 where cross-examination by the accused and the *Amici Curiae* was limited to two hours in total; and *Prosecutor v. Delic*, IT-04-83-T, "Decision Adopting Guidelines on the Admission and Presentation of Evidence and Conduct of Counsel in Court", 24 July 2007, Annex, para. 17 which states *inter alia* that cross-examination might be limited to "matters which the Trial Chamber has decided to allow the witness to be called for cross-examination". In *Delić*, the approach taken by the Trial Chamber in *Prosecutor v. Milan Martić*, IT-95-11-T, "Decision on Prosecution's Motion for the Admission of Written Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92*bis* of the Rules", 16 January 2006 was referred to with approval. In *Martić*, the Chamber ordered that the areas of cross-examination be limited as follows: "Witness MM-06, appear for cross-examination on matters going to the existence of a joint criminal enterprise in which the Accused allegedly participated, to the alleged goal of the joint criminal enterprise, and to the effective control the Accused allegedly had over units committing crimes; that Witness MM-07 appear for cross-examination on matters concerning the Arkan's Tigers, the alleged effective control of the Accused over units committing crimes, and a "policy" in "the area of responsibility in the Kordun area" "to get as many Croats as possible out of the territory"; that Witness MM08 appear for cross-examination on matters concerning the existence of a joint criminal enterprise in which the Accused allegedly participated, to the relationship of the Accused with other members of this alleged joint criminal enterprise, and to the "Red Berets"; that Witness MM-037 and Witness MM-044 appear for cross-examination on matters concerning "Martic's Police" (see para. 37).

It is in this context and alongside the qualification noted by the Prosecution previously[37], that one must consider the continued reliance by the Defence on this Chamber's dismissal of similar arguments on the basis that "the Accused would be prejudiced if judicial economy were allowed to take precedence over his fair trial rights."[38] Furthermore, fairness and expediency are not contrary principles. The Prosecution relies on its submissions made on this point in previous submissions.[39]

17. Thirdly, as stated above, there is no basis to the Defence claim that "the information sought to be tendered goes to the acts and conduct of the accused ..., [such that] cross-examination must be allowed."[40] Nor is the evidence so proximate as to require cross-examination. Even if portions of evidence are considered sufficiently proximate, as also stated above, this does not automatically require that the evidence be made subject to cross-examination. Therefore, taking the Defence at their oft repeated word that they are not challenging the crime base, the Prosecution is not being mischievous.[41] That oft repeated word can be fairly taken to indicate that there would be no cross-examination related to crime base and, as discussed above, there is no other valid basis for cross-examination of the Witnesses.

18. Finally, the Defence erroneously argues that it must be shown that the line of defence in previous proceedings coincides with that of the Defence in the current proceedings.[42] Assuming the conditions are present which would allow for cross-examination, what must be shown is that the Defence would explore areas not previously covered. In that regard, a general examination exploring credibility is sufficient to support a witness's reliability.[43] Even if a previous defence counsel conducted a cross-examination with different or hostile interests to the Accused, this factor is more appropriately considered in determining the weight to be assigned the testimony rather than precluding admission of the evidence.[44]

19. Notwithstanding the foregoing, should the Chamber order cross-examination, then, as argued previously, such cross-examination should be limited to relevant areas of inquiry

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[37] *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-01-03-T-588, "Public Prosecution Reply to Defence Objection to Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence Related to *inter alia* Kono District – TF1-218 & TF1-304", 12 September 2008, para 19.
[38] Objections, para. 22.
[39] *Supra*, footnote 37.
[40] Objections, para. 23.
[41] See Notice, para. 25, footnote 15.
[42] Objections, para. 24.
[43] *Prosecutor v. Popovic et al.*, IT-05-88-T, "Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92*quater*," 21 April 2008, para. 51. While the decision considers Rule 92*quater*, the dicta is relevant to the general issue of the significance to be given to prior cross-examination.
[44] *Id.* at para. 60.

not previously examined. Such limits are justified as all of the witnesses' cross-examination in the prior proceedings was full, rigorous and effective and carried out by defence counsel for an accused with a similar interest to the Accused in the present proceedings.[45] Further, limits on cross-examination, particularly in relation to witnesses whose testimony in chief is admitted under Rule 92*bis*, are not contrary to the fair trial rights of the Accused but, rather in balance with these rights, have ensured the promotion of one of the central purposes of the rule which is an expeditious trial.[46]

20. The Prosecution is cognisant of the logistical arrangements and advance planning which must be undertaken for witnesses to travel from Sierra Leone to the Hague. The Prosecution, therefore, advises that, should the Chamber order that these witnesses be made available for cross-examination, then the Prosecution shall endeavour that they be available from the beginning of October 2008.

