239.)

SCSL-03-01-PT
(7947 — 8344)

7947

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Freetown – Sierra Leone

Before: Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty

Acting Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel

Date filed: 16 May 2007



THE PROSECUTOR **Against** **Charles Taylor**

Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT

URGENT PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* FOR USE DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Office of the Prosecutor:

Ms. Brenda J. Hollis
Ms. Ann Sutherland

Defence Counsel for Charles Taylor:

Mr. Karim A. A. Khan
Mr. Roger Sahota
Mr. Avi Singh

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to Rules 73, 89(C) and Rule 92*bis* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("Rules"), the Prosecution files this request to the Trial Chamber to exercise its discretion and admit into evidence the material[1] which the Prosecution has selected, at this time, for use during its opening statement. The said material is listed in Annex A and contained in Annex B attached to this motion.

2. All the material formed part of the Prosecution's Rule 73*bis* Exhibit List filed on 4 April 2007, with the exception of the last three items listed on Annex A.[2] These three items have been the subject of on-going efforts by the Office of the Prosecutor to obtain same. The Office of the Prosecutor recently received the said items and disclosed them to the Defence.[3]

3. The Prosecution informs the Chamber that a number of the items contained in Annex A attached to this motion are contained in Annexes A and B to the Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice ("Judicial Notice Motion") filed on 14 May 2007.[4] This has been duly noted in Annex A attached to this motion.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

4. The general rule on admission of evidence is Rule 89(C), which provides the Chamber with the discretion to admit relevant evidence.[5]

---

[1] "Material" for the purposes of this motion, includes the information contained in the documents or audio-visual recordings as listed in Annex A (and contained in Annex B).
[2] Items marked as Doc. 3.060, Doc. 3.062 and Doc. 3.063 in Annex A.
[3] Item marked Doc. 3.060 was received by the OTP on 05/05/07 and was disclosed to the Defence on 07/05/07. Items marked Doc. 3.062 and Doc. 3.063 were received by the OTP on 04/05/07 and disclosed to the Defence on 09/05/07.
[4] The Prosecution in the Judicial Notice Motion asks the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of certain facts, and in the alternative, should the Trial Chamber decline to do so, the Prosecution requests that the Trial Chamber admit into evidence, pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis*, the corresponding documentary extracts set out in Annex B to that motion (*see* Judicial Notice Motion, paragraph 14).
[5] "By parity of reasoning, under Rule 95, the Trial Chamber can exclude evidence where its admission would bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute. Thus, the Chamber may exercise its discretion under this Rule and under its inherent jurisdiction to exclude evidence where its probative value is manifestly outweighed by its prejudicial effect." *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-391, Ruling on Gbao Application to Exclude Evidence of Prosecution Witness Mr. Koker, 23 May 2005 ("*Gbao* Ruling"), para. 7.

5. Rule 92 *bis* (A) provides that a Chamber may admit as evidence, in whole or in part, information in lieu of oral testimony.

6. Rule 89(C) constitutes the basic rule regulating the admission of evidence which applies in addition to, and not instead of, the more specific provisions contained in Rules 92*bis*.[6] The requirements of Rules 92*bis* must be met by the Prosecution in order for the Trial Chamber to admit the evidence pursuant to Rule 89.

7. Rule 92*bis* (B) requires that two conditions be cumulatively satisfied, namely that the evidence ('information' – being assertions of fact, but not opinion, made in documents or electronic communications[7]) is relevant to the purpose for which it is being submitted and that its reliability is susceptible of confirmation.

8. The phrase "susceptible of confirmation" contained in Rule 92*bis* (B) has been interpreted by the *Norman et al.* Appeals Chamber to mean that the "proof of reliability is not a condition of admission: all that is required is that the information should be capable of corroboration in due course."[8] Further, the *Norman et al.* Appeals Chamber held that:

> It is for the trial chamber to decide whether the information comes in a form, or is of a kind, that is 'susceptible to confirmation'. It follows, of course, from the fact that its reliability is 'susceptible to confirmation', that it is also susceptible of being disproved, or so seriously called into question that the court will place no reliance upon it.
>
> Rule 92*bis* permits facts that are not beyond dispute to be presented to the court in a written or visual form that will require evaluation in due

---

[6] *Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević*, IT-02-54-AR73.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence-In-Chief in the Form of Written Statements, App. Ch., 30 September 2003, paras 9-10.

[7] *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR73-398, Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against 'Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence 16 May 2005, ("*Fofana* Appeals Decision"), para. 26.

[8] *Fofana* Appeals Decision, para. 26. A panel of three Appeals Judges in the *Norman et al.* case (dealing with a bail application appeal) held that "under Rule 89(C), "[e]vidence is admissible once it is shown to be relevant: the question of reliability is determined thereafter, and is not a condition for its admission." *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR65, Fofana – Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail, App. Ch., 11 March 2005 ("*Fofana* Bail Appeals Decision"), para. 24, citing *Prosecutor v. Delalić et al.*, IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion of the Prosecutor for the Admissibility of Evidence, 19 January 1998, para. 19: "...it is neither necessary or desirable to add to the provisions of sub-Rule 89(C) a condition of admissibility which is not expressly prescribed by that provision."

> course. [...]. The weight and reliability of such 'information' admitted via Rule 92*bis* will have to be assessed in light of all the evidence in the case.[9]

9. This Trial Chamber in the *Brima et al.* case reiterated that "evidence may be excluded because it is unreliable, but it is not necessary to demonstrate the reliability of the evidence before it is admitted."[10] The Trial Chamber further considered that "reliability of the evidence is something to be considered by the Trial Chamber at the end of the trial when weighing and evaluating the evidence as a whole, in light of the context and nature of the evidence itself, including the credibility and reliability of the relevant evidence."[11]

10. The requirement to be met, therefore, for evidence to be *admitted* pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis*, is whether the evidence is relevant, its reliability is susceptible of confirmation, and its admission would not unfairly prejudice the Accused.[12] Unfair prejudice does not arise merely because evidence is incriminating. The analysis requires a determination of whether the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. "What is crucial in any such determination, where it is alleged that the probative value of the evidence under scrutiny is [substantially] outweighed by its prejudicial effect, is whether admitting the evidence will impact adversely and unfairly *upon the integrity of the proceedings* before the Court."[13]

---

[9] *Fofana* Appeals Decision, paras. 26-27.
[10] *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Prosecution Tender for Admission into Evidence of Information Contained in Notice Pursuant to Rule 92*bis*, 18 November 2005 ("*Brima* Rule 92*bis* Decision"), page 2 (last para), citing *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Joint Defence Application for Leave to Appeal from Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude All Evidence from Witness TF1-277, 2 August 2005, para. 6.
[11] *Brima* Rule 92*bis* Decision, page. 3 (second full paragraph). *See also Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-T-447, Decision on Prosecution's Request to Admit into Evidence Certain Documents Pursuant to Rules 92*bis* and 89(C), 14 July 2005 ("*Norman* Decision"), page 3.
[12] *Fofana* Appeals Decision, para. 26; *Fofana* Bail Appeals Decision, para. 24; *Norman* Decision, pp. 3-4 (fourth paragraph on page 3 and second paragraph on page 4); *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-618, Decision on Prosecution Notice Pursuant to Rule 92bis to Admit Information into Evidence, Tr. Ch., 2 August 2006, page 3 (paragraph 2).
[13] *Gbao* Ruling, para. 8. Emphasis added. ICTR/ICTY Rule 89(C) provides that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is **substantially** outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. (emphasis added).

11. The Prosecution respectfully submits that "capable of corroboration" as defined by the *Norman* Appeals Chamber[14] must be given a liberal interpretation. The material may not require corroboration at all, or at the very least, a scintilla of corroboration. For example, a United Nations map of Sierra Leone should not require corroboration and should be properly admissible without corroboration.

12. It is clear from the relevant provisions of the Rules that there is no blanket prohibition on the admission of the contents of documents/audio-visual recordings simply on the ground that their purported author has not been called to testify in the proceedings. Instead the conditions for admissibility are those contained in Sub-rule 89(C) and Rule 92*bis* discussed above.

III. SUBMISSIONS

13. The Prosecution submits that the material sought to be admitted meets the above requirements. The material is relevant to the facts in issue in this case, its reliability is susceptible of confirmation, and is not unfairly prejudicial to the Accused.

14. The relevance of the material to this case, and the indictment in particular, is set out in Annex A. The material relates either to contextual elements of crimes, elements of underlying crimes alleged in the Indictment, or to the Accused's individual criminal responsibility.

15. Admitting the material pre-trial, enabling the trial proceedings to be conducted in a smooth and expeditious manner, does not prejudice the rights of the accused to challenge the relevance, reliability or authenticity of specific items of the material at trial.[15] Thus, admission of the material pre-trial is not inconsistent with the Accused's right to a fair trial.

---

[14] *Fofana* Appeal Decision, para. 26.

[15] *See Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al.*, Case No. IT-98-30-PT, Order Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence, Tr. Ch., 17 March 1999; *See Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.*, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Decision Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence, Tr. Ch., 1 August 2000; *Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.*, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Decision Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence Regarding Duško Sikirica, Tr. Ch., 22 September 2000.

16. None of the material in question has been obtained by methods which either cast substantial doubt on its reliability, or would lead to a conclusion that its admission would bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute. A large percentage of this material sought to be admitted is open source. In addition, search and seizure missions have been conducted by members of the SCSL Office of the Prosecutor, the Sierra Leonean Police and the Liberian Government in which a number of documents were seized. Copies of the solemn declarations, statements or letters from the relevant authorities relating to these missions are contained in Annex C attached to this motion.[16] Unless the Trial Chamber deems it necessary, the Prosecution does not, at this time, seek to have the solemn declarations, statements or letters from the relevant authorities admitted into evidence.

17. Where the exhibits contained in Annex B do not bear an Evidence Register Number (ERN), the Prosecution seeks leave to substitute these copies with copies bearing ERNs where the Trial Chamber determines that the exhibits be admitted.

III. CONCLUSION

18. For the reasons stated above, the Prosecution respectfully requests the Trial Chamber in exercising its discretion, admit into evidence, pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis* of the Rules, the material listed in Annex A and contained in Annex B attached to this Motion. In the alternative, if the Trial Chamber declines to admit the material into evidence at this time, the Prosecution requests that the Trial Chamber admit the material on a provisional basis, i.e. "marked for identification." In the event the material is provisionally admitted by the Chamber, the Prosecution reserves the right to apply to have the material fully admitted pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis*.

19. The Prosecution requests that the Trial Chamber issue a ruling as follows:

(1) The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the material contained in Annex B to the Motion is relevant to this case and its reliability is susceptible to confirmation to admit the aforesaid material into evidence in this case;

[16] Annex C contains five parts: C.1-C.3 and C.5-C.6.

(2) The material contained in Annex B to the Motion be admitted for the purposes of the trial of the Accused;

(3) Counsel for the Accused is at liberty to challenge the relevance, reliability or authenticity of specific items of the material during the trial; and

(4) The Prosecution shall deal with any issues raised as to the reliability or authenticity of specific items of the material so admitted by way of rebuttal;

(5) The issue of weight will be determined by the Trial Chamber during its final deliberations, in the context of the trial record as a whole.

Filed in Freetown,
16 May 2007
For the Prosecution,

PER:

Brenda J. Hollis
Senior Trial Attorney

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

***Prosecutor v. Taylor.* – Case No. SCSL-03-01**

1. *Prosecutor v. Taylor,* SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice, filed on 14 May 2007.

Other SCSL Cases

***Prosecutor v. Brima et al.* – Case No. SCSL-04-16**

2. *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Joint Defence Application for Leave to Appeal from Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude All Evidence from Witness TF1-277, 2 August 2005.

3. *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Prosecution Tender for Admission into Evidence of Information Contained in Notice Pursuant to Rule 92*bis*, 18 November 2005 ("*Brima* Rule 92*bis* Decision").

***Prosecutor v. Norman et al.* – Case No. SCSL-04-14**

4. *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR65, Fofana – Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail, App. Ch., 11 March 2005 ("*Fofana* Bail Appeals Decision").

5. *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR73-398, Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against 'Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence, 16 May 2005 ("*Fofana* Appeals Decision").

6. *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-T-447, Decision on Prosecution's Request to Admit into Evidence Certain Documents Pursuant to Rules 92*bis* and 89(C), 14 July 2005 ("*Norman* Trial Decision").

***Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.* – Case No. SCSL-04-15**

7. *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-391, Ruling on Gbao Application to Exclude Evidence of Prosecution Witness Mr. Koker, 23 May 2005 ("*Gbao* Ruling").

8. *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-617, Decision on Prosecution Notice Pursuant to Rule 92bis to Admit Information into Evidence, Tr. Ch.,2 August 2006,

ICTY Cases

9. *Prosecutor v. Delalić et al.*, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion of the Prosecutor for the Admissibility of Evidence, Tr. Ch., 19 January 1998.

   http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/80119EV21.htm

10. *Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al.*, Case No. IT-98-30-PT, Order Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence, Tr. Ch., 17 March 1999.

    http://www.un.org/icty/kvocka/trialc/order-e/90317EV55982.htm

10. *Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević*, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence-In-Chief in the Form of Written Statements, App. Ch, 30 September 2003.

    http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/030930.htm

11. *Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.*, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Decision Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence, Tr. Ch., 1 August 2000.

    http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/trialc/decision-e/00801EV513343.htm

12. *Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.*, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Decision Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence Regarding Duško Sikirica, Tr. Ch., 22 September 2000.

    http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/trialc/decision-e/00922EV513523.htm

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.020	Excerpts from UNHCR Report on Atrocities Committed Against Sierra Leone Population, UNHCR Conakry Branch Office, 28 January 1999 (Rev. 2). (ERNs 00004550, 00004595, 00004621, 00004626, 00004634)	28/01/1999	00004549-00004652 A	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1**, (5; 6), **2, 3**, (9), **4, 5, 6**, (14), **7, 8**, (18), **9**, (22), **10**, (23), **11**, (28), *ICR*, (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007
1.042	Lists of diamond production at Kono from August 1999 to January 2000.	08/1999 to 01/2000	00007852-00007862	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	See Annex C.2	
1.049	Excerpt from Radio Log Book #3 covering the period of 23/09/1999 - 16/04/2000. Radio message from Ibrahim Bah to Foday Sankoh notifying Sankoh of departure for Monrovia and asking advice on the production.	12/01/2000	00008779	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	See Annex C.1	

9567

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.052	Excerpt from Radio Log Book #3 covering the period of 23/09/1999 - 16/04/2000. Radio message from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay directing Sesay to warn all soldiers not to touch any of the Liberian brothers who are coming together with General Ibrahim and others.	22/12/1999	00008881	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	See Annex C.1	
1.053	Hard copy of speech by RUF leader Foday Sankoh on cooperation and achievement of peace in Sierra Leone after Lome Peace Accords.	undated	00009476-00009477	☒Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.058	Letter to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander. Summary Report to Foday Sankoh of the situation on the ground while he has been absent.	undated	00009672-00009681	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	See Annex C.1	

7954

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.060	Transcript of SLBS Radio Broadcast, 29 May 1997 15:26 GMT. [Proclamation issued by the Administration of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Proclamation 1997, in Freetown on 28 May 1997].	29/05/1997	00009685-00009686	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.064	Revolutionary United Front's Apology to the Nation delivered on SLBS, 18 June 1997.	18/06/1997	00009769-00009771	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☒Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR*, (33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.067	Excerpts from Human Rights Watch Report: Getting away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape, July 1999. (Part 1, pp. 4, 5; Part IV, pp. 1, 3-10, 27-33, 48, 49)	01/07/1999	Public Document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4, 5, 6,** (14; 17), **7, 8,** (18; 21), **9,** (22), **10,** (23; 27), **11,** (28; 31), *ICR*, (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007

7952

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.071	Statements made by the Parties following four days of mediation talks to harmonise Relations between the RUF and the AFRC under the auspices of the Government of the Republic of Liberia, with the support of ECOWAS Member States.	02/10/1999	00011183-00011190	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.081	Verbatim Report on discussion between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his return from his detention at Nigeria in 1999 explaining their Activities during his Detention in 1996-1999.	undated	00012955-00012970	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	RUF Document	
1.085	Forum With the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff.	02/12/1998	00015487-00015491	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	See Annex C.3	
1.125	Untitled Video. RUF in training sings in praise of Charles Taylor, while waiting to receive their leader Foday Sankoh at their rebel base.	undated	EV0007	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	

47 of 87

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.128	Killing Democracy. Documentary providing an overview of the RUF's decade-long effort to take power in Sierra Leone.	undated	EV0071	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☒Other	**1,** (5; 6; 8) **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4, 6,** (14; 17), **7, 8,** (18, 21), **9,** (22), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.129	Operation Annihilation. Documentary focusing on efforts in Freetown to rehabilitate former RUF child combatants.	undated	EV0074	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☒Other	**1,** (5; 6; 8) **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18; 21) **9,** (22), **10,** (23; 27), **11,** (28; 31), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.132	Untitled Video. Showing the attempts by the AFRC/RUF to dislodge the Sewa Bridge so that Kono could be declared second Gbanga.	undated	EV0158	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☒Other	**1,** (5; 6; 7), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.145	Horror in Freetown.	26/01/1999 to 28/01/1999	Picture Monrovia Mission Sept 6-12, 032 00028262	☒Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), **9,** (22), **10,** (27), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.268	Horror…Chronicling the atrocities committed during the AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. Continuation of exhibit 1.145	26/01/1999 to 28/01/1999	March 2007 Mission Photo 122	☒Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), **9,** (22), **10,** (27), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.148	In S/Leone: 52 Burned Alive.	20/02/1998	Picture Monrovia Mission Sept 6-12, 047 & 48 00028277-00028278	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **10,** (23), **11,** (28), *ICR* (33; 34),	Public Domain	
1.149	In Sierra Leone: Massacre Again.	12/06/1998 to 15/06/1998	Picture Monrovia Mission Sept 6-12, 049 00028279	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	

19747

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.156	Excerpts from We'll kill you if you cry, Sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict. Detailing widespread and systematic perpetration of rape and sexual violence by AFRC/RUF. (pp. cover, 3, 4, 12, 15-53, 61-76)	01/01/2003	Public document	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1**, (5), **2, 3,** (13), **4, 5, 6,** (14; 17), **9,** (22), **10**, (23)	Public Domain	
1.157	Excerpts from Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16- 30, April 1998. Details security, political and humanitarian developments over the reporting period as well as RUF atrocities in Kono. (p. 1)	30/04/1998	Public Document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1** (5), **7, 8,** (18; 19), **11**, (28; 30), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007
1.159	BBC News: Grim Facts of Sierra Leone's War.	13/02/1999	Public document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), **4, 5, 6,** (17), **9,** (22), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	

9767

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.171	Excerpts from Sierra Leone: Humanitarian Situation Report, 17/02/1998. Details the beginning of ECOMOG's campaign to push the Junta out of Freetown. Reports of widespread looting in Kenema, Makeni and Bo by the AFRC. (p. 1)	17/02/1998	Public Document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **9,** (22), **11,** (28; 30), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.172	Excerpts from Amnesty International Report 1998: Sierra Leone. Covers human rights abuses throughout Sierra Leone during the period January-December 1997 and Jan-June 1998. (pp. 3-6)	undated	Public document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9; 10), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18; 20), **10,** (23), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007
1.173	Excerpts from Amnesty International Report 1999: Sierra Leone. Covers human rights abuses throughout Sierra Leone during the period January-December 1998. (pp. 1-3)	undated	Public document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1**, (5), **2, 3,** (9; 11; 13), **4, 5, 6,** (14; 17), **7, 8,** (18; 21), **9,** (22), **10**, (23; 26), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.177	Excerpts from Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict. (pp. 1-2)	26/02/2001	Public Document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **4, 5, 6,** (14; 17), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR,* (33; 34),	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007
1.180	Excerpts from Atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone. (p. 4)	01/05/1998	Public document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9; 11), **4, 6,** (14; 15), **7, 8,** (18; 19), *ICR,* (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007
1.182	UN Says Sierra Leone Rebels Holding 1,000 Children.	10/09/1999	Public document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), *ICR,* (33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.187	Top United Nations humanitarian official describes brutal treatment of civilians by rebels in Sierra Leone.	15/06/1998	Public document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR,* (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007
1.215	Excerpts from War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone, A Population-Based Assessment. (pp. 2-4, 37-81)	2002	Public document	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), **11,** (25), *ICR,* (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007

4967

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.216	Excerpts from Situation Report on Human Rights Violations in and around Makeni town, in the Bombali District, Northern Province, Sierra Leone, West Africa. (pp. 3976-77, 3981, 3983-96)	12/1998 to 07/1999	Public Document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), **11**, (25), *ICR*, (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007
1.218	AAP Newsfeed, "AFR: Sierra Leone Villagers Tell of Rebel Atrocities."	10/05/1998	Public document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5; 6), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18; 19)	Public Domain	
1.219	Excerpts from BBC Broadcast Video: Blood Diamonds.WMV, produced and directed by Rachel Morgan. Program ties conflict diamonds to RUF, Liberia and Al Qaeda. (9:28-13:40)	undated	V0000041	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **9**, (22), **10**, (23), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.259	Thousands Trapped in Freetown…Foday Sankoh Flown to Guinea; Rebels Still Burning Buildings.	13/01/1999	March 2007 Mission Photo 85 and 86	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☒Other	**1**, (5; 8), **2, 3** (9; 13), **10**, (23; 27), *ICR,* (33; 34)	Public Domain	

9947

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.260	In Freetown: More Bloodbath - As Rebels Reject Peace Talk.	08/01/1999	March 2007 Mission Photo 101 and 102	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3** (13), *ICR,* (33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.289	Votes Counted in S. Leone Amidst Protests.	29/02/1996 to 05/03/1996	Public document	☒Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☐Other	*ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.295	Excerpts from Sierra Leone: Childhood - a casualty of conflict. Chronicles that over 5000 children have fought in the SL war, some as young as 5 and both boys and girls. Outlines how child soldiers were used, and includes testimonies from SBU's in each faction. (pp. 3-6, 8-10, 14-15)	31/08/2000	Public document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (11), **5,** (14), **7, 8,** (19), **9,** (22), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007

29867

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.298	Aroun Rashid Deen interviews people in Connaught Hospital in Freetown. Most of the patients are people who suffered injuries at the hands of AFRC/RUF rebels in Kono District following the rebel retreat from Freetown in February 1998.	undated	EV0142 (also GC23)	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **7, 8,** (19)	Public Domain	
1.304	Excerpts from Child Soldiers Global Report. Detailing how child soldiers were abducted, utilized and rehabilitated. (ERNs 00010574-00010579)	01/05/2001	00010572-00010587	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **5,** (14), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), *ICR* (33; 34)	Public Domain	Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice filed on 14/05/2007
1.316	The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: the protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community.	24/07/1998	Public Document	☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9; 11), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18; 19), **9,** (22), **10,** (23),	Public Domain	
1.330	Return to Freetown. Documentary focusing on the plight of children soldiers in Sierra Leone as peace returns to the country.	undated	EV0107 (also GC16)	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **9,** (22), **10,** (23),	Public Domain	

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
1.361	"The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone", in "African Guerrillas", edited by Christopher Clapham.	01/06/1998	Public Document	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
1.401	Letter from Foday Sankoh to Charles Taylor dated 5th May 1992. Thanks Taylor for the brotherly help he is rendering to Sankoh's liberation struggle. Requests an audience with Taylor to discuss ECOMOG at the borders. I appreciate the five boxes of AK-47 raffle (sic) ammunition and the ten boxes of RPG gun rockets which I should receive from you today.	05/05/1992	00029778-00029779	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	See Annex C.6	
2.046	Photographs taken of killed civilians during the January 1999 Freetown invasion.	01/1999	8 Open Society photos + P0000066 and P0000067	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1**, (5; 8), **2, 3**, (13), **7, 8**, (21)	Public Domain	

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
2.047 (disc 1) 2.047 (disc 2)	Liberia An Uncivil War. Video of the Liberian War by James Brabazon and Jonathan Stack. Brabazon traveled with the LURD. Charles Taylor denies he was involved in the atrocities in Sierra Leone. Includes footage of Taylor's speech where he says he will step down.	26/06/2005	D0000049	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
2.068	28 photos of loose photos seized at White Flower.	undated		☐Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	See Annex C.5	

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
2.074	Soldiers enter Koidu Town and find captured civilians abandoned by rebels. Soldiers interview surrendered rebel commanders in Koidu Town. Rebel commander explains that Foday Sankoh said that after he was released from a prison sentence for taking part in a coup in 1967 in Sierra Leone, he went to Burkina Faso and joined his Sierra Leonean brothers to train and attack the then government of Sierra Leone.	undated	EV0059	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☒Other	**1**, (5), **10**, (23), *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
2.083	Video Footage of interviews at Connaught Hospital. Most of the patients were injured by AFRC/RUF rebels in Kono District following the rebels' retreat from Freetown in February 1998.	undated	EV0125 (also GC17)	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **7, 8,** (19)	Public Domain	

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
2.091	Video footage of interviews at Connaught hospital: This video features footage of a news report by Sierra Leonean journalist Aroun Rashid Deen. Deen speaks to a nurse, several patients and a doctor about the recent arrival of wounded civilians from Kono District.	undated	EV0146 (also GC25)	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5), **7, 8,** (19)	Public Domain	
2.115	Liberia's Response to Allegations of Her Involvement in the Sierra Leone Civil War.	16/01/1999	00028759-00028766	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	See Annex C.5	
2.186	Sierra Leone News Archive for 04-05/05/2000. News reports of the UNAMSIL abductions.	04-05/05/2000	Public Document	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
2.219	Video showing civilians fleeing from the east end of Freetown toward the west from the AFRC/RUF carnage.	undated	EV0155	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **7, 8,** (18; 21)	Public Domain	

14602

ANNEX A TO PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92*BIS* INTENDED TO BE USED DURING OPENING STATEMENT

Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	ERN	Relevance	Indictment	Certified By	Previously Submitted to the Trial Chamber
2.220	Video showing civilians waiting to be conveyed to Connaught Hospital after receiving first aid treatments for gun shot and machete wounds.	undated	EV0157	☐Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other	**1**, (5), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **7, 8,** (18; 21)	Public Domain	
3.060	BBC Focus on Africa, Interview with Sam Bockarie, - Duration: 3'20	14/01/1999	Public Document	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
3.062	DVD containing 10 video clips obtained from Duke University, which received the material from Pippa Scott of the International Monitor Institute (IMI).	Undated	Public Document	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	
3.063	DVD containing 1 video clip obtained from Duke University, which received the material from Pippa Scott of the International Monitor Institute (IMI).	Undated	Public Document	☐Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other	*ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34)	Public Domain	

7973

ANNEX B

00004550 1.020
~~00004551~~ 7914
C.W.

Introduction

Ever since the ECOMOG forces regained control of Sierra Leon's capital Freetown, mid February 1998 reports have come in about serious atrocities being committed by retreating junta forces against the local population. It soon became clear that the scale and nature of the crimes perpetrated served only two purposes: intimidation and humiliation.

It has emerged that perpetrators of these crimes do not discriminate with regard to age, sex, ethnic origin or other criteria in the choice of their victims. In blind rage, they hack off peoples ears, hands and other parts of the body and then send them off with a message to ECOMOG, the President of Sierra Leone or other persons. If they do not die en route, the victims end up in Freetown and Makeni hospital or in a refugee camp in Guinea.

All victims of violence and armed conflict carry with them the indelible memory of their ordeal. What distinguishes the victims of the atrocities committed by the Sierra Leone junta forces from other victims is that they remain, in addition to being mentally affected, physically handicapped for the rest of their lives .

Unable to carry on with their work and dependent on an already burdened nation, the victims of this cruel behaviour demand from the international community that justice be served and that perpetrators of these terrible crimes be apprehended, tried and convicted.

UNHCR by virtue of its mandate and its *accord de siege* with the Government of Guinea has access to all newly arriving asylum seekers on Guinea territory. Information obtained from them may assist in determining their status but also serve as important country of origin information. If, as in the case of the maimed victims, UNHCR staff come across evidence of serious crimes committed against humanity, the public may be notified through the P.I section, and policy makers are advised by means of various speeches made by Senior Executives. It is within the discretionary powers of the High Commissioner to assist the prosecutor of a competent court or tribunal with the evidence assembled. This information sharing may be especially appropriate as victims and witnesses may vanish over time. With these points in mind, the Senior Protection Officer at B.O. Conakry has initiated the preparation of this report. It contains interview reports based on standard questionnaires prepared by field and protection staff as well as medical certificates and digital pictures of registered victims of maiming that have arrived in Guinea since the retreat of junta forces to the diamond rich district of Kono located in Eastern Sierra Leone. In order to protect the confidentiality of the interviewed victims and witnesses, all names have been deleted whilst certain the digital pictures have been adjusted so as to avoid recognition. The original reports that includes names and signatures remains on confidential file with the protection unit of UNHCR.

♂ ♀
stated reason
names officers
languages spoken
state of rebels (high)
commits similar
tribe

August 1998

Assane Samb

Representative

UNHCR B.O. Conakry, Guinea

00004595

7975

CASE # 14

SIERRA LEONE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE - SUMMARY REPORT

1. Name:	******
2. Nationality:	Sierra Leone, Kuranko tribe
3. Sex:	Male
4. Date of birth:	57 years
5. Place of origin:	Dollah village, Koinadugu District,
6. Occupation:	Farmer
7. Date/Place of Attack:	3/5/98 at Dollah
8. Date of arrival:	Monday, maybe 15/5/98
9. Route followed:	Gberefeh, Serekolia, Walia, Songoya, Faranah
10. Accompanied by:	His own and his brother's family (27 people)
11. Physical Condition:	multiple cuts with machete
12. Date and Place of Interview:	2/6/98 at Faranah Hospital
13. Interviewing Officer:	Anne Paludan, Field Officer

Narrative:

Mr. ****** was at home on 3 May when around midnight three men - two armed with machetes and one with a gun - entered his house. The man with the gun tried to knock down Mr. ******, beating him on the spine. The others then began to cut Mr. ****** with machetes, striking him repeatedly on the thigh, the back and the arm. They struck 10 times, but they drew blood only three times. Three people in the house were beaten and cut by the intruders. Out of the 10 people living in the house, seven ran away while the three wounded remained in the house.

The assailants proceeded to capture 15 people, locked them into a house and set fire to the house as well as other houses in town. Mr. ****** escaped with the other captives. Five people in the village were killed, among them the town chief, recognisable from the drum in front of his house used by chiefs to collect the villagers. Mr. ****** estimates that there were around 150 rebels, and he heard them speaking Krio and some Liberian English.

Mr. ****** and many other villagers ran along the road into the bush. They scattered, but they could still hear each other. He was alone in his hideout. He suffered from his festering wounds, and he was hungry with nothing to eat but wild fruits and water from a stream.

After three days he came back to his village, but found it deserted and burned. A group of people passing by brought a message from him to his brother in Serekolia that he was seriously wounded. The brother sent six men from Serekolia to bring him there in a hammock. He stayed five days in Serekolia, then walked five days to Guinea with his own and his brother's family, 27 in all.

00004621

✓ CASE # 22 7976

SIERRA LEONE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE - SUMMARY REPORT

1. Name:	******
2. Nationality:	Sierra Leone
3. Sex:	Male
4. Date of Birth:	12/9/61
5. Place of Origin:	Serekolia
6. Occupation:	Farmer
7. Date/Place of Attack:	22/5/98 at Serekolia
8. Date of Arrival:	23/5/98
9. Route Followed:	Serekolia - Kerifaya - Walia - Dusubalia - Kangomalia - Songoya - Faranah
10. Accompanied by:	Brother-in-law (before capture) and friend [Case #17] (together when captured)
11. Physical Condition:	left hand severed, right hand and ears mutilated (deceased 30/5/98 of tetanus resulting from injuries)
12. Date and Place of Interview:	27/5/98 at Faranah Hospital
13. Interviewing Officer:	Charlotte Rostorf Ridung, Field Officer

Narrative:

Mr. ****** returned to Serekolia on Friday 22 May, 1998 to collect rice. He had escorted his mother and one of his wives to Walia, where he had asked them to wait for him. His other wife was staying in Seramaya, in Guinea.

In Serikolia, Mr. ****** received news that the rebels were only four villages away from Serekolia. After he had received the message, he and his friend, Case # 17, went to the rice field to work. While working in the field, two men passed by. Mr. ****** asked the men for information on the rebels, but they replied that they had no news of them.

According to Mr. ******, the rebels came out of the bush about 40 minutes later and captured Mr. ****** and Case # 17. He estimated that there were about a hundred rebels, composed of both Mende, Temne and Liberians and that they were in military uniforms.

The soldiers tied a rope around his waist and tied his arms behind him. They asked him to lead them to Serekolia. He agreed, was untied and accompanied them to Serekolia. Near the village, they tied him to a tree branch and left him alone for two hours while they attacked Serekolia.

When the rebels returned, they asked him to join them. He says that he accepted, because he feared that they would kill him if he refused. Finally, the rebels said that he could not join them, because they did not trust him.

00004626

CASE # 24

SIERRA LEONE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE - SUMMARY REPORT

1. Name:	******
2. Nationality:	Sierra Leone, Kuranko tribe
3. Sex:	Female
4. Date of Birth:	34 years old
5. Place of Origin:	Mondgobendu, Koinadugu District
6. Occupation:	Farmer
7. Date/Place of Attack:	22/5/98 near Mongobendu
8. Date of Arrival:	end May 1998
9. Route Followed:	Mongbendu, Kandia, Gbangofeh, Songoya
10. Accompanied by:	Husband, son and grandson
11. Physical Condition:	both forearms severely cut with machete, one bone broken
12. Date and Place of Interview:	11/7/98 at Donka Hospital, Conakry
13. Interviewing Officer:	Gregory Mose, Associate Protection Officer

Narrative:

Because there were few supplies in the village of Mongobendu, Ms. ***** and other villagers would periodically go into the bush to search for food. On the morning of 24/4/98 she was walking along a bush path with a group of 10 villagers, CASE 26, Kumba Sesay, CASE 18, CASE 15 , and CASE 22. While searching for food they were accosted by 24 armed men who emerged onto the path on either side of them. Ten of the men were in full military uniform and carried military rifles, while the others wore civilian dress and were armed with knives and machetes. Those in civilian dress also wore red bandannas around their heads - Ms. ***** is illiterate, but she noticed writing on the bandannas and her attackers indicated that the words "Bad Blood" were written there. The assailants spoke Krio to their captives but spoke a variety of languages amongst themselves, including English with what Ms. ***** identifies as a Liberian accent. She also noticed the smell of marijuana and what appeared to have been joints strewn along the path.

The man who appeared to be the leader of the group wore traditional African clothing known as a "ranko," which consists of a coarse cloth sleeveless shirt and pants. She described him as tall and thin, around 20 years old, having a fair complexion, a long face with a goatee, and a pointed nose. She also noticed among the group three young men whom she knew from her village: XXX (age 18), YYY (age 13 or 14), and ZZZ (age 9). The older two of the three boys carried machetes, but the youngest was unarmed. Their participation in the attack was limited to holding people, and Ms. ***** believes that they had been forcibly recruited.

CASE # 29

SIERRA LEONE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE -SUMMARY REPORT

1. Name:	******
2. Nationality:	Sierra Leonean, Kuranko tribe
3. Sex:	Male
4. Date of Birth:	1928
5. Place of Origin:	Seria, Koinadugu District, Northern Province
6. Occupation:	Farmer
7. Date/ Place of Attack:	beginning of April on the way to Siranikoro
8. Date of Arrival :	4 June 1998
9. Route Followed:	Siranikoro - Mongobendu - Songoya - Faranah
10. Accompanied by:	Son ******, and brother-in-law ******.
11. Physical Condition :	Right hand severed between wrist and elbow. Head injured by the back of a gun, causing an open wound that is now healing
12. Date and Place of Interview :	10/6/98 at Faranah Hospital
13. Interviewing Officer :	Charlotte Rostorf Ridung, Field Officer

Narrative:

Mr. ****** was living in Seria where the rebels were present. They were looting property, but otherwise not doing any harm to the civilian population. An ECOMOG detachment was based at Mongobendu, six miles away.

ECOMOG sent a message to Seria that people not supporting the rebels should leave town. If not, they would risk being killed. ECOMOG wished to warn the local population. Mr. ****** was afraid of an attack against the rebels by ECOMOG. Most people from Seria left town.

In April 1998 while on his way to Siranikoro, Mr ****** was attacked by the rebels. They were hiding on both sides of the road by a stream called Forngbo.

He was accompanied by his five year old son, and a man unknown to him. His son and the other man managed to escape the rebels as the two of them were walking behind Mr. ******.

About fifteen rebels attacked him. They were all unknown to him. It was a mixture of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians. They spoke Krio and Liberian languages. He did not know which fation they belonged to. Some of them wore uniforms, some wore civilian clothes. He cannot explain why the rebels attacked him.

The rebels tied him up with his elbows at the back. They hit him with the butt of a gun, thus causing an open wound on his head. Afterwards, they leaned him against a big tree and severed his right hand with a cutlass. He has asked them not to cut his right hand as he used this hand for work. They replied that he was lucky, pointing at a dead man lying on the

Sierra Leone - UNHC: 16-30.Apr.98

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 6 May 1998 15:24:22 +0200
From:Hazan.Gahigi@DHA.UNICC.ORG
To: OCHA.Standard.List.Africa@DHA.UNICC.ORG, ComEmerg..-.Main@DHA.UNICC.ORG,
ComEmerg..5f.-.Sierra.Leone@DHA.UNICC.ORG
Subject: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 16-30 April'98

SIERRA LEONE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT
Period covered: 16-30 April 1998

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea

SECURITY
1. ECOMOG has continued to prosecute the war against junta and RUF forces in Kono and Kailahun districts with mixed results. Although ECOMOG forces are now in control of the towns of Daru, Pendembu and Koindu, junta forces still occupy large areas in the four chiefdoms in the Eastern part of Kailahun district. Casualties on both sides have been heavy. Some RUF have moved from Kono district towards the North-East and have perpetrated several attacks near the towns of Kamakwie, Batkanu and Makeni. Looting and amputations are widespread.

2. ECOMOG spokesmen have alleged that RUF fighters are being trained at a camp in Lofa county in Northern Liberia. The Liberian Government has rejected these allegations. ECOMOG Force Commander in Sierra Leone, Col. Khobe, also stated in a radio interview that there was evidence that former NPFL and ULIMO-K fighters were crossing from Liberia into Sierra Leone to assist the activities of the RUF.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
3. President Kabbah has announced that Col. Khobe, ECOMOG's Force Commander in Sierra Leone, will act as his chief security adviser. Col. Khobe will be responsible for Sierra Leone's national security system and for creating a professional army. He will report directly to the President who is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. All the nominations for cabinet posts have been approved by Parliament and sworn into office.

4. The Attorney-General and Minister of Justice have requested the Managing Directors of four banks to freeze 93 accounts operated by deportees and businessmen who owe the State income tax and other sources of revenue. This request is intended to curb business malpactices.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
5. The intensification of the fighting between ECOMOG and junta / RUF forces in the East of Sierra Leone is creating a severe humanitarian situation. The most recent reports indicate a new influx of 54,000 Sierra Leoneans into Vahun, Liberia and 90,000 into Guinea since the start of the recent ECOMOG offensive against the AFRC/RUF in Kono and Kailahun districts. Many of the Sierra Leonean refugees are reportedly suffering from a combination of malaria, respiratory disease, diarrhoea and malnutrition. UNHCR is organising transport for the refugees from Vahun, which is only 8 miles from the Sierra Leone border, to Kolahun, thus enabling the refugees to benefit from increased access to relief services and improved security. Preparations are already underway for the arrival of

1.042

7980

Stage II Kono production

Date	recieved	From	No. of Pieces	Caratage	Percentage	Colo
02-03-99	Mohamed	S. Conteh	3	1	05 %	Mi
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai	Foday	1	—	34 %	Whit
✓ ✓ —	Komba	Buah	2	—	05 %	Mix
03-08-99	Kai	Foday	3	1	24 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba	Buah	5	—	72 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed	S. Conteh	5	2	04 %	"
04-08-99	Kai	Foday	1	—	15 %	Whi
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba	Buah	3	—	95 %	Mi
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed	S. Conteh	1	1	36 %	Wh
✓ ✓ ✓	✓	✓ ✓	10	3	28 %	Mi
05-08-99	Mohamed	S. Conteh	1	9	74 %	Whi
✓ ✓ ✓	✓	✓ ✓	16	5	65 %	Mi
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba	Buah	1	—	04 %	indus
07-08-99	Mohamed	S. Conteh	1	1	19 %	Whi
✓ ✓ ✓	✓	✓ ✓	18	4	60 %	Mi
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba	Buah	4	—	50 %	I
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai	Foday	2	—	33 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam	Bockarie	1	—	42 %	Wh
	Ground total of diamonds = 78 pieces ✓					
7-3-99	Ground garatage of Whites = 26 garat 95 %					
	Ground garatage of industrial = 7 garat 17 %					

00007852

Stage 1d Kono Production 7981

Date	recieved from	No of Pieces	Garatage	Percentage	Color
08-08-99	Mohamed S Conteh	7	3	36 %	White
08-08-99	Saidu Sam (Tefeya production)	1	1	52 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	47 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	2	70 %	industrial
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	14	5	80 %	Mix
	Tefeya total and garatage =	17	11	49 %	
	" " Gold weighed		8 GM		
09-08-99	Komba Buah	2	—	13 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S Conteh	1	3	—	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	28 %	industrial
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	13	2	72 %	Mix
10-08-99	Mohamed S Conteh	15	8	54 %	Mix
11-08-99	Sam Bockarie	1	—	46 %	orange
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S Conteh	1	2	80 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	11	4	20 %	Mix
12-08-99	Mohamed S Conteh	9	2	40 %	"
14-08-99	Mohamed S Conteh	1	3	28 %	Coffee
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	9	3	85 %	Mix

00007853

7982

Date	recieved From	No: of Pieces	Caratage	Percentage	Colo
16-08-99	Sam Bockorie	1	—	14 %	Whit
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	7	—	indus
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	3	74 %	orang
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	2	62 %	Whit
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	10	4	—	"
18-08-99	Sam Bockorie	2	—	88 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	8	1	95 %	M
19-08-99	Tamba Konoboy	1	4	15 %	Wh
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	5	1	75 %	Mi
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	3	05 %	indust
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	11	3	05 %	Mi
21-08-99	Tamba Konoboy	4	—	90 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	2	—	40 %	"
23-08-99	Tamba Konoboy	6	1	60 %	"
24-08-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	—	42 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Tamba Konoboy	5	—	80 %	Mi
25-08-99	Sam Bockorie	3	—	78 %	Whit
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	2	—	88 %	"
26-08-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	—	28 %	indust
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockorie	4	—	75 %	Mix
28-08-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	—	27 %	oran

00007854

7983

Date	Received From	No. of Pieces	Boratage	Percentage	Color
30-08-99	Sam Bockarie	1	—	05%	industrial
31-08-99	Sam Bockarie	1	—	13%	White
〃 〃 〃	Mohamed S. Conteh	3	1	05%	Mix
01-09-99	Mohamed S. Conteh	3	—	46%	〃
02-09-99	Mohamed S. Conteh	3	—	76%	〃
04-09-99	Sam Bockarie	3	—	20%	〃
07-09-99	Kai Foday	1	—	05%	White
〃 〃 〃	Mohamed S. Conteh	1	3	40%	〃
〃 〃 〃	〃 〃 〃	1	1	38%	〃
〃 〃 〃	〃 〃 〃	10	2	58%	Mix
〃 〃 〃	Tamba Koroboy	1	6	70%	White
〃 〃 〃	〃 〃	1	5	42%	〃
〃 〃 〃	〃 〃	1	3	26%	orang
〃 〃 〃	〃 〃	23	7	32%	Mix

Ground total and boratage of White = 81 pieces 54 grat 78

8-9-99 total and weight of Colored and industrials = 131 pieces = 66.6

Ground total of diamond = 212 pieces

Ground total weight of Gold = 8 gram

00007855

Stage 13 Koro production 7984

Date	recieved From	No. of Pieces	Carotage	Percentage	Colo-
08-09-99	Kai Foday	4	—	88 %	Mix
〃 〃 〃	Tamba Konoboy	5	—	76 %	〃
〃 〃 〃	Mohamed S Conteh	11	2	20 %	〃
09-09-99	Tamba Konoboy	3	—	92 %	〃
〃 〃 〃	Kai Foday	2	—	30 %	〃
〃 〃 〃	Mohamed S Conteh	14	3	55 %	〃
10-09-99	~~Tamba Konoboy~~	~~3~~	~~—~~	~~50~~	
11-09-99	founding diomond	1	—	08 %	Whi
〃 〃 〃	Kai Foday	1	—	05 %	Coffe
〃 〃 〃	Tamba Konoboy	3	—	50 %	Mix
〃 〃 〃	Mohamed S Conteh	12	4	06 %	〃
13-09-99	Tamba Konoboy	3	—	35 %	Whi
〃 〃 〃	Mohamed S Conteh	11	5	95 %	Mix
14-09-99	Kai Foday	4	4	58 %	〃
〃 〃 〃	Mohamed S Conteh	1	1	52 %	Whi
〃 〃 〃	〃 〃 〃	10	2	30 %	Mi
〃 〃 〃		1	—	22 %	Coffe
15-09-99	Tamba Konoboy	7	1	—	Mix
〃 〃 〃	Kai Foday	1	—	22 %	indust
〃 〃 〃	Mohamed S Conteh	9	2	75 %	Mi

00007856

7985

Date	recieved From	No. of Pieces	Carat	Percentage	Colo
16-09-99	Tamba Konobay	1	4	27%	orang
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	2	—	26%	indust
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	1	—	08%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	1	8	15%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	3	1	02%	Mix
18-9-99	Mohamed S Conteh	6	1	78%	Whit
20-9-99	Sam Bockarie	1	2	96%	Whit
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S Conteh	4	2	34%	Mix
21-9-99	Kai Foday	2	—	25%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S Conteh	5	1	60%	"
22-9-99	Mohamed S Conteh	2	—	20%	"
23-9-99	Mohamed S. Conteh	3	—	80%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	10	40%	oran
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	1	—	15%	"
25-9-99	Mohamed S Conteh	1	—	10%	Whi
27-9-99	Sam Bockarie	1	1	08%	"
28-9-99	Sam Bockarie	1	0	24%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S Conteh	1	—	75%	"
29-9-99	Mohamed S Conteh	4	1	40%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	3	—	75%	Mi

00007857

7986

Date	recieved from	No of Pieces	Garatage	Percentage	Cola
30-9-99	Kai Foday	1	—	40 %	Coffe
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S Conteh	3	1	20 %	Mix
02-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	7	1	68 %	"
04-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	5	3	12 %	"
05-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	3	—	52 %	indust
06-10-99	Sam Bockarie	1	5	75 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	1	—	06 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S Conteh	3	—	68 %	Mix
07-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	8	3	75 %	"
09-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	2	—	90 %	indust
11-10-99	Ground total and garatage of diamond				
	5 pieces of Whites and total garatage = 19 : 40 %				
	2 pieces of Orange and total garatage = 14 : 72 %				
	14 pices of Whites and total garatage = 8 : 10 %				
	162 pieces of industrials and total garatage = 61 : 40 %				
11-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	4	2	11 %	Mix
12-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	1	—	28 %	indust
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	—	34 %	"
13-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	2	—	64 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	—	15 .	"

00007858

7987

Date	recieved From	No of Pieces	Carratage	Percent	Color
14-10-99	Sam Bockarie	1	5	33%	Coffee
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	1	—	25%	industrial
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	1	2	20%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	7	2	33%	Mix
16-10-99	Ground total of diamond = 14 pieces				
	Ground total garatage = 13 Carat 63% ind.				

Stage 14 Kono Production

Date	recieved From	No of Pieces	Garatage	Percentage	Color
16-10-99	Mohamed S. Conteh	2	1	—	industrial
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	2	—	30%	"
18-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	7	6	28%	"
11-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	1	3	45%	White
✓ ✓ —	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	20%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	4	2	55%	industrial
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	—	25%	"
20-10-99	Mohamed S Conteh	1	1	20%	White
✓ ✓ —	✓ ✓ ✓	3	2	70%	Mix
✓ ✓ —	Sam Bockarie	1	—	60%	Coffee
21-10-99	Mohamed S. Conteh	1	—	23%	industrial
23-10-99	Mohamed S. Conteh	3	1	03%	"
28-10-99	Sam Bockarie	1	—	10	"

00007859

7988

Date	recieved From	No of Pieces	Garat	Percentage	Col.
02-11-99	Combatant 2nd Bde	6	1	40%	industr
02-11-99	Sam Bockarie	2	—	45%	"
08-11-99	Steven Monyah	1	1	10%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	3	—	50%	industr
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	—	30%	"
09-11-99	Steven Monyah	5	1	70%	"
10-11-99	Steven Monyah	1	1	40%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	5	3	80%	industr
11-11-99	Steven Monyah	4	—	50%	"

16/11/99 Ground total and weight of diamonds
14 pieces of Whites weighed 17 garats 87%

36 pieces of industrials weighed 12 garats 95%

Stage 15 Kono production

Date	No of Pieces	Garatage	Percentage	Colour
28/12/99	12 pieces	4	20%	Mix
29/12/99	6	3	54%	"
30-12-99	10	5	04%	"
31-12-99	22	17	54%	"
1-1-2000	16	5	25%	"

00007860

7989

Date	No. of Pieces	Garage	Percentage	Colo
02-01-2000	11 pieces	4	07 %	Mix
03-01-2000	18	17	42 %	"
04-01-2000	36	19	97 %	"
" " "	1	3	70 %	Whi
05-01-2000	20	10	45 %	Mix
" " "	1	14	66 %	Whi
06-01-2000	7	3	45 %	Mix
07-01-2000	9	3	60 %	"
09-01-2000	6	1	80 %	"
10-01-2000	3	1	08 %	indust
" " "	1	1	61 %	Whi
" " "	1	14	85 %	indust
11-01-2000	1	7	93 %	Whi
" " "	15	4	28 %	Mix

00007861



7990

		No. of Pieces (Diamond)	Gram
8-99	8-8-99	1562	8 Gram
9-8-99	15-09-99	301	
16-09-99	30-09-99	48	
02-10-99	28-10-99	17	
03-11-99	10-11-99	08	
28-12-99	31-12-99	32	
1-1-2000	11-1-2000	116	
		2134	

00007862

7991 1.049

TO:- THE LEADER FROM:- MR KOMBA GBUNDEMA D/ 10TH JAN 2000 1540HRS

SIR

BE INFORMED THAT WE INTERCEPTED SOME GUINEAN TROOPS (ECOMOG) YESTERDAY. ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY WERE HEADING FOR MILE 91 AND BO AND THEY WERE TRAVELLING ~~WITH~~ WITH THREE (3) AMOURED CARS, FIVE (5) TRUCKS AND LARGE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND AMMUNATIONS. WE ARRESTED THE THREE (3) AMMOURED CARS AND THE THREE (3) TRUCKS, ONE TRUCK LOADED WITH AMMO OF ALL SORTS. WE LATER RELEASED TWO (2) TRUCKS WITH ALL THE GUINEAN CONTIGENTS BACK ON THEIR BASE. FURTHER MORE, WE GOT ANOTHER INFO THAT ANOTHER GROUP OF GUINEAN TROOPS UNDER UNITED NATION ARRIVED YESTERDAY WITH TWO (2) TANKS TO REPLACE THE SAID CONTIGENT THAT WERE HEADING FOR BO AND MILE 91 BUT WE LATER UNDER STOOD THAT THEY HAVE RETURNED BACK TO GUINEA AFTER RECIEVING THE INFO ABOUT THEIR MEN BEEN INTERCEPTED BY OUR MEN. DETAILS WILL FOLLOW LATER SIR. ACCEPT THIS FOR YOUR INFO.

00008779

BEST REGARDS

TO:- SMILE FROM- GEN IBRAHIM. DATE- 12TH JAN 2000. 1540HRS

SIR,

WE ARE LEAVING FOR MONROVIA TODAY AS ALL OUR PROVISIONS HAVE FINISHED. WE ARE NOT DOING ANYTHING FOR NOW. THE LONGER ~~WE~~ WE DELAY FOR NOW, THE MORE WE ACCUMLATE LOSSES. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED ALL THE PROBLEMS AND WE KNOW ALL THE NEEDS TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS. SO WE ARE LEAVING TODAY TO SEE HOW TO PROVIDE THEM NOW. ALSO SIR, WE HAVE TO SEE OUR FAMILIES URGENTLY TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS AT HOME. SIR, ADVISE ON THE PRODUCTION WE HAVE HERE WITH US NOW. WE WILL GIVE YOU EXCELLENT INFO WHEN WE HAVE ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION. WE ARE ALSO PLEADING TO YOU TO INFO MONROVIA TO PICK US AT THE BORDER TODAY OR LATEST TOMORROW TO SPEED UP OUR MOVEMENT. SIR WE ARE AWAITING YOUR RESPONSE.

BEST REGARDS.

1.052
7992

FM. SMILE

TO. SURVIVAL

SUB. DIRECTIVE DATE 22/12/99

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO WARN ALL SOLDIERS NOT FOR THEM TO TOUCH ANY OF THE LIBERIAN BROTHERS WHO ARE COMING TOGETHER WITH GEN. IBRAHIM AND OTHERS ☺ THEY ARE OUR BROTHERS

WE ARE NOT TO REVENGE FOR ANY REASON ☺

SAMSON AND OTHERS ARE COMING WITH GEN IBRAHIM AND THEY SHOULD BE WELL TREATED.

TREAT THE ABOVE WITH CARE ☺

FRM REGARDS.

00008881

TRANSMITTED FOUR 16 HRS

SIGNED [illegible] 22/12/99

FM. SMILE

TO. ALL SUNRAYS

SUB. DIRECTIVE DATE. 25/12/99

BY MY DIRECTIVE, ALL OPS AREA ARE TO SUSPEND THE OPERATION OF ECOMOG AND UNAMSIL WITHIN THEIR AREA UNTILL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS

THE LOME DOCUMENT WHICH WAS SIGNED EARLY JULY ? NEEDS TO BE PROPERLY INTERPRETED OR ELSE, THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER DISARMAMENTS

STRUCTURES LAID DOWN FOR THE DDR PROGRAMME MUST BE MET WITH BEFORE DISARMAMENTS

REMEMBER THAT THE LOME DOCUMENT WHICH WAS SIGNED IS TO GIVE PEACE TO OUR PEOPLE! AT ANY RATE OF MERIT, PEACE MUST PUT NOT THE RUF TO BE DESTITUTES OR VICTIMS OF PEACE ☺

FRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 03 15 HRS

1.053
00009476 7993

STATEMENT BY CPL. FODAY SAYBANA SANKOH, LEADER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT

"My brothers and sisters, this is Cpl. Foday Sankoh speaking to you. I feel delighted that I have been given this opportunity to talk to you at this time when we all gather to search for peace in our country.

I want to reaffirm our continuous commitment to work towards genuine and lasting peace in Sierra Leone with the possibility of making any necessary adjustment to reflect prevailing circumstances.

You will recall, my sisters and brothers since my detention in Nigeria in 1997-1998 and also being convicted of treason with a pending appeal, much has taken place in my absence, not least of which is the 6th of January invasion (attack) of Freetown by the Rebels. Like all decent Sierra Leoneans I deplore their actions in the strongest possible terms.

In the last few months I have seen noticeable emphasis on the diplomatic option which I very much welcome in reaching a negotiated settlement to the war in Sierra Leone. I hope the conference will listen to the civil society organizations to what they have to say to you because they are my concern as the

masses of Sierra Leone to be paramount and should benefit from this peace as the RUF/SL is ready to give peace a chance once and for all.

President Kabbah and I have had several meetings. From discussions with him I have come to know him as a gentleman and that he is genuine, sincere and committed to peace and development in Sierra Leone. His strive for peace cannot be achieved if we do not cooperate with him.

I now join His Excellency the President and all of you as we put our thoughts together to find lasting peace for this nation. In the same vain I want to relay to some of you who may have interests in our revolution and to my sisters and brothers that we must see reason to turn our energy to bringing peace in our land.

I know that some of you will think that this is coming too late but I want you to know that I am genuinely sorry for all the pain and grief that my revolution has caused you and let us now put all our hurt behind us and forge ahead as we catch up with other developing countries.

I thank you all and may God help us.

Issa Sankoh
Leader RUF/SL

1.058

1995

REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S ARM
OF S/LEONE

00009672

TO : THE LEADER.
FROM : THE BLACK REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS
SUBT : SITUATION REPORT

Sir, on behalf of the entire Black Guard uni
se are hereby taking this opportunity to make a
ummary report to let you know or understand the
ituation on the ground.

To start with, we thank the Almighty God as
er your previous concentization programmes to
he entire movement that this is a Holy war which
verybody within the movement have realised, because
n your absent the struggle continues with lot of
levelopments.

Sir, as you left us in 1996 to go and sign the
bidjan accord, lot of enemy pressure (sanajoh)
as mounted on us, but due to the dedication and
oyalty of the Command you left on the ground, we
ere abled to contain situation untill the A.F.R.C
our'de fat, wherein you instructed the High-Commar
or us (R.U.F) to join the brothers inother to for
he people's Army, and defend the soverignty of our
other land.

The external delagates who were with you in
bidjan also went over the media that they have
pple the leadership of the R.U.F, and were to
extend of insighting people, but due to the
witness and the security experience of the High

Command, we were able to trick them to come on the ground for us to work out all necessary modalities. They came through the Guinea/Sierra Leone boarder (Nongowa Ferry) and were finally arrested by us and brought on the ground in a lock'd up.

Furthermore, when we join the brothers some of our senior officers and elders were given ministerial positions in the A.F.R.C Government. All the same things were not working well with the R.U.F members in which the High Command even decided to leave the city Freetown and decided to base in the provinces. Things were not put in a proper shape as the so called Honourables were just doing things as they like. There was no proper Command and control until ECOMOG decided to make a final strike into Freetown, in which they succeeded in driving the entire A.F.R.C from the city.

When Freetown fell in the hands of ECOMOG, High Command therefore decided at once without any delayance as there was no command and control to move straight to our original base (Kailahun) and position the R.U.F Combatants to the old former 1991 defensive points, which were KAILAHUN, BONBOHUN and JOJOIMA. These positions were seriously defended untill when the ECOMOG advance to Kenema and Daru. From then, the forces had tried there level best to penetrate

the defensive position, but no chance had being given to them. In the North, the enemies captured Makeni and tried to advance to Kono. Our men retreated and defended part of Kono.

Due to the security situation, the High-Comm and therefore instructed the then B.G.E Brigadier Issah Sesay to try by all means to report with the former A.F.R.C Chairman J.P.K to Bailahun. As a result, J.P.K ~~was~~ and his body guards were brought to Bailahun as per instruction. They were welcome by the High-Command and elders. Six, at this stage, the High-Command, J.P.K, Senior officers, Junior Officers and the entire Combatants held a forum and finally agreed to continue the struggle under one structure and Command.

Immediately Freetown and the provincial Headquarters fell in the hands of ECOMOG, the High-Command was Call to report by the president of Liberia HE Charles Taylor wherein the president seriously briefed the High-Command and gave him the confidence, that he should not give up but to keep up the struggle and uphold the Revolution until the Leader returns. The president gave full assurance to the High-Command and promise to give his maximum support to the R.U.F. The president also took an oath that he will never betray his brother (late Foday Sankoh). From that point the president gave huge quantity of logistics (Ammunition)

to the High-Command for us to start repelling the ECOMOG advancement or to contain situation.

10 this development, when the High-Command returned from Liberia, he briefed J.P.K pertaining to the latest development, and met him personally to give a helping hands with diamonds or any foreign currency he had brought from Freetown for him to impress president Taylor.

As a result, J.P.K denied bitterly that he had brought no diamond with him whereas the High command had gathered informations that J.P.K has brought lots of diamond with him, but he wants to keep it on his own without financing the movement as we are now under one umbrella.

Therefore, the High-Command gave instruction to Brigadier Issah Sesay and Brigadier Mike Lamin for them to properly search J.P.K for diamond. After the searching lots or large quantity of diamonds was taken from J.P.K and his body guards. Later the parcels of diamond was given to Mr Ibrahim (General) and sister Memuna for them to travel with the parcels directly to president Taylor.

10 this development, the High Command was able to recieve the first satellite phone from General Ibrahim which he was use to do some important Contacts with.

After General Ibrahim returned back to Burkina-faso, the High Command also received a good caraiage of diamond from Kono. He also plan to

Send another good parcel to General Ibrahim in Burkina-faso for Ammunition and Arms as he had started making some important Contacts for material.

The High Command therefore decided to hand-over the said parcel of diamond to the B.G.C Brigadier Issah Sesay inother for him to pass through Monrovia and make his way to Burkina-faso and meet General Ibrahim to work out fast modalities to get some needed materials for us.

Brigadier Issuh Sesay left the base and travel along with Col Jungle and some Liberia securities to Monrovia. He did not make his way through as he only stop in Monrovia, and Information was later recieved by the High-Command that the parcel of diamond has droped from Brigadier Issah He therefore return on base and gave the same report to the High-Command.

The joint security therefore ~~took~~ investigated the B.G.C and took statement from him.

Later a forum was held pertaining this issue, and the senior officers and elders suggested to suspend the issue untill the arrival of the Leader.

Moreso, President Taylor Continues to give helping hands with logistics which involves food stuff and materials. The High Command was to come every month to report to Monrovia for briefing.

The High Command later called Brigadier Gen Denis Mingle (Superman) on a forum for a mission to be carried-out to capture the whole

8000

00009677

of Kono. They came up with an agreement to apply some guerilla tactics to overun the strategic positions in Kono district. A plan was drawn, but superman never went with the plan and the mission fail without capturing Kono and over thirty (30) M.I.A on our side. and also K.I.A.

After this said mission, superman was able to put some man-power together and proceeded to Kabala axis and created a jungle there.

In sept 1998 the High Command called a Vanguared forum. He addressed the forum, and made all the vanguards to understand that they should tighten-up their belts and officiate themselves as Vanguards of this Revolution. Also as to how best they should operate to promote the good image of the struggle. In this forum the High Command tried to constructively criticize the way superman is behaving. The High Command made superman available over the communication for a dialogue in their dialogue. He criticize superman for putting a Lebanese woman behind him which is delaying the operation. Infact to this, the High Command therefore instructed superman to report for a better plan-up, but he responded that he will not report to the call from that point. superman started operating on his own

without taking any instruction or Orders from the high Desk.

In october, the High-Command was again call by president Taylor. We therefore went along with him to Monrovia. The High Command was instructed by president Taylor to move to Burkina Faso and meet with the Burkina President.

The High-Command, the War Council chairman and one S.L.A representative Col Eddy Sankoh took the trip to Burkinafaso. They met president Blaise Campoare, and they were highly welcome. They took two weeks in Burkinafaso. They were given words of confidence and assurance by president Blaise that he will not let Col Eddy Sankoh down atall. The president told the High-Command to be very hard in Command to withhold the movement until the arrival of the leader. Infact he instructed the High Command to forward the R.U.F Issue to the O.A.U as he is the current O.A.U Chairman.

On their return, they were given huge quantity of materials for serious offensive to start a Campaign for the release of our leader. The delegation return back to monrovia in November. The delegation return back to base and held an immediate forum for a serious offensive to commense.

All the Combatants were happy and agree to start the operation in Capturing Kono. The said operation —

was given to the B.F.C Bridgadier Issa Sesay. huge quantity of material was given to the B.F.C and he immediately left for Kono. They also held a forum in Kono and succeeded in overunning the entire Kono district and capture some artillary weapons and huge quantity of Arms and Ammunition. The whole operation was therefore given to the Late Col Rambo who further extended the operation to Tonkolili and advance to Makeni. After the fall of Makeni, the Late Col as per instruction went and recieve Bridgadier Superman to join the operation.

They therefore extended the operation to port-loko as far as Waterloo and Kambia axis.

Furthermore, Col Rambo also tried his level best to link up with the other brothers that entered Freetown, but the Freetown operation was not Co-ordinated as the said Commander Black-Jah was not going by the instruction from the High Command. When they retreated from Freetown, the B.F.C met them and told them to present a Comprehensive report pertaining the whole Freetown operation, but they deliberately fail to do so.

According to the Black Guards security information, they brought some diamonds and lot of foreign currency from Freetown, but they never presented anything to the High-Command.

The late Col Rambo even arrested six hundred

thousand (600,000) U.S dollars from some of the men from Freetown, and presented the said sum to the B.F.C Bridgadier Issa, and also some diamond.

Again there was instruction from the High Desk for Lt Col Gibril Massaqoi to report for important enquiry and briefing, but he refuse the call for over four (4) good times.

As a result, there was an instruction from the High Command to the B.F.C for Lt Col Gibril Massaqoi to be arrested and turn over.

The B.F.C further went along with the Late Col Rambo and some Black guards as per instruction to arrest Lt Col Gibril and Maj Nya.

During this process, superman and his men put on stiff resistance and even open fire and launch some R.P.G Bombs, therefore scatter the whole group and killed some men and went to the extend of advancing to makeni and attack the residence of the B.F.C and vandalize the whole compound and took every thing in the compound including the materials for operation and enough foreign currency and diamond. He even extended in raising the compounds of some other senior officers.

After some days, he came for the second time and attack Makeni and killed Col Rambo with some security personnels, fire some people and but they missed to kill the B.F.C and chase him all the way to masali and missed him there.

8004

00009681

the second time.

According to security findings, most of the senior officers can not give any advice or try to contain that situation. Instead they keep on insighting to spark the situation.

According to Superman, he has vowed not to ever take command from the High Command.

In regards to the mining process, it is only recently that the authorities has given the go ahead for mining to be going on. Lt Col Kennedy is the overall mining Commander. They have being getting some small small pieces which is in our big record book.

Another development is that one business man from Cuba by the name of Carlos offered [illegible] movement one F.M radio station, and the station itself has being built up a hill in Dodo Kotima.

Also in ~~Decem~~ January, the High Command organise an operation for ~~the~~ seghewma to be captured inother to cut the supply between Daru Barracks and Kenema. The said operation went on smoothly, but unfortunately fail to capture. We in fact left another operation at hand to attack Kenema.

In Conclusion Sir, we are hereby suggesting that the issue of Superman should immediately be put under control before he try to mislead some of our struggle brothers.

Faithfully Submitted — Your Revolutionary Guards R.U.F S/L

SLBS TRANSCRIPTIONS

SLBS Radio, 29 May, 15:26 GMT

[Proclamation issued by the Administration of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Proclamation 1997, in Freetown on 28 May 1997] Proclamation to make provisions for the interim administration of the Republic of Sierra Leone by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council [AFRC] -- its establishment, [words indistinct] and for other matters connected therewith.

Whereas it is a fundamental duty of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone to secure and maintain the safety of the state and public order, and whereas the action and utterances of the (?ousted government), political parties and their leaders have created conditions which can lead to tribal faction, bloodshed, and tribal warfare, and whereas it is necessary and expedient to avert immediately that trend of affairs and for provisions to be made for the maintenance of law and order in Sierra Leone, [words indistinct] administration by law of the state of Sierra Leone, [words indistinct]; We, the members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in cooperation with the people of Sierra Leone, in order to ensure the maintenance of law and order, domestic tranquility, the enjoyment of the blessings of liberty, unity, and democracy for the people of Sierra Leone and all persons living therein, we hereby proclaim as follows:

Constitution of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council -- There is hereby established a council to be known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council carrying out [words indistinct]. The council shall be (?chaired) by a chairman and a deputy chairman and other members of the [words indistinct] and secretary general shall be appointed by the council and shall uphold the functions [words indistinct] the council will determine. The council [words indistinct] provisions of the Constitution [words indistinct] 1991. All the provisions of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 which came into operation on 30 October (?1996) which are inconsistent or in conflict with this proclamation or any law made thereafter shall be deemed to have been suspended as from 25 May 1997. Without [words indistinct] the generality of [words indistinct] the permanent [words indistinct] under the said constitution [words indistinct] 25 May 1997 is dissolved. All political parties are dissolved and membership in political parties is prohibited with effect from 25 May 1997.

(?Decree To Empower Council To Make Law) [subhead]

1. The Council shall have power as [words indistinct] and in the national interest to make laws which shall be known as decrees.

2. Any decree made by the Council may be amended, repealed or [words indistinct] made by the Council.

3. Every decree made by the Council shall be deemed to be an act as defined in Section III of the Interpretation Act, 1971.

4. Any decree made by the Council shall be signed by the chairman or, in the absence of the chairman, by the deputy chairman of the Council.

5. Subject to any decree made by the Council, all or enactments in force in Sierra Leone immediately [words indistinct] 25 May 1997 shall continue in force, provided that any enactment in force in Sierra Leone immediately before the 25 May 1997, which is inconsistent or in conflict with any provisions of this proclamation or any [words indistinct] made thereunder shall be deemed to have been suspended as from the 25 May 1997.

Publication and (?implementation) of Decree: Every decree made by the Council will be published in the gazette and shall come into operation on the date of such publication or on such other date as may be provided in or under the decree or in any public enactment.

6. Subject to any decree made by the Council, the public service of Sierra Leone as it existed immediately before the 25 May 1997 shall continue in existence, and any person holding or acting in any office in the public service immediately before that date shall continue in office subject to any decree or other enactments in force after that date.

7. Subject to any decree made by the Council, any reference to president, vice president, minister or prime minister in the constitution of Sierra Leone which came into operation on 1 October 1991 or in any enactment, continues in existence by virtue of this proclamation, shall, on and after 25 May 1997, be considered as a reference to the Council or such authority as the Council may by order appoint. [words indistinct] the Council may, while it considers it necessary to appoint [words indistinct] make an order against any person [words indistinct] made thereunder shall be deemed to have been suspended as from the 25 May 1997. Any order made under [words indistinct] directing that any person be detained shall not be [words indistinct] without prejudice to the generality of [words indistinct] accordingly.

Power to Amend or Repeal the Proclamation: The Council shall have power to amend, repeal, or suspend this proclamation or [words indistinct]. This proclamation shall [words indistinct] operation on the 25 May 1997.

Made in Freetown on 28 May 1997.
Major Johnny Paul Koroma [word indistinct] on behalf of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone.

1.064

RUF SPEECH TO THE NATION

00009769 8067

Fellow Countrymen,

For the past six years or so, we have been living in an environment of hatred and divisiveness. We looked at our brothers and killed them in cold blood, we removed our sisters from their hiding places to undo their femininity, we slaughtered our mothers and butchered our fathers. It was really a gruesome experience which has left a terrible landmark in our history.

But the atrocities that occurred must not be taken in the context of a personal vendetta. They were the result of the rottenness of a system which could not be uprooted except by brutal means. We did not take to the bush because we wanted to be barbarians, not because we wanted to be inhuman, but because we wanted to state our humanhood to a society that looked at us as sub-humans. The APC had spread its tentacles in our society so deep that had the RUF not emerged, we wonder if we would not have still been under the yoke of that wretched regime.

In the process of cleaning the system, however, we have wronged the great majority of our countrymen. We have sinned both in the sight of man and of God. We therefore openly and publicly apologize to you, our Sierra Leonean brothers and sisters, for all the terror and the mayhem we unleashed on you in our bid to make Sierra Leone a country that all Sierra Leoneans would be proud of.

Today, we have rejoined you. We have come back as prodigal sons, brothers and sisters, to meet our families in our different homes, so that we all can sit in our houses in peace and tell tales to our young ones of how Sierra Leone was once cleansed of the mess that unpatriotic politicians brought to her in yonder years. Let the farmers take their tools and go to their farms in peace, let the young women go to the stream and swim in peace, let them sing to their loved ones under the moonshine in peace, let Sierra Leoneans walk in peace, let us talk in peace, let us travel in peace, and just let us live in peace. We have finally discovered the right atmosphere for a peaceful coexistence. We must accommodate each other if we want to live in peace, and that is the miracle that has occurred in Sierra Leone through the coming of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). We have accepted to join forces with this government because it is the first to demonstrate a genuine feeling of brotherhood for us - it is the government that has seen us as Sierra Leoneans who came together to stand for a cause for the general good. We want to assure everybody that we are sincerely and genuinely committed to the maintenance and sustenance of this miraculously achieved long-awaited peace. We have not come to terrorize you, our brothers and sisters, we have come to embrace you in love and harmony. Our members are not

involved in the recent spate of armed attacks on residents of Freetown. No RUF member has so far been caught looting or behaving in any indisciplinary manner. Perhaps what has delayed the wholesome practicality of this long-cherished peace is this threat of a Nigerian invasion. But the moment that chapter is closed, we are prepared to disarm and melt into the civilian populace and the regular army, because we are fully convinced that the foundation for lasting peace and true democracy has been laid.

We have all along been most willing to end this crisis peacefully, but the past governments proved insincere and unfaithful to their words. The NPRC did not come with the desired reformation, and the SLPP made mockery of the Abidjan Peace Accord. Instead of integrating us into the society as promised, the SLPP only tried to bring divisiveness in our camp by selling our leader Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh to the Nigerians and staging a coup against him. This was a blatant disregard of the articles of the peace accord. Even when some of our members surrendered, they were still ostracized and treated as the dregs of society. And further still, even though we were abiding by the dictates of the cease-fire agreement, Hinga Norman directed the kamajors to attack our bases. This clearly showed that the SLPP was not ready for peace, and so we prepared for the worst.

But we must give bountiful thanks to the Almighty for the refreshing fact that instead of the worst, it is the best that has come through the concrete unbelievable peace that has been attained through the AFRC. We have not therefore denounced attempts at bringing back Tejan Kabbah because we hate him, but it is because he is not willing to accept us as his fellow Sierra Leoneans. Ex-president Kabbah disappointed us gravely, and we can never trust him again. We were prepared for peace, but the SLPP was not.

We are therefore appealing to the international community, and all those that love Sierra Leone, to critically examine the Sierra Leonean problem before any unwarranted action is taken. For six years we have lived in blood-bath, let us now have fresh baths in our streams, swimming pools and beaches. We assure the international community and all Sierra Leoneans of the RUF's total and unflinching commitment to lasting peace. All that we need now is for the United Nations to take the lead in assisting the AFRC in demobilizing and re-integrating our combatants into the society for the ultimate achievement of true democracy through free and fair elections that will be conducted in the whole country in peace. At least we can today sleep in peace with the thought that Sierra Leone has finally achieved its nationhood by being bold enough to tell the whole world that we are capable of solving our own problems.

8009

The ~~Revolutionary United Front~~ People's Army has come for peace.
I thank you.

00009771

1.067
8010

managed to escape.

The rebels ignored medical neutrality and threatened hospital personnel. Freetown's largest hospital was turned into a temporary rebel base for hundreds of combatants. There, and in other hospitals, rebels tortured, robbed, and removed patients from their beds, and, in at least one case, dragged a patient out of the hospital to be killed. They ordered hospital personnel at gunpoint not to treat civilians and threatened them with death if rebel commanders died. Hospitals and clinics were looted, ambulances were destroyed, and several medical facilities were set on fire.

As the rebels withdrew from the capital they set entire city blocks and suburban streets on fire. Housing authorities registered the destruction of 5,788 homes and residential buildings within the greater Freetown area. Within the eastern suburb of Calaba Town, the authorities calculated some 80 percent of residential structures had been left in ashes, and within densely populated Kissy the estimate was over 65 percent. According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Transport, extensive damage to at least eight of Freetown's factories, set ablaze by retreating rebels, has resulted in the loss of over 5,000 jobs. Embassies, government buildings, churches, mosques, and historical landmarks were also targeted, including Freetown's Big Market, built in 1802, and the Holy Trinity Church, built in 1877.

Witnesses and victims described the presence and participation of foreign mercenaries fighting with the RUF. Victims of arm amputations, killings, and massacres said some of their assailants were from Liberia and Burkina Faso. Others observed the presence of white mercenaries, believed to be from Ukraine, several of whom were seen giving orders and directing the battle during the ECOMOG assault on the temporary rebel headquarters at State House.

While the RUF committed the vast majority of atrocities and other violations of international humanitarian law during the battle for Freetown, those defending the capital also committed serious abuses, both during and after the rebel incursion. Members of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping force, and to a lesser extent members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) and Sierra Leonean Police routinely executed RUF prisoners and their suspected collaborators or sympathizers. Human Rights Watch has documented over 180 of these executions. Most were carried out by ECOMOG forces. While the victims were mostly young men, witnesses confirm the execution of some women, and children as young as eight.

Prisoners taken by ECOMOG, some of whom had surrendered and many of whom were wounded, were frequently executed on the spot. Suspected rebel collaborators and sympathizers were often killed with little or no effort to establish their guilt or innocence. Executions usually took place at checkpoints, or during small Amopping up operations. Officers to the level of captain were present and sometimes participated in these executions.

ECOMOG troops also violated medical neutrality during a January 11 operation in which they stormed a hospital, proceeded to drag wounded rebels from their beds, and executed them on the hospital grounds. At least twenty-eight rebels, including two children and a few who had already surrendered, were executed.

In the aftermath of the offensive, civilian witnesses also complained of looting by members of the CDF during routine search missions and some excessive use of force by ECOMOG forces when passing through checkpoints.

During the rebel incursion, children were both the victims of serious abuses committed by all parties to the conflict and, in some cases, the perpetrators of these abuses. RUF rebels raped girls as young as eight, singled out children for mutilation, and murdered children alone and with other family members. RUF child combatants, armed with pistols, rifles, and machetes, were witnessed actively participating in killings and amputations. Some of these child combatants captured by ECOMOG forces were later executed or beaten by members of the local community. Some children abducted by the rebels and taken to the bush have already been observed to be undergoing military training.

The atrocities committed during the January RUF offensive follow a now painfully familiar pattern in Sierra Leone. Relatively protected from such abuses in the past, Freetown residents can now bear witness to the level of brutality and destruction which has threatened residents of the rural areas over the past eight years. In the capital city, the scale of these abuses both in absolute numbers and in the percentage of the population affected and the level of sheer brutality, was simply staggering.

In Sierra Leone, a war is being waged against the civilian population, and particularly horrific and inhumane methods are being used to fight it. Human Rights Watch calls on all parties to the war, but especially the RUF rebels, who have been guilty of the worst abuses, to respect international humanitarian law as laid down in the Geneva Conventions and its protocol. In particular, parties to the conflict must distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and desist from targeting civilians for attack. Although influencing the actions of the rebel forces in Sierra Leone is difficult, international pressure must be maintained to convince them to cease indiscriminate killings, rape, mutilation, the abduction of civilians especially children for use as soldiers, laborers, sexual slaves, or other purposes and other violations of the laws of war.

In attempting to negotiate an end to the civil war, the international community and the Sierra Leonean government must insist on the need to bring the perpetrators of gross human rights abuses and war crimes to justice. RUF members suspected of having committed human rights abuses and former RUF collaborators must be given fair trials and punished according to national and international law. Allegations that members of the government's forces and Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces perpetrated abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law must be investigated and appropriate action must be taken.

The physical and psychological scars left by eight years of war in Sierra Leone are profound and far-reaching. In order to end the cycle of violence, there must be an analysis of the root causes of the conflict and a sincere effort on the part of the government and international community to address them. It is owed to the hundreds of thousands of people whose lives have already been torn apart by this war and essential for the future stability of both the country and the region.

8012



IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY RUF REBELS

Systematic Targeting of Civilians

The rebel occupation of Freetown was characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of all classes of gross human rights abuses against the civilian population. Civilians were gunned down within their houses, rounded up and massacred on the streets, thrown from the upper floors of buildings, used as human shields, and burned alive in cars and houses. They had their limbs hacked off with machetes, eyes gouged out with knives, hands smashed with hammers, and bodies burned with boiling water. Women and girls were systematically sexually abused, and children and young people abducted by the hundreds.

The rebels made little distinction between civilian and military targets. They repeatedly stated that they believed civilians should be punished for what they perceived to be their support for the existing government. Thus, the rebels waged war against the civilian population through the perpetration of human rights abuses. While there was some targeting of particular groups, such as Nigerians, police officers, journalists, and church workers, the vast majority of atrocities were committed by rebels who chose their victims apparently at random.

The arbitrary nature of these attacks served to create an atmosphere of complete terror. Some victims were attacked for resisting rape or abduction, trying to flee, trying to protect a friend or family member, or refusing to follow instructions to dance or make music on the streets, but most described being chosen for execution or mutilation at random, often without being asked a single question.

It is difficult to ascertain the level of seniority within the RUF at which the perpetration of human rights abuses was ordered, though the widespread participation in abuses suggests that they must have been authorized at a high level within the RUF's command structures. Victims and witnesses frequently overheard commanders on the ground give orders to perpetrate atrocities, and there are very few accounts of individual combatants or commanders trying to halt the abuses. When witnesses reported that individual combatants did object and try to halt the abuses, those objecting were often met with death threats from their fellow rebels.

On June 14, 1999, Human Rights Watch spoke with Omraie Golley, official spokesperson and legal representative for the RUF. He denied that his troops had committed any atrocities against the civilian population during the January offensive He said that while they have received allegations, "I have yet to find firm evidence that points to individual soldiers or commanders responsible for committing any atrocities against the civilian population. We've heard a lot of stories, we've heard a lot of terrible things. These kinds of allegations are easy to make but difficult to prove. But, if any of our soldiers or commanders have been guilty of such atrocities they will be brought to book." Golley also stated that the RUF has not initiated any formal investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any individual soldier or commander.

When asked about the mutilation and amputation of limbs, he said, "in July 1997 firm instructions were issued about the use of machetes. They were banned as an implement of war and it was made clear to all our soldiers and commanders that any found guilty of these atrocities would be severely dealt with. The RUF has been fighting a war to protect people, not to destroy them. If any civilians were mutilated during the January offensive, they were not mutilated by the RUF. There were many other groups involved in the conflict during the time of occupation and all of them the Civilian Defense Forces, The Kamajors, ECOMOG, and vigilante groups should be investigated." About the use of human shields and reports of rape, he said, "we unreservedly deny the use of human shields. This is clearly against our war policy and our commanders are well aware of this. Rape is clearly against the RUF penal code and in the past men found guilty of this have been severely dealt with.

In response to the allegations of atrocities committed in the last eight years of war, Golley said that in March 1999 the RUF asked the government of Sierra Leone to provide them with detailed allegations of such atrocities and set up "an independent commission made up of three RUF military personnel and three civilians to investigate various allegations of atrocities." Golley clarified, however, that, "the fact that we've set up a commission is not an admission of guilt, because as far as we're concerned we are not guilty of having committed atrocities against the people; rather it is in response to these persistent allegations."[13]

Massacres, Individual Murders, and Fire-Related Deaths

Human Rights Watch took testimonies from scores of survivors and witnesses to individual murders, group killings, and massacres. These killings began on the first day of the offensive and continued through the day the rebels abandoned the easternmost suburbs.

James Kajue and his family

In the early morning hours of January 6, as they were attempting to flee their home in the eastern suburb of Wellington, James Kajue and his family were stopped by advancing rebels and marched to a nearby side street. After being asked for money, a rebel opened fire on them, wounding both James and his wife Victoria and killing six of their children and their only grandson. One daughter, Frida, survived. James recounted what happened:

8014

We went to bed on the night of January 5 and left the children watching videos. Around midnight I woke up and heard gunshots coming very close. I didn't hear any shelling from ECOMOG so I figured the rebels were on their way. I called a few friends who live further east and when they didn't answer I said, Victoria, let's get out of here. So we put all the kids in the station wagon and left.

As we drove down the main highway there were thousands of people on the roads and when we'd gone a few more miles the cars were stopped. At that moment someone lit a flare illuminating the area and when I looked back I saw that mixed in with the civilians were hundreds of rebel soldiers. It was then I realized the rebels were among us.

There was a lot of gunfire so I told everyone to stay in the car and crouch down. I thought it was safer. Scores of rebels passed by without seeing us but then an eight-year-old rebel with an RPG[14] and who was small enough to see through the window noticed us and alerted the others.

One of them ordered us out of the car and said, you people have been deceived by ECOMOG, why are you fleeing towards them, we're your brothers. Victoria tried to calm him and told him we just wanted to go to someplace safe. He then walked us up a side street a few hundred yards away and told us to sit down. He wanted money so Victoria reached into her bag and gave him some. He said it was too little and as we were about to offer him more I noticed three or four more rebels moving up the road.

As they approached I heard them shouting, ASLA on the move...you thought we'd gone but we've come back. As one of them was approaching, I heard him say Awhy are you wasting time with these civilians...they've been supporting Tejan Kabbah and ECOMOG. We must teach them a lesson. I think we should just fire [kill] them.

And as soon as he said this, he swung around the AK-47, cocked it and opened fire on my family. It wasn't even one minute from the time he walked up to the time he opened up on us. And then I heard one of them saying, Awhy did you have to do it but the one who did it, who by that time was walking around to check if we were all dead, pulled Frida, who was alive, by the hair and said, see, they're not all dead. And then he got to me and said, I'll just pick up Pa's watch. I was hit on the hand which was resting on my chest so there was a lot of blood. I pretended to be dead so he just ripped off my watch and walked off with the others.

And then the roll call I couldn't do it. Victoria had to do it. Patrick, CiCi, Mary all died instantly. Ester was dying. At that moment only Frida replied. She was wounded but not gravely. There was a lot of gunfire so I got up and said, I'm going for shelter...can anyone who can walk just please, please follow me.

8015

> Victoria took my two year-old grandson who was crying and fatally wounded. We later dragged David who'd been hit in the spine and couldn't walk. And I could hear James calling, I'm stuck against this wall and can't move. By now rebels were passing and we couldn't go to him. Later we thought that he must've been hit in the spine and to him it must've felt like he was pinned against a wall. He only called a few times more and then fell silent.
>
> Little Hassan died a few hours later; he was hit three times. And David, the last time I spoke to him I said, can you promise me, promise me you'll survive this thing and he said, Dad I promise you but he couldn't. He died later that day.
>
> He [the rebel] came from nowhere. I didn't have time. I would've stood up and offered myself in place of the kids. They didn't ask us any questions. If they were to accuse anyone it should've been me. I would have given myself. I had some money. I would've offered it to them but the one who killed us didn't come for money he came to destroy our lives. He just opened up on my family without saying anything.[15]

Several attacks and massacres were perpetrated against civilians seeking refuge within churches, mosques, and hospitals. These included the January 18 attack on the Kissy Mental Hospital in which some sixteen men were executed and six women attacked with machetes, the January 19 attack on the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church in Wellington in which twelve people, including at least three children, were taken out and executed, and the January 22 massacre within the Rogbalan Mosque in Kissy in which sixty-six people were gunned down.

Ibrahim

According to numerous survivors interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the massacre within the Rogbalan Mosque was an organized, premeditated operation involving two groups of rebels and lasting approximately forty-five minutes. Several survivors described how, a few days prior, rebels had given warning that a massacre was going to be committed. Ibrahim, forty-eight, described what he saw as he was hiding and how he later counted the dead:

> The mosque was packed full of both Muslims and Christians. The rebels had been coming in and out of the mosque; abducting young girls and harassing us, but things were getting so bad outside we thought it was still safer than in our houses. That day at around 10:00 a. m. I was inside the mosque when I saw at least four rebels burst into the courtyard. One of them had a gun, one had a pistol and two others, including a ten-year-old, had knives and machetes. They were all wearing black pants and black T-shirts.
>
> A sixteen-year-old boy sitting on the steps tried to warn the others that the rebels were coming so when they entered the courtyard, the first thing they did was tell the boy to open his mouth and then the one with the AK put his gun into his mouth and shot him

through the head.

Once inside, the one with the pistol started asking everyone for money. In the meantime, two of the other rebels, including the ten year old, moved to block the doors. Then, as the pistol man was walking around pointing his gun and robbing people, a few of the others started arguing over whether to burn us alive in the mosque or shoot us. One of the rebels then walked around the mosque sprinkling petrol on people and I heard one of them say, you bastard civilians; you don't like us and we don't like you. Finally, one of the others raised his machete and screamed, Our mission is to kill you and cut your hands. People then started screaming and begging and the one with the rifle just started firing.

The mosque was very crowded. It was very confusing and people were running and trying to escape but the ten-year-old was standing by one of the doors and I saw him stab people as they tried to run past him. Sometimes the executioner would aim directly at one person and other times he'd just fire randomly. Then he walked back to the women's section and opened up on the people gathered there. Then he positioned himself in the passage leading out of the mosque and started picking people off as they tried to escape. It was here he killed a lot of people. His was the only way out, so as people made a run for it, he would shoot them.

Some fifteen or so minutes into the thing, another group of rebels arrived to reinforce. They surrounded the place and several of them came around and hit the little Islamic school we have in the back. I think many of the children who died in the massacre were back there. Then at some point a whistle blew and the rebels rushed around searching for things to steal from the dead. And then left.

Somehow a lot of people including myself managed to escape. I was hiding under a mattress in the courtyard and all I could think about was my daughter who was inside when the firing started. I prayed she was able to escape. After I was sure the rebels had gone, I crept out and started looking for her. That's how I came to know how many were killed. I went through the mosque, the women's section, the school, the courtyard, and the street looking for my daughter. I thank god I didn't find her among the dead. But I counted sixty-six bodies including seven little children.[16]

Adama

During the fighting and rebel occupation, civilians tended to concentrate in the larger or more fortified houses of their neighbors, friends, and family. Such concentrations of people often fell victim to brutal rebel attacks in which large numbers of civilians would be killed. Sometimes the men would be targeted and other times no one would be spared. The houses were frequently set on fire with the wounded civilians still inside.

Adama, sixteen, was hiding in a closet with her two small cousins on January 21, while rebels walked

9017

room to room killing seventeen men, women, and children including several relatives. The house was later set on fire with one blind man and at least three of the wounded still inside. She recounted:

> At around 7:30 a.m. when we were just sitting down to breakfast, two rebels came into the compound and told everyone to get inside the house. They started screaming obscenities and then one of them said, we're going to kill all of you so we all ran upstairs.
>
> I hid with my two little cousins but I could see everything. As they were coming up the stairs I heard them shoot two men who'd sought refuge in our house. Then they came into our apartment and my sister's husband Mani started to plead saying, please, I beg you, if it's money you want I'll give it to you but they said, we don't want money, we said we've come to kill you. Then they shot him in the chest. Then they turned on Mani's brother Tejan who was holding his nine-month-old baby. They shot him and he fell with the baby in his arms. Then they fired a friend of Tejan's. They said nothing, nothing, asked them nothing. The same rebel dressed in blue jeans and a white T-shirt and with dreadlocks was doing all the killing.
>
> When they'd finished in the parlor they went to the bedroom which I could still see from where I was. My sister Fatmata was on the bed with my three year old cousin Sia. They shot my sister two times, and then shot little Sia. Then I heard my twelve-year-old cousin Sahr scream, Amama, have you left me, and then they shot him. Then they shot a ten-year-old neighbor boy on the foot, then our friend Mr. Koroma and a fifteen-year-old neighbor named Aminata.
>
> Then they went to the next room. I couldn't see what happened but I heard three gunshots and later saw the bodies of three of our neighbors. There was a blind man who lived in that apartment with his seven-year-old boy. The blind man was the only one they didn't shoot and as they left the room I heard them say, now, you be sure and take care good care of all these people.
>
> When they were in the third room, my little eight-year-old cousin crept out from behind the wardrobe and went to her father. She was crying and she stood in front of him and bowed down. He was dead and her uncle Tejan who was still alive said, he's left us now... quick, you go hide. But, then she went to her mom and did the same thing. I think she was saying good-bye to them. Then I called her back to me.
>
> By this time we could smell smoke coming from downstairs. I guess the other rebels had set fire to the downstairs. The one who did the killing then sprayed petrol throughout our apartment and lit it on fire. Then I heard them go outside.
>
> By now there was a lot of smoke so I grabbed my cousins, went down the stairs and tried to leave but the rebels saw us. They told me to give them my cousins but I refused so two

of them pointed their guns at me and said, so it's there you're going to die get back into that house and burn. They then closed the door from outside and leaned on it so I couldn't escape.

I waited for several more minutes until I just couldn't stand it anymore and then tried the door again and this time managed to escape. By now the fire was really blazing. We could hear the screams of people upstairs and from the outside we could see the seven-year-old son of the blind man from the window, but his father was crying and he didn't want to leave him. We convinced him to jump by saying we'd rescue his father in a few minutes. We knew it wouldn't be possible but otherwise the boy wouldn't have come. The blind man and the others were burned alive. They kept crying but there was just nothing we could do.

The second rebel told the bad one at least twice to stop the killing but the bad one said he'd kill him as well if he said anything else. I just don't know why he behaved that way. In a quiet moment I feel it too much.[17]

Abdul

Abdul, twenty-eight, and his brother had sought refugee from the fighting in a large house in the business district of Freetown. He described how the rebels targeted only the men, leaving nine dead.

We'd been up fleeing all night and were so tired so we sought refugee with about fifty people within a fenced compound which we thought would be safe. At around 7:00 a.m. a group of seven rebels dressed in full military uniform stormed in. Once of them said, we're SLA soldiers. We've been gone for nine months but today we've come back.

Then they started pointing their guns at us and screaming for us to give them money. A few minutes later the one who seemed like he was their commander said, let's don't waste time, spray them all, at which point another rebel started shooting us one by one. The gunman was only two yards away from us. They shot my seventeen-year-old brother Isa and two of my friends. We begged them to spare us, we begged them to stop.

He shot us deliberately, one after the other and only picking out the men. They said we didn't support them and after shooting us said, now you see we're back if you people want us or not. I was so afraid to even look at them. It happened so fast; they were only there for five minutes.

Our brothers have done such a bad thing to us. What did we ever do to them? We know nothing of their rebel ways. That day I just looked around me and started to cry.[18]

Agnes

Victims and witnesses describe the rebels purposefully attempting to terrorize the civilian population by forcing them to watch atrocities being committed. They would then admonish them to behave or meet a similar fate. Civilians acting out of line by trying to escape or protect a family member were often killed in front of their family.

Agnes, twenty-five, together with her family and neighbors, was lined up and forced to watch the brutal execution of three neighbors on January 9. She recounted:

> They [the rebels] ordered us out of our houses and then assigned a small rebel unit of six or eight to guard over each group of twenty or so civilians. It was very organized. They lined my family up with about twenty of my neighbors in a single file line on the street. They kept us standing for over one hour while they insulted us and others ransacked our houses. They got drunk on the alcohol we had left over from the Christmas holidays.
>
> Then, a few rebels called the first three civilians standing in the line; from the left. They were two men and one woman. They moved them about fifteen feet away and just opened up on them. They must have fired at least twenty shots into them. One of the rebels then turned to us and said, you've seen the example now if any of you dare move we'll do the same to you. And then we had to stand perfectly still for another one and one-half hours while our neighbors were lying dead on the street.[19]

Memunatu

Before commencing an attack on a compound, the rebels would frequently assemble everyone together and then select the ones they wanted to abduct. Most often those chosen for abduction were young girls, and boys of fighting age. Abductees were led away either before the attack began or after having to witness family members be killed.

Memunatu, twenty-one, was one of eight young women abducted from their compound on January 23, immediately after the execution of seven family members. She recounted:

> I looked up and saw four rebels coming into the compound. Only one had a gun and the others were armed with axes and machetes. We were over forty in the compound and those that weren't able to escape were gathered together and told to sit down right outside the verandah. A few of us started singing, we want peace but one of the rebels said, you shut your mouths. You're all hypocrites.
>
> They [the rebels] then picked out eight of us young girls and one seventeen-year-old neighbor boy. They ordered us to get up and stand to one side. And then the one they called ACO Blood started the killing. He used a single barrel shotgun. He shot Alusine first, and then Hannah and Saphiatu who was nine months pregnant. Then they ran out of ammunition and set upon the rest with machetes and axes. They hit them on the neck and head. As we stood off in the corner we were begging them to stop but they kept insisting they'd leave no one alive.

> And then they forced us to go. We left our families bleeding and never knew who lived and who died. I was with them [the rebels] for eight days and when I finally escaped I found out that eight of my family and friends had been killed. In fact it was seven but because Saphiatu's baby was ready to be born, we count it as eight.[20]

Hasanatu

Hasanatu, eighteen, and several female members of her family were attacked by the rebels as they were attempting to flee the eastern suburb of Wellington on January 23. She described how six family members were abducted before the remainder were lined up and shot. She said:

> The night before they'd burned our house so we decided the men should hide in the swamp and the women and children should try to hide in an abandoned house. So we left the men and the twelve of us took off down the road, but just as we were leaving our compound we were confronted by two rebels who asked us where we were going.
>
> We told him we were looking for a safer place. They ordered us to sit down and after looking us over picked out five young women and one ten-year-old boy. They were all my cousins. Then they pushed them and ordered them to go to the bush.
>
> The rest of us begged for our lives and then two of them started arguing over whether to kill us or not. I guess they decided because a few minutes later they ordered an old woman, a neighbor of ours, to stand up and as she did, they shot her. Then they told the rest of us to stand up and proceeded to shoot every one of us including my cousins Ramatu [four] and Jenneh [ten].
>
> When they shot me in the shoulder I pretended I was dead. From the blood it looked like they'd got me in the heart. A few minutes later I heard the other rebels returning with all my cousins who'd been abducted who burst into tears when they saw all of us lying there. Then they [the rebels] said sarcastically are you related to any of these because if you are we've just finished them off. [21]

Burning Alive

There were frequent accounts of the particularly sadistic practice of burning people alive. Children and the elderly seemed to be particularly vulnerable. There were a few documented cases of children being thrown into burning fires and many accounts of elderly people being left behind in a burning house as their children and grandchildren were forced to flee in haste. The pleas by other family members to retrieve their children or elderly parents were most often met with threats of death.

One witness described an incident in which a thirteen-year-old boy who was accused of having washed the clothes and shined the boots of ECOMOG soldiers at a checkpoint was later recognized by one of the rebels and thrown into a burning fire in the business district. Another incident involved a

needles but the rebels said it would give them power.

About twenty minutes later the boys started screaming like they were crazy and some of them even passed out. Two of the rebels instructed the boys to scream, I want kill, I want kill and gave a few of them kerosene to take with them on one of their burn house raids.[46]

Joseph

Joseph described how he was abducted and brought to State House where he and several other civilians were held at gunpoint and injected with a brown substance:

They had me in a room in State House where they put a gun to my head and forced me to take that thing. They said, You take this so you won't feel afraid. It was a liquid and after some minutes I felt like I was flying and my head ached. It took me two weeks to get over that thing; my head felt heavy and confused. [47]

Abdul

Abdul, twenty, another abductee held at State House, described large groups of rebels being called forward to receive pills and the distribution of drugs by rebel commanders and, on a few occasions, white mercenaries. He said:

There were hundreds of rebels in State House because it was their base. They were always drinking, smoking jamba [marijuana], sneezing a white powder, and some of them took these bright blue tablets.