Defence Request to Rescind Previously Granted Protective Measures

21. Should the Trial Chamber allow cross-examination of any of the Witnesses, the Objections once again fail to meet the relevant test for rescission or lessening of existing protective measures. This test was recently reaffirmed by the Appeals Chamber when it found that the party seeking to rescind the existing measures must:

> "present supporting evidence capable of establishing on a preponderance of probabilities that the witness is no longer in need of such protection. *The Trial Chamber* must thus be satisfied that there is a change in the security situation facing the witness such as a diminution in the threat level faced by the witness that justifies a variation of protective measures orders."[47]

22. Therefore, in accordance with the Appeals Chamber's ruling, the Trial Chamber must first determine whether the Defence has provided supporting evidence capable of establishing "on a preponderance of probabilities that the witness is no longer in need of

[45] The nexus between the RUF case and the Taylor case was recently argued by the Defence in their motion seeking access to closed session defence witness testimony from the RUF trial and limited disclosure of RUF defence witness names and related potentially exculpatory material in *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-T-377, "Public Defence Motion Pursuant to Rule 75(G) to Modify Sesay Defence Protective Measures Decision of 30 November 2006 for Access to Closed Session Defence Witness Testimony and Limited Disclosure of Defence Witness Names and Related Exculpatory Material", 14 December 2007.

[46] See footnote 36 above.

[47] *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-1146, "Decision on Prosecution Appeal of Decision on the Sesay Defence Motion Requesting the Lifting of Protective Measures in Respect of Certain Prosecution Witnesses", 23 May 2008, para. 37 (emphasis added).

... protection" and then determine the nature and extent of the variations ordered.[48] The Defence has provided no evidence, just unsupported general assertions.

23. Additionally, the Defence assertions are without merit. The continuing security threat to the Witnesses is evidenced by the fact that this Trial Chamber has continued to grant and apply protective measures in this case. Further, the Defence did not claim that the Witnesses have no subjective security concerns. Accordingly, the Defence has failed to provide evidence demonstrating a change in circumstances that would warrant a reduction in the protective measures afforded to the Witnesses. It is to be noted that the jurisprudence of this Court has clearly established that protective measures do not infringe an accused's right to a fair trial.[49] Further, this jurisprudence determines that testimony given subject to protective measures is not "in camera" justice.[50]

III. CONCLUSION

24. The Defence Objections are without merit.

25. The application by the Prosecution was properly made under Rule 92*bis*.

26. The Defence has not established any legal basis on which any of the evidence submitted for admission under Rule 92*bis* should be excluded as the evidence is relevant, does not go to the proof of the acts and conduct of the Accused (giving such phrase its plain and ordinary meaning as is required by the jurisprudence), its reliability is susceptible of confirmation and it does not relate to opinion evidence, or in the alternative, the opinions were properly elicited.

27. The Prosecution requests that the prior testimony as submitted by the Prosecution and related exhibits of the Witnesses be admitted into evidence under Rule 92*bis*.

Filed in The Hague,

22 September 2008

For the Prosecution,

Brenda J. Hollis
Principal Trial Attorney

[48] *Ibid*, para. 38.
[49] *Prosecutor v. Norman*, "Ruling on Motion for Modification of Protective Measures for Witnesses", 18 November 2004, para. 50
[50] *Ibid.*

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

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Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-01-03-T-571, "Public with Confidential Annexes D to G Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence Related to *inter alia* Kono District", 28 August 2008

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Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-01-03-T-589, "Public with Confidential Annex A Defence Objection to 'Prosecution Notice under Rule 92*bis* for the Admission of Evidence Related to *inter alia* Kono District' and Other Ancillary Relief," 12 September 2008

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***Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T**

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Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Prosecution Tender for Admission into Evidence of Information Contained in Notice Pursuant to Rule 92*bis*, 18 November 2005

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Prosecution v. Milošević, IT-02-54-T, "Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Admission of a Transcript and Statement Pursuant to Rules 92bis(D) and 89(F) for Witness B-1805", 12 January 2004
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