I was held there for three days and at least once a day one of the commanders would call people together saying, Ait's time for your medicine and give out those pills. I even saw two of the Ukrainians [white mercenaries] walking around distributing what I thought was probably cocaine from a small sugar box.[48]

Mutilation and Amputation

The practice of mutilation and, in particular, amputation of hands, arms, legs and other parts of the body was also widespread during the January RUF offensive. The rebels used axes, machetes, and knives to kill and maim hundreds of people, mostly men but also women and children.

During the month of January, Freetown's three main hospitals Connaught, Brookfield, and Netland Hospital treated ninety-seven victims of amputations resulting from attacks with axes and machetes. The majority of amputations were of the hands and arms, including twenty-six double amputations. One hospital treated over forty cases of attempted amputations, serious lacerations to the arms and legs, where medical staff were able to save the extremity or extremities.[49] In these cases medical personnel note that the damage to the nerves, tendons, muscles, and bones frequently leads to some degree of decreased functioning.[50] Wounds from lacerations to the head, neck, and other areas were also

numerous.

What will never be known is the number of victims who died before being able to receive medical attention. Many people reported seeing corpses on the streets of Freetown with both hands dangling or missing. Public health workers and mortuary attendants responsible for the collection of corpses and burial within mass graves, also observed many bodies with missing limbs and lacerations.[51] The main hospitals, which were located in western Freetown and under ECOMOG control, were inaccessible to the majority of victims in the east where the vast majority of amputations took place. Unable to cross front lines, victims frequently reported going two to three days before receiving medical attention.

Lansana

Lansana, twenty-four, was one of three brothers each to have one of their hands hacked off as they were attempting to flee towards an ECOMOG position on January 18. He described how one brother died near the site of the amputation:

> The closer ECOMOG moved to our area, the more they [the rebels] started committing atrocities. At 9:00 a.m. me and my brothers Amara, seventeen, and Brima, twenty, decided to flee. We packed up a few things and then took off. About a quarter mile from our house, we rounded a bend and ran straight into a group of about fifty rebels. They argued about whether or not to kill us and then one of them said "let's send them to ECOMOG," which is their way of saying our arms should be cut.
>
> They told us to lie down in the road, face down they had their guns to our heads. The first to be cut was Brima; they cut his left hand with an axe. Then my left hand was hacked off and then Amara's right hand. They didn't ask us any questions or accuse of us anything. There was a lot of gunfire all around. The battle for the place was really on. We were all bleeding so much. Brima tried to get up a few times, but he stumbled and fell. The last time he only made it a few yards and then collapsed. He couldn't move, he fell down right there. I think he lost too much blood or just couldn't take the shock. It was so tense; the bullets were flying and me and Amara had no other choice. We had to leave our brother right there on the street.
>
> After we got out of the hospital we went back to the place where it happened. The people there told us Brima had been buried later that day in a common grave, right near where he fell.[52]

Alpha

Alpha, a victim of a machete wound to the head, described seeing two victims of limb amputations die on January 22 during the battle for the eastern suburb of Calaba Town:

> As I ran towards the ECOMOG position, blood was gushing from my head. The rebels

8023

had whacked me three times with a machete. The ECOMOGs had their guns on me but when they saw I was bleeding, I heard them say, "this man isn't a rebel; he's one of your brothers. Come and help him." They brought me to the back of a house and lay me down next to three other badly wounded civilians; a woman with a gunshot and two men with their hands cut off.

One man forced me to drink water and then I passed out. When I woke up some hours later I saw that all three of the civilians had died. I wanted to leave that place and go home. I didn't want to die there.[53]

Civilians were often mutilated in pairs or groups of up to eight, during small rebel operations in which victims were rounded up, made to form a line and their limbs amputated one after the other. Other amputations were done as punishment for having resisted the abduction of a family member or for fleeing from a rebel patrol. In other cases the rebels choose their victims randomly, frequently without asking a single question.

Ramatu

Ramatu, fifteen, and five other neighbors rounded up by the rebels, had their hands or arms amputated near the Kissy Mental Home where dozens of amputations were witnessed. She described how they hacked off her left arm:

Ten rebels broke into our house and started demanding money. Then they ordered us outside and grouped us together with about thirty other people from the area. They held us at gunpoint in a circle, and started pointing, "you, you, you," and telling us to follow them. They didn't ask us any questions. I don't know why they chose me, or the others. We were three men and three women. A few of them were young like me.

They then marched us at gunpoint to the hill near Kissy Mental. They didn't say why they were taking us but we knew. When we arrived they ordered us to lay face down and started cutting us. They dragged us, they had us get down on our knees and put our arms on a concrete slab. They had others standing over us and holding us from behind. One rebel did all the cutting. A few had both hands cut off; others just one. And then they walked away. I couldn't even bury my arm. And now I don't think I'll ever find someone to marry me.[54]

Osman

Osman, forty-two, and a neighbor had both of their hands amputated in Kissy on January 25 when they were caught hiding in the banana trees behind their house. He recounted:

At around midnight, they [the rebels] started firing at our house and ordered us to come outside. I fled into the bush with my wife and four children. We found our neighbor and

8024

his family there and remained hiding throughout the night. Early the next morning we saw another group of rebels passing by but the neighbor's baby started to cry and gave away our position. We started running but they were too fast.

They ordered me and the other man forward. They cursed and insulted us and without asking any questions pushed my friend to the ground and cut off both his hands with an axe. When they called me forward I begged them and offered them all my money. But, they did it anyway.

The rebel who cut my hands had a white T-shirt with "Captain 2 Hands" written in what looked like blood. My four-year-old son was screaming, "Don't cut my papa's hand."[55]

The rebels would often single out one or two family members for amputation before massacring an entire compound, or amputate limbs of the survivors. Sometimes the men would be killed and the women attacked with machetes. The, by then mutilated, survivors were then instructed to take a verbal message to ECOMOG or members of the government.

Mani

Mani, forty-eight, watched as a commander ordered the execution of seven civilians and then singled him out for amputation on January 21. He said:

A group of thirteen rebels came to my house, poured kerosene on the furniture and then set it ablaze. I stumbled out of my house and started running up the street but was immediately caught by a group of ten rebels. The ordered me to join a group of seven other people from my neighborhood.

The commander, who introduced himself as a Liberian, then ordered everyone but me to stand to one side and said, "I'm going to kill you all, so say good-bye to the world." He kept them there begging for three minutes and then at 7:03 p.m. I looked at my watch ordered another rebel to open fire on them.

Then, the same Liberian said, "I'm ordered and paid by Sam Bockerie not to spare anyone and that is why I have killed. You saw it with your own eyes. But now I am ordering your hand to be cut." He ordered me to lay face down in the road and called forward a rebel with an axe who then hacked off my hand. It was hanging off limp and bleeding and when I saw it I started to cry. The rebels just walked away.[56]

Amadu

After massacring his neighbors in Kissy on January 20, Amadu, forty, described how the rebels hacked off his arms:

8028

> I was hiding in my house with my wife and family, when at around 9:30 p.m. we started hearing shouts and screams. Several minutes later we heard our neighbors begging, "don't kill me, I beg," and then I heard gunfire. I peeked out but one of them [rebels] saw me and screamed for me to come out. I ran back into my house but after a few minutes they doused it with kerosene and set it on fire. When the heat was too much we fled out the back but they caught me and marched me to my neighbor's compound.
>
> It was then I saw over what had happened to my neighbors; I saw at least twenty of them lying on the ground and I screamed, "you've killed my people there." One of them called for the man with the axe to come and hack off my arms and they did it right there in that compound. When they were done they said, "you go to Pa Kabbah and ask him for a new set of arms."[57]

Kaima

Kaima, forty, was captured with a group of civilians seeking refuge in the Kissy Mental Home. The rebels separated them gunning down the men and attacking the women with machetes. She received severe lacerations on both legs and, unable to walk, spent over three days without any medical attention. Due to the severity of the injury and degree of infection, both legs had to be amputated above the knee. She recounted:

> They ordered us out of the building at gunpoint. There was a lot of confusion and we took off running. They caught about twenty-five of us and put the men on one side of the grounds and the women on the other. As they fired the men [shot them] I again took off running with my infant son on my back. But, I fell in a ditch and as I struggled to get up they had me surrounded. There were five of them and they started hacking at my legs. I guess they attacked my legs because I tried to run.
>
> As they were striking me with machetes, my baby was lying on the ground next to me. One of my attackers then raised his machete to strike my baby but I blocked the blow with my right hand and screamed, "it's enough now you have cut my legs and now you want to kill my baby it is enough. They then set upon the five other women with machetes; cutting the hand off one, the fingers off another and striking the head of yet another.[58]

The majority of amputations were done shortly before the rebels were forced to retreat from neighborhoods under their control. Victims and witnesses describe the rebels often mobilizing special cut hand squads which were then sent on operation. The leaders of some of these infamous squads introduced themselves to their victims as Captain 2 Hands, Betty Cut Hands, OC Cut Hands, and Adama Cut Hands. After being captured, the victims were sometimes made to wait until the cut hands unit arrived. Several of the commanders and members of these units were adolescents or women.

Tejan

Tejan, a forty-three year old driver, described the brutal way in which a fifteen-year-old combatant from

one of these units named "Commander Cut Hands" hacked off his two hands in Kissy on January 20:

> After they set fire to my house they caught me trying to escape out the back door. They then brought me to the compound next door where I saw they'd captured two of my neighbors. They started arguing over whether to kill me or cut my hands. Then the one who seemed to be in charge gave the order to amputate both my hands and called forward a fifteen-year-old boy they called "Commander Cut Hands."
>
> I refused to lie down. They beat me and it took several of them to hold me. They tripped me and when I fell to the ground three of them had to sit on my legs and back and another few had to hold my arms. Then they took out that axe. I was crying and after they'd hacked off both of my hands I screamed, "just kill me, kill me."
>
> They also cut off the hands of my two neighbors. I feared they might attack me because I was a driver for the SLPP [Sierra Leone People's Party], the President's party, but they never found that out. They knew nothing about me.[59]

Allieu

The particularly macabre practice of filling up bags with amputated hands and fingers was witnessed by several people interviewed by Human Rights Watch. Another witness hiding within a house in Calaba Town on January 24 witnessed a commander calling himself "Dr. Blood" summon five rebels and order them to begin a "cut hands" operation. He then said, "I want a bag of hands from Kissy, one from Wellington, and one from Calaba Town." [60]

Allieu, fifty, a civil servant with the customs department, described seeing a bloody rice bag full of hands during the brutal amputation of both of his arms in Kissy on January 21:

> They surrounded my family and one of them said, "Since Pa Kabbah won't give us peace, we have come to cut your hands." I begged them not to harm my wife and children so they fired their guns in the air and told them to run away. They then marched me up the hill to the grounds of St. Patrick's Catholic Church where I saw over one hundred rebels. They ordered me to put my left arm on a tree truck and then they swung the axe from behind and hacked it off. They kept talking about President Kabbah and as they ordered me to put my other hand. I screamed, "but I don't know anything about politics" and one of them answered, "but you voted for Kabbah." Then he hacked off my remaining hand.
>
> Blood was spurting out of my arms. I was weak and kept falling as I tried to get up. They started laughing at me and I shouted, "just kill me, kill me, look at how you've left me." They spit on me and started pounding me and then several of them took a hammer, held me down and started knocking out my teeth. I left four of them [teeth] in the dirt. They danced around me and said, "we've really got you now, here you will die."

> As I lay there bleeding in the church courtyard I saw them amputate the hands of two other men. And, then a rebel walked by with a white rice bag, with blood dripping out the bottom, and said - pointing to the hands lying on the groundC"put those things in here."[61]

Children and in some cases even toddlers were not immune from attack. In one case, children were even singled out. The youngest known amputation victim from January 1999 was a boy aged just one year and eight months. One small clinic in Kissy during January 1999 treated twenty-one children from three to fifteen years old for laceration wounds, mutilation, and amputation. Five of these children were from three to five years old.[62]

Lucia

Lucia, ten, described how on January 13 she and two of her friends were chosen out of a large group, taken away, and had both of their arms amputated:

> At around 4:00 in the afternoon I was sitting under the big mango tree in front of my house with all of my family and neighbors when we saw a group of four rebels coming down the road. We got up and ran inside. When they arrived they ordered us all outside. They had a container of petrol and asked for matches. We thought they were going to burn our house but instead they started pointing at several of us; me, my cousin Miata who is twelve, and my friend Finda who is fifteen.
>
> They marched us up the hill where we were joined by another rebel and two more adult men. And, then they started hacking off our arms. When it was my turn they pushed me to the ground and told me to put my right hand on a big stone. One rebel held me down, one put his foot on my arm while the one they called "Blood" hacked it off with a big axe. Then they did the same thing with my left hand. They hit each hand one time each.
>
> We couldn't run; they had their guns on us the whole time. It was so fast; the whole thing only took about ten minutes. They then walked us back down the hill and back to our compound. When my mother saw me, with my hands dangling from my arms and blood spurting everywhere she screamed and burst out crying. When they were cutting me, I heard one of them say, "now you will know the rebels; now you will know the bitterness of the war."[63]

Rape and Sexual Assault

Throughout the January offensive RUF forces perpetrated systematic, organized, and widespread sexual violence against girls and women including individual and gang-rape, sexual assault with objects such as sticks and firewood, and sexual slavery. These sexual crimes were most often characterized by extraordinary brutality and frequently preceded or followed by violent acts against other family members.

tros

and started cutting off the head of the second soldier. It took them about ten minutes and when they were finished, they started dancing around and brought it around to show the other soldier. I felt sick.

By this time there was a lot of gunfire and it seemed like the rebels were going really mad. They pushed the other prisoner down and grabbed a long stick and started shoving it up his backside; sodomizing him. They kept doing it for about thirty minutes. The soldier was screaming and crying and eventually just passed out. And then they shot him and just left him in the gutter. He was very bloody and everyone thought he was dead. But, several hours later he regained consciousness and called people to come and help him.[101]

Violations of Medical Neutrality

There are many accounts of RUF forces storming and occupying both public and private hospitals in which they threatened hospital staff, looted and destroyed hospital property, and in a few cases mutilated and executed patients.

Sierra Leone's biggest public hospital, Connaught Hospital, suffered most from these violations. Doctors, nurses, and patients describe how the hospital was stormed by RUF fighters on January 6, and turned into a rebel base. They described how the hospital filled up with hundreds of rebel fighters who then used the premises for cooking, washing, and cleaning their weapons. The hospital was looted and both ambulances destroyed. Patients were removed from their hospital beds and were then replaced with wounded rebels. Patients' possessions were looted and as wounded civilians entered the hospital they were robbed by rebel fighters.

While most medical personnel ran away, the few doctors and nurses who remained on duty were threatened with death if rebel commanders died, and forced to work long hours under unsanitary conditions. When they tried to rest they were sought after and brought back to work under gunpoint. When wounded civilians entered the hospital, doctors were ordered at gunpoint not to treat them. Most of these patients died.

Nurses describe how on January 6, in the Curney Barnes Memorial Hospital, rebels violently shook the leg of a patient whose fractured leg had just been operated on, whilst accusing him of being an ECOMOG soldier. Five nursing staff were kept at gunpoint while they looted shoes, radios, jewelry, and money from the patients, stole medicines and instruments from the hospital and set the outpatient ward on fire. The hospital closed down the next day.[102]

In Good Shepherd Hospital in Kissy, after removing and executing one Nigerian patient from the hospital on January 18, rebels forced all ambulatory patients, staff members, and other civilians to a nearby wall and then shot some fifteen of them. At least one nurse and a few relatives of the patients were wounded and several others died. Later the same day a fourteen-year-old rebel walked around the wards threatening patients with a hand-grenade. The hospital closed down the following day after rebels

threatened to burn it and kill all staff.[103]

In the Summertime Clinic in Kissy, nurses described patients belongings and medicines being looted by the rebels on several occasions. One nurse said, over the course of a week, we lost seven patients, simply for lack of medicine. They needed antibiotics but the rebels had stolen what we needed to help keep our patients alive. [104]

In the Kissy Mental Home, rebel forces killed five patients and attacked several others, including one man whose legs they attempted to amputate with a machete. They also looted and burned part of the hospital.[105]

Paul

Paul, a doctor at Connaught Hospital, described how the rebels threatened to kill him if their wounded commanders died of their injuries or if he treated the civilian wounded:

> On January 6 we received the first wounded rebel at around 5:30 a.m.; several rebels brought him in. They told me at gunpoint he was a very important commander and, if he dies, you too will die because this man is far more important than you are.
>
> By 6:30 I'd received three more rebels with gunshot wounds. By this time there was heavy gunfire all around. Again they threatened me saying they'd kill me if any of them died; that they didn't care how I did it.
>
> Over the next few days the hospital was turned into a command center. The rebels were bringing in bags of rice and cooking, drinking beer, and smoking pot, doing their laundry, coming and going. I saw them telling patients to vacate their beds on wards three, five, and seven, replacing them with their own wounded. They looted from the patients and even stole from the wounded civilians and their families as they entered the hospital.
>
> In the morning hours I also received about ten wounded civilians; all gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen. The rebels threatened me, again at gunpoint, not to give medicine to or treat any civilians. And I lost them one after the otherCthey all died.
>
> By 16:00 I was exhausted. I'd been working non-stop; the conditions were terrible and unsanitary, there was blood everywhere, I had no gloves, it was filthy.
>
> By 20:00 we received the heaviest causalities; three wood carts loaded with over sixty wounded, all of them civilians. Of these I can tell you only fifteen survived. Most of the wounded were head and abdomen injuries but the operating theater wasn't working, no nurse, no medicines. All we could do was stop the bleeding. By the next day there were over 200 corpses in the morgue.[106]

6628

00011183

8080

[redacted] **STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PARTIES FOLLOWING FOUR DAYS OF MEDIATION TALKS TO HARMONISE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RUF/SL AND THE AFRC UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, WITH THE SUPPORT OF ECOWAS MEMBER STATES**

Statement of the ALLIANCE of the Revolutionary United front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) and The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) on the occasion of the return of the Leadership of the ALLIANCE FOR PEACE to Freetown, Sierra Leone, facilitated by his Excellency President Charles Ghankay Taylor on behalf of the Ecowas Authority.

We, the leadership and the joint high command of the RUF/AFRC alliance, express on behalf of the peace-loving people of Sierra Leone, our profound gratitude and appreciation to his excellency Charles Ghankay Taylor, the government and the courageous people of Liberia, for the sacrifices that they continue to make to the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone.

We take this opportunity to thank the Heads of State, government and people of the member states of ECOWAS and the Chairman, His excellency President Gnassingbe Eyadema of the Republic of Togo, for standing by the people of Sierra Leone throughout the crisis.

We remind ourselves also of the monumental contribution of His Excellency President Henri Konan Bedie, the government and the people of Côte d'Ivoire to the cause of peace in Sierra Leone and the sub-region.

We also hereby express our appreciation for the distinctive role of the UN, the OAU, the European Union and the Commonwealth.

We say thank you to the non-governmental organisations and civil society groups who have kept the people alive and the flame of democracy, good governance, accountability and transparency burning in all our hearts.

When we pause and reflect, we can only see that we are not alone in this our struggle to create a new Sierra Leone of equal opportunity, freedom and justice for all. There is a great deal of goodwill towards Sierra Leone so far as our focus is on peace, national reconciliation and development. The courageous people of Liberia, through their President, have demonstrated this goodwill towards us and we shall never fail them in our commitment to peace. We do agree with His Excellency President Charles Taylor that there can be no peace in Liberia when there is no peace in Sierra Leone.

There has been a great deal of concern expressed in Sierra Leone and within the international community about the alleged split in the RUF/AFRC alliance. Truly, we experienced some internal problems but these have been put behind us with the timely intervention of His Excellency Charles Ghankay Taylor, supported by his brother Heads of State of the ECOWAS Authority. It is important for us to express the fact that we took notice of the concern that our internal problems could threaten the cause of peace consolidation in Sierra Leone. We would like to thank the people of Sierra Leone and members of the international community for their concerns and their wish for our alliance to hold in the supreme interest of peace.

The people of Sierra Leone know that the RUF and the AFRC came together to end the war. The people of Sierra Leone know that our alliance is for peace. We are happy to proclaim on this Second Day of October 1999 that our Alliance For Peace is strong for, we know that, when you are strong nothing will be wrong.

We are going to Freetown to help consolidate the peace and contribute to the transformation of our society.

Once again, we thank the courageous people of Liberia and the member States of ECOWAS and their leaders for facilitating this historic encounter between the leaders of the RUF/AFRC alliance and their eventual return to Freetown, Sierra Leone, in the cause of peace and stability in the Mano River Union and in the West African sub-region.

Long live the courageous people of Liberia!
Long live the noble ideals of the Mano River Union!
Long live the United Nations!
Long live the OAU!

00011185

Long live the European Union!
Long live the Commonwealth
Long live the NGO community!
Long live civil society groups!
Long live the Alliance for Peace!
Long live the peace-loving people of Sierra Leone!
Our gratitude and praise to the Almighty Allah/God and our glorious ancestors.

Done in Monrovia, the Republic of Liberia on October 2, 1999.

Statement by Lt. Col Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, made at the Executive Mansion, Monrovia, on 2 October 1999.

It is with great relief and joy that we are able to announce to our people in Sierra Leone especially, the West African sub-Region and the World at-large that under the auspices of His Excellency President Charles Taylor of Liberia, the Hon Foday Sankoh and myself have had a very successful two days' meeting, at which we were able to clear any misunderstanding or disagreement that would impede the ongoing peace process that started with the signing of the Lomé Peace agreement on 7th of July 1999.

The success of this meeting has greatly strengthened the alliance between the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council - AFRC - and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUF/SL. We firmly believe that this alliance is not only very good but also very necessary for our people and peace in Sierra Leone. We are now agreed that enough time has been wasted and it is high time that we returned home and put this process on the road.

Before I conclude this statement, I wish to make two appeals. The first one is to the "Press", especially the International Press, who are quick to read danger in any small delay or hiccup in the process as a major danger to the Peace Process or a very serious disagreement between the AFRC/RUF/SL Alliance. This kind of speculative journalism unnerves our people, who have greatly suffered from

almost a decade of war.

To our people, we say that we understand their impatience to see us disarm and demobilise so that normalcy could return to our country, Sierra Leone. We however appeal to them to be patient and give us time to handle this process with the greatest care it needs. It would take time, probably more time than had been anticipated at the time of signing the agreement. But believe me, by the grace of God/Allah, we will eventually get to the Promised Land. One welcome assurance I wish to give to our people, and the world at-large is that Hon Foday Saybana Sankoh and myself have agreed that there will be no more war in Sierra Leone. The "War, War" is now over and it is now the time to "Jaw, Jaw". In this, we hope and believe that we are in understanding with the views of President Kabbah and his people and that we have the total support of the International Community.

We will end this statement by giving profound gratitude and thanks to President Charles Taylor and the good people of Liberia who have been patient, helpful and encouraging, in helping us to take one faltering step after the other along the long road to peace. We say to them "Thank you and God bless."

Thank you all.

Statement by His Excellency Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of the Republic of Liberia, at the conclusion of reconciliatory talks with Cpl Foday Sankoh, Chairman, RUF and Lt Col Johnny Paul Koroma, leader, AFRC on the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peace Agreement

October 2, 1998,
Executive Mansion
Monrovia
Liberia

Distinguished Ladies & Gentlemen

Today the prospects for peace in the Republic of Sierra Leone are self evident by the presence of Corporal Foday Sankoh of the

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC in Monrovia, as they prepare for their historic return to Sierra Leone.

The Government of Liberia, which along with the Leadership of ECOWAS brokered the peace process, is also serving as the intermediary to facilitate the early return of Corporal Sankoh and Lieutenant-Colonel Koroma to Freetown to help implement the Sierra Leone peace plan.

We commend ECOWAS leaders for their sacrificial support and the endurance they have shown in restoring peace to Sierra Leone. We particularly laud the efforts of President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for his dynamism in helping to give the sub-region a new sense of direction for peace and stability. Special note is made of the 39th Independence Anniversary of Nigeria and our best wishes for the peace, progress and prosperity of the people of that great nation.

We applaud the president of Togo and Chairman of ECOWAS, Gnassingbe Eyadema, as well as the ECOWAS Secretariat, for the steady leadership in hosting and directing the negotiations that brought about the Lomé Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone.

We make particular mention of other leaders in the sub-region with whom we have interacted over the past several days to realise success in these reconciliation talks. The President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Campaore, the President of Sierra Leone, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the United States Ambassador to Liberia, Bismark Myrick, our special negotiator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, D Musulem Cooper, the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all deserve favourable mentioning for their tireless efforts in the process.

Our special thanks goes to the wonderful people of Liberia, the Legislature and all those involved with these talks for their hospitality, brotherliness and understanding. Our people have always been a warm and caring people. They can be proud that once again, Liberia has served as a stage for peace and progress among the comity of nations.

From the onset of the Sierra Leone civil war, Liberia has believed

in constructive engagement for resolution of the conflict. What we have tried to do in the last few days by hosting these meetings is to provide an atmosphere of stabilising and maintaining the momentum of the peace process in Sierra Leone by sharing our experience on conflict resolution.

We have endeavoured for Sierra Leone to benefit from the hindsight of our own process that brought peace to Liberia and ushered in a new democratic order. This what we are pursuing to ensure the perpetuity of good neighbourliness. We believe that the last chapter in Sierra Leone's bitter crisis is at its terminal point, which will bring durable and lasting peace for our brothers and sisters. We realise however that final peace rests with Sierra Leoneans themselves. They must develop the courage to forgive and forget!

Our contribution has thus been based on the strength of our conviction that we are one people with a common destiny; that there cannot be peace and progress in Liberia without a corresponding peace and progress in Sierra Leone.

The Lomé Peace Agreement signed on July 7th this year must be fully implemented to ensure the smooth transition envisaged by the peace loving leaders of ECOWAS.

The strengthening of relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia benefits the Mano River Union and also the sub-region. The potential for the Mano River Union to be the engine of progress and development in the sub-region is untapped. Our rich flora and fauna, marine life, mineral wealth, and human potential is unparalleled, and these God-given untapped wealth can best be developed not by a single country but our Mano River Union. This is what peace in Sierra Leone means to Liberia. The Mano River Union unites us.

We see peace in Sierra Leone and the strengthening of the Mano River Union as an important contribution to the speeding up of the integration of the economies of the rest of the sub-region. Every action we have taken has been done in the supreme interest of ECOWAS. We have an opportunity to integrate and synchronise our national planning and development objectives, particularly in the areas of telecommunications, energy, road and transport,

banking, insurance, health, education and mining.

We have the opportunity now to integrate our socio-economic systems in keeping with the noble objectives of the ECOWAS Treaty. The socio-economic unification will naturally lead to political integration. And I dare say that nothing prevents us now from thinking about and planning towards a Mano River Union parliament. The legislative contacts being advanced now should be speeded up in the light of the continental parliament mandated by the Sirte Declaration in Libya last month.

Presently, the Liberian Government is contemplating re-opening the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border and working collectively for the revitalisation of the Mano River Union. In this light, we look forward with great anticipation to attending the Mano River Union summit scheduled to be held in Freetown early November. Meanwhile, we will continue to constructively engage the Guinean Government in solidifying our relations, because our three countries are inextricably yoked by the Mano River Union heritage.

We believe when our relations are in full bloom, our problems of security, reconstruction and development will gain added impetus. It will buttress our confidence building and normalisation of relations between our two nations.

We close this statement with optimism. This sub-region is now on the road to peace and progress and no one will be permitted to derail our noble journey.

As our brothers return to their native land, we wish them God Speed and success in their endeavours. To ensure solidarity on this historic occasion, I have selected a high level delegation headed by the President Pro-Tempore of the Liberian Senate, Hon Kekura B Kpoto, to accompany Messrs Sankoh and Koroma to Freetown. They are being joined by the Minister of Overseas Co-operation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Professor Jerry Gana, the Minister of Defence of Togo, the United States Ambassador to Liberia, and representatives of the United Nations and ECOWAS. A 10-member Press team has also been approved to accompany the delegation.

In union strong, success is sure. May God continue to bless the work of our hands and save the State.

I thank you.



1.081
00012955
8038

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

VERBATIM REPORT ON A RECORDED DISCUSSION BETWEEN CPL. FODAY SANKOH AND HIS COHORTS ON HIS RETURN FROM DETENTION AT NIGERIA IN 1999 EXPLAINING THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING HIS DETENTION IN 1996 – 1999 (SPECIFICALLY JAN. 6)

ADJUTANT GENERAL:

The leader Sir, war council Chairman, the adviser, and other members of the delegation. The report that we had prepared since we came here contained certain issues which I felt should not be documented because of security reasons. Therefore, we decided to meet the leader and other members and brief them orally. Among the issues jotted down for the leader and other members to deliberate on were:

1. We start with minerals:- first and foremost the one thousand eight hundred and thirty two pieces of diamonds in nine plastics received from J.P.KOROMA.

Next was the fourteen pieces of diamonds misplaced by Brigadier ISSA SESAY. Among which was an eleven carats piece of diamond. Then the sales of two hundred and forty four pieces of diamonds at a total price of seventeen thousand United States dollars to raise fund.

2. Some of the behaviours of Brigadier Superman:-
   (a) He was disloyal to the Commander on the ground.
   (b) He break the Kono Bank without informing anybody
   (c) He had been attacking and killing some RUF members
   (d) He had misused RUF funds

3. The mass promotions that was made by us
4. Moreover we made some trips to Burkina Faso and other neighbouring countries.
5. Then of course we had been informing you about some mining programs that we have undertaken in Kono and Tongo. But Pa ROGERS and C.O. MIKE can elaborate more on these points mentioned. So let us start now with number one diamond received from J.P. KOROMA which was 1832 pieces in 9 plastics

PA ROGERS:

It is true that diamonds were received from J.P. KOROMA O.K; those that the adjutant general had put on paper were received from him. How these diamond were received I could not tell because while some of us pulled out from Freetown we were at Kono when J.P. KOROMA arrived at our base. As a result of this, we did not have any fore knowledge on whether they had received diamonds from him. But there was a reason why they received the diamonds from him. In the first instance, when we pulled out, we thought that since he was regarded as head of state at that time he may have something to feed the boys as the boys did not have anything on the ground to feed the combatants, other people and his own delegation. We had to tell the CDS that J.P. KOROMA had nothing at hand which prompted them to ask other members of the delegation (SLA) that if they know of members in their delegations which had money in their possession they should inform mosquito to take action. With this view, they had to raid the place of J.P.KOROMA. Mike Lamin will be in a better position to elaborate on the raid because they did the operation. Hence by the time we arrived, we only heard that they had taken diamonds from Johnny Paul Koroma But.again, how these diamonds were transacted; only. Brigadier MIKE can actually explain to you how they had gone about it as far as the diamond business was concerned

BRIGADIER MIKE:

O.K. Sir just to reiterate what the chairman of war council has just said we left Freetown and arrived at Kailahun via Kono where we met MOSQUITO who virtually had nothing to feed the soldiers especially the SLA brothers. Infact Brigadier ISSA and myself escaped with JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA to Kailahun. Later, MOSQUITO, Brigadier ISSA and myself told JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA that since he was the head of State, we expected him to have some amount of money, which we can decide to use for logistical support in a bid to organise the men. JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA told them that Gullit also known as black JAH ,had some diamonds he had instructed him to mine in Kono. I then left with Brigadier ISSA to meet Gullit in Kailahun. I told him to hand over all the diamonds he had in his possession and we collected one hundred and fifteen

pieces of diamonds from him which was valued at fifteen thousand U.S. dollars. We returned with the diamonds to MOSQUITO the same day. These diamonds were handed over to MOSQUITO in the presence of JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA, Brigadier Issa and myself. He in turn, handed over the diamond to JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA but he later refused to respond to our needs when we have set out defence position at GBAIMA in KOIDU areas so that the enemy could not push us further. In sequel, RAMBO the C.S.O. to JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA informed us that JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA is in possession of a plastic containing diamonds including some United State Dollars, which he intends to escaped with together with his family. Notwithstanding this, we have been monitoring him through intelligence source that he had intentions to escape so we intimated Mosquito and Issa suggesting that we confront this brother and ask him to hand over all government properties he had in his possession to enable us procure all the logistical materials to carry out the operations they agreed with us and therefore confronted Johnny Paul Koroma in a non-violent manner. Johnny Paul Koroma had to reason with us and handed over nine plastics containing diamonds. We in turn handed over these diamond to mosquito for safe keeping and utility in the presence of his late body guard, brother SHABADO,C.O. Mohamed's body guard, Major Kamara; C.O. Issa and other senior men. Since then the diamonds were with mosquito since Pa Rogers and others were in Kono. Not too long, Mosquito informed me that he wanted us to contact the other brothers in Monrovia. Although he had already made some contacts with them, but he needs some of the gem stones to give to the leader in Monrovia to facilitate these contacts. Before this, of course, we were aware that some transactions was going on as on several occasions he made visit to Monrovia through the help of one Benjamin Legon, a Liberia Security personnel; in collaboration with the Adjutant General.. The General Adjutant knows about some demands given to Benjamin Legon for onward handing over to the leader of Liberia. Then we later decided to send somebody to the Brother in Burkina for the logistical materials hence brother Mosquito decided that Brigadier Issa should go on that mission. In this way, some parcels of diamonds among which was a fifteen carats diamond that I have seen myself was handed over personally by General Mosquito and

myself to him. We left for Monrovia but we understood later from Issa himself that he had lost the diamonds in Monrovia.

FODAY SANKOH : He lost what?

BRIGADIER MIKE: The diamonds sir! because of this, Mosquito had to summoned a General Meeting to find out how these diamonds got missing as every one was concerned about it, but since at that moment the enemy was pushing our troops, Mosquito and myself called Pa Rogers and others pointing to them that in order to avoid further misunderstanding within the men the matter should be investigated later Issa should be sent to the front-line at Pendembu to put the situation under control since the pressure on us was increasing at the time and to avoid the enemy infiltrate our positions. Thus we agreed that when it is appropriate we shall look into that matter.

In addition, we captured Kono the other day, and started some mining operations there. The proceeds of that operations was documented. All the diamonds were handed over to Mosquito and sold at seventeen thousand united states dollars at Buedu in the presence of Pa Rogers, Johnny Paul Koroma and other senior members. The amount was utilised on external delegations and the purchasing of other items such as drugs. That is all I know.

FODAY SANKOH: You gave money to external delegation! Who are these external delegations that you gave money.

BRIGADIER MIKE! We gave Dr. Simbo and one Alusine Kamara one thousand united states dollars.

FODAY SANKOH: (grumbling) Why?..... O/K continue

BRIGADIER MIKE: Yes sir! The General Adjutant will give the break down as Pa Rogers also knows about it but the proceeds recovered from these diamonds was utilised in facilitating the transportation of materials and other

8042

logistics since our men were in disarray. Therefore, Pa Rogers will comments more on that.

PA ROGERS: Just as Brigadier Mike had explained about the proceeds before we disbursed the money, we considered the part played by the external delegation comprising Omrie Golley and General Ibrahim who had been spending their money to facilitate contacts and to clarify some issues on behalf of our movement. We had trust in them even though they did not put forward any claim for the expenses accrued by them; we think it fit to encourage them hence, the General called me to give the external delegation eight thousand U.S dollars which I did. Next I was not present on the issue about Johnny Paul Koroma. I was made to understand that General Ibrahim was presence at the time of that operation. Therefore General Ibrahim or General Adjutant will dilate on that issue what actually was given to him for the other brothers outside there, I could not tell but we were in dire need of those things so that we can defend our ground to prevent the movement going into disarray. These are the areas that Brigadier had not commended on.

ADJUTANT GENERAL ! Allow me to say something now with regards to what Brigadier had just said about the things received. These diamonds were with Mosquito when we decided that we should make good use of it by creating an avenue for outside contacts since the pressure was high against us. Then luckily, General Ibrahim arrived the same day. There and then, we all agreed to move to Monrovia to meet the big brother this move coincided with Benjamin leaving for Monrovia also . In this way, we met at Koindu were, we checked the 1832 pieces of diamonds in 9 plastics which was intact . In lieu of this, Bra told Benjamin that they had something that they want to presence to Big Brother in Monrovia so that he will help us.

Immediately, Benjamin advised us that for security reasons, we should not enter Liberia at the moment as Ecomog are hunting for us. Benjamin further said that he was instructed to sneak with J.P. Koroma to Monrovia to avoid suspicion. Then 'Bra' replied that J.P.was not around, he then asked which area is J.P. presently. Brat said J.P. is about fairly miles away from where we where at

the time hence Benjamin has to leave. What follows after this was, "Bra" asked me he said "Rash' " provide one operator and one body guard including Jungle. I will be leaving to night for Monrovia to meet Pa Musa . During that journey, we narrowly escaped Ecomog patrols and arrived at Pa Musa's residence. We informed him about what we have at hand and our intentions. He agreed with us and said he will brief the Big Brother about our present stance. But when Pa Musa met with Big Brother, and explained about our mission, he said No! Mosquito should not come for security reasons and even told us to leave Liberia immediately as information has spread around that we all going to him and that Ecomog were deployed from that point onto Mabaclay. Therefore after we received such advise from pa Musa, we left the same night. Hurriedly washing our car, which was too dirty because of the bad Lofa road. We reached Gbanga. Less I forgot, he told us that if we have anything, we should send it with a reliable person but Mosquito should not go there. We arrived at Koindu in the evening, and met Benjamin, Memuna and others where we left them and gave them the feedback on our mission." Bra" said no problem, this is how God works out things" that he could have been arrested, He said we should write a letter and hand over the 1832 pieces in 9 plastics to the Papay. " Bra "approved the letter.. ,General Ibrahim ,Memuna and Jungle went to Liberia while we returned to Buedu. When Pa Rogers and others went to Gbanga later these diamonds were shown to him. Big Brother told them he is going to reserve them until you (pa Sankoh) return.. With regards to the 244 pieces that we sold, I have the record in a ledger showing the quantity, and everything. The sales was followed by the arrival of external delegation selling drugs and other brothers. "Bra" called J.P. Pa. Rogers, C.O.Mike Dr. Willaims ,other authorities including two other brothers, who were assisting us in getting drugs, food and other necessities outside that were needed at the Front line we haggled on the prices of gems we agreed at 17000 U.S. Dollars which was paid later $1000 was given to Johnny Paul for his feeding. $800 was given to Mr. Golley and Ibrahim and the remaining amount was used in buying more rice and the needed items such as Cigarettes etc that the boys needed up front. These items arrived recently. Although $500 was given to us when we left with Brigadier Issa . I cannot give much detail about that because

I was seriously sick with 'open mold'' for about two months but I believe JRR, one of your security can brief you better on that Sir.

JRR (Junior Rambo).: yes Sir,pertaining to the diamonds that General handed over to Brigadier Issa. I was with general when these diamonds were brought from Kono. Among the gem was an eleven carat pieces. The General held a meeting with some senior officers. He told them that the war had reached a stage wherein we need external assistants to make contacts for ammunition in Burkina Faso. Thus Brigadier Issa, a senior member in the movement was given the said document to hand over same to general Ibrahim in Burkina Faso. Issa was also given the diamonds and briefed on how best he could travel with it to Monrovia then Burkina Faso. He left Koindu with S.S security like Colonel Jungle that the leader had assigned to us for such operation. he was on this mission (Pause) ... This Col. Jungle, the high command instructed him that they should secure Issa onto Liberia. From there, the High Command further instructed Issa to try his level best to reach Burkina Faso to meet General Ibrahim for the said diamond: sales. He was on this until we heard from Jungle that he dropped these diamonds in Monrovia. The commander immediately summoned Brigadier Issa to report back to the base. Jungle went to received him as he reached at the base.

FODAY SANKOH :STOP! So the mission was not accomplished?

PA ROGERS, YES SIR: Next we come to discipline the behaviour of Brigadier SUPERMAN. Sub heading he proved disloyal to the command on the ground. He break the Kono Bank, He attacked and killed other RUF/ Soldiers .then he misused some fund for RUF movement. The First issue is when he proved disloyal.

FODAY SANKOH; Excuse me! I hope you will be brief.

PA ROGERS: I felt that since you left me on the ground with the exception of Pa Kallon we had elders. And one of them was me the Chairman of the council. I settled any confusion without any favour when the high command confirm such orders to do so. But with particular reference to Brigadier Superman, who was made Battle Group Commander in your absence by the Field Commander CDS because he had been making efforts. But when he was sent to

Kono he was not doing his work as required, Hence the CDS told us to call him and organise a better operation so that the area will not fall to the enemies. Superman refused to come, even though, this matter was referred to the war council to lookinti it. This was jotted down, so that we can deliberate on this issue that Superman had broken the structure you left behind.

FODAY SANKOH: Execute me! Superman is not the one that have disrupted the structure. Because of I had given instruction, Mosquito had no right to appoint neither Col .or a Major in my absence. He has no right! But that I will look into on future. I am not here for that at the moment. When you make a lot of promotion, that is, you have so many Brigadiers, so many Colonels so many what do you call them, you see it is difficult on that side to deal with it.

MOSQUITO: carry on Sir, I was just trying to explain. Does it mean that if you promote a person, he should not listen to you. That is ungratefulness or whatever you might called it. However, since you have said so about the command structure, we might have made mistakes but that will be corrected because we knows that even if we had gone astray you are there to correct us. What I had done, was to call him to resolve the matter.

FODAY SANKOH: I appointed you, Field Commander; Issa, Battle Field Commander; you have no right to give any appointment to superman. This has caused the problem, because you now know that this man is hard to control. Look at the man that you gave command. He is not fit to be a Battle Group commander so again! He is a problem to you Superman. He is not fit to be a Battle Field /group Commander.

MOSQUITO: But he is Senior

FODAY SANKOH! I know he is senior, let me tell you, but he is not fit to be a Battle Field Commander, because I know his attitude ,when I am there you can get him under control when I am not there, he is a problem. This is what I have said this appointment has caused the problem . One thing I noticed he had no respect for the man sitting down here. Yes, it is true! He has no respect for him. can you do that to your teacher even if you had superseded him.? But Superman had not being the cause of the problem. But Command Pa Rogers ,in the Army

you know that it is the peoples war. If you are appointing somebody, you must becareful. When they promoted me. I will continue to criticise and I will neither take any action nor charge anyone but when the time comes, we shall look into that. Superman to put him under control ,God will put him under control. His behaviour is important but also not important. Do you understand that? I thank you for all what you have done. But the command structure should have remained as it was. He promote some brigadier, when I do not the power and opportunity to promote a person Brigadier. Infact, in a peoples war all promotions stopped, at Colonel, Lt. Colonel, full Colonel that is all until the war ends. After the end of the war we can promote people.

FODAY SANKOH: Does anybody have anything to say against Superman:

ANOTHER SPEAKER: Yes Sir. In your absence, I was assigned with Brigadier Issa, until we moved from Buedu to Kono where we launched an operation up to Waterloo. We met the brothers from Freetown there we were expecting them to give their SLA report but they did not. On a certain day, C.O.ISSA asked Barry a newly elected commander in the presence of Superman, Bra Issa Gullet, and 55 about the SLA operation report. They did not give any SLA Ops reports or present anything nor did they gave any account about their manpower, and arms. There was confusion over this issue. At that moment we had to plans attack Tombo Village after Benguema. We went on that operation and returned on the next day we had to follow up on the issue concerning the Freetown operations. All they could tell us was they had freed the other brothers. Two or three days later, we arrested some SLAs with 600 U.S. Dollars and Thirteen millions Leones. These money was taken to Makeni with the SLAs. At night Superman attached us in Makeni and took away the money .During that period issa was in possession of some diamonds had from our mining activities at the kambia axis. This attack took place when the General sent me to bring along Bra Gibo C.O.Gibo.

FODAY SANKOH: GIBO?

SPEAKER: Yes Sir Gibo! He told us to bring Superman before him as he had called him on several occasion but he refused to come. And that the matter concern your business.

FODAY SANKOH: Who was that person?

SPEAKER: Gibo Sir Gibril Massaquoi was called on six different occasions to be briefed and he did not report. Therefore General Mosquito instructed Brigadier Issa to arrest Superman and escort him to Kailahun.

At that time, Superman, Brigadier 55 and others had left the front line, leaving Kallon behind without even informing others. I also left the front line on a vehicle with AA gun mounted on it and I met them at Gberay junction close to Lunsar. Although my vehicle had mechanical problems in Makeni, I later told Issa what had happened at the front-line. Late Mamba and I then left for Lunsar arrested Gibo the same night and placed him in the vehicle. C.O Issa told us to arrest C.O. Nya also. We went to the compound where C.O. Nya and C.O. Denis were residing. As we approached the entrance of the compound, we met Superman who told us that if any one of us enters his compound, he will shoot at us. Rambo and I began to move forward while saying that we have not come to him but to C.O Nya because C.O. Mosquito said he must report. We did not even step into his compound when he fired at us sporadically but before this. He took the commando mortar, loaded the bomb and launched it at us. Before his sporadic firing. I was at the middle of both parties; C.O Gibo was on one side, while C.O. Denise was on the other side. One person was killed among us as we scattered about. Since only seven of us went as a security to C.O. Issa, Superman Gibo, C.O.Nya came to Makeni, and raided our houses, took away all ammunitions and other materials as the civilians fled for their lives. We found out way back tthroughtMile91, Magburaka and then Makeni.. After a month, General Mosquito had to send to Issa, instructing that they should meet at waterside to discuss the issue. Mosquito advised Superman to forget about this raid. We left for Makeni again with some ammunition, and RPG rocket supplied by the General. As we arrived at night we had plans to run some operations along Bo-Makeni highway. Staff told me to get the trucks, fuel them and collect some man power from Masingbi, Sewafe and Cole town. That was our last mission. After which, Superman went and told us that you had instructed him to arrest Mosquito, C.O. Issa, Moses Kallon because he (Mosq uito) had refused to answer a telephone call you made to him and to obey your instruction. And that Mosquito should now take orders from him. He then attacked us from three

8048

flanks; he led the flanks that went to Rambo who had repelled a Kamajor attack at Mile 91. At night we had to retreat to as far as Masingbe. Later we went to Magburaka and freed our men that were arrested by Superman.

SANKOH: This command issue, even the soldiers are grumbling about it. And I will advise Rogers on this because this is the root of the matter.

PA ROGERS: whether I am here or not I will brief you better so that if you all want to carry on with the movement, you can do so. Alhamdurulai! As I was saying, everything is in the hands of God. We do not want to come in like that. Let us forget the business of Koroma, Superman etc. Look here, Pa Rogers ,if it happens that we form a Government, I will look firstly on who to appoint Minister. I will not start from those who have just joined us, but those who had struggled. Just imagine somebody from America may want to be appointed Minister. How will you feel about that? This man, do you all want to overlook him because of his body? I have noted that in my diary. This man had trained all of you. What ever he was doing when I promote, I always say he is not going to be a commander, but an overall adviser. Until I came back. If I did not send informing you that this man is deputy officer, can anybody know? He deserves that, because you are not objective.

Those people gave me command that I am deputy. They had wanted to use me but I know later. How can you do that to release three hundred soldiers from three of us? You could not even tell Foday Sankoh what Koroma said over the air that we are now friends. Yet you release all the Nigerians. Is that not so, even though we were in custody?

SPEAKER: Permit me to us these words. The son of a bastard, we shall kill them today. We tried to disarm him and place him into our car he had no alternative but to listen to top senior officers and briefed them that this is our position. We need assistance and back up.

In fact we were in Freetown. And every day we had to arrest one or two Colonel and place them in ... so it was.

Not too long, we began keeping them off, and then 98.1 radio station started announcing that a number of colonel had surrendered to them. You see? The

problem I am arriving at. This point is this. J.P made blunder sir. We made the blunder because by then we had appointed him when he was an officer in the Army. This he had to listen to the officers since he felt that they will support him, but they were fooling him. Do you understand sir? While there was total disintegration of the revolution. Pa Rogers can bear me witness. We went to J.P with General during which the General was explaining about all that was happening but with God, I managed to put it under control. The civilians were happy in such a way that they presented one drum of diesel to Rambo because he had repelled the Kamajor attack on Mile 91. Consequently, Rambo left for Makeni to report the incident to C.O Issa. Even though there was petrol and diesel scarcity, he did not report on the night of his arrival because he was too tired and needed rest. With the hope to see C.O Issa the next morning, but C.O. Superman attacked Makeni with four groups. He, Superman advanced to the house where Rambo was resting at opened fire at the entrance. In this way, Rambo was shot on his stomach. Superman then forced the door opened and told C Rambo that he is going to kill him, but Rambo pleaded that he should not kill him because Superman is his elder brother. That took him to that place. Superman later killed him. In addition to this, the other three groups led by Colonel T attached to Brigadier Mani, Colonel Gibo and colonel Kumba. Superman's operations commander attacked our base at D.O's barracks in Makeni, took all the ammunition, the next day, he called the civilians and apologised for what he has done. He told them that he had acted on military instruction given to him.

FODAY SANKOH: Instruction? When everybody heard me over the air. Did anyone of you hear me give that instruction?

SPEAKER? No Sir! He did that just to gain support and co-operation form the soldiers, even though there are some soldiers who had not entered Buedu since they pulled out of Freetown. They are still in the jungle. Therefore most of them are not aware of the CDS and the other brother's efforts.

FODAY SANKOH: why did not you go over the air to inform the people that what he had said was untrue?

SPEAKER: Yes sir. At that moment, we were under arrest; including C.O. Ibrahim, who was beaten and placed in cells after they advanced 42 miles further on to Matotoka ,from Matotoka to Makali. And all of us were taken to Magburaka Prison. That was why we were unable to refute that statement. At this point, J.P had wanted to say something but pa Rogers stopped him. He said please sir, you have to listen so that you will know how you have blundered. He said the accumulation of all the blunders have placed us in this position today. Hence he allowed us to blow our minds. Then from that point we turned to a new page. From all this, what I was trying to say is this. That from the onset, J.P was not one hundred percent of himself during the entire revolution. I was with him in prison. I launched the first revolution and I was arrested, placed in prison while others called on the international community, which forced them to free ten of us. When we came out, we launched another attack and freed them. Do you understand sir? This was how it all happened. Even when Ecomog entered Freetown. Gborie is not here today ,but I am saying this with the fear of God and my conscience we sat together with J.P and argued bitterly we told him that he should not allow the Nigeria ship to berth here. But Gborie argued again bittlerly that we need to gain international support. During that brief argument, Victor King the pilot who was executed was on my side. I asked them what was international community's business in this matter because when two Heads of State are in dispute and one has come to talk peace. It means this matter will be solvedon the table (NEGOTIATION). I told them that they should stay on their own side while we remain here. Finally they persuaded J.P who later allowed them to berth at government Wharf. And when they entered our territorial waters, they moved to the quay. He told them to come out of their ships with personal arms. What we saw were armoured cars, RPGs, motars, being offloaded from their ship. These are the mistakes that happened. By then his elder brother SFY Koroma was Chief of Defence Staff.

FODAY SANKOH: Chief of Defence Staff? Who made him Chief of Defence Staff?

SPEAKER: J.P appointed him because the former Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier Hassan Conteh was appointed by SLPP with Max Kanga. Although we had all kinds of pressures – blockade, sanction, embargo etc. and we proved ourselves to be a government as we ensured that we functioned everyday. Notwithstanding this, every day during our nine months, we must heard of missiles being launched, fighting near Freetown etc.With this scenario, we held our last meeting wherein C.O. Mike was the Director of Intelligence. He told us that our popularity has dwindled within the populace, because of "anti Revos" (our men) had been harassing them. For instance, some of them who felt that because they are around ''Leather Boot'' at certain deployment they should enjoy. But we picked our men based on their loyalty. When we felt that if we instructed someone, he obeyed us he is our comrades in struggle.

FODAY SANKOH: But why did you appoint Momoh adviser?

SPEAKER: I did not. In fact Momoh was not an adviser to me, but we needed him. Beside Paul Thomas you asked for had pulled out including others.

FODAY SANKOH: Where is Paul Thomas?

SPEAKER: He has gone. The problem was ,we needed Brigadier Mani, although that is still possible; because he is an old soldier, who can provide us with a formidable plan to enable us go on the offensive. But he refused to come when called on several occasions. His usual replied was that he preferred to stay with the men at the battle fronts as he put it, his men will leave their deployment if he is not there. This effort was appreciated but we needed him at the rear.

FODAY SANKOH: when this man refused to come, don't you know that he has hidden agenda? Even when I was talking to him, I gathered something from him. I am an experienced man and I will not say anything against him. He can be contained when I returned inside I will be in position to work with him because my mind has accepted him on certain issues.

Speakers' everybody was coming up with his own suggestions, while others were looting which later received condemnation from the international committee. What we were trying to do was to do things in order to gain some international praises. As they told us that the RUF have been roaming about killing people which was not true. In fact we had been praised for better behaviour than the Sierra Leone Army in

Freetown. Further, all the fighting that we had engaged in was to free you. All that had happened over there, we pray that you go back as there are lots of problem if we fail to found a solution to it, it will be hard for us to refuse the criticism against us since we all responsible.

ANOTHER SPEAKER : I want to talk to on behalf of the other Senior brothers. There had been problems with us in the bush. And this problem started after the merger between RUF and AFRC until we ended up in disarray. We are therefore informing you our leader so that you will know how this problem began. Firstly all what the other brothers have said is true and every body had been making frantic effort. But these mistakes happened because of the break in communication between you and the movement. And one lesson that I have learnt in this struggle is when the leadership is absent there is always a problem. The solution to this problems was done with the help of God through the good advise of Pa ROGERS . Dr. S.S WILLIAMS, and other elders. Finally we are happy to meet you today so that you could be in a better position to handle them when you return to the bush ..In this way, I will conclude by allowing you the external delegation to say some thing.

OMRIE GOLLEY: we all want our outside activities those come inside to be done simultaneously in a bit to unite our operations as our main concern was you release. Superimposed of all of these is the issue of bringing the RUF to international recognition and respectability. This was why we had worked so hard to achieve this objective. On our part, we have made a lot of efforts from London to Paris, from Paris to America,. from America back to the Sub-Region: to Burkina Faso, Togo, Nigeria, Liberia, and all other countries within the sub-region. Because I do not want to talk much, IBRAHIM will explain. The only thing I have to say is that the movement that you are now leading is a very, very good movement .Within the short time., I have been with the movement and meet with the brothers. I am convince that we are on the right way forward to bring peace to the country. We must therefore continue not only as a government but as a representative of the people of Sierra Leone. And all I was doing was to protect the image of the movement because I am not a Military man I cannot add more to this as every body contributed in their own individual way. I well not say I have worked more than MIKE LAMIN but the critical thing is that

we should continue to work and move forward as the outside forces are many especially the Sierra Leoneans are worst. They will talk to you nicely but when you are not around they will say the worst things about you that will actually cause not to sleep or even eat anything. But mistake that has been made, we will continue to live with it as we move forward. One thing JOSEPHINE has said that is very, very important that we are not the external delegations but all of us. Therefore while some of us has to leave other will be returning to their bases, so you have to explain to the brothers what you have seen and what has happened . Let us leave now because this is not the time to begin backbiting about what a person has done. Let us move forward not only to fight the enemies but to start preparing ourselves for governance. That is the name of the game we must fight and in this way put ourselves in a position to better ourselves and our people we have suffer for too long. We shall continue to fight to protect the name of the RUF to bring it to International recognition and respectability because of the negative things that has been done. We are very, very concern., we have lacked many things in and out of our movement that has really limit our work. Most of the things that we have done we did them in our own way, myself together with this man had lived in an hotel that we pay our bills including telephone bills ,one frank after another, when I told them why we cannot pay for huge bills. They told us we control all the diamond areas. Therefore we should have money, we had nothing with us at the time. The way we had worked IBRAHIM will explain but we need to find a way to resolve this problem. This money issue must be solved once and for all to let the movement proceeds forward. As we cannot proceed without money, we must try to send the money.

FODAY SANKOH: Has the movement reacted some where?

IBRAHIM: Talking about the military side of the situation first when the coup took place and when you instructed the brothers to join the AFRC our main helper in Burkina Faso was really annoyed. He told us that with his experience that is not going to succeed. It is difficult for a revolutionary leader to join another group in this kind of situation ……..

This discussion which was recorded by the RUF (with all participants speaking in the local Krio language) ended at this point.

1.085

BATTLE FIELD COMMANDER - RUFSL

00015487

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS.

2nd December, 1998.

FORUM WITH THE EXTERNAL DELEGATES LED BY THE OF DEFENCE STAFF.

This meeting was summoned by the High Command Brigadier Sam Bockarie (CDS-RUFSL) inorder to acquaint members present with report on the external mission they went on. Venue-water works and time was 1323 HRS GMT.

In attendance were:

1. Brigadier Sam Bockarie
2. Mr. S.Y.B Rogers
3. Col. Edward Kanneh
4. Maj. Lawrence Womandia
5. Major Junior Vandi
6. Maj. Mohamed S. Banya
7. Lt. Col. Rashid Sandi - External delegates
. Col. I.H. Sesay RFC and members of various units were also in attendance.

The meeting was opened with a short Muslim and Christian prayers.

The Chairman CDS- Brigadier Sam Bockarie welcomed every one who attended the forum. He told us all that the forum was intended to brief us on the mission they had gone through. The CDS appointed Mr. SYB Rogers to give a salute report about the mission.

Mr. SYB Rogers extended his heart felt thanks to all persons in attendance. Pa Rogers wasted no time to tell us the mission was a very big success through our blessings and co-operation. A ccording to Mr. SYB Rogers, this plan of sending out people to seek our welfare at the international front at hand. Many of these people failed us but God Almight blessed this very outstanding effort made by the CDS and indeed the success was very great interms of what they were able to receive. Mr. SYB Rogers stated further that since the 1997, May 25 coup, RUFSL was invited to join our brothers(AFRC)but he lamented that the MERGER was unsuccessful because there was no common understanding or ideology. He reiterated that indeed "God is behind our movement so that we shall not be disgraced". He admonished that we must reckon with the efforts played by the high command when it deserves praise. It is the sole right of the senior command structure and all combatants to defend the civilians. This is the reason why he, as Chairman of the

Peoples War Council and an elder among us he confirmed it as his primary duty to advise and educate the higher authorities as to what they must do. Let no one feel or say that Brigadier Mosquito is doing things on his own, we must come together and consult even with ourselves and the high command on problems we don't understand". Pa SYB Rogers pledged his sincere thanks and credit to the CDS for his leading role in the external mission they went on: Indeed the CDS' effort was very excellent. Pa SYB Rogers noted with profound gratitude the effort applied by our host govt. on the other side for granting us the in-let and exit facilities even with escort. It was very suprising to note that according to Pa SYB Rogers, most heads of States have been thinking that the RUF/SL had been in disaray since the kidnapping of our Dear Leader. It was therfore good and a blessing in disguise to us all that the young Brigadier himself, who has held the garrison strongly against the enemies went to see some of the Heads of State in person. According to Pa Rogers, both the CDS and himself paid a courtesy call on his Excellency C.A.T. To every body's delight, there are friendly countries who have been wishing to receive serious minded people that will seek RUF/SL interest abroad.. Pa Rogers lamented that we were disappointed by most of the past external delegates who squandered RUFSL funds and made no head way so as to open our way to success . 'They have met their fate' says Pa. Rogers. "The people's Sin has fallen on them". The missions extended to Burkinafasso where they (delegates) were warmly received and attended to. All discussions with the Burkinabey authorities were highly fruitful. There was however a diplomatic test on the CDS to prove his ability and seriousness as commander on the ground. The CDS behaved excellently and maturedly to the admiration of his excellency, Campore . The Brigadier has done a very historic job for the RUFSL movement. He has signed a rich contract for us and with our support, given to him and the movement, we shall do every thing possible to promote this struggle. The WAR COUNCIL Chairman made it public that people have been meeting him on the note that the CDS is intending to take the leader's power, According to Pa Rogers, he advised every one not to think of the CDS in that way. He Pa SYB Rogers told us that he has examined the Brigadier in and out and has not suspected the least of such intention in the Brigadier. We must give the Brigadier all fervent support, so as to encourage him (Brigadier) for his great sacrifice. Pa Rogers concluded by thanking Col. Issa Sesay the RPC/Ag. CDS and all authorities who held the ground and frontlines strongly while the CDS and delegates were out.

Next to speak was Col. Eddie Kanneh (SLA Rep). The young Colonel thanked every body for their courage to attend the forum. According to the Colonel, all the trip was very successful. He dilated on how at several times he faced embarrassement on account of his association and deep commitment to the RUFSL. He made us understand that since his familiarity with our Brigadier or CDS, he, (Col. E. Kanneh) sees the CDS as a man who does not want to get involved into politics and that he has known the CDS to be far sighted person who can predict with possible results. He therefore asked all and sundry not to picture the CDS the way, other people are classing him to be (i.e Power Hungry). He warned that there must be solidarity among us all. He commanded Pa SYB Rogers for his fatherly part he is playing in the movement. Col. Issah Sesay for his gallant part he played in the absence of the CDS for keeping the ground under control. He asked us to remember outstanding external friends of this movement like General Abraham. "Let us mobilize, unite, be conscious" and "I leave a general warning that no one must take revolution lightly to avoid subversion. We must care for the junior ranks and I hope and pray that this movement shall continue to live and prosper in good fate" - concluded the young Colonel. The Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier Sam Bockarie buttressed the speeches of Pa SYB Rogers and Col. Eddie Kanneh. He threw light on some important things however for the general understanding of those who attended the meeting. In the first place, the CDS told us that they were not financially strong to make the trip as successful as it turned out to be. He said that in the first attempt, they stopped half way and heard about the shocking news on Focus about the trial and Death sentance passed on our Father and Leader Cpl. Foday S. Sankoh. The CDS made hasty preparation and returned back to the brothers as [illegible] to launch offensives against the govt. of Tejan Kabba for the release of our Leader. The CDS congratulated Col. Jungle and General Abraham for their sincerity and honesty in delivering the parcels that were given to them for our father across. The CDS said the father showed him the parcels and said that he was keeping the parcel until we eater and get more so as to be able to purchase reasonable quantity of whatever we want. The CDS reiterated that if we work hard and remain united, victory will be on our side" According to the CDS, he took along Major Lawrance Womandia because he can speak

French and it was the delegates intention to visit France - Countries and even Libya. The CDS said due to copious arrangements Col. Eddie and Pa Rogers had at hand he did not hope he would see them to make the trip as planned but "God Greatly Helped Us, we . . Pa Rogers and Col. Eddie and we made the trip together". The CDS concluded that the trip was a big success on the whole. The Brigadier told the forum that he was able to formally hand over our struggle and petition about our Leader to the President of Burkina Faso, who is the current Chairman of O.A.U so that as O.A.U Chairman, he will step in and mediate Peace between us and the SLPP govt. He warned that now is the time to work together to secure the release of our Leader and to avoid funny things like gossips that will lead to disunity among us. The CDS admonished and placed a curse on any one who should plan to mismanage the small logistics they had laid down their lives for in the interest of the struggle. The Brigadier informed us that he went with a two and half carats (2½ carats) diamond and some other items which he gave as present to a senior security - Benjamin inorder to facilitate easy access to all chances for the undelayed success of our mission. The CDS concluded by thanking every boby both missionaries and these who .

The Battle Field Commander - Col. Issa Sesay thanked the delegates. He promised that we shall put our efforts together to consolidate our strength for victory. We are to strike for the release of our Leader and the victory of our movement. "A commando will feel good when he attacks and captures rather than been called to join with others - it will make no prospect". The Field Commander extended many Blessings to all those who joined the CDS to bring us the expected good which will bring success for us all. Col. Isaac Marego thanked the CDS and delegates for their grand effort. He advised every body to work hand in hand for the victory of RUFSL. We are not fighting for Pa Sankoh or the Brigadier but our selves and our country Sierra Leone for victory and peace. This the RUFSL Leader has been telling us all along.

Col. Mike Lamin, thanked the CDS and the delegates who went with him on the mission. "We as RUFSL must consider this gesture as a brilliant challange and we must do some thing impressively in return of the challenge". He warned that we must not talk on how the material was channelled to our base for security reason.

[redacted]

8058

00015491

Col. Moris Kallon - Thanked the CDS and delegates for the great effort. He stated in the first place that for the person or persons who go about saying that the CDS wants to take the Leadership of RUFSL, Col. Kallon noted that except such people do not construct them selves in a way to be understood without grudge or malice but the second in command appointment was given to the CDS by our Leader himself and that it is natural that he shall succeed our Leader after long years of the Leaders services to the movement and the Nation. He compared a combatant's risk of life to that of an external delegates own, by which he stated that the laters own risk of life was far more greater than the combatant because he does not know the enemines around him. Col. Kallon warned all persons to put to good use what the CDS has fought hard to get for the movement.

Chiefdom Commander, J.P Samuka thanked the CDS and delegate and prayed for God's blessing for them. He juxta-posed Tejan Kabba God hearing prayers as a chance now gracefully given to the RUFSL.

Pastor A lpha on behalf of the Christian group thanked the CDS and delegates. He threw in a proverb which says "Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown". He prayed fervently to Almighty God for our senior officers, junior officers, against the enemies and grand success of the RUFSL. Pastor A lpha invoked the spirits of Tabaraka and Jeheja, the Great God.

Mgor E. Collins stated that the CDS was killed two birds with one stone ie solved Political and military Problems. The CDS announced a senior officers meeting from where arrangements were to be done for full scale operations.

Meeting ended in harmony.

Signed: [signature] 9/11/98
Joint Security Rep.

cc: CDS - RUFSL.
NPC "
War Council "
Col. Mike "
Overall M.P & ELC Commander
File.

[redacted]

00023262

1.145 Q59



8060

...e probe will be

...further revealed
...ness activities
...on will resume

...the news of the
... a workshop
...g conducted at
...as disrupted

...ion's employees
... were running
...ng for safety,
...ty personnel
...ire building.

... also attracted
...lookers at the
... corporation's
...ne people were
... groups.
... described the
... the work of
... he said, are
...rupt the level of
...bility in the
...called it an ...
...tage.
...n blamed LTC
...l who she said,
...ionally ...
... information
... an atmosphere
...onrovia.

He said, though Liberia is small, for many years, it advanced the cause for African liberation and aided many sons of Africa, noting, "Liberia has never neglected her role".

Horror In Freetown



President Tylor [illegible]

Horror and [illegible] have taken over [illegible] the political capital of Sierra Leone as AFRC/RUF rebels [illegible] from the city [illegible] the country.

A [illegible]

relations and closer [illegible] the new Head of State of [illegible] Gen. Abdulsalami [illegible]

President Taylor [illegible] international relations [illegible] remarkable [illegible]

Court's [illegible]

also abducting [illegible] including [illegible] Priest and [illegible]

The [illegible] people [illegible] areas are [illegible] shortage of [illegible] other urgently [illegible] items.

Network Africa [illegible] that a [illegible] Liberian [illegible]

1.268
8061

00031406

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Monrovia, Liberia

Government Announcement

The Ministry of Justice has observed with much concern that Used Car Dealers in Monrovia and other parts of Liberia are engaged in the habit of clearing vehicles from the Port of Monrovia and other ports of entry without clearance from the Ministry of Justice.

The Ministry of Justice therefore warns, that hereafter, any Used Car Dealer or person otherwise engaged in such illegal act will be arrested and vehicle(s) impounded... The offender will thereafter be prosecuted in a Court of Law.

This notice services as a due and timely warning.

Sgd.

Cllr. Eddington A. Varmah
ATTORNEY GENERAL/MINISTER OF JUSTICE, R.L.

Ministry of Justice MONROVIA
January 23, 1999

ambassadors and honorary consuls, who are political appointees.

Liberia's aspirations, beliefs and interests, President Taylor said, remain the determining factors in the conduct of foreign relations. " These national interests are and will remain the perpetuation and preservation of principles which guided Liberia's international relations."

Namely, the sovereignty of all states, strict compliance with the Charters of the United Nations, the OAU ECOWAS, Mano River Union (MRU), the Principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as all international conventions to which Liberia is a signatory, he told the lawmakers.

Horror

in areas under the Tejan Kabah Government are now with worship services, BBC further disclosed.

However, the spokesman for AFRC/RUF rebels pointed out that they are not responsible for what is happening in that country.

1.148

DAILY TIMES

VOL. 2 NO. 19 FRIDAY FEBRUARY 20, 1998 MONROVIA, LIBERIA PRICE: $20

In S/Leone:

52 BURNED ALIVE

• As Junta Goes On Rampage

[illegible]

At the Port of Freetown, youths and other supporters of the junta are said to have vandalized the facility to the point where it has become inoperable, with communications equipment, electricity and other essential services having been destroyed or looted. As a result, there is no way for the port to communicate with vessels on the high lines.

Other facilities looted or destroyed include the warehouses of Medicines Sans Frontieres and other international NGOs.

Radio reports monitored by this [illegible] said ECOMOG [illegible]

[illegible] ON PAGE [illegible]

Bright Future Awaits LEC

A four-man delegation from Stewart & Stevenson International and Midland Power Int'l Company, two electrical companies based in the United States and Great Britain respectively,



SAMUEL BURNETTE have been holding discussions with the Management of the Liberia Electricity Corporation (LEC) on the possible rehabilitation of the corporation's system.

While here, the delegation explored the possibility of improving facilities of the LEC to provide electricity on a regular basis [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] according to their areas and greatest known [illegible]

NAME	AREA	GREATEST DEPTH
Pacific Ocean	64,000,000 sq. miles	[illegible] feet
Atlantic Ocean	31,815,000 " "	[illegible] "
Indian Ocean	25,300,000 " "	24,460 "
Arctic Ocean	5,440,200 " "	18,456 "
Mediterranean Sea	1,145,100 " "	15,197 "
Caribbean Sea	1,049,500 " "	22,778 "
South China Sea	895,400 " "	18,458 "
Bering Sea	884,900 " "	15,859 "
Gulf of Mexico	615,000 " "	12,425 "
Okhotsk Sea	613,800 " "	12,001 "

FAMILY

[illegible]

them, identified only as 'Skiddie', refused to pay after being served, adding, 'One Vai boy owns this gas station. He's too lazy, but we will deal with him,' she recalled.

[illegible]

COMPUTER

continuing with the JJ Ross High School and the College of West Africa (CWA), to be followed by meetings with other learning institutions.

Mr. Kollie said it was necessary that [illegible] be computer-[illegible] in view of the [illegible] of the age of [illegible] technology. A [illegible] by [illegible] Mr. Kollie [illegible] to [illegible] who the [illegible] in the [illegible] Colleges [illegible]

[illegible] the U.S.A. [illegible] the [illegible] organs need to provide [illegible] and continuous power generation, which are [illegible] essential for the growth and development of the country's overall electrical system.

Other members of the delegation included Mr. Glover and Mr. Wendell L. Wilson, both of Houston, Texas, U.S.A.

While in the country, the delegation was also expected to pay courtesy calls on President Charles Taylor, National Bank Governor Charles Bright, Finance Minister Elie Saleeby and United States Chief of Mission William Milan.

GD/KRU

address the problem until now due to the pressing problems of food sustenance, displacement, returning refugees and resettlement.

Since the coming to power of the NPP-led government, however, mechanisms have been put into place designed to [illegible]

[illegible]

The Captain of the Stingers, Aaron Problah, who received the Perkins Trophy on behalf of his team, is expected to formally present it to the management of CFA this Saturday.

NDDC

Works, has denied culpability on a number of occasions.

Besides the money, the former fighters say 200 bags of rice were given to Mr. Kamara to be distributed among them, but the rice was siphoned by him and his cohorts, something which Mr. Kamara has vehemently denied.

The AFC has therefore recommended that the [illegible] and subsequently dissolved, and that those found guilty of misdeporation or [illegible]

He

Vol. 2 No. [illegible]

In Sierra Leone

Massacre Agai

As mercenaries still flood in

The disintegrated empire of the [illegible] command of Samba Bockarie, [illegible] behind a heap of corpses as [illegible] loyal to him have now [illegible]



Islamic Associ[illegible] to Aid Liber[illegible]

[illegible]



[illegible]

LTC Unveils Plans

[illegible]

1.156
8065

SIERRA LEONE

350 Fifth Ave 34th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
http://www.hrw.org
(212) 290-4700

Vol. 15, No. 1 (A) – January 2003



A woman receives psychological and medical treatment in a clinic to assist rape victims in Freetown. In January 1999, she was gang-raped by seven revels in her village in northern Sierra Leone. After raping her, the rebels tied her down and placed burning charcoal on her body. (c) 1999 Corinne Dufka/Human Rights Watch

I was captured together with my husband, my three young children and other civilians as we were fleeing from the RUF when they entered Jaiweii. Two rebels asked to have sex with me but when I refused, they beat me with the butt of their guns. My legs were bruised and I lost my three front teeth. Then the two rebels raped me in front of my children and other civilians. Many other women were raped in public places. I also heard of a woman from Kalu village near Jaiweii being raped only one week after having given birth. The RUF stayed in Jaiweii village for four months and I was raped by three other wicked rebels throughout this period.

-Testimony to Human Rights Watch

"WE'LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY"
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

1630 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, DC 20009
TEL (202) 612-4321
FAX (202) 612-4333
E-mail: hrwdc@hrw.org

2nd Floor, 2-12 Pentonville Road
London N1 9HF, UK
TEL: (44 20) 7713 1995
FAX: (44 20) 7713 1800
E-mail: hrwuk@hrw.org

15 Rue Van Campenhout
1000 Brussels, Belgium
TEL (32 2) 732-2009
FAX (32 2) 732-0471
E-mail: hrwbe@hrw.org

I. SUMMARY

Throughout the armed conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2001, thousands of women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, including individual and gang rape, and rape with objects such as weapons, firewood, umbrellas, and pestles. Rape was perpetrated by both sides, but mostly by the rebel forces. These crimes of sexual violence were generally characterized by extraordinary brutality and frequently preceded or followed by other egregious human rights abuses against the victim, her family, and her community. Although the rebels raped indiscriminately irrespective of age, they targeted young women and girls whom they thought were virgins. Many of these younger victims did not survive these crimes of sexual violence. Adult women were also raped so violently that they sometimes bled to death or suffered from tearing in the genital area, causing long-term incontinence and severe infections. Many victims who were pregnant at the time of rape miscarried as a result of the sexual violence they were subjected to, and numerous women had their babies torn out of their uterus as rebels placed bets on the sex of the unborn child.

Thousands of women and girls were abducted by the rebels and subjected to sexual slavery, forced to become the sex slaves of their rebel "husbands." Abducted women and girls who were assigned "husbands" remained vulnerable to sexual violence by other rebels. Many survivors were kept with the rebel forces for long periods and gave birth to children fathered by rebels. Some abducted women and girls were forcibly conscripted into the fighting forces and given military training, but even within the rebel forces, women still held much lower status and both conscripted and volunteer female combatants were assigned "husbands." For civilian abductees, aside from sexual violence their brutal life with the rebels included being made to perform forced labor, such as cooking, washing, carrying ammunition and looted items, as well as farm work. Combatants within the rebel forces had considerable latitude to do what they wanted to abducted civilians, who were often severely punished for offenses as minor as spilling water on a commander's shoes. Escape for these women and girls was often extremely difficult: In many instances, the women and girls, intimidated by their captors and the circumstances, felt powerless to escape their life of sexual slavery, and were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, "as it was war." The rebels sometimes made escape more difficult by deliberately carving the name of their faction onto the chests of abducted women and girls. If these marked women and girls were caught by pro-government forces, they would be suspected of being rebels, and often killed. Even though many women did manage to escape, some escaped from one rebel faction or unit only to be captured by another. An unknown number of women and girls still remain with their rebel "husbands," although the war was declared over on January 18, 2002.

The main perpetrators of sexual violence, including sexual slavery, were the rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the AFRC. Human Rights Watch has documented over three hundred cases of sexual violence by the rebels; countless more have never been documented. From the launch of their rebellion from Liberia in March 1991, which triggered the war, the RUF perpetrated widespread and systematic sexual violence. Its ideology of salvaging Sierra Leone from the corrupt All People's Congress (APC) regime quickly degenerated into a campaign of violence whose principal aim was to gain access to the country's abundant diamond mines. The AFRC, which consisted of disaffected soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who in May 1997 overthrew the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, were also responsible for subjecting thousands of women and girls to sexual violence, including sexual slavery. After the signing of the peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, in July 1999, sexual violence, including sexual slavery, continued unabated in RUF-controlled areas and was also perpetrated by the West Side Boys, who operated outside of the capital, Freetown. The human rights situation worsened after the May 2000 crisis when fighting broke out again, until relative peace was re-established, with U.N. and British assistance, by mid-2001. The prevalence of sexual violence peaked during active military operations and when the rebels were on patrol. Even in times of relative peace, however, sexual violence continued to be committed against the thousands of women and girls who were abducted and subjected to sexual slavery by the rebels. No region of Sierra Leone was spared.

Human Rights Watch has documented only a limited number of cases of sexual violence by pro-government forces, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the militia known as Civil Defense Forces (CDF), the latter consisting

of groups of traditional hunters and young men who were called upon by the government to defend their native areas. Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of sexual violence by the SLA prior to 1997. This may in part be due to the fact that survivors would have often found it difficult to distinguish between rebel and government soldiers, as the latter frequently colluded with and disguised themselves as RUF forces. Sexual violence was committed relatively infrequently by the CDF, whose internal rules forbid them from having sexual intercourse before going to battle and who believe their power and potency as warriors depends upon sexual abstinence. Some of this internal discipline, however, was lost as CDF moved away from their native areas and traditional chiefs and were given more responsibility in national security. Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of rape by the largest and most powerful CDF group, the Kamajors, who operate predominantly in the south and east.

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of sexual violence by peacekeepers with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), including the rape of a twelve-year-old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean contingent and the gang rape of a woman by two Ukrainian soldiers near Kenema. There appears to be reluctance on the part of UNAMSIL to investigate and take disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. Reports of rape by peacekeepers with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the majority of whom were Nigerian, deployed at an earlier stage in the war, were rare. Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women, including the solicitation of child prostitutes, whilst deployed in Sierra Leone.

Rape in wartime is an act of violence that targets sexuality. Moreover, conflict-related sexual violence serves a military and political strategy. The humiliation, pain, and fear inflicted by the perpetrators serve to dominate and degrade not only the individual victim but also her community. Combatants who rape in war often explicitly link their acts of sexual violence to this broader social degradation. The armed conflict in Sierra Leone was no exception. The rebels sought to dominate women and their communities by deliberately undermining cultural values and community relationships, destroying the ties that hold society together. Child combatants raped women who were old enough to be their grandmothers, rebels raped pregnant and breastfeeding mothers, and fathers were forced to watch their daughters being raped.

To date there has been no accountability for the thousands of crimes of sexual violence or other appalling human rights abuses committed during the war in Sierra Leone. The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement included a blanket amnesty under Sierra Leonean law for offenses committed by all sides, as the price for the RUF/AFRC agreeing to lay down arms. The United Nations (U.N.) stated that it did not recognize the Lomé amnesty insofar as it purported to apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Two important transitional justice mechanisms, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) have been established with U.N. assistance and are tasked with investigating the human rights abuses, including sexual violence and sexual slavery, committed by all parties during the war. Both bodies were operational by the third quarter of 2002. The SCSL, a hybrid national and international court, is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law" committed in the Sierra Leonean conflict since November 30, 1996. As the SCSL is likely to try only a very limited number of persons, due to funding constraints, a clear and comprehensive prosecutorial strategy is essential, with a strong affirmation that gender-related crimes will be thoroughly and competently investigated and rigorously prosecuted as crimes against humanity or war crimes. The TRC, provided for under the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement partially to offset the controversial amnesty it also included, has the mandate to establish an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law from the outset of the war in 1991, promote reconciliation, and make recommendations aimed at preventing a repetition of the violations committed. The final report on the findings of the TRC should highlight the crimes of sexual violence committed throughout the entire country during the armed conflict and make recommendations to strengthen the promotion and protection of women's human rights.

reinstated. Over the succeeding months ECOMOG forces were able to establish control over roughly two-thirds of the country, including all regional capitals: as of mid-1998, the ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone was composed of approximately 12,500 troops, predominantly Nigerian with support battalions from Guinea, Gambia, Ghana and Niger.[17] Sankoh was transferred to Sierra Leone from Nigeria and incarcerated in July 1998. In October 1998, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone tried and sentenced Sankoh to death for his role in the 1997 coup.

Once expelled from Freetown, the AFCR/RUF rebels tried to consolidate their own positions in other parts of the country. The Kabbah government, which had negligible forces of its own, had to rely on ECOMOG to stay in power. Through a series of offensives, the RUF/AFRC managed to gain control of the diamond-rich Kono district and several other strategic towns and areas. By late 1998, the rebels had gained the upper hand militarily and were in control of over half of the country, including all the mineral-rich areas. From this position, the RUF/AFRC launched a major offensive on Freetown in January 1999.

The battle for Freetown and ensuing three-week rebel occupation of the capital were characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of a wide range of abuses against the civilian population, and marked the most intensive and concentrated period of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in Sierra Leone's ten-year civil war. At least five thousand civilians were killed and one hundred civilians had limbs amputated, including twenty-six double arm amputations. Thousands of women and girls, including girls as young as eight, were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence. In addition, the rebels used civilians as human shields, both while advancing towards ECOMOG positions and as a defense against ECOMOG air power. They also burnt whole neighborhoods, often with the residents in their houses.

Government and the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces also committed serious human rights abuses, though on a lesser scale, including over 180 summary executions of rebels and their suspected collaborators. Prisoners taken by ECOMOG, some of who had surrendered and many of whom were wounded, were executed on the spot often with little or no effort to establish their guilt or innocence. Officers to the level of captain were present and participated in the executions. ECOWAS officials have yet to initiate a formal investigation into these killings.

As the RUF/AFRC were driven out of Freetown in February 1999, they abducted thousands of civilians, who were used to carry looted goods and ammunition, forcibly conscripted into fighting or used for forced labor. Thousands of girls and women were used as sex slaves by the rebels and forced to "marry" rebel husbands. As they moved eastward, the rebels continued to commit egregious human rights abuses, including killings and amputations, particularly in the villages around the towns of Masiaka, Lunsar, and Port Loko.[18]

In the months following the January invasion, and as a result of intense international pressure, Kabbah's government and RUF rebels signed a ceasefire agreement on May 18, 1999,[19] followed by a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, on July 7, 1999.[20] Sankoh was released from prison by the Sierra Leonean government to participate in the peace negotiations. The accord, brokered by the U.N., the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and ECOWAS, committed the RUF/AFRC to lay down its arms in exchange for representation in a new government. Sankoh was given the chairmanship of the board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) and the status of vice-president.[21] Johnny Paul Koroma was made the chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), provided for under Article 6 of the peace agreement.[22]

---

[17] *See* Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol.10, No. 3 (A), July 1998.

[18] *See* Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape," for a comprehensive report on the January 1999 invasion.

[19] *See* the annex to U.N. Security Council report, S/1999/585, May 18, 1999.

[20] Lomé Peace Agreement at http://sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.

[21] Article 5 (2) of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

[22] The RUF delegation to the peace talks in Lomé included members of the AFRC who were also appointed as ministers as part of the agreement to share power.

The human rights situation continued to improve in 2002, with the disarmament and demobilization phases declared completed. By January 2002, 47,710 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized. On January 18, 2002, the armed conflict was officially declared to be over in a public ceremony attended by many dignitaries. In addition, the state of emergency was lifted for the first time in four years on February 28, 2002. Following the end of the state of emergency, the government charged Sankoh, and the other RUF and West Side Boys members held in custody since May 2000, with a number of crimes, including murder and related charges. The resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees from Guinea and Liberia was ongoing as of the writing of this report. By July 2002, approximately 250,000 refugees and IDPs had been resettled. The RUF transformed itself into a political party and nominated presidential and parliamentary candidates for elections held on May 14, 2002.

In the elections, President Kabbah's SLPP was re-elected for a second term and faced the challenge of rebuilding the country and its economy. After a decade of war, Sierra Leone ranks last out of 162 countries in terms of life expectancy at birth; adult literacy; combined enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education; and GDP per capita.[31] Fifty-seven percent of Sierra Leone's population struggles to survive on only U.S. $1 per day.[32] Unemployment is rampant and the current economy is driven by the presence of UNAMSIL and other international organizations. Investors who could create desperately needed jobs remain cautious given the rampant corruption that permeates all levels of Sierra Leonean society and their concerns about regional security.

Women and Girls under Sierra Leonean Law

The Sierra Leonean Legal system

Three systems of law—general, customary, and Islamic—co-exist in Sierra Leone.

General Law

General law consists of the statutory law (codified) and common law (based on case law) mainly inherited from the United Kingdom, the former colonial power. General law is administered through the formal court system, which follows the usual Commonwealth structure, under which the High Court hears more important cases, and magistrates courts the less important ones, both civil and criminal. There is an appeal system, first to the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court, which is the ultimate court of appeal and also hears cases relevant to the interpretation of the constitution. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court are located in Freetown. A High Court and magistrates courts are constituted in Freetown. The High Court was re-established in Kenema and Bo in 2002 and there are magistrates courts in Bo, Kenema and Port Loko.[33] The court system in the provinces, which had a limited infrastructure before the war broke out in 1991, was virtually destroyed during the war—the High Court has not held hearings outside Freetown for six years—and was only gradually being rehabilitated from 2002. Access to the judiciary for rural Sierra Leoneans is further limited by their lack of funds for lawyers, or even transport money.

Only a small number of women, primarily those who reside in the Western Area (where Freetown is located) and women with sufficient funds, have access to the formal court system. As many general law provisions have not been updated since colonial days, the protection that general law affords women is often only marginally better than that provided under customary or Islamic law.

Customary Law

Customary law is defined by the 1991 constitution as "the rules of law by which customs are applicable to particular communities in Sierra Leone."[34] Although there are sixteen ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, a general treatment of customary law is justified, as there are many fundamental similarities between the customary laws of

[31] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 141-144.
[32] Ibid., p. 151.
[33] An itinerant judge covers the High Court in both Bo and Kenema.
[34] The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter XII - The Laws of Sierra Leone, Section 170 (3). *See* http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-xii.html.

these ethnic groups.[35] Customary law has not been written down or codified and is only applied by the local courts. [36] These courts operate in the provinces and not in the Western Area, which is historically where the Krio and the British colonizers settled. A chairman presides over the local courts with the assistance of chiefdom councilors who are knowledgeable in customary law. The chairmen in theory should be independent from the paramount chiefs who used to preside over the local courts before reforms were introduced both prior to and after independence.[37] Customary law officers who are trained lawyers are supposed to review decisions of local courts and provide training to the personnel of local courts. The government Law Officers' Department, however, remains chronically understaffed, and few of the customary law officers' posts are filled.

As the majority of Sierra Leoneans live in the provinces, customary law governs at least 65 percent of the population in relation to issues not reserved by statute to the magistrates courts or High Court. In practice, issues that should be dealt with in the magistrates courts and High Court are also dealt with under customary law. In addition to problems accessing the formal court system, rural Sierra Leoneans, in particular, have historically always preferred to administer justice amongst themselves to ensure that good community relations are maintained in villages where the other residents are invariably relatives by marriage or descent, rather than turning to outsiders.

Although customary law is not applied in the formal court system, it is recognized and there is some interaction between the two systems. There is the right of appeal from the local courts to the District Appeal Court, where a magistrate sits with two assessors who are chiefdom councilors from the given area of the local court and are knowledgeable about the customary law in their respective areas.[38] The assessors advise the magistrate on questions of customary law, with the decision remaining with the magistrate. Likewise, a decision of the District Appeal Court can be appealed to the High Court, with the High Court judge being advised by assessors with expertise in customary law.[39]

Islamic Law

Islamic law has been recognized by statute in Sierra Leone in relation to marriage, divorce, and inheritance among Muslims.[40] Otherwise, Islamic law, if applicable at all, is considered part of customary law. In this report, Islamic law is therefore treated as part of customary law except when referring to the specific areas dealt with by the Mohammedan Marriage Act, and cases involving Islamic law are heard by the local courts. Criminal *sharia* law is not applicable in Sierra Leone.

Constitutional Status of Women

In theory, Sierra Leonean women are granted equal rights to men under the 1991 constitution, which provides as one of the "fundamental principles of state policy" that the state "... [s]hall discourage discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, sex, religion,...."[41] The equal rights of women are again underscored in the human rights chapter of the constitution.[42] Under Section 27 of the constitution, however,

---

[35] H. M. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law* (Freetown: Atlantic Printers Ltd., 1983), p. 6.

[36] *See* 1963 Local Courts Act.

[37] Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest*, p. 46.

[38] Section 29 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act and Section 76 of the 1965 Courts Act.

[39] Section 31 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act.

[40] The Mohammedan Marriage Act (Cap. 96 of the revised laws of Sierra Leone, 1960) deals with marriage, divorce, and intestate succession. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 20. Intestate successions occur when the deceased did not leave a will.

[41] The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter II – Fundamental Principles of State Policy, Section 6 (2). *See* http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-ii.html. Under Section 8 (2) (a), "... [e]very citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations, and opportunities before the law...." and specific safeguards of equality before the law in terms of health care, employment and education are provided under Section 8 (3) (d); Section 8 (3) (a), (c), (e) and Section 9 (1) (a), (b) and (2) respectively.

[42] Ibid., Chapter III - The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, Section 15. *See* http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-iii.html. Section 15 provides that "every person in Sierra Leone is entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, has the right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public

discrimination is permitted, *inter alia*, under laws dealing with "adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law," which have direct bearing on the rights of women, as well as under customary law.[43] This important contradiction in the constitution—similar to that in many African constitutions—has contributed to the low status of women in Sierra Leone, as it legitimizes the application of discriminatory customary law. No protection from discriminatory customary law can be sought under the constitution on the basis of sex. Customary and Islamic laws also continue to be widely applied, notwithstanding the fact that legislation provides that general law should prevail over customary law when customary law is "repugnant to statute or natural justice, equity, and good conscience."[44]

Marriage

The rights of married women remain limited, particularly for those married under customary and Islamic laws, which govern most marriages. Women married under the general law have comparatively more rights.[45]

A married woman's position under customary law is comparable to that of a minor: a woman is generally represented by her husband who has the right to prosecute and defend actions on his spouse's behalf.[46] Sierra Leonean women can gain status through marriage as well as through their role as mothers: a woman's status within society and the polygynous household increases with the number of children she bears. Sierra Leone has one of the highest birth rates in the world, with the average number of children born to each woman estimated at 6.5.[47] Most households are polygynous, apart from the monogamous Christians (approximately 30 percent of the population); under customary law, a husband can marry as many wives as he wishes. Muslims (60 percent of the population) can marry up to four wives.

Under customary law, a girl is considered of marriageable age once her breasts have developed, her menses have started and she has been initiated, which could mean as young as twelve. Marriages are usually arranged, and the consent of the bride-to-be is not considered essential in most ethnic groups, but the consent of the girl's/woman's family is required.[48] The fact that a girl is considered "ready" for marriage at such a young age and her consent is not sought has contributed to the common practice of early forced marriages. Men wishing to marry do not need to seek consent from their own parents. The statutory age of marriage under general law is twenty-one years.

---

interest, to each and all of the following—(a) life, liberty, security of person, the enjoyment of property, and the protection of law; (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; (c) respect for private and family life, and (d) protection from deprivation of property without compensation."

[43] Ibid., Section 27. Subsection 27 (1) provides that "Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5), and (7), no law shall make provision which is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect." Under Subsection 4, however, the protection provided under Subsection 1 does not apply "... (d) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law, or (e) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe or customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons." Discrimination is also permitted against persons who are not citizens of Sierra Leone or naturalized Sierra Leoneans. According to Dr. Tucker, former Chairperson of President's Kabbah's Advisory Committee, the original intent of Section 27 was "to preserve certain areas of segregation which are embedded in traditional practices and are generally acceptable to both sexes, such as the segregation between male and female secret societies. What was taken up in the constitution was more extensive than what was intended." Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Tucker (Consultant on the Law Development Program funded by the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID)), Freetown, April 25, 2002.

[44] Section 2 of the 1963 Local Courts Act and Section 76 of the 1965 Courts Act.

[45] Marriages under the general law are governed, *inter alia*, by the Christian Marriage Act, (Cap. 95), the Civil Marriage Act (Cap. 97), and the Matrimonial Causes Act (Cap. 102).

[46] Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 98. Under customary law, a Sierra Leonean woman is always under the guardianship of a male relative.

[47] UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 157. This figure is based on births recorded for 1995-2000.

[48] Consent is a very relative term, as girls generally will find it very difficult to disobey their parents' wishes, which can result in severe punishment, including ostracism from the immediate and extended family.

Under Islamic law, a male or female dependant can be given in marriage against his or her will, and the legal guardian of an adult woman has the right to object to her choice of husband if the prospective husband is not of equal birth.[49] Under customary law, a dowry is usually paid to the wife's family. Under Islamic law, the dowry is paid to the bride, although the contract is concluded with the legal guardian of the bride-to-be.[50]

Under customary law, a wife can only refuse to have sexual intercourse with her husband if she is physically ill, menstruating or suckling a young child. She can also refuse intercourse during the daytime, in the bush or during Ramadan.

Under customary law, a wife's decision-making powers are limited since she is obliged to always obey her husband. This lack of decision-making power means that women in families where the breadwinner is the man find it very difficult to influence decisions on how the (generally) little income that the family makes is disbursed. Under customary law, a married woman must ask her husband for permission to work outside the house or visit her family. In families where the woman has been given permission to work outside the house and is the breadwinner, it seems that the added responsibility has not necessarily come with increased decision-making power.

A wife, especially in rural communities, is expected to cultivate food for herself and her children, whilst the husband's responsibility is limited to providing accommodation and clothing.[51] A wife residing in an urban area is generally given a lump sum of money by her husband to start a small business, usually petty trading. If the business fails, the wife must refund the capital to her husband. Given the heavy work burden on women, however, there is little opportunity for women to seek remunerated work outside the house.

Divorce and Death of Husband

Under customary law, both parties can bring divorce proceedings either extrajudicially or judicially before a local court, but in practice women are generally not as free to do so as men.[52] Only the husband has the right to divorce through unilateral repudiation.[53] A wife married under customary or Islamic law may, however, seek dissolution of marriage on grounds of impotence of the husband, for example.[54]

Under customary law, the dowry is refundable upon divorce. Dowries paid to poor families are sometimes set purposely excessively high to ensure that the wife's family will not sanction a divorce given their inability to repay the dowry, again highlighting how little control women married under customary law have over their lives.[55] Under general law, a husband is expected to pay alimony for his wife and children on divorce, which both parties may initiate.[56]

When a husband dies, the widow is expected under customary law to undergo a mourning period and rituals.[57] It is only after these rituals that widows are considered purified and can remarry. Some ethnic groups

[49] Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 161-2.
[50] Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 161.
[51] Full maintenance of his wife is only the responsibility of the husband during the rainy season (approximately between the months of May and November) or when his wife is sick or nursing a baby. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, pp. 106-7.
[52] Judicial divorces are rare as they are more expensive. Ibid., pp. 146-149.
[53] Ibid., pp. 143-4.
[54] Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic* Law, p. 165.
[55] Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 79. Strict tribal Muslims do not require that the dowry be repaid on divorce.
[56] Christian Marriage Act, Cap. 95 of the revised Law of Sierra Leone, 1960, s. 7 (2), s. 15 (1) (b), and s. 5 respectively.
[57] A widow must mourn for forty days. Her head is shaved or, in some chiefdoms, disheveled and her body is washed with the same water used to wash her husband's corpse. In some chiefdoms her body is smeared with mud to indicate her mourning. After either one week or forty days for strict Muslims, widows are taken to a stream to be ceremonially washed.

still insist that if the widow remarries, she does so within her deceased husband's family, otherwise all marriage payments are refundable.[58]

As Sierra Leone is a patrilineal society and the husband has custodial rights over children, children are handed over to the husband's family head upon his death.[59] Under Islamic law, the mother has the right to care for a boy child until the age of nine and a girl child until she comes of age.[60]

Under customary matrimonial property law, a wife is generally only able to keep her own possessions and her self-acquired property in the event of divorce or death. A wife is generally not entitled to keep property acquired through the joint efforts of husband and wife and has no rights over the matrimonial home.[61] Nor can a wife inherit under Islamic law: either the eldest son or brother or the official male administrator of the deceased inherits.[62] Under general law, a wife is also only entitled to one third of her deceased husband's property, if he has not made a will.

This denial of inheritance rights of women is a major problem given the large number of war widows who are now able to return to their villages of origin, but have no access to land.

Domestic Violence

Societal attitudes to domestic violence are another indicator of the status of women and girls in society; physical violence against women and children is common in Sierra Leone. Indeed, under customary law, a husband has the right to "reasonably chastise his wife by physical force."[63] If the husband is persistently cruel and frequently beats his wife to the point of wounding her or causing her great pain, the wife can divorce her husband, but under customary law a single act of physical and brutal force is permitted. A population-based assessment of war-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone carried out by Physicians for Human Rights among 991 female-headed households in camps for displaced people found that, although 80 percent of women surveyed expressed that there should be legal protections for the rights of women, more than 60 percent of the women believed that a husband had the right to beat his wife.[64]

Rape as a Crime under General Law

The laws governing rape in Sierra Leone are very confusing even for persons working in the criminal justice system, such as members of the judiciary and police force. They are also archaic and date back to the British 1861 Offences Against the Person Act. Under this Act, rape is defined as "the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent by force, fear or fraud."[65] Penetration (however slight) is required to constitute the crime of rape.[66] In addition, although a child is defined as a person under the age of sixteen,[67] Sierra Leonean law makes the extremely unhelpful distinction between unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of thirteen and

---

[58] The Mende, Krim, Sherbro, Vai, Karonko and Yalunka adhere to this custom, whereas the Temne, Susu, Limba, Loko, Kissi and Kono allow a widow to select her own husband and do not require a refund of the marriage payments if she marries outside her deceased husband's family. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 138.

[59] If the couple was married under general law, the custody of the children is often determined by the courts, which generally grant the mother custody of the children.

[60] Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic* Law, p. 167. In practice, the mother and children will stay with whomever has the money to provide for them.

[61] As customary marriages are generally polygynous, a divorce with one of the wives would result in the dissolution of the whole household if she were to ask for a refund for her contribution to building the house. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law* , pp. 113-120.

[62] Mohammedan Marriage Act, Cap. 96 of the revised laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, s. 9.

[63] Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, p. 152.

[64] Physicians for Human Rights, *War-related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone: A Population-based Assessment* (Boston: Physicians for Human Rights, 2002), p. 55 (hereafter referred to as PHR report).

[65] Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c 100), s. 63. Unlawful carnal knowledge refers to sexual intercourse between unmarried persons. The law does not actually forbid or make sexual intercourse between unmarried persons a punishable crime, but it only recognizes the right to sexual intercourse for married couples.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act (1926), Cap. 31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone 1960, s. 2.

unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl between thirteen and fourteen years of age. The law is unclear about unlawful carnal knowledge committed against persons aged between fourteen and sixteen, although the few cases involving this age group that have gone to trial have reportedly been prosecuted as rape.[68]

Nor is the age of consent explicitly stated, although it is presumably by necessary implication sixteen years old. Marital rape does not exist under Sierra Leonean statutory law, and most Sierra Leoneans firmly believe that it is the duty of a wife to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to.[69]

Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of thirteen, whether with or without her consent, is a felony and carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment.[70] Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl between the ages of thirteen and fourteen, whether with or without her consent, is, however, only considered a misdemeanor and carries a maximum sentence of two years.[71] The language "with or without her consent" refers only to cases of unlawful carnal knowledge that do not constitute rape; for example, an eighteen-year-old man who has sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl with her consent.

The police and judiciary seem to have misconstrued the meaning of the law. When an offence of rape against a girl under the age of fourteen is reported, the police and judiciary turn to either Section 6 or 7—depending on the age of the victim—of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act and determine that the girl did not consent. Based on her age, they then charge unlawful carnal knowledge and not rape. This misinterpretation therefore leads to a lesser charge for the rape of a child than for the rape of an adult.[72]

Rape of a person over the age of sixteen is considered a felony and carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.[73] Indecent assault—sexual assault without penetration—on or attempts to have carnal knowledge of girls under the age of fourteen years carry the same maximum sentence as unlawful carnal knowledge of girls between the age of thirteen and fourteen i.e. only two years of imprisonment.[74] No person can be convicted of unlawful carnal knowledge, indecent assault or attempted unlawful carnal knowledge "upon the evidence of one witness, unless such witness be corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused."[75]

The law pertaining to the abduction of girls for immoral purposes applies to any unmarried girls under the age of sixteen.[76] Abduction of girls for immoral purposes is a misdemeanor, carrying a maximum sentence of two years of imprisonment.

In addition to the legal confusion that exists in general law concerning rape, attempts by women to obtain the prosecution of rapists are frustrated by the collapsed state of the judiciary and the lack of effective law enforcement, which has contributed to the ongoing climate of impunity for offenders.

---

[68] Human Rights Watch interviews with Abdul Tejan-Cole (human rights lawyer and acting coordinator for the national nongovernmental organization Campaign for Good Governance), Freetown, February–May, 2002.

[69] As the right to have intercourse between a husband and wife is recognized, a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife unless he has been legally separated from his wife. *See* also PHR report, p. 55.

[70] Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, s. 6.

[71] Ibid., s. 7. If a man were legally married to a girl under fourteen years of age, sexual intercourse with her would not be an offence.

[72] Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

[73] Offences against the Person Act, s. 48.

[74] Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, s. 9. Section 9 stipulates that "whosoever commits an indecent assault or attempts to have carnal knowledge shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction before the Supreme Court be liable for imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any period not exceeding two years." Consent is no defense to a charge of indecent assault of a child under fourteen years.

[75] Ibid., s. 14.

[76] Ibid., s. 12. There are also problems with the term "unmarried" because abduction of persons should obviously be prohibited irrespective of their marital status.

Prosecution of Sexual Violence under Customary Law

The manner in which rape is dealt with under customary law is indicative of the societal values towards sexual violence and the low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone. Although all serious criminal cases should automatically be tried under general law, rape cases continue to be prosecuted under customary law in the local courts.[77]

Under customary law, when a case is brought to the local court, the perpetrator is generally required to pay a substantial fine to the victim's family as well as to the chiefs. "Virgin money" is payable to the victim's family if the victim was a virgin. In some communities, in particular Muslim communities, the victim is forced to marry the offender, as a girl who is not a virgin is considered less eligible for marriage. Traditionally, in some ethnic groups, both the victim and the perpetrator will be made to undergo a purification ceremony. For the victim, the purification ceremony is supposed to restore her virginity and for the perpetrator to cleanse the guilt. Any man who invades the husband's exclusive sexual rights over a wife compensates the husband, and not the wife, for "woman damage."[78]

In addition to applying discriminatory laws, the local court system is problematic as women of some ethnic groups do not have direct access to the local courts, but must be represented by a male guardian.[79] The situation is further exacerbated as the chairmen and chiefdom councilors of the local courts are generally all male, which makes it difficult for women to bring cases of sexual violence as the women are often embarrassed and their cases are generally dealt with insensitively by the male court staff. The local courts are also prone to interference by the chiefs as well as the concerned parties, especially in cases dealing with sexual violence.

Many people in rural areas prefer to settle the case between the families and do not go to court. In cases settled between the two families, money or goods are given to compensate the victim's family. Paradoxically, the giving of gifts or money to a rape victim may even elevate her status within her family.

Some families turn to the local chiefs who can arbitrate between the two families but have no right to impose any fines. In practice, however, the local chiefs have been known to impose fines.

Discrimination against Women and Girls in Practice

In addition to being subjected to discriminatory laws, all women and girls face structural discrimination in Sierra Leone's patriarchal society, which accords automatic respect to its older male members. As a result of the low status accorded to them by law and by custom, women in Sierra Leone face substantial discrimination in practice.

Education

Systemic discrimination against women starts in childhood, when many parents prefer to spend their scarce resources on the education of their sons rather than their daughters. According to the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Gender-Related Development Index, females account for only 21 percent of the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, compared with 32 percent males.[80] This gender disparity illustrates not only that fewer girls attend school but also that their education is discontinued at an earlier age than boys. This is reflected in the literacy rate of persons over fifteen years: only 20 percent of females are literate compared to 40 percent of males.[81]

---

[77] Under Section 13 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act, the local courts have no jurisdiction in seduction actions, which includes any act intended to lead the wife astray. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, footnote 34, p. 121.

[78] Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 5.

[79] Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Mariane Ferme (Lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, U.K.), Freetown, April 19, 2002.

[80] UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 213.

[81] Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone: A Household Survey Report (MICS-2)* (Freetown: 2000), p. 30. The literate population includes those who are able to read "easily" or "with difficulty." Only 30 percent of the total population over fifteen years is literate.

The high illiteracy rate among women can in part be explained by the higher demand for female labor in the family. Girls are required to work in the house at an early age given that their mothers have to take care of the household and the children and do farm work. Another contributing factor to women's illiteracy is the harmful traditional practice of early forced marriage, which is very common in the provinces (see below).

The Workplace

Sierra Leone has ratified numerous international labor conventions.[82] Some discriminatory practices, such as restricting the right to maternity leave to married women, which was the norm in the formal sector in the 1970s, have been prohibited by law. Extremely poor working conditions, however, persist in Sierra Leone for the majority of workers. In addition, women working for male bosses continue to be subjected to sexual harassment. According to the president of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, the trade union federation, much work remains to be done to ensure the full and even application of the labor laws, especially in the provinces.[83]

Sierra Leone's rural population is primarily engaged in subsistence farming, with women constituting 80 percent of the labor that produces 70 percent of the nation's food.[84] This agricultural labor is generally not remunerated by cash wages and women have unequal access to land or technology. In Sierra Leone, the different ethnic groups continue to operate under communal and family land holding systems. Women can use the land for subsistence farming but the control and management of the land and any property on it is vested in the male head of the family. With the post-war resettlement process underway, war widows returning to their villages of origin often lack the legal means or community support to reclaim their families' properties. As women have little or no property to offer as collateral, their access to credit is limited. Women therefore tend to rely on traditional sources of credit such as rotating savings, which only provide small loans.[85]

Due to the limited number of educated women, which is partly the result of the high demand for girls to perform household tasks at a young age, the preference of sending boys to school, and early forced marriages, few women are represented in the better remunerated professional or managerial jobs. Sierra Leone's crushing poverty and high unemployment have also meant that positions that in the West are perceived as women's jobs are often held by men in Sierra Leone, leaving even fewer openings for women. In the formal employment sector, women therefore constitute only 40 percent of the clerical staff and a mere 8 percent of the administrative and managerial cadre.[86] In the informal sector outside agriculture, where the cash returns are low, women are mainly involved in petty trading, soap making and tie-dying. Given the lack of opportunities for remunerated work, women tend to be heavily dependent on their husbands.

The breakdown of community values as the result of the war, combined with cultural practices, also serves to make girls and women vulnerable to abuse and sexual exploitation, which has historically been rampant in Sierra

[82] Multilateral Convention (no. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 28, 1947); Multilateral Convention (no. 105) concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force January 17, 1959); Multilateral Convention (no. 100) concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force May 23, 1953); Multilateral Convention (no. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960). Sierra Leone has not signed Convention 47 (40 hour week), Multilateral Convention (No. 95) concerning the Protection of Wages, July 1, 1949 (entered into force September 24, 1952), Multilateral Convention (No. 102) concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security, June 28, 1952, 210 U.N.T.S. 131 (entered into force April 27, 1955) or Multilateral Convention (No. 182) concerning the Worst Forms of Child Labor, although a social security system for both the public and private sector was recently established.

[83] Human Rights Watch interview with Uriah O. H. Davies, president of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, Freetown, April 14, 2002.

[84] Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, *National Policy on the Advancement of Women* (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone, 2000), p. 7.

[85] Ibid., p. 15. Rotating schemes are schemes whereby groups of women pool their resources and each member of the group has access to the funds on a rotating basis.

[86] Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, *National Policy on Gender Mainstreaming* (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone), p. 3.

Leone.[87] Many women and girls have been driven to prostitution as a result of the increased poverty caused by the conflict and their lack of other opportunities and skills.

In the Political Arena

Discrimination against women is evident in the political arena. Women were not granted the right to vote or stand for election for any political office until after independence in 1961. Given their economic dependence on men, it is also much more difficult for women to raise the necessary campaign funds. In the Northern Province, women continue to be excluded from contesting and voting for the elections for traditional leadership positions (although there are reportedly several female chiefdom councilors).[88] Out of the 149 paramount chiefs in the country, only three are female, all based in the south.

Under the new block voting system which was introduced for the 2002 elections, 112 parliamentary seats are elected by popular vote. An additional twelve parliamentary seats are reserved for paramount chiefs who are elected in separate elections by chiefdom councilors. There are presently only eighteen female parliamentarians, including two female paramount chiefs. This does represent an increase over the previous government, which had a total of eight women parliamentarians, including two female paramount chiefs. At government level, there are only three female ministers and three female deputy ministers, which is a marginal increase from President Kabbah's previous Cabinet.[89]

Harmful Traditional Practices and Their Impact on Women's and Girls' Health

Early forced marriages

The health of many women and girls in Sierra Leone is compromised by early forced marriage.[90] Early forced marriages are very common in the provinces, where men often sponsor a girl from birth (paying for school fees, clothes, etc.) and marry her after she has been initiated (see below for an explanation of the initiation process).

Early forced marriage is one of the factors contributing to Sierra Leone's high maternal mortality rate, since young girls have several children before their bodies are fully mature. At 1,800 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, Sierra Leone's maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world. This mortality rate translates to approximately 4,000 maternal deaths per year based on a total population of five million.[91]

Girls who are forced to marry early not only miss out on education, but also on skills training opportunities and are therefore highly dependent on their husbands.

---

[87] Human Rights Watch interview with a highly respected international observer who has worked in Sierra Leone for two decades, Freetown, February 27, 2002.

[88] Only persons paying tax can contest and participate in elections for paramount chiefs who are elected from ruling houses. The paramount chieftaincy system was introduced by the British Colonial Administration to administer the various chiefdoms in the Protectorate (i.e. the whole of Sierra Leone excluding the Western Area). Although there is reportedly no law against women paying taxes, women in the Northern Province have historically not done so probably due to lack of opportunities to find remunerated work. The tax is a negligible amount that women are willing to pay to ensure their eligibility for these elections. Human Rights Watch interview with Joseph Hall and Honerin Muyoyatta from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Freetown, March 22 and 23, 2002.

[89] The three ministerial posts are Minister for Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Minister for Trade and Industry, and Minister of Health and Sanitation. The three female deputy ministers are in the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Works, Housing and Technical Maintenance. The new government was sworn in on July 12, 2002.

[90] Early forced marriages are marriages whereby the consent of either party is not sought or more commonly whereby the consent of the girl is not sought and whereby one or both spouses is/are under the age of consent (which under international law should not be less than fifteen years of age). This harmful traditional practice contravenes article 16(3) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which states that the betrothal and marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, article 16(1) and (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which says that "[n]o marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses."

[91] Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, p. 63.

Female Genital Cutting

Sierra Leonean girls as well as boys are traditionally initiated into secret societies at adolescence. The secret societies that perform the initiation rites take the adolescents into a sacred place in the bush where they are circumcised and taught about traditional practices. The male and female societies are segregated and males are not supposed to know what happens in female secret societies or vice versa.

Traditionally, initiation for girls entailed spending an extended period (up to two years) in the bush with girls of the same age, being taught various cultural skills (dancing, singing, drama, arts and craft, how to use local herbs, how to respect elders, etc.) and being a good wife (cooking, cleaning, child welfare, hygiene, fishing, etc.) by older women. Girls who undergo initiation through the secret societies are treated with deference after having completed the ritual and are feted by their communities.[92] Today, the duration of the initiation ceremony has been greatly reduced, minimizing the skills transfer aspect, and thus focusing on the cutting itself. Because it was not always possible to hold the ceremonies during the war, initiation rites are now often practiced on adults, girl mothers, and pregnant girls—whereas traditionally it was seen as a rite of passage into adulthood for adolescent girls, who had to be virgins. In recent years, girls and/or adult women who do not wish to be initiated have been abducted and circumcised by force by female members of the community.

Ninety percent of Sierra Leonean women have undergone female genital cutting, which can have major health repercussions, including pain, injury to adjacent tissue of the urethra, hemorrhage, shock, acute urine retention, and infection.[93] Longer-term health effects include recurrent urinary tract infections, pelvic infections, infertility, keloid scar, and problems during childbirth.[94] The high prevalence of conflict-related sexual violence, which causes trauma to the genital area, can only have served to aggravate these health repercussions and both have in turn contributed to the increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases, including Human Immunodeficieny Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS).

This harmful traditional practice, which is contrary to provisions of several international human rights instruments, continues to be practiced due to the significant societal pressure exerted by adults as well as peers.[95] Girls who have not been initiated are seen as less eligible for marriage and many future husbands sponsor the initiation of their bride-to-be.

Societal Attitudes to Sexual Violence against Women and Girls

The low status of women and girls is highlighted by the prevalent societal attitudes towards sexual violence. The notion of sexual violence as a crime is a very recent concept in Sierra Leone. It is still widely believed that only rape of a virgin is rape, which in Krio is called "to virginate." Rape of a non-virgin, on the other hand, is not considered rape, and there is often a belief that the woman must have consented to the act or is a seductress. Marital rape is not recognized under either customary or general law in Sierra Leone.

---

[92] Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Mariane Ferme, (lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, U.K.), Freetown, April 19, 2002.

[93] Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, *The Circumcision of Women: A Strategy for Eradication* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1992), p. 19. The type of female genital cutting performed in Sierra Leone is clitoridectomy (removal of the prepuce of the clitoris) and excision (removal of the prepuce, the clitoris and all or part of the labia minora). The extreme form of infibulation is not practiced in Sierra Leone.

[94] U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Report on the First Donors Meeting For FGM/FGC Elimination* (Washington D.C.: USAID, 2001), p. 12.

[95] Female genital cutting violates the right to be free from violence (Article 1 of the CEDAW) and the right to bodily integrity (Article 6 of the CRC). Under Article 5 (a) of the CEDAW, states are called upon "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." Article 24 (1) and (3) of the CRC also requires states to abolish traditional practices that are harmful to the health of children. General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Committee also links traditional attitudes which subordinate women and violent practices, including female genital cutting, that "... justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women."

Given the lack of statistics about rape cases before the war, it is impossible to establish the historical prevalence of sexual violence, but several doctors reported to Human Rights Watch that, before the war, they only treated a limited number of young girls who generally had been raped by older men.[96] According to the doctors interviewed, many cases of rape before the war occurred within the extended family and were considered family matters. They were rarely discussed or reported, in order to ensure that the victim's chances of marriage and obtaining a good dowry were not destroyed. Rape was also apparently unlikely to occur within a village community, where everyone knew each other and the shame attached to the offender would be too great. Rape outside the extended family was more likely to be committed in environments where there were mixed ethnic groups, such as in mining areas or larger towns. The cultural definition of rape and lack of reporting, however, may have led to the understanding that rape rarely occurred before the war. Sexual exploitation, however, has always been rampant in Sierra Leone, where economic options for women are limited and which has traditionally condoned a high level of promiscuity, despite the high value placed on virginity. With the increased poverty caused by the war, sex has become even more of a commodity.[97]

The societal attitudes to rape and the low status of women have meant that no cases of conflict-related sexual violence and few cases of non-conflict-related sexual violence are prosecuted.[98] (See also below at p. 61 for a discussion on the amnesty included in the Lomé Peace Agreement.)

V. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Prevalence of Sexual Violence during the War

Throughout the ten-year civil war, thousands of Sierra Leonean women and girls were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. A survey of 991 female heads of households in communities of displaced persons carried out by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) in 2002 found that approximately one of every eight household members (13 percent) had been subjected to one or more incidents of conflict-related sexual violence; among the actual respondents to the survey, the prevalence rate of conflict-related sexual violence was 9 percent (94 out of 991).[99] Based on this prevalence rate, as many as 50,000 to 64,000 internally displaced women may have been subjected to sexual violence as a result of the war.[100] Adding extrapolated data for other types of victim, PHR calculated that as many as 215,000 to 257,000 Sierra

---

[96] Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, February 25, 2002; Dr. Noah Conteh, Freetown, March 1, 2002 and Dr. Bernard Fraser, Freetown, March 3, 2002. The latter two doctors practiced in the provinces as well as in Freetown.

[97] Sex can be bought for as little as U.S. $0.50. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Save the Children U.K., *Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone* (Geneva/London: UNHCR/SC-UK: 2002). Human Rights Watch has some concerns about this report as the report does not provide an adequate review of the context, including the status of women and girls within the given countries. Given the low status of women and girls in these countries, the sexual exploitation is much wider than reported: the power dynamic means that men of all walks of life, such as teachers, pastors, police, businessmen as well as aid workers or peacekeepers, exploit girls and women. It would also appear that the short-term solutions proposed do not adequately address the underlying structural issues, such as poverty, lack of education or alternative means of income generation for many women.

[98] It was not possible to obtain reliable statistics as reporting and recording of cases by the police and judiciary are not consistent.

[99] PHR report, p. 2. The PHR report captures some of the different types of sexual violence that women were subjected to. Of the ninety-four internally displaced women reporting their own experience of sexual violence to PHR, interviewees reported among other things: rape (89 percent); being forced to undress/stripped of clothing (37 percent); gang rape (33 percent); abduction (33 percent); molestation (14 percent) and insertion of foreign objects into genital opening or anus (4 percent). It should be noted that the definition of rape used by the PHR report differs from that used throughout this report. The definition used in this report, as mentioned above, is that used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in the *Foca* case.

[100] Ibid., p. 3. As PHR points out this figure might be an underestimate due to deliberate non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts made to ensure privacy.

Leonean women and girls may have been subjected to sexual violence in the conflict period.[101] Although these figures are necessarily no more than estimates, they do give an indication of the widespread nature of sexual violence during the war.

Human Rights Watch has primarily documented sexual violence committed during the latter stages of the war when the organization had a full-time presence in the country, beginning April 1999. This does not mean that sexual violence was at its worse during this period. Since that time, Human Rights Watch extensively documented crimes of sexual violence during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown as well as ongoing human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch has also received numerous reports of sexual violence dating from earlier in the war.

Perpetrators

Survivors of sexual violence mostly reported being raped by rebel forces, but were at times not able to identify which rebel faction the perpetrators belonged to or whether—especially given the frequent collaboration between soldiers and rebels—the perpetrators were indeed rebels or rather soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). In addition, survivors explained that they often deliberately did not want to look at their rapists out of fear and because they did not want to make eye contact. For example, D.T., a twenty-five-year-old woman raped by four rebels, including one child combatant, said that she would not be able to recognize any of the perpetrators, as she was too afraid to look at them (see below at p. 36).[102] A. B., a thirty-year-old who was raped by two rebels, also said that:

> When you are with these people [rebels], you do not ask questions. I did not even look into their faces. Many of them rubbed black chalk on their face and when you looked at them would say, "What are you staring at?"[103]

Rebel Forces

The RUF committed crimes of sexual violence—often of extreme brutality—from the very beginning of the war when they invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia in March 1991. RUF rebels committed crimes of sexual violence in the course of their military operations, during which thousands of women and girls were abducted and forced to "marry" rebel "husbands." These abducted women and girls were repeatedly raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence throughout the duration of their captivity, which in many cases lasted years. During captivity, these women and girls were also made to carry out forced labor, including carrying heavy loads, cooking, cleaning, etc. Many women and girls have given birth to children fathered by rebels. Especially during the early years of the war, the RUF were assisted by Liberian forces, who also committed rape and other sexual violence.

The AFRC committed crimes of sexual violence from May 1997, using the same tactics as the RUF. Sexual violence by the RUF and the AFRC continued to be committed after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999, and they were joined in this by the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the AFRC formed after the signing of the Agreement. An unknown number of abducted girls and women still remain under the control of their rebel "husbands" who did not want or feel able to relinquish the "families" they had founded in the bush; in many cases the abductees' own families would not have welcomed them back.

Sexual violence peaked during the rebels' military operations, which occurred countrywide as the rebels sought to capture more territory. After capturing a town or a village, the combatants rewarded themselves by looting and by raping women and girls, many of whom they later abducted. Crimes of sexual violence committed during and following military operations, such as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself"

---

[101] Ibid., pp. 3-4. PHR's calculation is not inclusive of all categories of victim: to the IDP women reporting conflict-related sexual violence, PHR added non-conflict-related sexual violence among non-displaced women, assuming a prevalence rate of 9 percent.

[102] Human Rights Watch interview, Foriah, March 6, 2002.

[103] Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000.

that took place in 1998, have been documented by Human Rights Watch.[104] Human Rights Watch has also extensively documented the January 1999 invasion of Freetown by the RUF/AFRC, during which sexual violence was systematically committed against women and girls on a massive scale. The sexual violence committed during January 1999 serves as an illustration of the widespread nature of sexual violence committed by the rebel forces. Among the perpetrators were child combatants, and many of the victims were also children. Members of the Small Boys Units (SBUs) within the rebel forces were known to be particularly cruel and committed egregious human rights abuses.

Although there are no exact figures for the number of women and girls subjected to sexual violence during the January 1999 invasion, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Sierra Leone chapter of the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE Sierra Leone), a nongovernmental organization that has been treating survivors of sexual violence since 1999, provided medical treatment and counseling to 1,862 female survivors of sexual violence who had been raped and/or abducted during the invasion. According to MSF, 55 percent of these survivors reported having been gang raped and 200 had become pregnant.[105]

As the RUF/AFRC rebels controlled most of the countryside apart from pockets of government-controlled areas in the south and some key towns, including Bumbuna and Freetown, at different times throughout the war, women and girls living in these rebel-held areas were also subjected to sexual violence when the rebels went on patrol or simply sought to assert their domination over the population. Women and girls in government-controlled areas also lived in fear of rebel hit-and-run attacks, during which many women and girls were subjected to sexual violence and abducted. Women and girls residing in Freetown were "spared" until the January 1999 invasion by the RUF/AFRC.

Pro-Government Forces

Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of sexual violence by the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) prior to the time of the 1997 AFRC coup. According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, of seventy-five women and girls who reported having been raped and identified the rapists' affiliation, only three said they were raped by SLA soldiers.[106] This may in part be due to the fact that survivors would have often found it difficult to distinguish between the rebel factions and the SLA. With the "sobel" phenomenon, the SLA soldiers would disguise themselves as rebels (the rebels were also known to disguise themselves as members of the SLA or the ECOMOG peacekeeping force).

Human Rights Watch has documented only a few cases of sexual violence committed by the pro-government Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF movement consists of groups of traditional hunters and young men organized into militia. They were initially only deployed by the government in their own chiefdoms, in order to ensure their loyalty and discipline and make the best use of their superior bush knowledge.[107] The government provided training, weapons and food to the units. The relatively small number of identified cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the CDF may be related to the CDF's internal rules that stipulate that warriors cannot have sexual intercourse before going to battle, as they would lose some of their protective powers that are bestowed on them during their initiation ceremonies. These powers are meant to make the fighters invincible and immortal. During the initiation ceremonies, the fighters are also instructed not to harm civilians, and required to take an oath to that effect. Thus, it is likely that the pro-government forces did not actually commit sexual violence on a widespread and systematic basis; however, the low number of identified cases may also be partially due to Human Rights Watch's human resource constraints, faced with the overwhelming number of abuses committed by the rebel forces. Research on the CDF was mainly conducted in the south where the Kamajors, the

[104] *See* Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Report*, July 1998.

[105] Human Rights Watch interview with MSF, Freetown, March, 2000.

[106] PHR report, p. 48. and Table 5 on p. 52. *See* also Binta Mansaray, "The Invisible Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone: Conflict-related Rape, Sexual Slavery and Other Forms of Sexual Violence," June 2001. On file with UNAMSIL human rights section.

[107] The Kamajors operate predominately in the south and east, the Tamaboros in the far north, the Gbettis in the north and the Donzos in the far east. See also "Background" section.

largest and most powerful group of the CDF, are based. In recent years, as the Kamajors have been moved away from their villages of origin and the influence of their traditional chiefs, they have become increasingly undisciplined and cases of rape by Kamajors have become more common.

Peacekeeping Forces

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of sexual violence by UNAMSIL peacekeepers, including the rape of a twelve-year-old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean peacekeeping contingent in March 2001 and the gang rape of a woman by two Ukrainian peacekeepers in April 2002 near Kenema (see below). There appears to be reluctance on the part of UNAMSIL to investigate and take disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. Reports of rape by ECOMOG peacekeepers, the majority of whom were Nigerian, were rare.

Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women and solicited child prostitutes.

Sexual Violence Committed by the Rebel Forces

"Virgination"—Targeting Young Girls

The rebel forces subjected women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes to individual and gang rape. Although the rebel forces raped indiscriminately irrespective of age, the rebels favored girls and young women whom they believed to be virgins. This was evident not only by their actions, but was also explicitly stated by them as they chose their victims. As in many countries, Sierra Leonean society places a high value on virginity. Girls who have been "virginated" and are therefore no longer virgins, are considered less eligible for marriage. M.B., a fifteen-year-old girl from Freetown, described how RUF/AFRC rebels deliberately sought out virgins for violation during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown:

> We were hiding in the mosque when two rebels dressed in civilian [clothing] entered. It was dark but they shone their flashlights looking for girls and said, "We are coming for young girls ... for virgins, even if they tie their heads like old grandmothers, we will find them." They also said that if the people did not hand over the young girls, they would open fire on all of us.[108]

Some victims explained that female rebels physically checked girls to see whether they were virgins.[109] M.W., a thirty-eight-year old nurse who was captured by the RUF/AFRC during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown and forced to treat wounded rebels and civilians, said that the youngest rape victim she treated was "a little nine-year-old from Calaba Town [an area of Freetown]. Her perineum was bleeding and had been badly torn. Every day we gave her sit baths and she eventually recovered."[110] The consequences of sexual violence for virgins can be particularly severe as these testimonies highlight, although mature women also reported experiencing similar consequences.[111]

R.T. was about sixteen when she was brutally raped vaginally and anally by ten RUF rebels in the forest near Koidu in Kono district in January 1997. R.T. developed vasico-vaginal fistula (VVF) and vasico-rectal fistula (VRF) from her brutal gang rape:

> I was hiding in the bush with my parents and two older women when the RUF found our hiding place. I was the only young woman and the RUF accused me of having an SLA husband. I was still a virgin. I had only just started my periods and recently gone through secret society. There were ten rebels, including four child soldiers, armed with two RPGs [rocket propelled grenades] and AK-47s. The rebels did not use their real names and wore ski masks so only their eyes were

[108] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 1, 1999.

[109] It should be noted that virginity can not be medically proven.

[110] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 21, 1999. The victim probably suffered from vasico-rectal fistula (a tear or opening in the tissue between the rectum and the vagina, usually resembling an open blood vessel), which would have left her incontinent.

[111] International humanitarian law prohibits all rape and other acts of sexual violence, of course irrespective of whether the victim was a virgin or not.

visible. The rebels said that they wanted to take me away. My mother pleaded with them, saying that I was her only child and to leave me with her. The rebels said that "If we do not take your daughter, we will either rape or kill her." The rebels ordered my parents and the two other women to move away. Then they told me to undress. I was raped by the ten rebels, one after the other. They lined up, waiting for their turn and watched while I was being raped vaginally and in my anus. One of the child combatants was about twelve years. The three other child soldiers were about fifteen. The rebels threatened to kill me if I cried.

My parents, who could hear what was happening, cried but could do nothing to protect me. I was bleeding a lot from my vagina and anus and was in so much pain. My mother washed me in warm water and salt but I bled for three days. I can no longer control my bladder or bowels as I was torn below. We stayed in the bush until ECOMOG took over Koidu. When we came out of the bush, even adults would run away from me and refused to eat with me because I smelled so badly. I had an operation in 2000 but it did not work. Before I got a catheter in 2001, I had no friends, as I smelled too bad. I am still in pain and have a problem with vaginal discharge. I also have nightmares and feel discouraged.[112]

This extreme sexual violence is illustrated also by the following testimony by F.B., who describes the resultant deaths of eight young girls in one Liberian refugee camp alone (no doubt many others died from similar treatment during the war). F.B.'s testimony also illustrates the RUF's connection to Liberia and the role of Liberian mercenaries in the RUF movement. F.B. was a ten-year-old girl living in Mano village in Kailahun district near the Liberian border when the RUF accused civilians in her village of helping the SLA. Her family decided to flee to Liberia in November 1991, but was fired upon by the rebels as they fled. At least fifteen civilians were killed, including her father and several women with babies on their backs:

Only six of my family survived; my mother, one brother, two sisters, one uncle, and me. After hiding and fleeing through the bush for three days, Mohammed, my uncle, found someone with a boat to help us cross over to Liberia. We crossed into Vahun where there was a sort of refugee camp. We were there for two weeks and terrible things happened. We thought we had escaped from the rebels but we found many of them there. They controlled the camp. Even though food was being air dropped, the rebels took it all. They took everything we had, our money, salt, and all our food. The rebels were mixed Sierra Leoneans and Liberians.

About a week after arriving, the rebels came into our house in the evening and took my fifteen-year-old sister away. My mother stayed up the whole night. The next day my uncle went from hut to hut looking for her. He called her name and heard her groaning inside a hut. He picked her up and carried her home. When my mom saw her she burst out crying. I was only ten and didn't know anything about man business. My sister was crying all the time and couldn't walk. She cried, "Oh mother, I'm going to die." My mother just held her and told her it would be O.K. My uncle exchanged five gallons of palm oil so we could get some salt, which my mother later mixed with water and had my sister sit in. She was bleeding a lot. She told me they had tied her mouth and raped her many times, but I didn't know what rape was.

After that my uncle shaved my head, gave me trousers and made me look like a boy. When I was walking around a camp I saw a few girls aged under twelve years old, lying on the ground with their legs spread open and blood coming out between their legs. Some had their dresses pulled up and others had cloth stuffed in their mouths. During the two weeks I was in Vahun I saw eight girls like this. Sometimes their family would come and wrap them in white so I knew they had

[112] Human Rights Watch interview, IDP camp called "Lebanese Camp," March 2, 2002. Women and girls with obstetric fistulae suffer from a constant wetness that results in genital ulcerations, frequent infections and a terrible odor. These fistulae generally require surgery although occasionally they spontaneously heal.

died. Other times no one picked them up and they stayed there for days until someone buried them. There were so many girls who had lost their parents and were there alone, so no one would come for them.

I saw the rebels catching young and even older women. Once they caught an old woman. She said, "No, leave me. I'm too old for this business." But they made fun of her saying, "Oh look, we have caught a young *Bundu* [initiate into secret society] girl here." Other times I heard women screaming in the middle of the night. Everyday people were dying—from hunger, illness, and this rape. After that I had dreams about a dead person coming to hurt me.

The only reason we stayed that long was because people were still moving across the border and we figured things were even worse in Sierra Leone. Besides, the rebels stopped us from going back home, and we did not know anyone in Liberia so we would have died of hunger.[113]

M.M. was only eleven when she was abducted, together with her aunt and her aunt's four children, when Koidu was attacked during the dry season[114] in 1994. M.M. had not yet experienced her first period or been initiated into secret society:

I was raped by seven child combatants, who were aged between fifteen and sixteen years old, on the way to Kailahun. I was raped in my vagina and anally. Other rebels and also civilians saw me being raped but the civilians were too afraid to protect me. My aunt put native herbs on my genital area but I bled for five days. The RUF had medicine but would not give it to us civilians. My aunt carried me on her back, as I could not walk because of the pain. It took us five days to reach Kailahun. A rebel commander wanted my aunt to be his wife but she refused so he killed her. In Kailahun, I was not raped again. Since my rape, I have only experienced irregular periods and my belly is always swollen like I am pregnant.[115]

M.F. was abducted from Koinadugu town in Koinadugu district in September 1998 when the RUF/AFRC attacked the town. She was only thirteen at the time and was brutally raped both vaginally and anally by five RUF rebels. During the same attack, the RUF killed over thirty older women:

I was only thirteen and a virgin. They forced me to go down on my hands and knees with my bottom in the air and raped me both vaginally and anally. Five rebels raped me on that first day. My clothes were bloodied and it hurt to urinate and defecate afterwards. The rebels who raped me promised to take me to Freetown and give me money and dresses. They gave me nothing after they used me. I was given to one of them, Mohammed, as his wife. We stayed in Koinadugu town for four days. I was with my parents but could not tell them about the rapes although my mother heard me being raped.

The RUF said they came to kill civilians who were ungrateful and talked bad about the RUF. The RUF cut my grandmother with a knife and beat her with a pestle. She died. The RUF told the older women to go to the mosque to attend a ceremony. More than thirty women, some of whom had children, went to the mosque. The RUF set fire to the mosque. Another old woman was rolled into a mat and the mat was set on fire.[116]

[113] Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000. *Bundu* is one of the secret societies that initiate girls and perform female genital cutting.
[114] The dry season in Sierra Leone is approximately between November and May.
[115] Human Rights Watch interview, Lebanese Camp, March 2, 2002.
[116] Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7, 2002.

Rape Victims Subjected to Multiple Human Rights Abuses

Rapes were often preceded by or followed by other human rights abuses against the victim, her family members and/or her community. Hardly any family was unscathed by abuse during the war. The PHR report highlighted that 94 percent of the 991 female-headed households surveyed had experienced at least one serious human rights abuse during the ten-year period.[117] M.P., who was twenty-four years old when the RUF attacked Jaiweii village in Kailahun district in May 1991, testified:

> I was captured together with my husband, my three young children and other civilians as we were fleeing from the RUF when they entered Jaiweii. Two rebels asked to have sex with me but when I refused, they beat me with the butt of their guns. My legs were bruised and I lost my three front teeth. Then the two rebels raped me in front of my children and other civilians. Many other women were raped in public places. I also heard of a woman from Kalu village near Jaiweii being raped only one week after having given birth. The RUF stayed in Jaiweii village for four months and I was raped by three other wicked rebels throughout this period.
>
> The rebels, who spoke Liberian English, said they were fighting for the SLPP to be in power. When the RUF first entered Jaiweii, they accused my husband of giving information to the SLA, so they tied his hands behind his back and beat him mercilessly. They kept him tied up and continued to beat him. After six days, he died and they threatened to kill me if I cried. The RUF also shot three other men whom they accused of giving information to the SLA. My three children all died because they became sick and there was no medicine. The older one who was five years died one week before the two younger ones who died on the same day. They were only three and seventeen months old.[118]

M.P. added that the RUF had said that they could do whatever they want with women whom they "owned." A.J., a fourteen-year-old student, was abducted by the RUF from Pujehun and was held by them from February to May 1994. She was first tortured, caged, and then brutally raped:

> On February 3, 1994 at around 8:00 p.m., the RUF attacked Pujehun. There was lots of firing because the SLA was deployed here. As we were fleeing, we ran straight into a group of over one hundred RUF. They were dressed in civilian clothes and nearly all had guns. Among those rebels was one named Maliki, who was actually from Pujehun. RUF Commander Bai Bureh started to select several people from our group. As he was doing the selecting, Maliki told him to choose me because if they let me go, I would go back to Pujehun and tell the SLA that he was there. They chose eight of us, four young men and four young women, including three of my cousins. They told the rest of the civilians to go back into the bush and said that if they found them the next day they would be killed. We were taken to their camp.
>
> Two weeks later, the four young men managed to escape. When the rebels found out, they blamed us for what happened. They said the boys were really SLA solders that were there to get information on the RUF. I was then tortured by a Liberian RUF commander named C.O. Rackin. He said I was "bright and bold" and must have known how they escaped. He interrogated me, asking me if the boys were SLA's. During the interrogation he cut me in twenty-one places with a knife including a deep cut on my left breast. He drew a small, small circle in the dirt and told me to step inside and walk around in it. Any part of my body left outside he stabbed with a knife.
>
> Then a commander called Momoh Rogers, who was the battalion commander, ordered that my cousin and I be put in a wooden cage smaller than one square meter. He said that if our brothers

[117] PHR gave the following examples of serious human rights abuses: beating, bodily injury, amputation, torture, killing, forced labor, captured for less than one day, sexual assault without rape, rape, abduction, burned dwelling, looting. PHR report, pp. 45-47.

[118] Human Rights Watch interview, Lebanese IDP Camp, March 2, 2002.

who had gone to tell the SLA came to attack, it would be very easy for them to kill us. The cage was what the village people used to store their husk rice in and it had almost no ventilation. We were only let out to defecate. They told me I had to pee on myself in the box. They poured water into the cracks but it was never enough and was dirty. Sometimes they dropped cassava and boiled bananas into the cage, feeding us like we were animals. The stab wounds I had got infected and I got sores all over my body. They were painful and smelled very badly.

After about two weeks in the cage, one of Patrick's bodyguards took me to C.O. Patrick's house. When I saw him, I told him about the sores on my feet and breasts. I told him I was in pain and asked for treatment. C.O. Patrick told me to shut up and ordered me to go into the house. He turned to his bodyguard and said that if I refused, I was to be taken behind the house and executed. When we got inside, Patrick told me to lie down on the floor. Then he forced himself upon me. I was a virgin. He was violent and rough. Then he told me to turn over and give him my behind. But I told him I could not lie down because my breast was so swollen. So he brought a chair and told me to stand up and lean onto the chair. Then he stood behind me and tried to shove his penis into my vagina. The first time he did this I fell over onto my chest, which was so painful. I started bleeding from my chest wound. Then he told me to get up and said if I did not hold the chair firmly he was going to kill me. He took a long time doing that thing to me. I was crying from the pain of my breast and because it was painful, being the first time. He told me to shut up. As he was sexing me he accused my brothers of being spies and said he was going to kill me and that he was only waiting for the others to come from the frontline to do it.

C.O. Patrick asked if I had done sex before and I told him "No, I am a school-going girl." Then he said, "Well, tonight you are going to have sex, because you are going to be killed and you should do it before you die." I was terrified. I started crying. All I could think of was my death and all that guy could do was do that thing to me. After he was satisfied, I was taken back to the cage.[119]

A.M. was eighteen when she fled Freetown with her two children, two sisters, and brother after the 1997 AFRC coup. Not only was she first forced to watch the execution of three male civilians by Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers in Fadugu, Koinadugu district, but also the rebel execution of her brother and sister. The RUF tried to get her to eat her brother's liver and heart. Her sister's head was also placed on her legs:

After the rebels were driven out of Kabala by ECOMOG, the rebels spread to different towns, including Mongo, Badela, and Dankawali. One day I went with my brother to wash in the stream, as I was afraid to go by myself. We heard shots, which my brother thought must have come from ECOMOG soldiers. I was afraid. We met three rebels with guns who accused my brother of being a SLA soldier. "Superman" was the commander. They beat my brother with their gun butts and took off his clothes. "Superman" forced my brother to go down on his hands and knees and made me sit beside him. They cut his neck from the back and then took an axe and cut his back. They removed his heart and liver and put them on my hands. The heart had more shape and the liver was flat. They tried to force me to eat them but I refused to. Another rebel, Colonel Titus, a mercenary who spoke Liberian English, arrived and told the others not to force me to eat my brother's heart and liver. He said he would show me how they will deal with me. He said they should abduct me. They took me back into the village of Dankawali where we met my grandmother on her veranda. She was tied up and she said that another rebel commander, Hakim, had carried my two children and small sister away in the first group.

The rebels had abducted another group of twenty-five persons and held them by the cotton tree. My big sister was under the cotton tree. I told her that the rebels killed our brother. Colonel Titus slapped my sister and told her not to cry. They killed my sister and two other women and placed

[119] Human Rights Watch interview, Pujehun, February 12, 2002.

> their cut off heads on my legs. The rebels also locked some villagers in the houses and set all houses on fire.[120]

H.K., a sixteen-year-old student, was abducted from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion. She was taken to Makeni where she was "virginated" and forced to be the wife of Colonel "Jaja," a twenty-two-year-old half-Liberian who threatened to kill her entire family if she escaped. H.K. was brutally tortured after Colonel "Jaja" accused her of stealing his money, which was in fact taken at gunpoint from her by "Superman," a notorious rebel commander and his bodyguard called "Yellowman." She described what happened afterwards:

> Then the rebels took me into a stream and tied me to a tree in the water. They told people to beat me. I was in water up to my head. "Jaja" said the boys should cut down the tree and let me drown. I was there for several days, maybe up to a week or so. Once a water snake swam by and ate my foot in the water. When I was tied there, Jaja cut my neck and put cocaine into my body. He also gave me marijuana cigarettes to smoke. Finally he untied me and put me in an old container where I stayed for several days. While in the guardroom Jaja and Alhaji "Cold Boots" came several times to give me drugs.[121]

The rebels often used psychological torture against civilians by, for example, making them clap or sing in praise while watching family and friends being killed, raped or mutilated. They further exerted their domination over civilians by not allowing them to show any emotion, and threatening to kill anyone who did. In 1997, when K.M. was abducted by the RUF from Kabala in Koinadugu district, her brother was shot in front of her. The RUF accused him of planning to escape. She was not allowed to show any emotion and was forced to throw his body in the river. In 1999, K.M.'s husband was killed in front of her by RUF Captain Solvelar in Yomandu in Tonkolili district, when a child combatant accused her husband of not doing his job properly. As Captain Solvelar shot K.M.'s husband, he warned her not to cry otherwise she would be killed. Later in the same year, K.M.'s baby was killed in front of her in Kambia district by a rebel captain who wanted to rape her:

> Captain "Danger" pulled my baby from my back and before I could do anything, he sliced my child in two. I was told not to cry as otherwise I would be killed as well.[122]

Rape with Objects and Other Sexual Torture, including Sexual Mutilation

The rebels frequently used objects, including weapons, burning wood, and hot oil, to rape or otherwise torture (including sexually torture) women and girls, sometimes resulting in their death. In 1994, J.M., an elderly man from Giehun village in Kailahun district, witnessed the killing of nine civilians accused of plotting to set Foday Sankoh up for a government ambush. One of those civilians, a woman named Janneh, was alleged to have been one of Sankoh's "wives." J.M. described how rebels brought her into the village square, forced her to lie down and then poured boiling palm oil into her vagina and ears:

> The RUF rounded up about seventy of us civilians, including Abi and Janneh, and accused us of making a plot to arrest Sankoh. The commmander said we were to be killed but that first he would do an investigation. First he called upon Abi who accused Janneh of calling people in Freetown to arrange something against Sankoh. So Janneh was the first to be killed. The rebels grabbed her, stripped her and threw her down in front of the whole village. Several of them pulled her legs apart and held her tightly. They poured a pan of boiling palm oil into her vagina and then into her ears. This terrified us. She started shaking all over and was bleeding from the nostrils and mouth. While on the ground they struck her with a gun and danced around her saying, "When you were loving with the old man [Sankoh], you didn't show us any respect, but now your time for punishment has come." She died about an hour later. The rebels said they were sent by Sankoh who was living in Kailahun about seven miles. Nothing small or big happened without his

[120] Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 9, 2002.
[121] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 12, 1999.
[122] Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7 and 9, 2002.

knowledge. After killing Janneh they poured hot oil in the mouths, eyes and noses of three other villagers, and then shot five others. I guess Janneh must have known all of Sankoh's secrets.[123]

M.F., the thirteen-year-old who was raped by five rebels (see above, p. 30), witnessed how her stepmother's mother was beaten by the RUF with a long pestle in Momoria village in Koinadugu district in 1998. The rebels then shoved the pestle into her anus. M.F. said that her stepmother's mother was still alive when they left her with the pestle in her anus, which was bleeding.[124] One woman also reportedly had pepper put in her vagina as the RUF suspected her of being the wife of a SLA soldier. Rebels inserted burning firewood into the vagina of twenty-five-year-old F.T. and another woman during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown:

> On 21 January 1999, I went to a neighbor's house to buy rice, as I had not eaten for over two days. The rebels had been in the area and as I bought two cups from my neighbor, we heard the rebels coming again. My neighbor told me to leave quickly so that he could lock up his house. When I left with another woman and a man, we met a group of ten rebels who surrounded us. They were dressed in full combat [uniform] and asked us where we were going in Krio.
>
> The rebels asked us what we could give them, so the man took out all his money and gave it to them. He was then allowed to go. As the other woman and I did not have any money, they told us to take off our clothes at gunpoint. We begged them not to harm us. The rebels then told us to lie on the dirt ground and open our legs. They put their guns to our throats and stomachs to make sure that we followed their order. Once we were on the ground all the rebels surrounded us, and a tall rebel well over six feet went to the kitchen of Parliament House and took a piece of burning firewood from the fire. He then squatted down and with his two hands inserted it into my vagina. Then he returned to the fire and got another piece and then a third. I felt like I was being stabbed inside.
>
> He did the same to the other woman. While they did this to us, I heard them say "This is the way we are going to fuck you. We are not able to do to you half of the things we do to people in the provinces. You bastard civilians, you hypocrites; as soon as you see ECOMOG, you start to point fingers at us."
>
> They left shortly afterwards and I managed to drag myself to a nearby house with blood gushing from my vagina. I went to a clinic where the doctor removed bits of firewood from my vagina. I feel so unhappy and fear my husband will find another wife to satisfy his sexual desire. The treatment is very slow and I do not have money for treatment. There are sores inside me. I can not sleep at night or walk more than one hundred yards.[125]

H.K., the sixteen-year-old Freetown student forced to be the wife of Colonel "Jaja," had an umbrella shoved up her vagina as part of the torture that followed her being accused by "Jaja" of stealing his money:

> When Jaja came home, I told him what happened and instead of believing me, he blamed me and accused me of having stolen the money. He dragged me out of the house into the street and started beating me. He caused a great scene. He stripped me, tied me up and hit me again and again with a stick. He also beat with the butt of his gun. Then he took an umbrella and pushed it up inside me two times—he shoved it up into my privates—hard. Many people were standing around watching and even some of the other rebels told him to leave me. He went crazy. He started shooting up in the air. I lay there for a few days, naked and bleeding. I was three months pregnant but after this I aborted. I bled for over a month. Once a boy named Junior came by and put his hand inside my vagina. He brought out his hand, which was all bloody and said, "Look at

[123] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, November 11, 1999.
[124] Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7, 2002.
[125] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

your blood, you're sick." All the civilians seeing this felt sorry for me, but of course they couldn't say anything.

Rebel forces were known for mutilating pregnant mothers to find out the sex of the unborn child. According to witnesses, they would bet large sums of money, and the rebel who had rightly guessed the sex of the unborn child after the women's belly had been cut open would keep the money. Some women were cut open alive, but sometimes the women were killed before the rebels cut their abdomens open. K.M. who was abducted during the 1997 attack on Kabala, witnessed the killing and sexual mutilation of a pregnant woman near Kono in Kono district (see above):

> They captured a Koranko woman who was pregnant. Two RUF, Captain "Danger" and C.O. "Cut Hand" argued about the sex of the child. They bet 100,000 leones [approximately U.S.$50] on the sex of the child. Then they shot the woman dead and opened her belly. The RUF held up the baby with the placenta, which they shook in the air. The baby cried and then died. I wanted to run away but my husband said that the civilians would think that I was a rebel and that they would kill me.[126]

Fifteen-year-old F.K. was raped by the RUF in Lunsar in Port Loko district in May 2000 and witnessed the sexual mutilation of a pregnant woman as well as the killing of her three male relatives, and six amputations:

> I was raped when the RUF attacked Lunsar in May 2000 by four rebels including one man called "Put Fire," who had made me his rebel wife from 1997 to 2000. One of the other rebels was called "Kill Man No Blood." While I was being raped, the rebels found my three male relatives who were hiding under their beds. They stabbed them with their bayonets and then shot them. They raped me in my bedroom and then brought me into the living room. Three men and three women were also brought into the room. They were put in line and then the rebels gave them the choice between their life or their money. The rebels strip searched each one and then killed them on the spot. The group was forced to watch as each was killed.
>
> One of the women was six months pregnant and slightly disabled. She was last in the row. When it was her turn, she was stabbed in the neck and fell down. The rebels started to discuss whether she was carrying a boy or a girl. They bet on the sex of the baby so they decided to check it. Kill Man No Blood split open her belly. It was a boy. One of the other rebels took the baby out and showed everyone that it was a boy. The baby was still alive when he threw it on the ground next to the woman but died shortly after. As the rebels took me away, I saw six men who had just been amputated. Some had an arm cut off below the elbow, others above the elbow. They were screaming, "Please kill us, don't leave us this way."[127]

Sexual Violence with the Added Element of Violating Cultural Norms

The rebel forces have used sexual violence as a weapon to terrorize, humiliate and punish, and to force the civilian population into submission. The rebels sought complete domination by doing whatever they wanted with women, including sexual acts that, by having the additional element of assailing cultural norms, violated not only the victim but also her family or the wider society. The rebels have forced civilians to commit incest, one of the biggest taboos in any society. One survivor witnessed the RUF trying to force a brother to rape his sister in Sambanya village in Koinadugu district. When the brother refused to do so, the rebels shot him.[128] Fathers were forced to rape their daughters. Fathers were forced to dance naked in front of their daughters and vice versa. In Sierra Leone, postmenopausal and breastfeeding women are presumed not to be sexually active, but rebels violated this cultural norm by raping old women and breastfeeding mothers. Child combatants also raped women who could have been their mothers or in some instances even their grandmothers. Many rapes were committed in

[126] Human Rights Watch interview, March 7 and 9, 2002.
[127] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 25, 2000.
[128] Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 9, 2002.

full view of other rebels and civilians. Victims were also raped in mosques, churches, and sacred places of initiation.

During the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, A.C. was forced to watch the rape of his daughter by RUF/AFRC rebels:

> The rebel in charge was a thirty-year-old ex-SLA known as "Amos." I knew him from before. He had plasters on his face. The others were called "Junior" and "Blood," who did most of the talking. They gathered five young girls together, including my fifteen-year-old daughter, and put them in the back room. They asked us for five million leones [approximately U.S. $2,500] otherwise they threatened our girls would be killed. We managed to collect 350,000 leones [approximately U.S. $175], which we gave to them.
>
> Then they brought out the girls. They pushed my daughter and a seventeen-year-old on the bed in the parlor and started tearing off their clothes. I peeked through a crack in the door and could see them fighting with my daughter. They put clothes in her mouth so she would not scream. The rebels punched, slapped her and knocked her head with the butt of their rifle. Then one of them opened the door and asked who the fathers of the girls were. One of them took us and lined us up right in front of the bed and said, "Don't you want to see what we do to your daughters?" We begged them to leave them alone but they said, "If you continue to talk, we will burn this house and kill everyone of you." A rebel had his gun pointed at us the whole time and there were two more at the door. Amos raped my daughter and Blood raped another girl. Then the rebel with the gun and the one guarding took their turns. My daughter was crying but they covered her mouth and told her to shut up. Blood then told the girls to get dressed and they took them away.[129]

S.G., a fifty-year-old widow, was raped by a teenage rebel called Commander "Don't Blame God" and subsequently had both arms amputated in Mattru village in Bo district prior to the 1996 elections:

> I pleaded but Commander Don't Blame God said he was going to kill me if I didn't lie down. I told him it had been such a long, long time since I had sex. During the rape I was pleading with him saying, "Don't kill me, please don't kill me." He was so rough with me. Then he took me up a big dune above Mattru village. As we were walking, he said he was going to kill me. I pleaded with him and he then said, "I've changed my mind, I'm going to give you a letter." Once we got there I saw many more rebels, about twenty. I was stripped naked down to my underwear. It was humiliating. Then they asked me to sit down and wait. Commander Don't Blame God said: "I have a letter for you but wait for the cutlass man to come." Then the one with the machete came and told me to put out my left arm. It took them three chops with the cutlass to cut off my arm. After this I begged them not to cut my other arm but they struggled with me and a rebel held it down and cut it off. The cutlass man said, "We belong to Foday Sankoh's group." Then one of them took my left arm and put it under my vagina and kicked me twice in the vagina ... very, very hard.[130]

D.T. was gang raped by a child combatant and three other RUF rebels in the rainy season in 2000 near Foriah village in Koinadugu district:

> I was hiding in the bush from the rebels with about fifteen other villagers when the rebels found us. The rebels separated me from the others because my nine-month-old son was crying. A child combatant ordered me at gunpoint to put my son down. He then raped me. I do not know how young he was but he had not yet been circumcised. He was maybe as young as twelve. Then three other rebel men raped me. When I was being raped, I made no movement as they might think that

[129] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.
[130] Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

> I was trying to resist. I was bleeding after being raped by four males. After being raped, the rebels forced me to carry a heavy load and walk to Kania town. I escaped the same day and returned to the farm. I explained to my husband that I had been raped but he was happy to accept me back.[131]

R.F., a thirty-three-year-old farmer, explained how she felt after she was gang raped by West Side Boys, including four child combatants, at Petifu village in Port Loko district in November 1999:

> Four children between ten and twelve years used me. They were so small I could barely feel them inside me. The small ones tried to imitate the older ones and one of them kept saying, "I'm trying it, I'm trying it." It was the war that brought that humiliation. I kept comparing them to my own children; my first-born son is ten. I forgave them because they are children. It was not of their own making. They must have been drugged.[132]

In December 1994, thirty-year-old A.B. was abducted with six other women from Yonibani in Tonkolili district by the RUF when they launched a surprise attack with the collusion of the SLA. The RUF made the women carry looted items to their camp, where A.B. stayed for a week before escaping. She herself was repeatedly raped by two rebels, including one Liberian, and witnessed the rape of an old woman with gray hair:

> At least four of the women I had been abducted with were raped. Before they raped me, the rebels went for an old woman with white hair. When she realized what they wanted, she took off her headscarf to show her white hair and said, "I'm old, I have stopped having sex." At first the commander said the rebels should not touch her because she was old. But the other rebels got annoyed and started insulting the commander saying, "Fine, you can fuck any woman you want, anytime you want, but now that we have one we want, you say no." The commander finally said that they could go ahead so all five rebels, including a small boy of fifteen years raped her. One was on his knees with his trousers down while the others stood around watching.
>
> When I saw that I felt sick. When I saw a young boy and that old woman, I realized they could do anything and that they were going to do the same thing to me. But I guess I was lucky as only two did it to me.[133]

S.J., a wealthy forty-five-year-old woman, was raped by RUF rebels, including a child combatant, and then burnt in late January 1999 in Manjoro village in Bombali district:

> Thirty rebels attacked our village. The rebels said that we, the civilians don't want peace. I saw them kill three people and were it not for God, I would have been the fourth. Then they burned thirteen houses and looted all our things. I ran with my four children to the house in the bush where we tend to the cows. We slept there with the cows for a few days but then seven rebels surprised us there. The commander of this group was called C.O. Caca Scatter. He was a Mende. Others were speaking Mandingo and Temne.
>
> They started stealing what few possessions I had and then C.O. Caca Scatter said that I should be raped. When I heard that order I pleaded, "Please, don't do that one to me." But they said they would do whatever they wanted. Four raped me and the last one to rape me was a fifteen-year-old. I could have given birth to him, he was so young. He put a knife to my throat and said he was going to kill me but the C.O. said I shouldn't be killed.
>
> Then they tied my hands behind me and C.O. Caca Scatter burnt me. He scooped up hot charcoal from the fire we had been cooking with and tried to burn my face with it. I struggled and turned

[131] Human Rights Watch interview, Foriah, March 6, 2002. The rainy season starts in May and ends in October.
[132] Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko, November 27, 1999.
[133] Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000.

> my face so he burned my chest instead. He did this four times on my front and seven times on my back. Each time they picked up the charcoal and held it on my body until it burned deep into my skin. They left me with my skin burning but I could not roll on the ground for fear it would catch fire and burn me even more. When they started to burn me I pleaded for them to kill me. I started screaming and my children came around to try and save me. They took two of my children, gave them looted property to carry and took them away. That is the last I have heard of them.[134]

T.B., a fifty-year-old woman was abducted from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion and made to walk to Magburaka in Bombali district. There, a RUF/AFRC rebel raped her until she developed an abscess in her vagina:

> In Magburaka, I was first raped by three rebels. While doing it they called me a bastard child and that civilians wanted to burn them all alive. After that I was taken as a wife by a commander called "Bird Bod" who was in his thirties. He raped me every day. They were always on drugs. He said he didn't have a wife so I cooked and washed for him. He roughed and beat me and used to put his fingers violently up inside me. He would get an erection while he was doing this and would sometimes rape me afterwards. I think this is how I started to get boils—I had five or six of them. It started to create an ulcer. Over the two months I was with them it got worse and worse. It was terribly painful but Commander Bird still raped me and put his fingers up me even though I had this problem. I don't know why the RUF would treat an old woman like me in such a way.
>
> The abscess got very swollen and started to hang down between my thighs. I could barely walk. It started to smell very bad and it was then that the commander finally drove me away. I walked for two to three weeks through the bush going from village to village until I got to Masiaka. In every village I went, the women felt for me and would give me food and make a bath of herbs and salt for me to soak in. Then when I felt strong enough, I would walk to the next village. When I reached Freetown, I received medical treatment. My husband has accepted me back and feels sorry for me.[135]

Breastfeeding mothers were also not spared by the rebel factions even though in Sierra Leonean culture, women are not supposed to have sexual intercourse until their children have been weaned and can walk, which can take up to three years.[136] Sierra Leoneans believe that doing so will weaken the breast milk and the ability of the child to fend off infection. Women whose infants died from malnutrition after they—the mothers—had been raped frequently attributed the death of their child to the fact that they had been raped. It is also a specific crime for a man to commit adultery with another man's wife while she is breastfeeding. Traditionally, the guilty spouses are thought to be under a curse and will suffer misfortune.[137] A.B., who was raped by two rebels and witnessed the rape of an old woman, tried at first to dissuade the first rebel from raping her by telling him that she was a breastfeeding mother with full breasts, but the rebel said he did not care.[138] M.C. was breastfeeding her two-week-old baby when she was brutally gang raped by RUF/AFRC rebels in early January 1999 near Mabang in Tonkolili district; she breastfed her baby while being raped. She suffered a prolapsed uterus[139] as a consequence of the rape:

> At the time of the January 1999 offensive, my husband who is a policeman was based in Mile 91. I became very worried about him and decided to travel to find him. I left Bo on January 8. I had just given birth to a baby girl two weeks before so was still feeling very weak but I desperately wanted to find my man.

---

[134] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.
[135] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, July 8, 1999.
[136] Mariane C. Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2001), p. 131.
[137] Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Law*, pp. 127-8 and 131.
[138] Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.
[139] A prolapsed uterus is a condition in which the uterus drops from its normal position. In severe cases, such as those that may be associated with injury from sexual violence, the cervix and uterus may protrude beyond the vaginal opening.

I arrived late in the evening. Then all of a sudden we heard firing. There was confusion and armed rebels captured me. They took me to their bush camp in a place called Mabang. They started sexing me two days later. I tried to fight and told them to leave me, but several times they put a pistol into my vagina. I gave myself up to God and asked that he save me. The first day, about ten sexed me. After the first day there were fewer men, between three and six a day. Every day they came and stood in line waiting to rape me. All together there were over thirty different men. They were aged between seventeen and twenty-five years old. The younger ones were rough and most of them seemed to be on drugs. I think these were RUF people. Most of them seemed to be Mendes. I saw many young girls in their camp. I guess the lucky ones only had one rebel. But I'm from Bo and wouldn't allow myself to be together with one of them. I told them I wasn't a Kamajor and that my husband was a policeman and they said, "Oh policemen are our enemies ... we've killed them all. Forget about your husband."

Sometimes they tied my legs to my arms with my legs spread and raped me one after the other. They said since I was from Bo and I was a Kamajor's wife that they were going to rape me to death. [Sometimes] I held my baby Hawanatu in my arms while they were raping me. When she cried they said they wanted to shoot her so I gave her the breast.

They raped me for two or three weeks and then in early February, my vagina came out [i.e. she suffered a prolapsed uterus]. It was so, so painful. I can't tell you how much it hurt. When this happened, I thought I was going to die. In order to get it to go back in I had to lie down and push it back in. To urinate, I had to lie down. They provoked me and made fun of me. They said now my Kamajor husband will not be able to have sex with me. A wife of one of the commanders told a villager to help me escape which they did. He took me to a nice woman in another village away from the rebel area and after explaining my problem, she helped me so much. She gave me herbs and tried to cure me and my baby who by that time was vomiting and very sick. It's only God that helped keep my little Hawanatu alive. He decided that this little child is mine to keep. Later, when I was stronger, I made it to Freetown and had an operation for my prolapsed uterus. I feel much better now.[140]

Rebels also raped pregnant women. In polygynous marriages, pregnant women generally stop having sexual intercourse with their husbands once their pregnancy has been confirmed, to protect the fetus. R.F, the thirty-three-year-old farmer gang raped by West Side Boys at Petifu, Port Loko, in November 1999 (see above, p. 39), was six months pregnant at the time. As the result of the gang rape she delivered prematurely, causing the baby's death:

I went with Isatu, her husband and my five-year-old son to harvest rice in Isatu's village, Petifu. We traveled by boat and at night to avoid the rebels. When we were resting having worked all the next day, we heard the rebels. They were all over the village and told us to give them our rice and palm oil. Several of them started hitting me on the head with their guns. Three were wearing uniform, the others wore civilian clothes. They spoke all different languages.

One of them tied a rope around my waist like a goat and pushed me out of the door screaming, "Show me where your people are." My little boy was left sleeping on the bed. Seven of the rebels then led me about a mile out of the village, screaming at me to tell them where we had hidden the rice and palm oil. I told them I was a stranger there but they did not believe me. They took me into a small farmhouse where they all used me. This went on for a few hours until the cloth I was lying on was soaked. I could barely walk. Then they ordered me to get up and dragged me like a sheep back to the village.

[140] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 5, 1999.

> Once back in the village, they put me in a house and more of them started raping me. I was used by at least twenty rebels. I think the whole unit raped me throughout the night. The only one who did not use me was the commander. He kept coming in and saying, "Have you had your turn?" He was the one they kept calling "Commander."
>
> When one of the Temne speaking rebels was raping me I said, "Please brother, talk to these people and ask them to leave me." But he said he could not do anything. Another rebel pulled out a knife when he was on top of me and said if I said anything he would kill me. I told them I was pregnant and said, "Can't you see? I have a six month belly." But they said, "We do not care. We see your belly but so what." Two of them told me to stoop down, but I couldn't and they just pushed me down and used me. After many had used me one of them said, "Oh, there is no more sweetness there," so they turned me over and did it to me from behind. Three of them did it to me like that, and now when I go to the toilet it is so painful; I am still bleeding and it feels like my insides are coming out. One rebel had sex with me several times. He said he was punishing me for not having shown him where the rice and palm oil was hidden. I yelled for the commander and complained, saying, "He wants to kill me, tell him to leave me!" but he said, "We have killed others that are better than you." I did not complain after that. They kept saying they were about to stop fighting—that they really want peace and that after peace comes, they won't do these things any more.
>
> In the early hours of the morning, they finally left. They wanted me to carry their looted items but I could not walk. They took other people whom they used to carry the looted goods. At one point I tried to get up but could not, I slipped and fell down to earth. By this time I had started bleeding. I felt my baby trembling in my belly. A few hours later the water broke and then I started to have contractions. I have five children and had never even had a miscarriage. I had about three hours of labor before giving birth. The little thing shook for a minute or so and then it died. It was so beautiful; it had fine hair and the face was so pretty. I wrapped it with a cloth. I could not bear to look whether it was a boy or a girl. I was gushing out blood and shortly after I delivered the placenta. I felt dizzy. I was barely able to walk.
>
> Later when I had a little more strength I covered my baby and threw it in a pit latrine. I felt so bad for throwing it away like that but I did not have the strength to bury it properly. After thinking everything over, I am only angry at this war and thankful that I still have my life and that the life of my child [her five-year-old] was spared. It's only God that saved him. He was lying on the bed the whole time.[141]

Forced Pregnancies

Many women and girls became pregnant as the result of the rape(s) they were subjected to. Although some women were reportedly able to abort without the knowledge of the rebels using traditional herbal treatments, the majority had no choice but to carry the child to full term. M.W., the abducted nurse already quoted above (see p. 28), said that many girls who had been raped had miscarriages that might have been self-induced with herbs. I.S., a twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted by the AFRC during the January 1999 invasion, tried to abort, but was unsuccessful:

> When I got pregnant I didn't tell my rebel husband for months. I asked a woman who knows about medicine to give me herbs to abort the baby, but it never worked and after my belly started to swell, he found out. He warned me that if I tried to flush the baby out, he'd kill me. He said he wanted the baby and that he hoped it would be a boy.[142]

M.W., the abducted nurse, also mentioned that medical personnel were instructed by a rebel doctor, Dr.

[141] Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko, November 27, 1999.
[142] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

Lahai, not to perform abortions, give birth control, or advise that traditional herbal treatments be taken, as the rebels felt that too many people had died and they needed to increase the population.[143] Many women did have miscarriages because of the brutal rapes and trauma they were subjected to by the rebels, as well as the difficult conditions in the bush.

Forced Abortion by West Side Boys

Human Rights Watch has documented one case of forced abortion by the West Side Boys, the splinter group of the AFRC that took power in the 1997 coup. Twenty-year-old M.K. was abducted from Magbele village in Port Loko district in July 2000, when she was four months pregnant. She was raped by four West Side Boys and was made the wife of a rebel who forced her to abort:

> I was abducted with two other civilians, including my brother-in-law, by the West Side Boys. They were all wearing uniforms; some uniforms were new, and others wore old ones. We were taken to their base in Magbele Junction where there were many other abductees. At nighttime one of the rebels called Umaro Kamara came to me and said he wanted to have sex with me. He spoke nicely with me and said that he wanted to take me to Makeni and make me his wife. He raped me that day. The rebels saw that I was pregnant and said to Umaro, "We are not going to work along with any pregnant woman, we should kill her." Umaro said that he wanted to take me as his wife and that I should be given an injection instead. Umaro called me and tried to convince me to get rid of the baby. He said, "They will kill you if you do not agree so you better have the injection." I was taken to the doctor who gave me an injection and some pills. Two days later I started bleeding. I felt weak and had pain all over my body: Then I lost the baby.
>
> When Umaro was on patrol, three other rebels raped me. When we moved out to go to another base, I saw the body of my brother-in-law. After one day I started bleeding again so Umaro took me to the doctor who gave me another injection. When we reached Lunsar, Umaro wanted to make me his wife. Even while I was bleeding, Umaro used me. He told me to wash myself before raping me.[144]

Rape by Female Combatant

Human Rights Watch has documented a case of a female rebel manually raping female abductees. The virginity checks performed by female rebels on abductees prior to their "virgination" by male rebels, noted above, also constitute rape given that penetration occurred without the consent of the victim. More of such abuses may have been committed but not reported due to shame, as expressed in the testimony below. The rebels captured sixteen-year-old F.P. on January 7, 1999 when—as she was fleeing the fighting in central Freetown with two other girls—she ran into a patrol of five heavily armed rebels, including one female rebel. They knew the female rebel from before as Aminata; she had lived in their neighborhood before the 1997 AFRC coup. She had joined the rebels at that time and had not been seen since the AFRC was driven out of Freetown in February 1998. F.P. remembered having had an argument with her several years ago. The rebels called her "C.O. Sally." F.P. was taken with her sister and another girl whom she did not know to a rebel base. Her friend was raped by five men, which she was made to watch. F.P.was also "virginated" by male rebels and sexually molested by "C.O. Sally," along with another girl, also called Sally:

> C.O. Sally came into the room where we were kept and said, "Why are you hollering? These are my boys, why are you refusing them?" Since we knew C.O. Sally, we asked her to help us get away, so finally on January 10 she took us at gunpoint to another house. She made us cook and wash for her. Once she told us to go into a room and take off our clothes. She had an RPG [rocket propelled grenade] on the ground as well as a gun. We took off our clothes and then she took two long sticks and tied our hands to them straight out from our shoulders. She stood us in front of her and asked if we remembered her to which I answered, "No." Then she said that she remembered

[143] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 21, 1999.
[144] Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko IDP camp, July 13, 2000.

> me and that we had fought last time we had met each other. She made me put one leg up on a drum and then she fingered me with two fingers. I was so embarrassed and ashamed. I asked her why she was doing this but she screamed at me to shut up. She did not touch herself or say anything, but kept on fingering me. Then she called Sally and did the same thing to her. When she was finished, she left us standing there with our arms tied. A little later she fingered us again. It did not seem sexual to me and I do not know why she did it. An hour later a young rebel came and said he thought he was hearing gunshots from ECOMOG. C.O. Sally ordered the boy to untie us as "I have punished these people already."[145]

Rape and Other Sexual Violence against Boys and Men by Male and Female Rebels

According to FAWE Sierra Leone, boys and men were also raped by male rebels. FAWE Sierra Leone treated fourteen boys aged between nine and fifteen years old who had been raped, but suspects that there are more cases. Due to the stigma attached to homosexuality in Sierra Leone, male victims of rape feared they would be perceived as homosexuals and therefore few boys were willing to report it. Human Rights Watch has not documented any of these crimes of sexual violence, which were apparently committed on a much smaller scale than sexual violence committed against women and girls. FAWE Sierra Leone did not want Human Rights Watch to interview the boys they had treated as they feared that interviewing them would re-traumatize them.[146]

Human Rights Watch documented two cases in which female rebels forced men to have sexual intercourse at gunpoint. One case involved a female rebel forcing a male civilian to have sex during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, and the second involved a RUF female training commander and male conscripts in Kono. Cases of these crimes of sexual violence were also reported by FAWE Sierra Leone. It is impossible to determine the prevalence of this type of sexual violence, but—given the general level of violence within the rebel forces and the power that female combatants had over civilians—Human Rights Watch believes that such incidents did happen more often than has been reported, albeit again on a much reduced scale compared to male combatants raping female civilians.

Abduction, Sexual Slavery, Forced Labor, and Conscription

Abduction

The rebel forces used abduction as their primary method for recruitment. During an attack on a town or village, rebels typically rounded up civilians as they tried to flee or were found hiding. Men were abducted to carry the looted items as well as being forcibly conscripted. The abducted children were also given military training and forcibly conscripted.

In thousands of cases, women and girls were abducted after being subjected to sexual violence. The rebels often killed family members who tried to protect their women and girls. Abducted women and girls described being "given" to a combatant who then took them as their "wives" (see also "Sexual slavery" section, below).[147] Abduction of civilians continued for the duration of the armed conflict. In the early years of the conflict, the RUF went on hit-and-run raids, returning to their base camps with looted items and abducted civilians. As the RUF took over more territory, an increasing number of civilians were abducted. As their ranks increased with more men and boys being forcibly conscripted, so did their abduction of women and girls. The AFRC and West Side Boys used the same tactics. Some women had the extreme misfortune of escaping from one rebel faction, or unit, only to be abducted by another. One such victim, thirteen-year-old M.F. (see above, p. 34), who was first

[145] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 18, 1999.

[146] Human Rights Watch interview with Christiana Thorpe (founding Chairperson of FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter), Freetown, March 22, 2002.

[147] The PHR report found that 9 percent of women reporting having themselves experienced sexual violence had been forced to "marry" their rebel "husband." PHR report, p. 2. These types of marriage are similar to marriages by capture, which were common at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. In tribal wars, the conquerors would kill the male inhabitants of the vanquished village and capture the women who subsequently became the wives of the conquerors. The "marriage" was validated by the captor's public declaration of his intention to cohabit with his captive. Such a wife was regarded as a slave and her children could not inherit from their father. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 29.

abducted from Koinadugu by the RUF/AFRC and gang raped, was driven out of Makeni in October 1999 when it came under attack by the RUF. She was subsequently abducted by the West Side Boys and raped by two child combatants.[148]

Sexual Slavery and Forced Labor

Women and girls were primarily abducted to be the sex slaves of the rebels and to perform slave labor. The survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights found that 33 percent of the interviewees reporting war-related sexual violence had been abducted and 15 percent had been subjected to sexual slavery. Consistent with fairly common practice among the Sierra Leonean male population at large, many rebels had polygynous "marriages," including with abducted women whom they had forced to "marry" them. Rebels also changed "wives" frequently when they tired of them or when their "wives" were too ill to perform their tasks (a consequence of the brutality that they were often subjected to). Victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported attaching themselves to one rebel to avoid gang rape and be given a degree of protection. The more highly ranked the commander, the more protection a woman had. Women and girls, however, remained vulnerable to sexual violence by other rebels. M.F., the thirteen-year-old who was gang raped by the RUF/AFRC in Koinadugu was raped by two other commanders when her "husband" Mohammed was out on patrol.

Women who were "married" to high-ranking rebels benefited not only from "protection" but also were able to exert power over others. The women and girls often benefited from the looted items that their rebel "husbands" gave them, and took part themselves in looting raids to steal clothes, shoes, and jewelry. Not all were abductees: some women and girls voluntarily joined the rebel forces and sought to benefit from their relationship with the rebels, i.e. from the looted goods or escaping from their parents (some girls would use a relationship with a rebel boyfriend to gain freedom from parental control, by threatening to involve the boyfriend in their dispute over parental restrictions). Such women consenting to marry a rebel were probably still vulnerable to sexual violence from other rebels.

Numerous victims described being subjected to abuse or forced to work by commanders' wives. FAWE Sierra Leone also reported that female combatants "married" to rebels killed new abductees if their "husbands" showed a preference for them. A.J., the fourteen-year-old student who was abducted in Pujehun and tortured by the RUF from February to May 1994 (see above, p. 31) is an example of how some "wives" were treated by other female abductees or combatants:

> I was put under the control of Commander Patrick, a Liberian. He was married to a woman called Neneh who was very jealous of me. Once, after the commanders had gone to the war front, Neneh told one of our guards to open up the cage where I was being held and take me out. She said, "My husband is interested in you. If you accept him to have sex with you, I'll kill you, so be forewarned." Neneh and Patrick have one child. She told me she'd joined the rebels voluntarily. She said, "You are just a captive. Do you think I was abducted? I was not abducted. I joined voluntarily. So you have no right to fall in love with my husband."[149]

A few victims also described how some of these women, usually the wives of commanders, used their power to try and protect, and at times facilitate the escape, of other abductees. For example, M.C., who was brutally raped by rebels in early 1999 in Mabang and suffered a prolapsed uterus (see above, p. 38) was helped to escape by a commander's wife who felt sorry for her.[150]

Abducted women were made to carry out forced labor during their captivity, including cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, and carrying heavy loads of ammunition and looted items. In many instances, women—intimidated by their captors and the situation they were in—felt powerless to escape their lives of sexual slavery, and were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, "as it was war." The rebels often deliberately

[148] Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, 7 March 2002.
[149] Human Rights Watch interview, Pujehun, February 12, 2000.
[150] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 5, 1999.

marked abducted civilians with the letters "RUF" or "AFRC" carved mainly onto their chests. This made escape more difficult because, were they to be caught by government forces, they would likely be suspected of being rebels and killed. Some women used traditional herbal remedies to remove their markings, and international organizations have also performed surgery on these victims to remove the scars.

Relationships between Rebels and Abductees

The relationships that developed between the abductees and rebels were very complex and varied. Most relationships were obviously very volatile, as described by I.S., the twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted by the AFRC in the January 1999 invasion (see above, p. 40). She stayed with the AFRC/West Side Boys until August 1999 when she was able to escape:

> We stayed there for months and they were always going on attacks in the Port Loko area. Occasionally C.O. Blood was nice to me and I had to kiss him and play love with him. But I could never tell him what was really in my heart; that I missed my family and wanted to escape. Other days he would beat me for nothing. He did the same thing to his other "wife." Neither of us could complain.[151]

H.K. was assigned as the wife of "Jaja" and was so badly treated by him that even the other rebels sometimes tried to prevail on him to be less violent:

> Jaja was already "married" to another abductee, and when she saw what he had done to me, she escaped. He always beat both of us. He used to sex me twice every night. He made me take his penis in my mouth. I tried to refuse him but he always threatened to kill me. He was actually an SLA soldier but had joined the RUF. His C.O. was Colonel Stagger, who used to criticize him for how he treated us. Colonel Stagger used to say, "Look, when we take these kids, we should take care of them and now you beat her for nothing." Jaja used to say it was not Stagger's business. Stagger's own abductees were treated pretty well. He never beat them.[152]

Some women fled at the first opportunity. Other women, especially those who had children with the rebels, found it difficult to leave these abusive relationships. Many women and girls experienced their first sexual relationship with their rebel "husband" and may have developed aspects of the "Stockholm Syndrome," whereby the hostage identifies with the hostage-taker. They adjusted to the level of violence with the rebels, which over time became "normal," in order to survive.[153] Others feared that their "husband" might seek revenge if they escaped and returned to their family. The rebels instilled fear in their "wives" by telling them that their families would not accept them back. The abductees also feared to some extent that they would be blamed for what happened to them. For some women who had lost their families, the rebels became a surrogate family. As many rebels had themselves lost their families or could not return to their villages of origin, given that they had in some cases committed human rights abuses in their communities, they did not want to relinquish their surrogate families or their slave labor.

As the women and girls were never registered in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program and there was insufficient documentation of this large category of victims throughout the armed conflict, it is unclear how many girls and women were abducted. It is now impossible to establish how many remain under the control of their rebel "husband" or have returned to their village of origin.

The ones who have remained involuntarily will only re-examine their situation when alternatives become available. Women who wish to sever links with ex-combatants have few alternative economic or social options. They are a very vulnerable group that has little or no means of support. They are often not able to return to their

[151] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.
[152] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 12, 1999.
[153] A group of female ex-combatants and abducted women, for example, defined to Human Rights Watch domestic violence as "wounding or losing consciousness."

villages out of fear, lack of funds and social stigma, especially if they have given birth to children fathered by rebels. The women are therefore often forced to remain in situations in which they are vulnerable to continuing abuse. Numerous victims end up being commercial sex workers, selling their body for as little as U.S.50¢ Exploited girls and women can end up abandoned with several children to raise by themselves by the time they are in their early twenties.

Rebel Control over Abductees

Life with the rebels was very tough. Civilian abductees, in particular, were treated ruthlessly. The RUF established a military police system and courthouses to administer a form of justice to those who contravened RUF rules of behavior. Some of the RUF rules were written, but the rules, trial and punishment were to a large extent arbitrary, dependent on the particular commander. Interviewees reported that severe punishment was meted out for small incidents such as spilling water on a commander's shoes (one week in a cell with daily beatings) or not lodging complaints through the official channels (imprisonment in a dungeon). "Courthouses" were established to try both combatants and the civilians.[154] A rebel was expected to provide for his "wives" and children during their captivity even if he had taken on another "wife" or "wives." If a rebel reneged on his responsibility, then he could be put in a cell and beaten to death. Civilian women who were tried by the court were raped and beaten if they did not have a commander to stand up for them. According to K.M., who was abducted by the RUF from Kabala, Koinadugu, the three male rebels who presided over the courthouse in Burkina, a training camp in Kailahun, would arrange amongst themselves who could rape the women. She also said that one woman was raped to death by six rebels.[155]

Forced Conscription: Female Combatants

Women and girls were also forcibly conscripted into the rebel fighting forces. The RUF established military training camps for women. During active fighting, female combatants were sent into battle after the men and the Small Boys Units (SBUs). There were only very few high-ranking female commanders in the rebel forces and a much smaller number of female combatants than adult men or boys. Female combatants had more power than female civilians: combatants, including female combatants, who had received military training, had substantial power to do whatever they wanted to civilians. Within the rebel forces, however, women still held much lower status: female combatants were assigned "husbands."

Forcibly conscripted female combatants were in many ways as vulnerable as civilian abductees, and may have decided to stay with their rebel "husbands" for the same reasons as their civilian counterparts i.e. shame, lack of alternative options, and economic dependence on their "husbands."

RUF Officers' Responsibility for Sexual Violence

In addition to their individual criminal responsibility, rebel commanders can bear direct command responsibility for crimes of sexual violence and sexual slavery, for ordering the rape and abduction of women and girls (see below, p. 60, for a discussion of the principle of command responsibility in international law). C.O. Caca Scatter, for example, ordered the gang rape of S.J., the wealthy forty-five-year-old woman (see above, p. 37). A.J., the fourteen-year-old student, was tortured, caged and brutally raped by C.O. Patrick (see above, p. 43). S.G., the fifty-year-old widow was raped and had both arms amputated by Commander "Don't Blame God" (see above, p. 36).[156] Indeed, the organized way in which victims frequently describe being rounded up and taken, as well as the number of rebels involved in these abductions and the number of victims abducted, suggests an element of premeditation and planning on the part of the RUF, AFRC and West Side Boys command. Victims also frequently described being specifically selected to be given to a commander or being sexually abused in the presence of commanders, which again suggest that sexual violence was committed under the direction of and with the consent of members of the rebels' hierarchy. I.S., the twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted and

[154] Abdullah and Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," p. 189.

[155] Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7 and 9, 2002.

[156] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999. Under Article 6 (1), persons are held individually responsible for the planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the statute.

gang raped by the West Side Boys from January to August 1999 explained how Commander "Blood" had initiated the "wife" selection process:

> One of the commanders said he was going to amputate all of us too. But another commander, C.O. Blood, said, "Don't kill them, let's chose them as wives." Then we were divided up. The one who seemed to be in charge, C.O. Blood, chose me. When he looked at me I was frightened. His pupils were huge—he was high on drugs. He took me to a house and told me to lie down on the ground. He said if I did not allow him to have sex, he would kill me. He took out a knife and said he would not even waste his ammunition on me. He would just chop me to pieces. I knew he meant what he said. He forced my clothes off and used me twice. He was rough and after the second time I begged him to leave me, but he said he did not care. My insides hurt so much. Then he used me from behind. Other women were being raped in the same room. They [the West Side Boys] did not care.[157]

According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, thirty-four of the ninety-four survivors directly reporting sexual violence believed that their attackers' commander was aware of the attack.[158] While it is difficult to generalize from this figure, it does tend to confirm the findings of Human Rights Watch that sexual violence and slavery, which were committed on a widespread and systematic nature, were part of the rebel forces' military strategy to dominate, humiliate and punish the civilian population.

The RUF has made occasional efforts to declare rape a crime within certain areas under their control and disciplined ordinary soldiers accused of raping. The disciplinary measures included summary trials followed by execution. These efforts failed to prevent sexual violence in practice. One commander, for example, prevented at least temporarily the rape of an eight-year-old girl who was abducted by a ten-year-old child combatant by ordering the child combatant to only use the young girl "for cleaning and cooking for now."[159] A.B. witnessed the gang rape of an old woman, which the commander had originally tried to stop but then allowed to happen (see above, p. 37).

Senior male and female figures in the RUF interviewed by Human Rights Watch mainly denied that sexual violence had happened, explaining that the women joined the RUF movement voluntarily and fell in love with their rebel "husbands."[160] A key figure in the AFRC admitted that he had heard of cases of sexual violence and blamed it on the breakdown of law and order.[161] He also said that none of his men had expressed any remorse for the human rights abuses they committed. In the vast majority of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, those who committed rape were not disciplined or punished in any way

Sexual Violence Committed by the CDF

As already noted, there are relatively few reported cases of rape committed by the CDF. The CDF were reasonably disciplined during the war, although their discipline deteriorated when they were deployed in chiefdoms outside their own native areas. Sexual intercourse is believed to act against the protection bestowed on the fighters during their initiation ceremonies. However, Human Rights Watch has documented several crimes of sexual violence by the Kamajors, the CDF based in the Southern Province.

In March 1998, a forty-five-year-old Temne man, M.B., witnessed the rape of a young Temne woman called Jeneba by the Kamajors in Kenema town. The Kamajors also mutilated and killed Jeneba. M.B. explained that during the ECOMOG intervention to restore the democratically elected government in 1998, Kamajors accused members of the Temne and Limba ethnic groups of being RUF/AFRC supporters and persecuted them. According to M.B., the Kamajors identified Temnes and Limbas as such by their last names and publicly beheaded or

[157] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.
[158] PHR report, p. 54.
[159] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 16, 1999.
[160] Human Rights Watch interviews, Freetown and Makeni, April 1999 to May 2002.
[161] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 26, 2002.

stabbed to death numerous alleged rebels. The Kamajors also ate some of their victims, believing that this would bestow additional powers to them. The accused had no means to defend themselves, as ECOMOG initially backed the Kamajors and did not realize until later that the killings were carried out along tribal lines. After receiving death threats, M.B. sought refuge in the house of a chief who was Temne and the father of Jeneba. A group of about eight Kamajors came to the house, looking for Jeneba, and accused her of having a sexual relationship with an AFRC fighter:

> I saw Jeneba being raped by one Kamajor, while the others were standing around watching. Then the Kamajors threatened to kill us if we did not stop looking at them, so we went into other houses to hide. From there we could not see what was going on but heard Jeneba screaming at the top of her voice, and when the Kamajors had gone we came outside and found Jeneba dead. She was naked and her hands and feet had been mutilated by a machete.[162]

On February 17, 1999, J.K., a thirty-one-year-old woman was raped by two Kamajors in a small village in Bonthe district. A group of Kamajors entered J.K.'s house looking for her brother, who had not been home for the past three years:

> One of the Kamajors called Kinie said that they had been told that my brother was in the village and was planning to attack them. I assured them no one knew where he was. During this argument, the other civilians in village became afraid and fled into the bush. As soon as the Kamajors forced their way into my bedroom, I followed them to check up on what they were doing. Kinie and another Kamajor whose name I did not know pushed me to the ground, tearing off my clothes. I screamed for help but no one came to my rescue. Even my father who was in the house was unable to help me. They both raped me while the others stood around laughing. When they left the village, they looted some goats and chickens. There was no one to report the incident to and I had no money to pay for a hospital visit. I decided to leave everything to the Almighty God.[163]

In another incident, at least three female civilians were raped, including by a Kamajor commander. In July 2000, M.S. and twenty-five other passengers were taken off a bus at Bauya in Moyamba district, beaten, and accused of being RUF rebels. All their possessions were taken off the bus and inspected by the Kamajors but they did not find any incriminating goods. Their possessions were stolen by the CDF. In the evening, M.S. was locked in the guardroom at the CDF office with nine other women and her young child:

> Twenty CDF came to the guardroom and told us, the women that we could choose between [being] raped or killed. I was raped by a young CDF on the ground of the guardroom. I told him that I was a suckling mother but he did not care. My baby was in the room when he raped me. He made me stoop like an animal. He said, "I am a government man so no one will ask me anything about this." My breast milk has gone bad now. I could hear another woman who initially refused to be raped being beaten with the torch. She was raped by two CDF called Mohammed and Ahmed.[164]

In the same incident, an older high-ranking CDF commander raped a thirty-five-year-old trader, R.K.:

> Mr. S. raped me all night. He raped me five times. I cried as I was not used to doing that even with my husband. He was rough and did it from behind like an animal in a bad way. He accused me of being a RUF commander's wife. I told him my husband is a Gbetti [part of the CDF].[165]

[162] Human Rights Watch interview, Kenema, August 12, 2002.
[163] Human Rights Watch interview, Bonthe district, July 8, 2002.
[164] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.
[165] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed B.R., a Kamajor fighter who reported witnessing the rape of two civilians that took place in 1997 and 1998. He also witnessed the killing of a captured RUF female combatant, who died after being raped with a stick. B.R. explained that the rape that took place in 1997 happened when a patrol of six Kamajors, including B.R., met a group of female civilians in the bush:

> Some of the women started talking bad things about the Kamajors and said that we were taking food off people. Then one Kamajors went for this woman. I saw him raping her. He had stripped her naked and she was screaming. I did not want to see it or be a witness but I had to rush there. At one point I thought he was killing her.[166]

The incident was reported to the high priest, one of the main Kamajor initiators who decided that the offender had to be punished. B.R. explained that the punishment was called "walking the highway," which entailed the offender being made to walk slowly through fifty Kamajors lined up on two sides, with the Kamajors flogging him with canes. B.R. said that the victim would have reported the rape to the Kamajor high priest, but that he and the others on patrol decided to report it first, otherwise it would have made them equally guilty of the crime. The rape committed in 1998 involved a young Kamajor raping a twenty-year-old woman. B.R. explained that the offender was given a trial, during which he admitted to having committed the crime. He was subsequently locked up in prison (probably a local prison).

In another instance, B.R. explained how a twenty-five-year-old female RUF combatant captured in Tongo in Kono district was brutally killed by the insertion of a long stick in her vagina after the Kamajors had cut off her ears and nose and gouged her eyes out with a machete. The Kamajor commander allegedly wanted to teach the woman a lesson and said that: "This stick is your husband and is screwing you. Are you enjoying it? Just say your last prayers, as you are going to die bit by bit."[167]

Sexual Violence Committed by International Peacekeeping Forces

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of rape by the international peacekeeping forces. Human Rights Watch was informed of a rape committed by a Guinean peacekeeper, Sgt. Ballah, by two reliable sources, including the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), who had interviewed the twelve-year-old victim. The victim was raped on March 26, 2001 when she asked for Sgt. Ballah's assistance in securing a ride to Freetown at the checkpoint that he was manning. The rape was perpetrated in Bo, the area of deployment of the Guinean peacekeeping contingent. Sgt. Ballah was charged to court on the same day. Unfortunately, the SLP dropped the case and the offender was sent back to Guinea. Human Rights Watch was not able to locate the victim.

In February 2001, a Nigerian peacekeeper reportedly raped a sixteen-year-old girl in Freetown. When Human Rights Watch investigated the case, the SLP claimed they had not been able to trace the perpetrator for questioning. UNAMSIL claimed that the Nigerian contingent and UNAMSIL Civilian Police Section had investigated the matter and that the plaintiff had subsequently dropped the charge.

Human Rights Watch interviewed a witness to an alleged rape by two Ukrainian peacekeepers that took place on April 3, 2002 in the village of Joru in Kenema district. K.S., a fifty-five-year-old female farmer testified that she as well as others in her village had witnessed the gang rape:

> Late at night I came out of my house to ease myself [urinate]. Maybe I had been woken up by a big white truck that had stopped about fifty meters away from my house. I hid and watched what was happening; there were people inside. I noticed two white men and one black lady inside the truck. Clearly there was a struggle going on. I could hear her yelling at them to "leave me alone" in what sounded like a Liberian accent, but I can not be sure. The door was open and one of them was on top of her. The lady was really struggling. I saw that one of them was holding her down while the other was raping her. I was able to see because in the process the men had opened the

[166] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, July 31, 2000.
[167] Human Rights Watch interview, July 31, 2000. The CDF generally killed any RUF that they had captured.

door to the car and the light had come on. I am sure they were raping her and she was fighting with them to stop it. I stayed and watched this go on for several minutes. I later learned a few more people were also watching what was going on. In fact we talked about it the next morning.

Then, perhaps afraid of being watched, the two whites moved their truck further down the road ... past my house, further down the road going out of town. Maybe they thought that because there were no houses around, we would not see what they were up to. They stayed another thirty or so minutes in this second location. I saw both of them have their turn on her, but I did not see any guns. After they were finished, I saw one of them drag her out of the cabin and put her in the back of the big truck. I can not remember if one of them got in the back with her but I think so. Then they drove off.

The next morning when I went out to go to the mosque, we found one of her black shoes that she must have kicked off while struggling with those men. The shoe was near the first place they had stopped. We took it to the police but they never came to ask us any questions. We are all a bit frightened of those UNAMSIL people now. We tell our girls never to get in a truck with them or the same thing might happen to them.[168]

Neither the SLP in Joru or UNAMSIL in Kenema conducted a proper investigation into this alleged gang rape, both claiming that the absence of the victim prevented them from conducting their investigation. The UNAMSIL human rights section was not aware of this alleged gang rape until Human Rights Watch informed them, and to date has also not conducted a thorough investigation.

On June 22, 2002, a fourteen-year-old boy was allegedly raped by a Bangladeshi peacekeeper near the Jui transit camp for Sierra Leonean returnees located outside of Freetown in the Western Area. The rape occurred when the victim and his friends were fishing with several Bangladeshi peacekeepers near the camp. The offender was reported to have taken the boy away from the others in the group before raping him. The victim's friends reported that the boy looked disheveled after rejoining the group and immediately told them what had happened. The offender gave the victim the equivalent of U.S $0.25 to silence him. The boy reported the rape to the SLP on June 24 and a medical exam carried out on the same day confirmed penetration had taken place.

The SLP were involved in the case for ten days, until the UNAMSIL provost marshal took it over. The provost marshal concluded that there was no conclusive evidence to link the crime to the perpetrator. After reviewing the case, the UNAMSIL force commander concluded that while the evidence was inconclusive, the circumstantial evidence was strong enough to conclude that the peacekeeper had violated military discipline, and as such issued an order of repatriation. It is not clear to Human Rights Watch whether this violation will be recorded on the offender's file. According to a reliable source, the investigation by the police and UNAMSIL was conducted in an insensitive manner and members of the Bangladeshi contingent spoke with the victim while the UNAMSIL investigation was ongoing, even though they should not have had access to him. Nor did UNAMSIL follow up with the victim or his family to apologize, provide compensation, and explain the outcome of the investigation.[169]

UNAMSIL investigations into allegations of sexual violence by peacekeepers indicate a lack of appreciation for the seriousness of the problem of sexual violence. Human Rights Watch urges UNAMSIL to fully investigate any allegations of sexual violence committed by UNAMSIL military or civilian personnel. The human rights section should systematically monitor and report on sexual violence, including cases involving UNAMSIL personnel. UNAMSIL should establish a mechanism with the SLP whereby allegations of sexual violence by persons employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL reported to the police are immediately reported to the relevant UNAMSIL staff members, including the provost marshal and the gender specialist in the human rights section. UNAMSIL should reciprocate by reporting cases known to it to the SLP. UNAMSIL should ensure that states

[168] Human Rights Watch interview, Joru, May 28, 2002. Other villagers did not want to be interviewed.
[169] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 15, 2002

report within the prescribed six months on follow up to cases involving military personnel that have resulted in the alleged perpetrator being repatriated to his country of origin, in order to ensure that states prosecute the accused. This will serve to actually enforce a stated "zero tolerance" for sexual exploitation by UNAMSIL staff and persons affiliated with UNAMSIL, which to date has had no teeth and therefore no impact on changing behavior. Civilian staff who commit sexual violence should be fired and their misconduct properly recorded in their personnel file to ensure that they are not rehired in another U.N. mission.

The UNAMSIL human rights section should also provide in-depth gender sensitization training to military and civilian staff. The training should ensure that the peacekeepers understand the code of conduct and the consequences if they do not adhere to it. The U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers and the Military Observer Handbook need to be revised to ensure that the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with U.N. missions and the consequences of such acts are clearly stated in these guidelines. Similar guidelines for civilian staff need to be widely disseminated to all U.N. missions.

Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women and solicited child prostitutes.

VI. EFFECTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Health

Sexual violence often continues to impact the physical and mental well-being of survivors long after the abuses were committed. In addition to the reluctance of some survivors to seek medical treatment, the lack of health facilities, especially in the provinces, as well as the survivors' lack of money for transport, medical treatment and drugs has meant that the health status of survivors is poor.[170] Survivors also were often only able to seek medical treatment months after the abuse had happened, for example when they managed to escape rebel captors and make their way to a health center.

The probability of transmission of HIV and certain other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) is greatly increased in violent sex and any sex where a woman or girl is injured. Doctors and other health personnel interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported a high prevalence of STDs amongst victims, as the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, like other armed conflicts, served as a vector for sexually transmitted diseases.[171]

A World Health Organization (WHO) report found an alarmingly high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS amongst Sierra Leone Army soldiers. According to the report, the SLA tested 176 soldiers and eighty-two civilians working for the army who had prolonged diarrhea, tuberculosis, weight loss or pneumonia, and found a HIV-positive rate of 41.9 percent (or 108 persons). Among the group tested were eighty female soldiers of whom thirty tested positive (37.5 percent). As many SLA soldiers defected to the rebel factions, it is likely that victims of sexual violence by them have been infected with the virus.[172] A U.N. report on the impact of conflict on children states that rates of sexually transmitted diseases among soldiers are two to five times higher than those of civilian populations, and that during armed conflict the rate of infection can be up to fifty times higher.[173] Commercial sexual exploitation of women by soldiers, including peacekeepers, also contributes to the spread of

---

[170] PHR report, p. 45.

[171] Human Rights Watch interviews with Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, February 25, 2002; Dr. Noah Conteh, Freetown, March 1, 2002 and Dr. Bernard Fraser, Freetown, March 3, 2002.

[172] World Health Organization, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone: The Future at Stake—The Strategic and Organizational Context and Recommendations for Action* (Freetown, 2000), p. 3.

[173] *See* United Nations Security Council resolution 1308 on the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security: HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations, July 17, 2000; and Graça Machel, "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: A critical review of progress made and obstacles encountered in increasing protection for war-affected children," report prepared for and presented at the International Conference on War-Affected Children, September 2000, Winnipeg, Canada, p. 12, at http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/machel-e.asp.

STDs, including HIV/AIDS.[174] In 1997, tests showed that 70.6 percent of commercial sex workers in Freetown were HIV positive compared to 26.7 percent in 1995.[175]

The 2002 report by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) on the global AIDS epidemic estimated that by the end of 2001 there were 170,000 persons aged between fifteen and forty-nine living with HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone. UNAIDS estimates that more than 50 percent of this figure (90,000) are women and girls.[176] More accurate figures on HIV/AIDS prevalence in Sierra Leone, as opposed to estimates, should be known when the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) publish their report based on a nationwide HIV/AIDS prevalence survey conducted in May 2002.[177] The government of Sierra Leone should ensure that future information campaigns on HIV/AIDS are designed both to impart basic information and to help reduce stigma, especially in light of the large number of survivors of sexual violence who may have been infected with HIV.

Other health problems are vasico-vaginal and vasico-rectal fistulas (VVFs and VRFs), as a result of the rape(s) especially of young girls but also of mature women; complications when giving birth; prolapsed uterus; trauma; and unwanted pregnancies. Health professionals have noted high rates of pregnancies amongst young girls with likely resultant illness, injury, and even death, due to pregnancy-related complications. These girls are likely to experience future complications including uterine problems and scarring, reducing their ability to have a normal sex life or to conceive or carry a child to full term in the future. The health of children born to abducted girls is also likely to suffer as the girls often have no one to teach them motherhood skills, contributing to high rates of infant mortality. The health risks are further exacerbated by various factors that impede safe sex, including lack of information about HIV/AIDS, as well as cultural practices and beliefs that undermine the use of reproductive health services and contraception.[178] The lack of attention paid until recently to conflict-related sexual violence has meant that the health needs of women and girls have not received as much attention or funding as required to adequately address the scale of the problem. In general the Sierra Leonean health services lack trained and motivated personnel, medical equipment and supplies, drugs, and blood for transfusion. The reproductive health infrastructure, which was poor before 1991, virtually collapsed during the war.[179] There are only six specialist obstetricians and gynecologists in Sierra Leone.[180] Treatment for sexually transmitted diseases is limited to the main towns and outreach by mobile clinics in some chiefdoms.

Mental health services for survivors of sexual violence are inadequate and as of 2002 there was only one qualified psychiatrist in the country. FAWE Sierra Leone, which has substantial expertise in treating survivors of

---

[174] Human Rights Watch interview, UNAMSIL medical personnel, Freetown, April 30, 2002.

[175] Ministry of Health and Sanitation, *National AIDS/STD Control Programme Annual Report for 1998* (Freetown, Ministry of Health and Sanitation, 1998), p. 3.

[176] UNAIDS, *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002* at http://www.unaids.org/, p. 190. This figure is based on a total population of 4,587,000.

[177] Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Joaquim Saweka (WHO Sierra Leone Representative), Freetown, May 3, 2002. The preliminary results of the CDC showed a prevalence rate of 4.9 percent.

[178] Only 297 of 4,923 women (or 6 percent) surveyed by the government in 2000 reported that they used contraceptives. This low prevalence of contraception use is due to lack of access to family planning services within the communities, inadequate health facilities, especially in the provinces, lack of disposable income to pay for these services, and the low education of women. Only 3 percent of women with no education used contraception compared to 8 percent of women with primary education and 14 percent of women with secondary or higher education. Another worrying factor is the unwillingness of partners to use condoms, which does not bode well given the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other STDs. *See* Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, pp. 55-58.

[179] UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 198.

[180] WHO and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, *Assessment of District Hospitals in Sierra Leone for the Delivery of Safe Motherhood and Reproductive Health Services* (Freetown: 2002), p. 10. The Assessment also found that physicians attended only 3 percent of births whereas traditional birth attendants assisted in 38 percent of births nationally. Ibid. pp. 56-57. Only 10 percent of 4,923 women surveyed by the government in 2000 reported that they received antenatal care from a physician. *See* Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, p. 10.

sexual violence, believes that counseling on a massive scale is needed to ensure that the women and girls can face the future.[181]

Stigmatization and Shame of Survivors

The rebels frequently committed crimes of sexual violence in public places. A.M., a twenty-year-old male, reported that when he was held in captivity in State House in Freetown from January 8, 1999 for three days, he saw from his cell window RUF/AFRC combatants raping about twenty to twenty-five girls each night on the grounds.[182] Given that rape has been committed on such a systematic and widespread scale and was witnessed by many people, it seems that rape survivors, particularly in urban centers, are generally not stigmatized by society. Survivors interviewed have expressed fear of rejection by their families and communities, but in practice it seems that their fears are unfounded. Most survivors are accepted back into their communities, with their families simply overjoyed to find that they are still alive.

Nevertheless, some women, like R.K. who was raped by the CDF (see above, p. 48), have been rejected by their husbands:

> I told my husband what happened. He cried and rejected me. He said he will find another wife. My family has begged him to accept me as it was not my fault. He does not love me anymore. I am annoyed because I was the senior wife and now he does not treat me well.[183]

Girls and women who voluntarily joined the rebel forces are less likely to be welcomed back.

The survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights gives an indication of survival strategies employed by women who had been raped: of the ninety-four interviewees reporting having themselves experienced sexual violence, sixty-one (or 65 percent) told someone about their case(s) of sexual violence. The majority of these survivors (fifty women and girls or 53 percent) reported their experience to a health care provider in a hospital, health care center or to a traditional healer, albeit on average five months after the incident(s) occurred. Among those not reporting these incidents and who stated a reason (twenty-eight out of thirty-three), the reasons given were feelings of shame or social stigma (eighteen women and girls or 64 percent), fear of being stigmatized or rejected (eight women and girls or 28 percent) and not having trust in anyone (six women and girls or 21 percent). Eighteen women and girls (19 percent) reported that discussions with family members helped them to try to forget about the incident(s). Other survivors reported that what helped most was to try and forget about the incident (46 percent), support of family (35 percent), a health care provider (33 percent) and traditional medicine (32 percent).[184]

Human Rights Watch also found that many survivors feel intense personal shame that the rebels have defiled them, and therefore often do not report the crime or seek medical attention. S.G., the fifty-year-old widow who had both arms amputated after being raped (see above p. 36), described the shame and anger she felt after her ordeal:

> I didn't even tell my people about the rape. It's such a shameful act. Not just because of the rebel's age, but also because never in my life have I had sex with someone besides my husband. I was a good woman. Can you imagine how I felt when this young boy raped me, kicked me and then told me to get out of his sight after doing this to me? And without my arms, how can I as a woman even clean myself, let alone take care of my affairs. We're farmers and how am I to farm now? Both the rape and amputation are awful ... but later when thinking about what happened, I was even angrier about the rape than the amputation because for him to have done that to me was

[181] Human Rights Watch interview with Christiana Thorpe (founding chairperson of FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter), Freetown, March 22, 2002.
[182] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 12, 1999.
[183] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.
[184] PHR report, p. 51 and Table 6 on p. 54. Women could select more than one of the choices given.

> like killing me inside because of the shame. Sex is something you should enjoy together with your man. But to do it like that, to handle me like that, to torture me like that and then kick me and leave me like that ... it's too much. But I guess I was somehow lucky. There could have been ten people doing that to me.[185]

P.S. twenty-five, who was abducted and gang raped by the West Side Boys in January 2000, explained why she had not reported her rapes:

> I didn't want to tell anyone what happened. I was ashamed because it is bad enough being done like this, but having a rebel do it is even worse. I felt so bad because I wanted to save myself for someone special. I went to secret society and they instructed us not to be involved in sex until we were ready to marry. And now I'm afraid because of AIDS. When I think of them I feel so angry.[186]

VII. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Introduction[187]

Women and girls have, since time immemorial, been subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, including rape and sexual slavery, during armed conflict. Mass rape of women and girls was documented during the Second World War as well as in more recent conflicts in such diverse countries as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.[188] Sexual violence has traditionally been considered as the inevitable by-product of armed conflict and has been mischaracterized by military and political leaders as a private crime or the unfortunate behavior of renegade soldiers. The use of rape as a weapon of war, however, means that rape is not a private or incidental crime. Rape as a weapon of war serves a strategic function and acts as an integral tool for achieving military objectives.

Conflict-related rape is an act of violence that targets sexuality, but it is also a military and political tool. It functions to subjugate and humiliate both the women and men within the targeted community. Furthermore, rape is generally not committed in isolation and victims are often subjected to multiple human rights abuses, which serve to further traumatize the survivor. In conflicts in which civilians are the principal targets, sexual violence has become an even more deliberate and insidious weapon of war. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, rape and other grave abuses committed by Serb forces were with the intent to drive the non-Serb population from their homes and communities.

---

[185] Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

[186] Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, February 8, 2000.

[187] Some of the information in this section was published previously in Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, *The Global Report on Women's Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); and Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph, "Rape in War: Challenging The Tradition of Impunity," *SAIS Review* (Washington D.C.: John Hopkins University Press, Winter-Spring 1994).

[188] *See* for example Human Rights Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: U.N. Cease-Fire Won't Help Banja Luka* Volume 6, Issue 8, June 1994, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/bosnia2/; Human Rights Watch, *Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping,* Vol. 7, No. 13, October 1995, http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.bosnia9510.html; Human Rights Watch, *Bosnia and Hercegovina, A Closed, Dark Place: Past and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca*, Vol. 10, No. 6 (D), July 1998, http://www.hrw.org/reports98/foca/; Human Rights Watch/Africa, Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, September 1996, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm; Human Rights Watch, *The War Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo*, June 2002, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/; Human Rights Watch, *Democratic Republic of Congo, War Crimes in Kisangani: The Response of Rwandan-backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny*, Vol. 14, No 6 (A), August 2002, http://hrw.org/reports/2002/drc2/; United Nations, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45*, E/CN.4/1995/42 (United Nations, 1994), p. 64.

8108

VIII. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS FOR SIERRA LEONE

Two transitional justice mechanisms are currently underway to address the cycle of impunity in Sierra Leone: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Both bodies became operational in the third quarter of 2002.

The Lomé Amnesty

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, controversially provided for amnesty for combatants in the civil war. Under Article 9 (1), Sankoh was granted an absolute and free pardon (he had been convicted and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 1997 coup); and under Article 9 (3) the government was required to ensure that "no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the time of signing of the present Agreement...."[243] At the last minute, the U.N. secretary-general's special representative attending the talks added a hand-written caveat that the U.N. held the understanding that the amnesty and pardon provided for in Article 9 did not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Under international law, states have an *erga omnes* obligation—in other words a duty owed to the whole international community—to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and torture even if this means that amnesty laws are in effect annulled. This means that Sierra Leone therefore has an obligation under international law to prosecute those who committed crimes against humanity and torture, irrespective of the Lomé Amnesty and the setting up of the SCSL. Other states also have an obligation to prosecute these crimes based on the principle of universal jurisdiction (see below at p. 66 for a discussion on this principle). Crimes committed in the post-Lomé period fall outside the amnesty and can be prosecuted under domestic law.

The granting of an amnesty may also be challenged under the Sierra Leonean constitution and international law, as being against the fundamental legal principle of the state's duty to provide an effective remedy against official violation of guaranteed rights. The U.N. Human Rights Commission has ruled that "States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such rehabilitation as may be possible."[244] A duty to revoke the amnesty retroactively may even arise under international law. Several Sierra Leonean lawyers have discussed the issue of the amnesty's constitutionality and whether to challenge it in court.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was conceived by nongovernmental organizations attending the peace talks as a counterbalance to the amnesty granted to all parties. Under the peace agreement, the TRC was to be established to "address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, [and] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation...."[245]

The commission should have been established within ninety days after the signing of the peace agreement, but the Sierra Leonean Parliament did not pass the Truth and Reconciliation Act establishing the TRC until February 2000. Its establishment was further delayed due to the renewed outbreak of fighting in May 2000, and lack of political will of both the government and the international community. As the selection process for the commissioners took longer than planned, the government also decided to delay the commencement of the TRC until after the May 2002 elections to ensure that the TRC would not be politicized by the elections. The activities of the TRC may well be further hampered by funding shortfalls. Only U.S. $1.5 million had been pledged as of June 2002, partially because the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) did not

[243] Article 9 of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.
[244] Robertson, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, p. 260.
[245] Article 26 (1) of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.

launch the funding appeal until January 25, 2002. Its total planned budget was reduced from almost U.S. $10 million to U.S. $6,276,440 in August 2002 and has remained unchanged since then.[246]

On May 13, 2002, President Kabbah announced the seven commissioners. The four Sierra Leoneans are: Rt. Rev. Dr. Joseph C. Humper; Justice Laura A. E. Marcus-Jones; Prof. John A. Kamara; and Mr. Sylvanus Torto. The three international commissioners are: Madam Ajaaratai Satang Jow (Gambia); Ms. Yasmin L. Sooka (South Africa); and Professor William Schabas (Canada). The commission had a three-month preparatory phase, which started in July 2002, and must wrap up its activities and submit a report within twelve months of the start of hearings, which as of this writing have not yet begun.[247] An interim executive secretariat headed by the Sierra Leonean lawyer Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff and staffed with eight other members was established to support the work of the commissioners. The budget will be used to establish the secretariat of the commission in Freetown, which will support the seven commissioners and the office of the executive secretary. In addition, it is likely that six operational units will be established to provide support to the commissioners and the executive secretary.[248] The establishment of regional offices is also provided for under the Act and should encourage Sierra Leonean participation and ownership of the process. These offices are expected to begin functioning in early 2003.[249]

The TRC's mandate is "to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the armed conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity; to respond to the needs of the victims; to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered."[250] The commission is called upon to give special attention to the subject of sexual abuse and may also implement "special procedures to address the needs of such particular victims as children or those who have suffered sexual abuse ..."[251] Any committees formed by the commission to assist it in the performance of its functions should also take into account gender representation.[252]

Both the UNAMSIL human rights unit and NGOs have conducted sensitization activities, mainly in the key urban centers, to ensure Sierra Leonean awareness of the process, but at the time of writing, there was still considerable confusion about the role of the TRC, especially in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).

Human Rights Watch believes that the work of the TRC would be greatly enhanced were the staff of the TRC to be gender-balanced with women represented at all levels and to include persons with expertise in sexual and gender-based violence. The gender adviser, expected to take up the post in January 2003, should provide gender sensitization training and ensure that the work of the TRC, including investigations and hearings, are carried out in a sensitive manner. Human Rights Watch recommends that the TRC explore the relationship between the widespread and systematic nature of conflict-related sexual violence and the low status of and discrimination against women. The final report on the findings of the TRC should highlight gender-specific abuses committed throughout the country during the armed conflict. The TRC should also make recommendations on improvements to the law and judicial system toward eliminating the discriminatory nature of customary and general law, and on legal reform and human rights training for government authorities, including members of the criminal justice system. The report should highlight the need for increased assistance (shelter, medical care, education, skills training, mental health programs, etc.) for women, as well as for strengthening existing women's groups through capacity building.

---

[246] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with TRC staff, November 14, 2002.
[247] The TRC can extend its operations for another six months provided that good cause is shown. TRC Act 2000, Section 5 (1). *See* http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html.
[248] The six operational units will probably be: Administration and Programming; Public Information and Education; Legal; Investigation; Research; Reconciliation and Protection.
[249] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with TRC staff, November 14, 2002.
[250] TRC Act 2000, Section 6 (1). *See* http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html.
[251] Ibid., Section 6 (2) (b) and 7 (4) respectively.
[252] Ibid., Section 10 (2).

8/10

Special Court for Sierra Leone

Following the hostage taking of over 500 U.N. peacekeepers and the renewed outbreak of fighting between the RUF and government forces in May 2000, the government of Sierra Leone requested that the U.N. assist in establishing a court "to try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of U.N. peacekeepers as hostages."[253] The government expressly mentioned that the RUF, in reneging on their obligations under the Lomé Peace Agreement, continued to subject many women and children to human rights abuses, including sexual slavery. On August 14, 2000, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1315 requesting the secretary-general to negotiate with the Sierra Leonean government an agreement for the establishment of a special court.

Due to delays in funding contributions and agreement on key substantive matters, the agreement between the government and the U.N. to establish the Special Court for Sierra Leone was not signed until January 16, 2002.[254] The total budget for the SCSL is U.S. $56.8 million. The first year of the court has been fully funded and pledges have been received for the second year.[255] The secretary-general appointed the prosecutor and registrar on April 19, 2002, and it is hoped that the first trials will commence in the second quarter of 2003.[256] Given budgetary constraints, it is likely that only a limited number of persons will be tried, perhaps as few as twenty.

The SCSL differs in notable ways from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Firstly, it is based on an agreement between the government and the U.N. and was not established by a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This means that the Special Court does not have the power to require international cooperation.[257] Secondly, the SCSL is a hybrid court relying on both international and domestic laws. The professional and support staff of the court will be a mix of Sierra Leonean and foreign nationals.

Article 1 of the SCSL provides that the court has the competence to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996."[258]

Other crimes that the court has the jurisdiction to prosecute are provided under Article 2 to Article 6. Under Article 2, which defines the crimes against humanity that the SCSL has the power to prosecute, the following crimes of sexual violence are specified: "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence."[259] Rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault can also be prosecuted as violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II as stated under Article 3 of the statute. Under Article 4, specific serious violations of international humanitarian law are enumerated, including intentionally attacking civilians and the recruitment of children under fifteen years old into

[253] Letter dated June 12, 2000 and addressed by the president of Sierra Leone to the U.N. secretary-general. Letter and annexed Suggested Framework for the Special Court.

[254] Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf.

[255] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Robin Vincent (registrar of the SCSL), U.K., July 4, 2002.

[256] S/2002/246, Letter dated March 6, 2002 from the secretary-general addressed to the president of the Security Council. David Crane, a prosecutor for the U.S. Department of Defence, was appointed as prosecutor and Robin Vincent of the U.K. was appointed as the registrar.

[257] See also letter from Human Rights Watch to members of the Security Council and other interested states dated September 27, 2001. Under Chapter VII, which is entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," the Security Council can decide to take non-military and/or military action against states that threaten international peace and security. Decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII—which should be read in conjunction with Article 24, which confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council, and Article 25, under which U.N. member states agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council—are binding on member states.

[258] Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone at http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents-specialcourt.html.

[259] The other crimes against humanity are: murder; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; and other inhuman acts.

the armed forces. With the unanimous adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in May 2000,[260] however, the minimum age for any conscription or forced recruitment has been raised to eighteen.[261] Under Article 5, gender-based crimes can also be prosecuted under domestic law provisions. However, as these provisions do not meet international standards in terms of definition of crimes and punishment, they should not be applied.[262]

In accordance with the U.N.'s statement that it did not recognize the Lomé amnesty as it purported to apply to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, Article 10 of the court's statute states:

> An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.[263]

This means that those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity (Article 2); violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (Article 3); and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4) can be prosecuted for their crimes.

The issue of command responsibility is of crucial import to the SCSL given that its mandate is to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders, who in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone."[264] The court therefore will only prosecute the so-called "big fish" and not the "small fry" or those persons who in many instances actually committed the violations. Article 6 of the statute of the SCSL provides that:

> 3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
> 4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Special Court determines that justice so requires.[265]

The failure by rebel commanders and army officers to punish combatants involved in abuses, despite documentation of and international attention to crimes of sexual violence perpetrated by rebels and pro-government forces, indicates that such persons of authority knowingly tolerated and even condoned these abuses. Commanders may also bear individual criminal responsibility for crimes of sexual violence in addition to command responsibility, as the testimonies in this report highlight.

It is highly regrettable that the court's temporal jurisdiction does not extend to the beginning of the conflict (March 23, 1991). Instead November 30, 1996, the date of the Abidjan Peace Accord, was chosen as it was felt that including the whole war would impose too great a burden on the court. The U.N. also felt that this date corresponded to a new phase in the conflict without necessarily having any political connotations, and that this

[260] General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, adopted May 25, 2000.
[261] Sierra Leone signed and ratified the Optional Protocol of the CRC on September 8, 2000 and on August 24, 2001 respectively. The Optional Protocol entered into force on February 12, 2002.
[262] Article 5 refers to the sections (6, 7 and 12) of the 1926 Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act that relate to abuses committed against girls under the age of fourteen. See above, "Rape as a crime under general law," et seq., for a discussion of these provisions.
[263] Article 10 of the statute of the SCSL.
[264] Article 1 of the statute of the SCSL.
[265] Article 6 (3) and (4) of the statute of the SCSL.

temporal jurisdiction encompassed the most serious crimes committed by persons of all political and military groups and in all geographical areas of the country.[266] The temporal jurisdiction is, however, open-ended as the war was still ongoing at the time of the discussions on the court's establishment. The U.N. states that the lifespan of the court will be determined by "a subsequent agreement between the parties upon completion of its judicial activities, an indication of the capacity acquired by the local courts to assume the prosecution of remaining cases, or the unavailability of funds."[267]

In terms of prosecuting crimes of sexual violence, the statute specifies that "given the nature of the crimes committed and the particular sensitivities of girls, young women and children victims of rape, sexual assault, abduction and slavery of all kinds, due consideration should be given in the appointment of staff to the employment of prosecutors and investigators experienced in gender-related crimes and juvenile justice."[268] Likewise, Article 16 (4) specifies that personnel of the Victims and Witnesses Unit should include experts in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence and violence against children.

As the TRC and Special Court will be functioning simultaneously, the interaction between the two bodies, whose subject matter as well as personal and temporal jurisdiction intersect, must urgently be clarified. This is crucial in terms of sharing of information, especially confidential information, but also for the sensitization efforts underway. Enabling legislation enacted in March 2002 contains a provision, criticized by many nongovernmental organizations, that establishes the primacy of the SCSL, apparently including over the TRC.[269]

Given that the SCSL will only try a limited number of alleged perpetrators, it needs to establish a clear and comprehensive prosecutorial strategy from the onset. Within the court's mandate, the prosecutor should ensure that gender-related crimes are thoroughly and sensitively investigated and rigorously prosecuted as crimes against humanity or war crimes. The two gender crimes investigators should conduct compulsory gender sensitization training for all staff, and provide more in-depth training for staff members dealing most directly with survivors of sexual violence. The gender crimes investigators should also have access to all cases under investigation, even the ones not previously identified as gender cases, to provide guidance and expertise.

Principle of Universal Jurisdiction

Given the limited number of persons that the Special Court can prosecute due to funding constraints, it is important to note that the principle of universal jurisdiction applies to war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery,[270] and torture.[271] A resolution passed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in April 1999, specifically reminded all factions and forces in Sierra Leone of this principle, stating that "in any armed conflict including an armed conflict of a non-international character, the taking of hostages, willful killing and torture or inhuman treatment of persons taking no active part in the hostilities constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law, and that all countries are under the obligation to search for such persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches and to bring such persons, regardless of their

---

[266] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, S/2000/915, October 4, 2000, para. 25-28. Other dates considered were May 25, 1997, and January 6, 1999, but the U.N. considered that these would be perceived as offering only selective justice.

[267] Ibid., para. 28.

[268] Article 15 (4) of the statute of the SCSL. A Woman's Task Force for the Special Court and TRC was established with the support of the International Human Rights Law Group to advocate that gender-based crimes be properly investigated by both bodies and—in terms of the Special Court—prosecuted. The Women's Task Force has also advocated for the appointment of staff who are experienced in and sensitive to cases of sexual violence, as well as for gender balance i.e. women should be well represented in positions of authority as well as in positions of support (statement takers, investigators, counselors and interpreters, etc.).

[269] Special Court Agreement 2002 (ratification) Act 2002 (March 7, 2002). Article 21 (2) of the Act provides that: "Notwithstanding any other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court."

[270] Slavery can be prosecuted as a war crime and a crime against humanity, but also on an independent basis against both state and non-state actors during wartime and peace given its status as a peremptory norm of customary law.

[271] Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Articles 8, 9, 17, 19 and 20, *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth Session*, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, para.50 (United Nations, 1996).

nationality, before their own courts."[272]

The special rapporteur for violence against women also stressed the principle of universal jurisdiction in her report on her mission to Sierra Leone:

> Thus, crimes of gender based violence must be investigated and documented for possible criminal prosecution in the domestic courts of other States which may have jurisdiction ...[273]

IX. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

National Response

Climate of Impunity

Human Rights Watch is not aware of any prosecutions in the Sierra Leonean courts of any cases of conflict-related sexual violence or other human rights abuses. The lack of both categories of prosecutions is due to a number of factors. Firstly, many survivors simply want to try to forget about the sexual violence and other human rights abuses they have been subjected to and just get on with their lives in post-conflict Sierra Leone, which for many is a daily struggle. Secondly, some women and girls fear reprisals. According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, thirteen (or 25 percent) of the fifty-one respondents indicating that their perpetrator should not be punished, expressed this fear.[274] Thirdly, women and girls are often ashamed of what happened to them and are therefore reluctant to present themselves in court. Fourthly, women and girls have little faith in the criminal justice system or the customary law system, which were never equipped to deal with crimes of such widespread and systematic nature. If a survivor of sexual violence does decide to prosecute, she is likely to be retraumatized by the whole experience given the very poor track record of the Sierra Leonean criminal justice system. Fifthly, many women and girls lack the financial means to access the court system. As women are generally economically dependent on men, many women who have initiated prosecution of non-conflict-related sexual violence, have dropped their cases once they realize that their husband may be sentenced to prison (dependency means that a previously abducted woman or girl who is still with her rebel "husband" is even more unlikely to bring any charges against him). Sixthly, victims are often not even aware of their rights, given high illiteracy rates, prevalent societal attitudes towards sexual violence, and women's low status in Sierra Leonean society. Many rural women and girls, in particular, see little value in the formal court system as there is often no financial or material benefit from bringing a case. Attitudes towards sexual violence, and the subordinate status of women and girls, mean that there is considerable societal pressure for women not to bring cases before the courts that could bring shame to the extended family, such as sexual violence cases.

The climate of impunity means that violence against women and girls remains a serious problem in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Rape continues to be committed by former rebels, members of the CDF and by civilians who are used to doing what they want with women by force and with impunity. A lawyer who practices in the Eastern Province reported to Human Rights Watch that of the rape victims he was currently representing at least 50 percent had been raped by civilians and the remainder by former combatants.[275] Girls continue to suffer the greatest number of sexual assaults: a lawyer who practices in the Freetown area reported to Human Rights Watch that of the at least fifty rape victims she represented at the time of writing, 98 percent are under fourteen years old.[276] Although there are no reliable statistics on the incidence of sexual or domestic violence, the police doctor in Connaught Hospital in Freetown, which is the largest government-run hospital in the country, sees about thirty victims of recent rape and sexual assault per month.[277] For the reasons enumerated above, this figure is likely to

---

[272] UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/1, April 6, 1999.

[273] United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women* E/CN.4/2002/83/Add. 2, 2002, para. 78.

[274] PHR report, pp. 53-55 and Table 7 at p. 56. Women could select more than one option.

[275] Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulai Bangurah (lawyer), Freetown, March 15, 2002.

[276] Human Rights Watch interview with Claire Fatu Hanciles (lawyer), Freetown, August 9, 2002.

[277] Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

be the tip of the iceberg. Physicians for Human Rights found that 39 percent of respondents expressed concern ("quite a bit" or "extremely worried") about future sexual violence by family members, friends or civilian strangers. Ninety-one women (or 9 percent of all respondents) had experienced sexual abuse, occurring at an average age of fifteen, from family, friends or civilians during their lifetime.[278]

Despite all these problems, seventeen out of a total of ninety-four respondents (or 18 percent) reporting sexual violence to Physicians for Human Rights supported punishment for "all those involved," thirty women (or 32 percent) supported punishment for the perpetrators, and seventeen women (or 18 percent) supported punishment for the commanders. Thirty-three women believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others.[279]

Corrupt and Ineffective Judiciary

Lack of faith in the system, as the few women who have decided to prosecute non-conflict-related rape have experienced, is fully justified. The judiciary—which, prior to the conflict, barely existed in the provinces, and in Freetown was only accessible to those who had sufficient funds—completely collapsed during the war. Many lawyers fled the conflict, and much of the infrastructure, including the law courts in Freetown, was destroyed. The low salaries of personnel working in the judiciary have meant that magistrates, lawyers, and judges are easy targets for bribery and/or intimidation. In addition to these problems, women who seek justice for crimes of sexual violence have to contend with more gender-specific problems. The judiciary is dominated by men and some of its older members, in particular, do not think rape is a serious crime and that the victims are generally to blame. The legal processes are very cumbersome and open to corruption, factors which favor the perpetrator. At the magistrates court level, it is up to the magistrate to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to submit a case to the High Court and whether to grant bail. As the court system is so overburdened this phase can take weeks or months, and it is not unusual for victims to have to appear over ten times before the case is handed on to the High Court. Magistrates have also been known to grant bail even if the offender and victim live in the same compound, which means that the victim is at risk at least of intimidation and even physical violence.[280] Many cases die in the magistrates courts, as victims run out of money, patience, and/or time. Cases at this stage are also frequently dismissed, if, for example, the witnesses do not show in court (after three no shows, the case can be dismissed): witnesses often decide against appearing in court for reasons including intimidation, ignorance of the law, lack of transportation money, and the slow pace at which court cases proceed, or because they simply do not care. The requirement for corroborating evidence is often an obstacle to prosecution and violates international norms.

If the magistrate decides that there is sufficient evidence, the case is handed up to the High Court. Cases in the High Court can also take months especially as there are also continuous indefinite adjournments to contend with. There have been no High Court sittings in the provinces for the past six years, and cases in the provinces have therefore been on indefinite hold. One offender who sexually assaulted two young girls spent five years in pre-trail detention before being sentenced to two years for indecent assault—the five years already served in pre-trial detention were ignored by the court, thus putting the offender in detention for a total of seven years rather than two.[281]

Need for Law Reform

Both general and customary law offer little protection for women and girls (see above, "Women and Girls Under Sierra Leonean Law"). The misinterpretation of the general law provisions pertaining to rape by members of the criminal justice system means that girls are offered even less protection than adults. There is an urgent need for the laws to be revised: the discriminatory provisions in both general and customary law should be removed and brought into line with international standards of human rights, including in relation to the protection of women and girls from violence. The law relating to rape, in particular, should be simplified as well as

[278] PHR report, p. 49.
[279] Ibid., p. 54.
[280] Human Rights Watch interview with John Bosco Alieu (lawyer), Freetown, February 26, 2002.
[281] Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulai Bangurah (lawyer), Freetown, March 15, 2002.

strengthened. Specific legislation on domestic violence, which currently does not exist, should be introduced as women seeking legal redress for domestic violence generally face even more difficulty in convincing the police and members of the judiciary that their rights have been violated.[282] The constitution should also be amended to remove the exemption for customary law and personal law from the prohibition on discrimination. Ending discrimination under customary law in practice will require a major public education exercise, but, as a start, staff of local courts, especially those presiding over them, should be trained in relation to issues of discrimination and the rights of women under the (revised) constitution and international human rights law. The judiciary and the police force need to be trained on the new laws to ensure that they are properly applied.

The Sierra Leone Police

Prior to the civil war, the Sierra Leone Police had been used by politicians for their own purposes and had not received any substantive training for decades. The attitude of the police force to sexual and domestic violence remains insensitive. Police officers, for example, often do not take reports of rape seriously and chastise women who report domestic violence. There are many problems with police investigations of rape cases. Firstly, the police lack basic investigation skills. Secondly, victims must be examined by state-employed doctors, including police doctors, as only a state-employed doctor can present medical evidence in court. Both the police and other state-employed doctors often charge money for these examinations even though they should be free of charge. Thirdly, both the doctors and the police may be intimidated and/or bribed to drop the cases, or police may demand money from plaintiffs before interviewing witnesses and arranging their transport to court. A nationwide system of Family Support Units (FSUs) is in the process of being established with the support of the British-funded Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) to deal with cases of sexual and domestic violence.[283] To date, however, only a small number of police officers (approximately sixteen) have received some training and much work remains to be done before the FSUs can deal with victims of sexual and domestic violence in an appropriate manner.

The International Response

In addition to funding UNAMSIL, the international donor community pours approximately U.S. $70 million a year into Sierra Leone for humanitarian assistance. Within the overall humanitarian assistance program to Sierra Leone, only a small percentage of funding is targeted to gender-related programs, notwithstanding the large number of girls and women who have been affected by gender-specific abuses. This funding has also come very late: there were no services specifically for survivors of sexual violence before 1999. After the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, the international community finally took note of the scale of sexual and gender-based abuses and started funding small-scale programs in accessible areas. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program consistently overlooked the assistance as well as protection needs of abducted women and girls (see below).

Donor funding has contributed to education, adult literacy, health care, trauma counseling, and skills training programs as well as credit and income-generating schemes for a limited number of survivors of sexual violence. These programs need to be expanded into all parts of Sierra Leone, so that more survivors can benefit from these programs. Long-term sexual and gender-based violence programs that aim to educate communities about sexual and domestic violence as well as provide women with health care and some legal aid on a limited scale have been established in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the east and south. These programs have been quite successful in changing the attitudes towards sexual and domestic violence of the IDP communities these programs serviced. They have also empowered rural women to stand up for their rights.

[282] Charges of physical assault can be made under the 1861 Offenses Against the Person Act under sections 18 (wounding with intent to maim; causing grievous bodily harm with intent; shooting with intent to maim), 20 (unlawful wounding) and 47 (assault, battery, actual bodily harm).

[283] Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

To date, funding for the judiciary has focused on the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the judiciary, but as the peace in Sierra Leone takes hold, donors, including the British government and the World Bank, are considering funding desperately needed judicial reform programs.

The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program

The extent to which sexual violence, including sexual slavery, has been ignored throughout the war and in the post-conflict phase is most evident by the lack of attention paid to the thousands of abducted women and girls and their children. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process has completely overlooked the protection needs of these women and children. The lack of clear policy and procedural guidelines on these abductees has meant that the responsibility for these women and girls fell between governmental institutions and implementing agencies, resulting in an *ad hoc*, inappropriate and inadequate humanitarian response. Little to no funding was allocated to the protection needs of abducted women and children and only a small number of programs that provide education, skills training and counseling were established for them. This important human rights issue was raised on numerous occasions at different levels with the relevant government institutions, donor governments and the World Bank by UNAMSIL and nongovernmental organizations as well as by World Bank consultants in confidential reports, but did not succeed in bringing about any concrete policy decisions.

The needs of abducted girls and women should, however, be considered an inextricable part of the DDR process and a priority issue that should have been addressed during meetings between the U.N. and government officials or rebel leaders prior to the commencement of disarmament. The abducted girls and women should have been registered and interviewed at the same time that their "husbands" entered the DDR program, with the interviews conducted separately from the "husbands." Information on alternative options could have been disseminated at the DDR camps through social workers and orientation sessions. Alternatively, if it had been possible to gain access to the abducted women and children in rebel-held areas before or during the DDR process then contact should have been established to determine total numbers and inform them of the reintegration support and alternative options available to them. Female social workers in the DDR camps could also have counseled the abductees to help them understand the implications of their decisions, and that the decision is theirs. Basic reproductive health services, including testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, should also be provided at DDR camps.

Donors and the government of Sierra Leone must redress their neglect of survivors' protection needs by drastically increasing funding for women's programs and providing women with desperately needed assistance in terms of health, education, trauma counseling, adult literacy and skills training to promote their rehabilitation into society. In addition, donors should fund legal reform and training programs for the judiciary and police, which will contribute to increase the protection of women's human rights. Donors should also learn from their failure in Sierra Leone and ensure that DDR programs in other countries where large numbers of women and girls have been abducted by the fighting forces, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, do integrate the protection needs of these abducted women and girls.[284]

United Kingdom

The U.K. has played a key role in restoring peace to Sierra Leone. During the May 2000 crisis, British troops deployed to Sierra Leone, and a standby force was deployed offshore ready to provide additional support to UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army, if required. Since the May 2000 crisis, it has provided technical assistance to most government departments and military training to the new SLA, and has publicly committed itself to remain closely involved in Sierra Leone.

The U.K. is the biggest donor in Sierra Leone, and in 2002 contributed £100 million (approximately U.S. $145 million) of which about £50 million (approximately U.S. $73 million) was disbursed through its development agency, the Department for International Development (DFID). DFID-funded programs aim at

[284] Human Rights Watch, *The War within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).

strengthening the protection and promotion of women's human rights. Since September 2001, the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), which is funded by DFID and staffed only by British nationals, has been working to establish a nationwide system of Family Support Units (FSUs) to deal with cases of sexual and domestic violence. Under this system, only female police officers are supposed to interview female victims, while both male and female police officers are responsible for interviewing suspects and witnesses. More officers need to be trained in addition to the sixteen who have received training. As the force has few women, more females need to be recruited so only female police officers interview victims of sexual and domestic violence. The police officers in the FSUs lack strong leadership and require more training and close supervision to ensure that victims are dealt with in a professional and sensitive manner.

DFID also funds a program to promote the participation of women in politics, especially in Parliament, as well as university research into conflict-related sexual violence committed in January 1999.[285] DFID has provided £2.5 million (about U.S. $3.5 million) for a three year Law Development Program which aims at rehabilitating the physical infrastructure of the court system, as well as providing training to administrative staff to ensure proper record-keeping of cases. The Law Development Program is under review to determine its future strategy, in particular with relation to legal reform, including customary law. DFID is currently considering funding a three-year program that will establish sexual and physical assault referral centers across the country.

The U.K. has contributed a total of over U.S. $500,000 to the operations of the TRC and its Interim Secretariat. The U.K. has also pledged U.S. $9,110,000 over three years to the Special Court.

United States

In 1999, the U.S. put considerable pressure on the warring parties to seek a negotiated settlement. However, following the breakdown of the peace process in 2000, U.S. policy revolved around ending external support for the RUF, supporting British military actions and transitional justice mechanisms as well as providing humanitarian aid. From 2000 to 2002, the United States contributed a total of U.S. $170 million to Sierra Leone, which was primarily disbursed on food-for-peace programs, the resettlement of displaced persons, and reintegration of former combatants. The U.S. has funded several women's programs, notably in the field of health, including the provision of obstetric surgery and HIV/AIDS education, a sexual and gender-based violence program, a program aimed at promoting women in politics, and micro-finance schemes for women. The Senate's Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) expand services to rape victims and fund a public education program on women's rights. The U.S., which is a strong supporter of the Special Court, has contributed U.S. $5 million to this body, and pledged an additional $10 million. The U.S. has contributed $500,000 to the TRC.

After the May 2000 crisis, the U.S. initiated a program called Operation Focus Relief (OFR) to train and equip seven battalions of West African troops for peacekeeping with UNAMSIL. In July 2002, the U.S. pledged to help ECOWAS set up military bases for the rapid deployment of troops in conflict areas. The first steps in this assistance program include the installation of a U.S. $5.3 million early-warning satellite communications system, which will link the ECOWAS secretariat with observation centers in four ECOWAS countries.

European Union

The E.U. did not play a key role in responding to the armed conflict and to date has not been a major donor. Since May 2000, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has disbursed approximately €30 million (roughly the same in U.S. dollars) in Sierra Leone. Few ECHO-funded programs have directly targeted women. ECHO has funded child protection programs, which have assisted child-mothers who became pregnant as the result of conflict-related sexual violence.

[285] A survey of 226 victims, conducted by the University of Sierra Leone Gender Research and Documentation Centre in collaboration with the Sierra Leone Association of University Women (SLAUW), Médecins Sans Frontières, UNICEF and FAWE Sierra Leone.

As the situation in Sierra Leone stabilizes, the E.U. will increase its funding to Sierra Leone through the European Development Fund (EDF), which from 2000 to 2002 disbursed €38 million on activities that supported the return to democracy, rehabilitation of infrastructure and resettlement. From 2002 to 2007, a total of €144 million will be made available for disbursement through the EDF on activities that focus on the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, good governance and institutional capacity building. An additional €76 million can be spent on activities outside of these two focal areas.

In 2002, the European Commission funded a two-year program that supports the reintegration of rape victims and other war-affected persons through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Human rights-related programs funded through the EIDHR, which has €6 million for disbursement over the next three years (2002-5), should include women's rights issues, which the EIDHR seeks to mainstream in all its programs.[286]

In addition to the U.K., other member states of the E.U. have bilaterally contributed to Sierra Leone. The Netherlands, in particular, has since 1999 funded sexual and gender-based violence programs. The Dutch government has also been a strong supporter of the Special Court and has contributed U.S. $11.4 million, which is approximately 20 percent of the total budget. A donation for the TRC is being prepared at the time of writing, but has not yet been formalized. A small budget for human rights programs was made available for 2002.

United Nations

Security Council, Secretary-General, and UNAMSIL

Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the members of the Security Council have devoted much attention to the conflict in Sierra Leone. Kofi Annan visited the country in July 1999 and December 2000. The Security Council has frequently denounced the egregious human rights abuses committed during the conflict, in particular by the rebel factions, and has stressed the importance of protecting women in armed conflict.[287]

Following the failure of the U.N. peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda, there was substantial pressure on the U.N. to ensure that the UNAMSIL peacekeeping mission would succeed when it was established in October 1999.[288] After the slow initial deployment of peacekeepers, which led to the May 2000 crisis, the U.N. committed itself to deploy 17,500 peacekeepers in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL is the world's largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission, costing the international community over U.S. $700 million annually.[289] As of March 31, 2002, there were 17,455 peacekeepers, 259 military observers, 87 civilian police officers as well as 322 international and 552 local civilian staff in Sierra Leone. The mission is now being hailed as a great success, although Human Rights Watch has criticized UNAMSIL on numerous occasions for failing to fulfill its mandate to protect the civilian population.[290] In a June 19 report to the Security Council on UNAMSIL, the secretary-general stated that the government security apparatus was not yet capable of protecting Sierra Leone from both internal and external threats and warned that the international community must protect the major investments that had made possible the progress achieved so far.[291] On September 24, the Security Council extended UNAMSIL's mandate for a further six months, but envisaged a reduction of 4,500 troops in the peacekeeping mission within eight months. The resolution was based on the recommendation of a further report on UNAMSIL which laid out benchmarks to govern the withdrawal of the U.N. from Sierra Leone, including the ability of the police and army

[286] Human Rights Watch interview with EIDHR representatives Andrew Kelly and Irene Corcillo and the Economic Adviser to the E.U., René Mally, Freetown, April 10, 2002.

[287] In resolution 1370, the Security Council expressed "... its continued deep concern at the reports of human rights abuses and attacks by the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) ... against the civilian population, in particular the widespread violation of the human rights of women and children, including sexual violence, [and] demands that these acts cease immediately..." U.N. Security Council resolution 1370, S/RES/1370 (2001), September 18, 2001, para. 4.

[288] U.N. Security Council resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (1999), October 22, 1999.

[289] U.N. Security Council resolution 1346, S/RES/1346 (2001), March 30, 2001.

[290] *See* Human Rights Watch letter addressed to Secretary-General Kofi Annan at http://www.org/press/2001/11/annanltr.htm.

[291] *Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2002/679, June 19, 2002.

to maintain security, the successful re-integration of ex-combatants, and the situation in the broader sub-region. The resolution also encouraged the government of Sierra Leone to "pay special attention to the needs of women and children affected by the war," and welcomed "the steps taken by UNAMSIL to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation of women and children," and encouraged the mission to continue to enforce a policy of "zero tolerance" for such acts. The Security Council also called on states to bring to justice their own nationals responsible for such crimes in Sierra Leone.[292]

UNAMSIL was initially authorized to field fourteen human rights officers, but for the first two years of UNAMSIL's existence, the human rights unit remained understaffed, which meant that human rights abuses were not effectively monitored. At various times during the lifespan of UNAMSIL, the gender specialist post was not filled. When UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded to 17,500, the human rights unit was authorized to recruit six additional human rights officers and most positions are currently filled. The Physicians for Human Rights report on conflict-related sexual violence was produced in collaboration with the UNAMSIL human rights section and has contributed to focusing the attention of the international community on the issue of sexual violence.

In October 2000, the Security Council held an Open Session on Women and Armed Conflict and adopted a resolution calling for documenting the impact of armed conflict on women and the role of women in peace-building.[293] Since then the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has undertaken a major study on the impact of armed conflict on women in more than ten countries around the world, including Sierra Leone. In January 2002, a three-woman UNIFEM team visited Sierra Leone in connection with this study.[294] UNIFEM also recently appointed a gender and AIDS adviser in Sierra Leone, who is tasked with strengthening the gender division of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs and local women's groups as well as mainstreaming gender in the TRC and Special Court for Sierra Leone. She will also research the relationship between gender, conflict and HIV/AIDS with the aim to increase protection against HIV infection.[295]

In November 2001, a team from the Training and Evaluation Service of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conducted a two-week training on gender in peacekeeping. The program involved over 1,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers and civilian personnel from both Freetown and the provinces. Local human rights activists and women's organizations were invited in order to contribute a domestic perspective on gender issues.

UNAMSIL has funded several women's programs for survivors of sexual violence through various trust funds. These trust funds are normally established for quick impact programs whilst the rehabilitation and reintegration of women who have been abducted and subjected to sexual violence and sexual slavery should be seen as long-term projects.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The then U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited Sierra Leone in June 1999, while the Lomé peace negotiations were taking place. The purpose of the mission was "to support the peace process, to encourage future programmes for the promotion and protection of human rights in the country, and to draw attention to the plight of children, women and civilians bearing the brunt of the excesses in Sierra Leone."[296] OHCHR has provided technical assistance for the establishment of the TRC, but was very slow to issue the funding appeal for the TRC. OHCHR has also assisted in the drafting of the statute for the national human rights commission provided under the Lomé Peace Agreement, but the establishment of this body has not progressed beyond that point.

---

[292] *Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2002/987, September 5, 2002; U.N. Security Council resolution 1436, S/RES/1436 (2002), September 24, 2002, paragraphs 14 and 15.

[293] U.N. Security Council resolution 1325, S/RES/1325 (2000), October 31, 2000.

[294] *See* the summary of the assessment's findings at http://www.unifem.org/gov_pax_assessment.pdf.html.

[295] Human Rights Watch interview with Jebbeh Forster (Gender and AIDS advisor to UNIFEM Sierra Leone), Freetown, March 11 and April 15, 2002.

[296] United Nations, *Sixth Report of the U.N. secretary-general on the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)*, S/1999/645, June 4, 1999, para. 39.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has condemned the human rights situation in Sierra Leone on numerous occasions.[297] In August 2001, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the commission's special rapporteur on violence against women, visited Sierra Leone to highlight the gender-specific abuses that thousands of women and girls have been subjected to. She highlighted that "systematic and widespread rape and other sexual violence has been a hallmark of the conflict in Sierra Leone" and noted that "the failure to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence has contributed to an environment of impunity that perpetuates violence against women in Sierra Leone, including rape and domestic violence."[298] She therefore stressed the need for accountability for these abuses.

World Bank

The World Bank established a multi-donor trust fund for the DDR program, which is now focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants. As discussed above, the protection needs of abducted women and girls were ignored by the DDR program even though World Bank consultants had raised this issue in their confidential reports. In 2002, the World Bank agreed in principle to allocate U.S. $140 million to support reconstruction and development efforts in Sierra Leone and U.S. $15 million to go towards HIV/AIDS prevention projects there.

X. CONCLUSION

The decade-long war in Sierra Leone has been characterized by egregious human rights abuses committed primarily by the rebel forces against the civilian population. Throughout the conflict, thousands of women and girls were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence of unimaginable brutality, including sexual slavery. The low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone by law, custom and practice remains a contributing factor to their vulnerability and may have contributed to the widespread and systematic sexual violence. In addition to the combatants' motivation to achieve their strategic military objectives through terrorizing the civilian population, the fact that sexual violence during the Sierra Leone conflict predominantly involved *men* raping *women* reveals that conflict-related rape, like most rape, reflects this dynamic of gender inequality and subordination. This assertion by men of their power over women is deeply imbedded in societal attitudes in Sierra Leone. The international community and the government therefore need to think of creative ways to change these deeply embedded attitudes.

The lack of attention paid until recently, both nationally and internationally, to the widespread and systematic acts of sexual violence, sexual slavery and their consequences means that there are few assistance programs for survivors. The international community and the government of Sierra Leone should drastically increase funding to ensure that desperately needed health care, education, adult literacy, skills training, trauma counseling, and income-generating schemes are provided. Nor have there been any prosecutions. Rape therefore continues with impunity and it is little wonder that women and girls in post-conflict Sierra Leone remain vulnerable to non-conflict-related violence, and are reluctant to seek legal redress in the domestic courts or even report the incident given the country's inefficient and corrupt criminal justice system. Although, the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should help to address this climate of impunity, the domestic legal system must urgently be revised to ensure that crimes of sexual violence are prosecuted in a sensitive manner. The international community therefore needs to fund legal reform and training

---

[297] The Commission on Human Rights deplored "... the ongoing atrocities committed by the rebels, including murders, rape, abductions ... calls for an end to all such acts." U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/24, April 18, 2000, para. 4. The Commission also expressed its grave concern "...at the targeting and abuse of women and girls that have been committed in Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front and others, including other armed groups, in particular murder, sexual violence, rape, including systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced marriages..." U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/20, April 20, 2001, para. 2(b).

[298] United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/49*, Addendum, Mission to Sierra Leone, E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.2 (United Nations, 2002), p. 2.

programs for the criminal justice system as a whole, which has a key role in promoting and protecting the rights of Sierra Leonean women and girls.

8122

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written by Louise Taylor, a consultant to Human Rights Watch, on the basis of interviews conducted in Sierra Leone from February to June 2002. It is also based on testimonies collected by Corinne Dufka, Human Rights Watch Africa Division researcher based in Sierra Leone, from 1999 to June 2002, and by Ellen Vermeulen, consultant, from February 2000 to April 2001.

The report was edited by Bronwen Manby, deputy director of the Africa Division; James Ross, senior legal adviser; and Ian Gorvin, consultant to the program office. It was also reviewed by Corinne Dufka; Widney Brown, advocacy director in the Women's Rights Division; Zama Coursen-Neff, researcher in the Children's Rights Division; Joanne Csete, director of the program on HIV/AIDS and human rights; and Joanne Weschler, U.N. representative. The final edits were inputted by Max Marcus, consultant. Production and coordination assistance was provided by Jeff Scott, associate in the Africa Division; Patrick Minges, Publications director; and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager.

We would like to thank all the organizations and individuals interviewed for this report for their invaluable assistance and insights. We particularly thank the survivors who agreed to recount their experiences. The courage and dignity of these women and girls never ceases to amaze and inspire.

Human Rights Watch recognizes with appreciation funding for work on Sierra Leone from the Oak Foundation, Stichting Doen, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Human Rights Watch
Africa Division

Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.

We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice, to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom and to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime.

We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.

We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law.

We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.

The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele Alexander, development director; Rory Mungoven, advocacy director; Carroll Bogert, communications director; John T. Green, operations director, Barbara Guglielmo, finance director; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director; Patrick Minges, publications director; Maria Pignataro Nielsen, human resources director; Joe Saunders, interim program director; Wilder Tayler, legal and policy director; and Joanna Weschler, United Nations representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board. Robert L. Bernstein is the founding chair.

Its Africa division was established in 1988 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in sub-Saharan Africa. Peter Takirambudde is the executive director; Bronwen Manby is the deputy director; Janet Fleischman is the Washington director; Alison Des Forges is the senior adviser; Binaifer Nowrojee and Jemera Rone are counsels; Carina Tertsakian and Lars Waldorf are researchers; Juliane Kippenberg is the NGO Liaison; Jeff Scott is the associate. Vincent Mai is the chair of the advisory committee.

Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org
Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message to hrw-news-subscribe@topica.email-publisher.com with "subscribe hrw-news" in the body of the message (leave the subject line blank).

8123

Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.

We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice.

We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.

We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law.

We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.

Human Rights Watch
350 Fifth Avenue 34th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
http://www.hrw.org

Sierra Leone - UNHC: 16-30.Apr.98

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 6 May 1998 15:24:22 +0200
From:Hazan.Gahigi@DHA.UNICC.ORG
To: OCHA.Standard.List.Africa@DHA.UNICC.ORG, ComEmerg..-.Main@DHA.UNICC.ORG,
ComEmerg..5f.-.Sierra.Leone@DHA.UNICC.ORG
Subject: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 16-30 April'98

SIERRA LEONE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT
Period covered: 16-30 April 1998

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea

SECURITY
1. ECOMOG has continued to prosecute the war against junta and RUF forces in Kono and Kailahun districts with mixed results. Although ECOMOG forces are now in control of the towns of Daru, Pendembu and Koindu, junta forces still occupy large areas in the four chiefdoms in the Eastern part of Kailahun district. Casualties on both sides have been heavy. Some RUF have moved from Kono district towards the North-East and have perpetrated several attacks near the towns of Kamakwie, Batkanu and Makeni. Looting and amputations are widespread.

2. ECOMOG spokesmen have alleged that RUF fighters are being trained at a camp in Lofa county in Northern Liberia. The Liberian Government has rejected these allegations. ECOMOG Force Commander in Sierra Leone, Col. Khobe, also stated in a radio interview that there was evidence that former NPFL and ULIMO-K fighters were crossing from Liberia into Sierra Leone to assist the activities of the RUF.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
3. President Kabbah has announced that Col. Khobe, ECOMOG's Force Commander in Sierra Leone, will act as his chief security adviser. Col. Khobe will be responsible for Sierra Leone's national security system and for creating a professional army. He will report directly to the President who is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. All the nominations for cabinet posts have been approved by Parliament and sworn into office.

4. The Attorney-General and Minister of Justice have requested the Managing Directors of four banks to freeze 93 accounts operated by deportees and businessmen who owe the State income tax and other sources of revenue. This request is intended to curb business malpactices.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
5. The intensification of the fighting between ECOMOG and junta / RUF forces in the East of Sierra Leone is creating a severe humanitarian situation. The most recent reports indicate a new influx of 54,000 Sierra Leoneans into Vahun, Liberia and 90,000 into Guinea since the start of the recent ECOMOG offensive against the AFRC/RUF in Kono and Kailahun districts. Many of the Sierra Leonean refugees are reportedly suffering from a combination of malaria, respiratory disease, diarrhoea and malnutrition. UNHCR is organising transport for the refugees from Vahun, which is only 8 miles from the Sierra Leone border, to Kolahun, thus enabling the refugees to benefit from increased access to relief services and improved security. Preparations are already underway for the arrival of

Saturday, February 13, 1999 Published at 05:24 GMT

World: Africa
Grim facts of Sierra Leone's war



Mutilation of civilians was common practice, according to the report

A United Nations report has blamed rebel forces for most of the atrocities during an attack on Sierra Leone's capital Freetown last month, but has also accused the Nigerian-led intervention force of carrying out summary executions.



The UN observer mission to Sierra Leone blames the rebels for untold numbers of random killings, mutilations, and rapes and the destruction of a fifth of the capital's buildings.

But the UN document also acknowledged that there had been reports that the West African peacekeeping force Ecomog had been "summarily executing detainees who were allegedly either rebels or rebel sympathisers".

Jon Leyne reports: Much of the killing was entirely arbitrary

The report said that the actual number of civilian casualties suffered during last month's attack on Freetown would never be known, although one mortuary worker said on 25 January that over 2,000 bodies of men, women and children had already been disposed of.

A large number of bodies were believed to have been left in ruined buildings or to have been hastily buried on waste ground.

Since rebel forces had renewed their offensive against



Africa | Americas | Asia-Pacific | Europe | Middle East | South Asia

Relevant Stories

11 Feb 99 | Africa
Major rebel attack in Sierra Leone

09 Feb 99 | Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone and Britain: Key dates

08 Feb 99 | Africa
New line on Sierra Leone rebels

27 Jan 99 | Africa
Freetown bears the scars

25 Jan 99 | Sierra Leone
A muddled conflict: Q&A

12 Jan 99 | Sierra Leone
A suffering that knows no end

Internet Links

Africa News: Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone Web

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (Unomsil)

The BBC is not responsible for the content of external internet sites.

In this section

Dam builders charged in bribery scandal

Burundi camps 'too dire' to help

Sudan power struggle denied

Animal airlift planned for

Sierra Leone's democratically elected government in December, conservative estimates put the total casualty figure at between 3,000 and 5,000, said the UN report.



Many rebel soldiers were children, the report said

It says the rape of women and girls appears to have been standard practice for the rebels.

Many of the soldiers on the rebel side were children, with some as young as eight.

Rebels advancing through Freetown on 6 and 7 January had "frequently forced civilians into the streets for use as human shields".

Much of the killing had seemed to have been completely arbitrary, the document said, and a number of those interviewed had described "the execution of the entire population of residential compounds" for refusing to obey instructions to dance and make music on the streets.

"Killing occasionally occurred in the context of games in which people were lined up and the executioners teasingly chose who to kill, and who to spare," the report said, adding that perpetrators were often said to have been under the influence of cocaine, other drugs or alcohol.

Food crisis warning



Peacekeepers: 'Made no effort' to establish guilt of victims

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented the report to a closed meeting of the Security Council before its public release on Friday.

The contents of the report emerged as the UN World Food Programme warned that continued fighting in the capital threatens to put the city's entire population at risk of a large-scale food crisis in as little as three weeks.

Although human rights violations by the Nigerian-led Ecomog force and Sierra Leone's Civil Defence Forces

Congo

Spy allegations bug South Africa

Senate leader's dismissal 'a good omen'

Tatchell calls for rights probe into Mugabe

Zimbabwe constitution: Just a bit of paper?

South African gays take centre stage

Nigeria's ruling party's convention

UN to return to Burundi

Bissau military hold fire

Nile basin agreement on water cooperation

Congo Brazzaville defends peace initiative

African Media Watch

Liberia names new army chief

did not match the scale of rebel atrocities, they were nonetheless totally unacceptable, the report said.

Interrogation 'inadequate'

Human rights monitors in Sierra Leone's UN observer mission had witnessed one execution by the peacekeeping force and said "witnesses of the highest probity" had reported that they were present at others.

"Witnesses make clear that, in all cases, the interrogation process was entirely inadequate and that there was no real effort to establish the guilt or innocence of execution victims," it said.

Search

Advanced options | Search tips

Back to top | BBC News Home | BBC Homepage | ©



UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA - AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER

SIERRA LEONE: Humanitarian situation report, 98.02.17

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT FOR SIERRA LEONE

21ST JANUARY - 12TH FEBRUARY, 1998

>From the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator

Security

1. On 7th February ECOMOG launched a sustained campaign to drive the AFRC from power In Freetown in response to an attack by the junta on ECOMOG's positions at Jui the previous evening. ECOMOG rnade significant advances during the next five days and was able to gain control of strategically-important locations such as Leicester Peak and Fourah Bay College (which are located on a hill overlooking Freetown), the ferry terminal in Kissy and Waterloo. ECOMOG has also secured all vehicular routes into Freetown effectively isolating the Freetown peninsula from the rest of the country. On 12th February the ECOMOG advance reached the centre of Freetown where they rnanaged to gain control of State House. AFRC casualties are knows to be high and many civilians have been killed and injured. The AFRC has reportedly armed youth groups and demobilised child soldiers In Freetown. Junta soldiers have also embarked on a systematic looting spree commandeering ammunition sites, supplies and vehicles. At least 20 vehicles are known to have been stolen since 7th February from UN agencies, NGOs and the ICRC. This has seriously reduced the capacity of these agencies to provide emergency-related services.

2. The safety of civilians in Freetown has been severely compromised by the recent escalation In the fighting, which has involved the heavy use of mortars, rockets and aerial bombardment. Many houses have been severely damaged and many have caught fire from shelling. ACF reported that the explosion of a bomb near its feeding centre in Kissv resulted in a mother and a child being killed and 10 civilians being injured. MSF has expressed public concern over the detonaton of 3.shells in the vicinity of the Connaught hospital on 11 th February. On 10th February the UN Secretary-General said in a press statement: I am concerned at reports that heavy shelling in Freetown is posing severe risks for the safety of civilians, and that some staff of humanitarian organisations have been prevented from evacuating. I call on both sides urgently to spare civilians and to ensure the protection of humanitarian personnel.

3. Although heavy fighting has occurred near Bo and Kenema, 'the towns themselves remain under AFRC control. The AFRC can regularly been firing mortars into likely Kamajor camps and concentration points. Widespread looting has been reported in Kenema and Bo towns as the AFRC have commandeered vehicles and food and other supplies from relief agency. In Makeni, which remains under AFRC control, vehicles have also been abducted causing relief agencies in this area to retreat to Kambia.

Humanitarian Developments

days.

In October soldiers and RUF members attempted to arrest the Secretary General of the Sierra Leonean Section of Amnesty International. Isaac Lappia, apparently suspected of opposing the AFRC and passing information outside Sierra Leone, escaped arrest; however, family members and others at his house were beaten and briefly detained.

Many students were vocal in their opposition to the AFRC. More than 120 people, mostly students, were arrested in August after attempting to stage a march for democracy. Most of those arrested were released after 12 days; others, however, were believed to have been held until October. Some students, including Juliet Jones, remained missing; it was unclear whether they had been arrested or had gone into hiding.

The AFRC's stated commitment to press freedom on coming to power was short-lived. In July the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists condemned unprecedented harassment and intimidation of journalists. That month four members of staff of *The Democrat* newspaper, and three others at its premises, were arrested by soldiers searching for the clandestine radio transmitter. Although four were released a few days later, Jeff Bowley Williams, Salomon Conteh and Fatmata Kamara were held for 12 days. Two journalists on their way to cover the students' demonstration in August were arrested with their driver and taken to Cockerill military headquarters. Kelvin Lewis, a correspondent for *Radio France Internationale* and *Voice of America*, and Winston Ojukutu Macaulay, a *British Broadcasting Corporation* (BBC) correspondent previously arrested in June, sustained serious injuries from beatings by soldiers who also threatened to kill them. Both journalists and their driver were released the following day. During October and November the crack-down on the press intensified; at least 20 journalists, including Jon Z. Foray, editor of *New Storm*, and Jonathan Leigh, editor of the *Independent Observer*, were detained without charge for up to two weeks.

Before the coup, in March, three journalists of the *Expo Times* newspaper were arrested on charges of spying, following an article criticizing the detention of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in Nigeria (see below). Released on bail, their trial was scheduled for May but the coup intervened and in July the charges against them were effectively dropped.

At least 15 people, both soldiers and civilians, were arrested in November, accused of conspiring to overthrow the AFRC and abort the return to civilian rule agreed the previous month. They included Stephen Bio, a businessman and close relation of the former Head of State who ceded power to President Tejan Kabbah, and Gibril Massaquoi, a prominent RUF member. None had been tried by the end of the year.

Following the coup, torture and ill-treatment by both soldiers and RUF members were widespread. In June Ansu Bockarie, a student leader, was reportedly beaten and cut with a razor blade by a prominent AFRC member. Students arrested in August were beaten, cut with machetes or stabbed with bayonets. Some women

students were reported to have been sexually assaulted while held at the residences of AFRC members.

Many journalists detained during the year were tortured or ill-treated. In October Umaru Fofanah, a freelance journalist suspected of providing information to the clandestine radio station, was reportedly tortured and shot in the leg by soldiers.

Some of those arrested in Freetown were held in conditions amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. For example, Sam Goba, arrested in September because of his close association with President Tejan Kabbah, was held with others in a freight container at Cockerill military headquarters for several months. His health seriously deteriorated as a result and his fate was unclear at the end of the year.

There were also reports of torture and ill-treatment by soldiers and RUF members in areas of the country affected by fighting with *kamajors*, in particular around Kenema in the east and Zimmi in the south. Villagers accused of supporting the *kamajors* were beaten and had their arms tied tightly behind their backs, causing serious injuries; women and girls were raped and forced into sexual slavery.

Many civilians died in the violence following the coup, some of whom were deliberately killed for political reasons by soldiers and RUF members. Soldiers searching for *kamajors* in Southern Province in June were reported to have killed about 25 people in the villages of Telu Bongor and Sembehun, as well as Albert Sandy Demby, father of the ousted Vice-President and a traditional leader, who was shot dead at his home in Gerihun. Also in June more than 10 people, including women and children, were reported to have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed when armed men, believed to be RUF members, attacked the town of Moyamba; a student, Sheku Kabbah, was reported to have had his eyes gouged out, ears cut off and throat slit. Many civilians were deliberately killed during fighting around Zimmi, Southern Province, in June. In December about 100 villagers were reportedly shot dead by soldiers posing as *kamajors* in the east of the country.

At least six students were shot dead in August by security forces. They included Morie Momoh, shot when soldiers entered his hostel room. In late August, six men suspected of involvement with the clandestine radio station were reportedly shot dead at Cockerill military headquarters.

Following the coup, several people were summarily executed by soldiers in Freetown following repeated AFRC warnings that suspected looters would be shot on sight.

In October, November and early December, 35 people, mostly soldiers but including some civilians, were executed by firing-squad following conviction for murder and other offences by military courts. Reports suggested, however, that in some cases no trial had taken place. In late November the AFRC passed retroactive legislation providing for the death penalty for looting or commandeering vehicles.

Despite the November 1996 agreement providing for immediate cessation of hostilities, unarmed civilians continued to be tortured and killed by RUF forces in the months before the coup, particularly in Tonkolili District, Northern Province. In January dozens of civilians were reported to have been killed and young girls raped in RUF attacks on several villages. According to reports, when soldiers moved into forest areas in Kailahun District, an RUF stronghold in Eastern Province, in February, they found more than 100 young children separated from their families, including three girls whose hands had been deliberately cut off and another child with an ear cut off. Similar atrocities by the RUF were reported during attacks on villages, including Kalangba and Pendembu, north of Makeni, in May before the coup; dozens of civilians were killed and others mutilated by having their arms or feet cut off.

In late March RUF members abducted at least five of their own members, a Sierra Leonean diplomat and members of the Guinean security forces in Kailahun District shortly after an announcement by prominent RUF members that Foday Sankoh had been removed as leader because he had obstructed the peace process. Foday Sankoh had been detained on arrival in Lagos, Nigeria, in early March, apparently for possession of arms and ammunition; he remained under house arrest in Nigeria at the end of the year. Two of those abducted, Fayia Musa and Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh, were RUF representatives on the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace established by the peace agreement. Although the diplomat was freed shortly after the coup, five RUF members remained held at the end of the year.

There were also reports that *kamajors* fighting AFRC and RUF forces deliberately killed, tortured and ill-treated civilians. In September four people, including a woman, who were suspected of being soldiers or AFRC supporters, were reportedly summarily executed by being beheaded when the vehicle in which they were travelling from Bo to Makeni was stopped by *kamajors*.

In February Amnesty International received a response from the Minister of Justice to its request for clarification of the death in custody of a soldier among those arrested with Major Johnny Paul Koroma (see *Amnesty International Report 1997*). The reply included a post-mortem report, rejected allegations of ill-treatment during interrogation and stated that he had died after attempting to escape by jumping from a window. In March Amnesty International called for the humane treatment and release of RUF members held hostage. Following the coup Amnesty International repeatedly called for an end to arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions, and in October published a report documenting these violations, *Sierra Leone: A disastrous set-back for human rights.* It called on the international community to give priority to the protection of human rights in efforts to resolve the political crisis in Sierra Leone. Amnesty International strongly condemned executions in October, November and December, called for the repeal of retroactive legislation extending the scope of the death penalty and urged that no further executions take place.

Annual Report UPDATE:

From January to June 1998

The arbitrary detention, torture and killing which characterized the period of rule by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), joined by the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF), after it came to power in May 1997 continued unabated into 1998.

Several prominent members of the community in Kenema, in Eastern Province -- including the chairman of the town council, B.S. Massaquoi -- accused of supporting a civil defence force loyal to ousted President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah were arrested in January and tortured; B.S. Massaquoi was killed by members of the RUF on 8 February.

Later that week the AFRC and RUF were removed from power by the West African force, known as ECOMOG, deployed in Sierra Leone. As the AFRC and RUF retreated from Freetown they killed, raped and mutilated hundreds of civilians. Horrific abuses were carried out in the east and the north of the country.

In Yifin, in Northern Province, at least two hundred unarmed civilians were killed when the village was attacked in late April. The number of those killed continues to rise as violence has spread throughout Northern Province.

Several hundred victims -- school children, housewives, farmers, traders -- are being treated in hospitals in Freetown, Makeni and Magburaka for crude amputations or attempted amputations, bullet and machete wounds. Many have had their arms, feet or ears cut off. Victims have reported women and children being rounded up, locked into a house which was then set alight. Women have been raped and suffered other forms of sexual assault. Men who refused to rape members of their own family were reported to have had their arms hacked off.

It has taken some of the victims days, if not weeks, to reach medical assistance. Many others -- possibly hundreds -- have fled into the bush. Some 250,000 Sierra Leonean refugees have arrived in neighbouring Guinea and Liberia since April 1998 -- many with amputated limbs, severe lacerations and suffering from disease, starvation and exhaustion after weeks in the bush.

An Amnesty International delegation which visited Sierra Leone in May met victims of these atrocities.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE: This report is an extract from the Amnesty International Report 1998 and is copyright (c) Amnesty International Publications. You may not alter this information, repost or sell it without the permission of Amnesty International. The complete edition of the Report, covering more than 140 countries and territories,is published in several languages and is available from Amnesty International sections or, in case of difficulty, from the International Secretariat. Additional places where you can purchase copies of the Annual Report can be found here.

1998 Annual Report Index | Country Index

1.173 8133

© Copyright Amnesty International

annual report 99

AFRICA
regional country index



AI REPORT 1999:
SIERRA LEONE

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (afrc) continued to detain prisoners of conscience without charge or trial and was responsible for torture and extrajudicial executions. After their removal from power in February, the afrc and the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (ruf) killed and mutilated thousands of unarmed civilians. A civilian militia supporting the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Civil Defence Forces (cdf), was also responsible for extrajudicial executions and torture, although on a significantly smaller scale. Hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the afrc and ruf were detained without charge by the reinstated government. Thirty-four soldiers were sentenced to death by a court martial which did not meet international standards for fair trial; 24 were executed. Forty-two civilians and the leader of the ruf were also sentenced to death.

The elected government of President Kabbah was reinstated after the afrc was forced from power in February by West African forces deployed in Sierra Leone _ the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ecomog). The afrc had seized power in a military coup in May 1997 and was joined by the ruf (see *Amnesty International Report 1998*).

During the ecomog offensive on Freetown, the capital, in February, afrc and ruf forces deliberately and arbitrarily killed many civilians. Several hundred others were injured or killed as a result of shelling by both sides, which in some cases appeared to be indiscriminate.

Following their removal from power and throughout the rest of the year, afrc and ruf forces embarked on a systematic campaign of killing, rape, mutilation, abduction and destruction in the east and north of the country. By December rebel forces had advanced towards Freetown and an attack on Freetown appeared imminent. The government of Liberia was widely reported to be providing

combatants, arms and ammunition to rebel forces.

In late April President Kabbah announced that the cdf, composed of traditional hunters such as the *kamajors*, had been placed under the command of ecomog.

On 10 March President Kabbah proclaimed a state of emergency, subsequently ratified by parliament, which included provisions for indefinite detention without charge or trial. Some 2,000 soldiers and civilians suspected of collaboration with the afrc and ruf were detained following the ecomog intervention. Many were suspected of human rights abuses.

In May the government established an independent committee of investigation to review the cases of several hundred detainees and recommend whether they should be charged or released.

Implementation of a comprehensive plan for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including an estimated 5,000 child soldiers, from the ruf, cdf and national army, was limited because of continuing conflict.

The un and other intergovernmental organizations repeatedly condemned as gross breaches of international humanitarian law the atrocities committed against civilians by rebel forces. The Special Representative of the un Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, following a visit to Sierra Leone in May, called for a more vigorous and concerted response by the international community to the needs of children affected by the conflict.

In July the un Security Council established a peace-keeping operation, the un Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (unomsil). unomsil human rights officers consistently investigated and reported human rights abuses, monitored treason trials and undertook several other important initiatives which contributed to the protection of human rights.

On 30 July the un Secretary-General convened a special conference in New York, usa, attended by representatives of the government of Sierra Leone, intergovernmental organizations including the un, the Organization of African Unity, ecowas, the European Union and the Commonwealth, and humanitarian organizations. The conference agreed to establish an international contact group to coordinate support for efforts to restore peace, stability, democracy and human rights in Sierra Leone. It first met in November.

While in power, the afrc and ruf committed widespread human rights violations, including detention without charge or trial, torture and extrajudicial executions. Among prisoners of conscience detained by the afrc were Sylvanus Kanyako, a journalist on the *Herald Guardian*, and David Kamara, its proprietor, who were arrested in January, held without charge for three weeks, and tortured.

In mid-January in Kenema, Eastern Province, the ruf detained several community leaders accused of supporting the *kamajors*. They were repeatedly beaten and one died as a result. Some were

released, but several others remained held, including B.S. Massaquoi, Chairman of the town council. He was killed by ruf forces in February, and his mutilated body was reported to have been found with 35 others in a mass grave near Kenema the following month.

After they were removed from power, afrc and ruf forces killed thousands of unarmed civilians, including many women and children, in the east and north of the country. The exact number of those killed remained unknown. The town of Koidu, in Kono District, Eastern Province, was virtually destroyed by rebel forces in April, and more than 650 bodies were reported to have been found there. More than 200 unarmed civilians were killed during an attack on Yifin, a village in Koinadugu District, Northern Province, in late April.

As many as 4,000 men, women and children suffered mutilation, crude amputations of their hands, arms, legs, lips or ears; others suffered lacerations and gunshot wounds. Survivors of attacks recounted that many others from their villages had been killed or had fled into the bush where many died of their injuries. They reported that villagers had been rounded up and locked in houses which were then set alight. Women and girls were systematically raped or subjected to other forms of sexual assault. Men who refused to rape members of their own families had their limbs amputated as punishment. Children were ripped from their mothers' backs and killed with machetes. Among the victims who were evacuated to Freetown was a 15-year-old schoolboy from Koidu who had severe lacerations to his right ankle after an attempted amputation; about 50 people with him were killed when they were attacked on 1 May.

Reports of atrocities declined significantly during July, but from August onwards, atrocities by rebel forces in Northern and Eastern Provinces escalated. In early September, for example, at least 40 civilians, including children, were reported to have been killed in Kamalu, Bombali District, Northern Province. Some of those killed had first been tortured and sexually assaulted and others were burned alive. Some 50 civilians were reported to have been abducted in Kamalu.

Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, were abducted during attacks by rebel forces. They were forced to fight and used as forced labour; women and girls were forced into sexual slavery. All those abducted were at risk of ill-treatment and deliberate and arbitrary killing. As many as 10,000 civilians in rebel-controlled areas, in particular in Kailahun District, Eastern Province, were effectively held captive.

An estimated 570,000 civilians fled to neighbouring countries to escape the violence or became internally displaced. Many remained at risk of killing, mutilation and abduction. In September rebel forces attacked a refugee camp at Tomandu in Guinea, killing at least seven women refugees and three Guineans and forcing others to carry looted goods across the border. In November, 20 refugees in Tomandu who crossed the border in search of food had their hands cut off by rebel forces. The un High Commissioner for Refugees subsequently moved thousands of refugees from Tomandu to camps further inside Guinea.

1.177 8136

Contribute to Human Rights Watch

HOME | SITEMAP | SEARCH | CONTACT | REPORTS | PRESS ARCHIVES

Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Sierra Leone

FREE Join the HRW Mailing List

Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict

(New York, 26 February 2001) Throughout the nine year Sierra Leonean conflict there has been widespread and systematic sexual violence against women and girls including individual and gang rape, sexual assault with objects such as firewood, umbrellas and sticks, and sexual slavery. In thousands of cases, sexual violence has been followed by the abduction of women and girls and forced bondage to male combatants in slavery-like conditions often accompanied by forced labor. These sexual crimes are most often characterized by extraordinary brutality and are frequently preceded or followed by violent acts against other family members. The rebel factions use sexual violence as a weapon to terrorize, humiliate, punish and ultimately control the civilian population into submission.

Human Rights Watch has documented cases of fathers being forced to watch the rape of their daughters, middle aged women being raped by boys as young as eleven, women being raped in public places, and girls being raped during sacred coming-of-age rituals.

The perpetration of sexual violence is often marked by the systematic breaking of taboos and undermining of cultural values. For example, Human Rights Watch has documented cases of fathers being forced to watch the rape of their daughters, middle aged women being raped by boys as young as eleven, women being raped in public places, and girls being raped during sacred coming-of-age rituals. As in other countries, the abuse of women in the Sierra Leonean conflict is rooted in the persistent human rights violations that push women into a lower status with limited rights in all spheres of their lives, from home to work.

Related Material

Sierra Leone: A Call for Justice
Photographs 2000

Sierra Leone focus page

The violence has affected thousands of girls and women of all ages. While members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC; the renegade members of the Sierra Leonean Army who led the 1997 coup, now sometimes also known as the West Side Boys) have been the most common perpetrators, members of the civil defense forces - the biggest and most powerful of which is the Kamajors - and the loyal Sierra Leonean Army have also been implicated.

Following the l999 Lomé Peace Accord, there was a marked decrease in most human rights violations - except sexual violence, which continued unabated. From the signing in July 1999 to the May 2000 collapse of the accord, Human Rights Watch documented some one hundred cases of rape by rebel forces. Since the collapse of the peace agreement in May 2000, Human Rights Watch has received consistent reports of rape by RUF rebels and AFRC soldiers, and to a lesser extent by Kamajor militias.

There are no official statistics on the numbers of girls and women who have suffered sexual violence during the war. This is due both to under-reporting because of cultural factors, fear of retaliation, and lack of faith in the criminal justice system, and to a lack of resources devoted to the problem on the part of the relevant government ministries. While it is common that women know the perpetrators of these violations, very few have dared to bring charges, for fear of reprisals against them and their families. However, those girls who have either been released or managed to escape rebel captivity indicate that the overwhelming majority are sexually abused. According to one 1999 study, there were 1862 female victims of sexual abuse seen for medical treatment and counseling in one program treating victims raped and/or abducted during the January 1999 offensive against the capital Freetown. Of these, according to information received from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in March 2000, 55 percent reported having been gang raped and 200 had become pregnant.

Since April 1999, the Human Rights Watch office in Freetown has done extensive research on sexual violence and taken hundreds of testimonies of victims throughout the rebel war and from all areas of the country.

International Law

Sexual violence within the Sierra Leonean conflict is not only a war crime, but - given its widespread and systematic nature - is also a crime against humanity. Rape and other forms of sexual violence also constitute torture when they are intentionally inflicted on a victim by an official or with official instigation, consent or tolerance for purposes such as intimidation, punishment, or eliciting information. Grave breaches of the laws of war, torture, and crimes against humanity are crimes of universal jurisdiction: any nation may prosecute the perpetrators, regardless of their nationality, the nationality of victims or of where the crime took place. However, it is not necessary to find that rape and sexual violence take place systematically or on a wide scale in order to prosecute the perpetrators under national law. Just as a single case of murder of a civilian can be prosecuted, so too can a single rape.

Victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch indicate that the violence is often premeditated and organized, suggesting command responsibility on the part of the military hierarchy. That is to say, officers have either authorized or ordered these abuses, or they knew or should have known that they were taking place, and took no measures to control their subordinates. An individual found to have command responsibility for the crime committed by a subordinate is deemed responsible at least of the same crime as the subordinate, that is, if the officer stood by while the subordinate committed rape, the officer is also responsible for rape.

Perpetrators

Rebel Forces

The rebels (at different times the RUF, AFRC, and West Side Boys) have perpetrated systematic, organized and widespread sexual violence against girls and women since the Sierra Leonean civil war began in 1991. Most of the rapes documented by Human Rights Watch occurred during attacks against a hamlet, village or town. During the course of the attack, the victims were most often abducted and forced to become sexual partners or "wives" to their rebel captors. Once captured, victims often described trying to attach themselves to one rebel so as to avoid gang rape, be given a degree of protection and be subjected to less hardship. They often become pregnant, had children and remained with the rebels for years. Some received military training, were given drugs and later themselves became perpetrators of serious abuses. Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of female rebels being involved in 'finding' and later abducting young girls to be later raped by their commanding officers.

The RUF has made occasional efforts to declare rape a crime within areas under their control, and discipline combatants accused of 'breaking the law.' Human Rights Watch has documented numerous cases of combatants being publicly executed after summary trials in which they have been "convicted" of rape. Human Rights Watch condemns such extra-judicial and summary proceedings and executions. These efforts have in any event failed to deter the perpetration of sexual violence by rebel soldiers in practice.

Civil Defense Forces

Rape has until recently been very uncommon among the CDF forces, the largest of which is the Kamajors, primarily because of the belief that power and potency as a warrior is dependent upon sexual abstinence. In the last few years the Kamajors have been moved away from their native areas and traditional chiefs, and given more responsibility in national security. Once separated from the influence of the paramount and regional chiefs, they have become increasingly undisciplined and the cases of rape have become more common. Human Rights Watch has also documented one case of the sexual torture to death of a female RUF commander by a senior Kamajor leader.

ECOMOG and UNAMSIL

Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of rape by soldiers serving under ECOMOG, the Economic Community of West African States peace keeping force., or under UNAMSIL, the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone. The UNAMSIL human rights section provides basic training in international humanitarian law to the officers of all units serving in the mission.

on the pounding block and amputated with a cutlass. Sometimes a pre-cut would be made with bayonet, to show where the amputation was to happen. People realising what was happening like one teacher, said that he used his left arm, even though he was right handed. His left arm was amputated.

Several patient reported that the attackers took the amputated arms with them. One patient said that they did not take his arm, but that he was able to keep his cut-off arm.

In some villages, after the people were rounded up, they were stripped naked and ordered to "use their women"; men were ordered to "use" their sister. When men refused to do so, their arms were amputated, and the women were raped by the attackers.

After the attack, many patients mentioned that the armed men would tell them to go now, and report themselves to ECOMOG and tell ECOMOG, "That we, the attackers do not want them here, and to tell ECOMOG that the attackers were here, and that they would come to ECOMOG soon".

Patients were also told that they should go to President Kabbah, and ask him for a new arm. One patient was given a letter by the attackers, with the order to give it to President Kabbah.

Some patients, who did not leave their village after the attack, and when encountering the attackers again, were ordered to leave ; "Why are you still here , we told you to go to ECOMOG !". Other men, who had one or two ears cut off, reported that the attackers told them, that without their ears, they should no longer listen to ECOMOG and the government and that they should listen better to the attackers.

Other patients reported that they hid under their beds but that the attackers pulled them out from underneath the bed, or shot under the beds in the room, as they were aware that people were hiding there. One patient reported that she was in a room with a group of other people, and that the attackers shot and killed four people, and the patient hid underneath the 4 dead bodies with her baby until the attackers had left.

Several patients reported that groups of people had been rounded up, locked into a house and then the house was set on fire. It was reported that this had happened to women and children.

In one family that was interviewed, the older brother had both arms amputated, his wife had one arm amputated, the younger nephew of 16 had both arms amputated, and another relative had both arms badly cut (tendons cut and ulna and radius broken due to cutlass attack). One man of 50 had walked for 4 weeks, from village to village, with both arms amputated, until he reached a place where he found a commercial vehicle that took him and 2 others to Freetown. These examples are just a few of the stories as recorded by the MSF staff. Each patient had a similar gruesome story to tell.

4. CONCLUSION

1,182

8139

Source: Pan African News Agency (PANA)
Date: 10 Sep 1999

UN Says Sierra Leone Rebels Holding 1,000 Children

Jerome Hule, PANA Correspondent

New York, UN, (PANA) - Rebels in Sierra Leone are still holding about 1,000 of the 4,000 children they had abducted during their invasion of Freetown in January, a senior UN official has said.

Olara Otunnu, the UN special representative on children in armed conflict, said Thursday in New York that about 60 percent of the abducted children were girls, most of whom were being sexually abused.

Otunnu, who returned from a six-day visit to Sierra Leone on 4 September, pointed out that more than 10,000 children in the country have been serving as child soldiers with the rebels and civil militia, called Kamojors.

On the basis of what he witnessed in Sierra Leone, he has proposed a 15-point agenda for action for the children of Sierra Leone.

In the agenda, he called for the establishment of a national commission for children in the country to promote the rights and welfare of children after the war.

He also called for the rehabilitation of amputees and special programmes for sexually abused children as well as the inclusion of child protection in the mandate of the UN mission in Sierra Leone and other UN missions.

The agenda also makes a case for creation of access to abducted children, demobilisation of child combatants, increase in the resources for relief operations for displaced children and rehabilitation of basic health and educational services in the country.

Otunnu appealed to all political leaders in Sierra Leone to demonstrate their commitment to implement the peace accord signed in July between the government and rebels of the Revolutionary United Front.

This site is part of AFRICA NEWS ONLINE. Send your thoughts to readers@africanews.org for our Readers' Forum. When commenting on a story, please indicate the article name and date.

Copyright © 1999 Panafrican News Agency. All Rights Reserved.

Copyright *All PANA content and graphics is protected by copyright and international treaties and may not be copied, reproduced or re-used for any purpose without written permission.*

With the exception of public UN sources, reproduction or redistribution of the above text, in whole, part or in any form, requires the prior consent of the original source.

Source: United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI)
Date: 15 Jun 1998

Top United Nations humanitarian official describes brutal treatment of civilians by rebels in Sierra Leone

The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sergio Vieira de Mello, said on Monday the brutal treatment of civilians by rebels in Sierra Leone was unlike anything he had seen in 29 years of humanitarian work.
Speaking to reporters in Geneva after a three-day mission to Sierra Leone, Mr. Vieira de Mello described a pattern of amputations, lacerations, and maiming of civilians, including children. "Hands are cut off and ears and noses are amputated," he said. "There are no words to condemn this sort of practice and bestiality."

Mr. Vieiro De Mello said there were half a million refugees in neighbouring Guinea, mainly because rebels still controlled some parts of Sierra Leone. The number of internally displaced persons was increasing and the food situation was very serious and likely to get worse. Areas previously held by the rebels were totally devastated and the country's infrastructure needed rebuilding. "Investment in development and rehabilitation cannot wait for total peace. We cannot just give humanitarian aid now," he said.

The legitimate Government of Sierra Leone has been back in office in the capital, Freetown, since March and has re-established control over a large part of the country.

With the exception of public UN sources, reproduction or redistribution of the above text, in whole, part or in any form, requires the prior consent of the original source.

1.215 4209 81141

FIGURE 1:
Extrapolation of Human Rights Abuses Among All IDPs in Sierra Leone



* Extrapolations are based on frequencies reported by 9,166 household members (Table 2); sexual assault is among female respondents only. For 95% confidence intervals, please see page 45, footnote 165.

related sexual violence (9%) among the study participants.

By extrapolating the number of war-related sexual violence incidents reported by participants in the PHR sample to the total female IDP population in Sierra Leone, PHR estimates that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 Sierra Leonean IDP women may have suffered such human rights abuses. If non-war-related sexual violence among non-IDP females is added to the IDP totals (assuming a 9% prevalence rate), as many as

4210
81142

215,000-257,000 women and girls in Sierra Leone currently may have been affected by sexual violence.[5]

Today, in the context of war, rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered war crimes[6] and can be prosecuted as such.[7] They also constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic[8] attack against the civilian population.[9] This population-based assessment demonstrates that war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses were indeed perpetrated as a widespread attack against the civilian population, and therefore constitute both war crimes and crimes against humanity.[10] A Special Court has been proposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1315 to prosecute those "bearing the greatest responsibility" for violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone's conflict.[11] A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is being created to provide an impartial historical record of the war and to foster reconciliation.[12]

Methods of Investigation

Quantitative

PHR sampled 1,048 households in three IDP camps (near Freetown, Port Loko, and Kenema) and one community with a large number of IDPs,

---

[5] To generate population estimates of sexual violence among the IDP and non-IDP females in Sierra Leone, PHR assumed a total IDP population of 1.0-1.3 million (55% female) and a non-IDP population of 2.7-3.0 million (50% female). UNOCHA database. Sierra Leone: UN Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs. Updated February, 2001; Norwegian Refugee Council, Sierra Leone Section, "Population profile and figures". Available at: www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/1c963eb504904cde412567820074 93b8/fdc6d215bab90118c12569dd002b1aec?OpenDocument; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Available at: unhcr.ch/un & ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf

[6] Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1 "FOCA" Available at: www.un.org/ICTY/judgement.htm

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] See Chapter V for a discussion.

[9] Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 5, Crimes against Humanity. Available at www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm#5.

[10] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), adopted 7/17/98. Available at: untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm; Askin K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*, M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1997. Askin K. "Women and International Humanitarian Law," in Askin K.D, Koenig D.M., Editors, *Women and International Human Rights Law*, Transnational, 1999. Vol. I. Also see: United Nations, Draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915. Available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf.

[11] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 (Adopted August 14, 2000). Available at: www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1315e.pdf

[12] For more information see www.sierra-leone.org/trc.html

A striking 94% of 991 households randomly surveyed reported among its members at least one of these serious abuses during the past ten years of conflict. The majority of abuses reported by participants in the PHR study occurred between 1997 and 1999 and, when known, were attributed primarily to forces from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The study's primary focus on abuses of women and girls stems from the historical neglect of these sexual crimes committed against women from previous reports of human rights abuses in Sierra Leone.

The PHR study indicates that war-related sexual violence experiences perpetrated by armed combatants (primarily RUF) are, indeed, widespread among IDPs in Sierra Leone. Approximately one of every eight household members (13%) reported one or more incidents of war-related sexual violence. Nine percent (94/991) of respondents reported war-related sexual violence.[2,3] A striking 53% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence, compared to less than 6% for any other combatant group.[4] One third of the women who reported sexual violence reported being gang raped.

Participants reporting sexual violence related the following: rape (89%), being forced to undress/stripped of clothing (37%), gang rape (33%), abduction (33%), molestation (14%), sexual slavery (15%), forced marriage (9%), and insertion of foreign objects into the genital opening or anus (4%). In addition, 22 (23%) of the women who experienced sexual violence reported being pregnant at the time of the attack with an average gestation of three months. The majority of the incidents of sexual violence reported by participants (68%) occurred between 1997 and 1999.

This prevalence rate of war-related sexual violence (8%-9%) during only a ten-year period is equivalent to the lifetime prevalence of non war-

[2] It is likely that the prevalence of war-related sexual violence in the study was underestimated because of willful non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts to ensure privacy. According to Koss (Koss M.P, "Detecting the scope of rape: a review of prevalence research methods," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*. 1993(8);198-222) reasons for willful non-disclosure often include fear of retribution by an assailant, being stigmatized and rejected, being blamed for the attack, and/or the psychological consequences of disclosure.

[3] In addition, the average age of participants reporting war-related sexual violence was more than twice the average age of non war-related sexual violence reported in the study. Although interviewers were careful to explain that there would be no material or other gain by participating in the survey, the number of abuses reported in the study may have been overestimated or underestimated if IDPs judged that it was in their material, political or psychological interest to exaggerate or conceal claims of abuse.

[4] Other perpetrators reported included Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), West Side Boys, unspecified "rebels", and Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) and ex-SLA. The UN peacekeepers and Civil Defense Forces (CDF) militia forces were not identified as perpetrators among respondents reporting sexual violence.

8144
4243

III. THE PREVALENCE OF WAR-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AMONG IDPs[156]

Methods

Subjects

Subjects of the PHR survey consisted of female heads of household who could most accurately provide information about the experiences of the entire household over the past 10 years. An assertive attempt was made to ensure that each respondent was interviewed privately due to the sensitive nature of questions asked. Of the 1,048 households sampled, 991 female heads of household participated in the study (response rate = 95%). Seven women were not eligible; 41 were not available at the time of sampling, and 8 women were either opposed to the survey, refused to participate, or requested the interview be stopped.

Sampling

At the time of the study, registered IDPs were living in a total of 21 camps or locales in seven districts and the Western Area of Sierra Leone. To obtain a representative sample of IDPs, the PHR/UNAMSIL team selected camps and/or locales on the basis of IDP arrival time and the place of residence before displacement. Since the proportion of "recent arrivals" (after the May 2000 crisis) was known for each camp/locale, the PHR/UNAMSIL team was able to select camps/locales that reflected the known proportion of two-thirds recent arrivals in all IDP camps/locales. A total of four sample locations from three different districts and the Western Area of Sierra Leone were included in the study. The camps/locales included those that best represented the IDPs' home district and/or region of the country. The four districts from which camps/locales were sampled

[156] This chapter is excerpted from Amowitz, L et al, "Letter from Sierra Leone: Prevalence of War-Related Sexual Violence and other Human Rights Abuses Among Internally Displaced Persons in Sierra Leone," *Journal of the American Medical Association* (Forthcoming January 23, 2002 issue).

87H5
4244

represented 91% of the registered IDP population in Sierra Leone. Camps/locales located in four other districts were excluded on the basis of inaccessibility due to safety concerns or an inadequate number of IDPs for sampling (less than 5,000).

Assuming a prevalence rate of sexual violence (based on a previous estimate by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) of 14% of Freetown residents witnessing rape in 1999)[157] to be between 10% and 20%, the PHR/UNAMSIL team determined the following sample sizes would be needed. For a 20% prevalence (18-22% margins), sample size would range from 653 at 80% confidence to 1,071 at 90% confidence. For a prevalence of 10% (9-11% margins), sample size would range from 1,457 at 80% confidence to 2,377 at 90% confidence. The PHR/UNAMSIL team therefore planned to include approximately 1,000 households in the study due to safety and logistical constraints during the time period of the survey. Households were selected in each camp/locale in proportion to the distribution of IDPs in that location. A total of 1,048 households were selected from the three camps and one town, Mile 91 Township.

All study participants were selected using systematic random sampling or a combination of systematic random sampling and cluster sampling.[158] In sampling IDPs, the PHR/UNAMSIL team first mapped all domiciles within the camp, cluster, or town, then conducted a systematic random sample of the entire camp, cluster, or town. A sampling interval (n) was calculated by dividing the number of households in the camp, cluster, or town by the number of interviews to be conducted in the camp, cluster, or town. A starting household was determined by random number generation and each nth household was interviewed until the entire camp, cluster, or town had been surveyed. One camp required cluster sampling due to size and difficulty in mapping. The camp was organized into eight administrative units. Two clusters (administrative units) were selected at random from seven of the units. One unit was excluded from sampling because it consisted of only very recent arrivals, unlike the other seven units.

Survey Questionnaire[159]

The PHR survey contained 49 questions pertaining to demographics, physical and mental health perception, experiences of war-related human rights abuses among household members, experiences of war-related sex-

---

[157] de Jong, K., Mulham, M., van der Kam, S., *Assessing trauma in Sierra Leone: Psychological Questionnaire: Freetown Survey Outcomes*, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières, January 11, 2000. Available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2000/sierraleone_01-2000.shtml .

[158] Patton MQ. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications; 1990:169-283

[159] See Appendix A.

97 H6 4245

ual violence, including assistance needs, opinions regarding punishment and justice for perpetrators, and attitudes on women's human rights and roles in society. The survey also assessed the lifetime prevalence of non war-related sexual violence.

Physical and mental health perception, fears of sexual violence in communities either by combatants or non-combatants, and family relationship changes after the incident of sexual violence were assessed using Likert-type scales (e.g., excellent, good, fair, poor). Human rights opinions and views on women's roles in society were asked of all female heads of the households. Opinions were assessed by a response of "agree" or "disagree" with statements concerning human rights and women's roles in society.

Regarding experiences of human rights abuses, respondents were asked whether they or their household members had been beaten, shot, killed, tortured, seriously injured, sexually violated, raped, abducted, suffered amputations or been subjected to forced labor by combatants during the past 10 years (e.g., since the war started). Respondents also were asked whether their homes were burned and/or property was looted. For each abuse, participants were asked the gender of the abused, type of abuse, who they thought committed the violation, and consequence of the abuse. Finally, all participants were asked about non war-related sexual violence experiences in their lifetime committed by non-combatants such as family members, friends, or civilian strangers, including age at time of attack, type of sexual violence and identity of the perpetrators.

Regarding war-related sexual violence experiences during the past 10 years of war, respondents were asked when the incident occurred, where it took place, the sexual abuse type, the identity of the perpetrator, the number of attackers, the duration of the attack, and the consequences of the sexual violence. In addition, these women were asked their opinions regarding the punishment of perpetrators, and whether they were interested in giving their names to the proposed Special Court or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The questionnaire was written in English, the official language of Sierra Leone, translated into Krio, the lingua franca of Sierra Leone, and back-translated into English. The questions on sexual violence and sexuality were written by Sierra Leonean women who conduct research in this area and who provide treatment services to survivors of sexual violence in Sierra Leone. Researchers learned to administer the survey in Krio in which they all were fluent and collaborated on a translation from Krio into the two other main languages in Sierra Leone (Mende and Temne). These translations were checked for accuracy by members of the PHR/UNAMSIL team. Seven regional human rights and sexual violence experts reviewed the questionnaire for content validity. The survey was pilot tested among twelve IDP women in Freetown and suggestions were incorporated for clarity and cultural appropriateness of questions.

8747 4246

Interviewer Training

The survey interviews were conducted by 21 Sierra Leonean women trained and supervised by the PHR/UNAMSIL field team. The five-member team had extensive experience in research, psychological counseling with survivors of sexual violence and torture, sexual violence aid programs for Sierra Leonean refugees and IDPs, and human rights issues. Researcher training consisted of eight to nine days of classroom teaching and role-play followed by several days of field observation and continuous supervision. (See Appendix B for details of training process.)

Interviews

All interviews were conducted over a four-week period in the calendar year 2001. Interviews with participants lasted approximately 25-60 minutes and were conducted in the most private setting possible. All questionnaires were reviewed for completeness and for correctness of recording after the interview by the researchers themselves, and then reviewed by the field supervisors at the end of each day.

Human Subjects Protections

This research was reviewed and approved by an independent group of individuals with expertise in clinical medicine, public health, bioethics, and international human rights research. In addition, permission for the study was granted by UN officials, camp administrators and local community leaders in each area surveyed and there were no limitations on movement or to surveying. The research was conducted in accord with the Declaration of Helsinki, as revised in 2000.[160] Every effort was made to ensure the protection and confidentiality of and to reduce any potential adverse consequence to the human subject participants. All data were kept anonymous. Verbal informed consent was obtained from all participants and parental consent was obtained for all participants under the age of eighteen. Participants did not receive any material compensation. To reduce the risk of possible retraumatization among respondents, researcher training included extensive sensitization to this issue by a psychologist and social worker who specialize in sexual violence and those who reported sexual violence were referred to any existing services.

Statistical Analysis

The data were analyzed using STATA statistical software.[161] For 2x2 cross tabulations containing cells with expected frequencies of less than five,

---

[160] World Medical Association, *Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects* [5th rev], Edinburgh, Scotland: World Medical Association; 2000.

[161] *STATA 5.0 (Intercooled) for Windows*, STATA Corporation, College Station TX.

statistical significance was determined using Fisher's exact test; Yates' corrected chi square was used for all others. For cross tabulations with greater than two rows, statistical significance was determined using Pearson chi square. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used for statistical comparison of means and the Kruskal-Wallis test was used for comparison of medians. For all statistical determinations, significance levels were established at $p<0.05$.

Definitions

A perpetrator was defined as any person who directly inflicts violence or abuse.[162] Torture was defined according to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.[163] Sexual violence included rape[164] and other forms of sexual violence such as molestation, sexual slavery, being forced to undress or being stripped of clothing, forced marriage, and insertion of foreign objects into the genital opening or anus. Gang rape was defined as rape by two or more individuals. Depression was self-reported as "depression." Symptoms of "depression" included "very sad," "excessive worry," sleeping difficulties, "unhappy," "change in appetite," and "feels bad."

Mental Health Counseling was defined as "having someone to talk to about your problems who will listen and give emotional support." A household was defined as "those people sleeping and eating under the same roof before first displacement." Female head of household was considered "the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household." War-related prevalence of sexual violence included experiences of sexual violence committed by combatants during the past 10 years of war. Life-time prevalence of non war-related sexual violence included experiences of sexual violence committed by family members, friends, or civilians at any time in a woman's lifetime. These two prevalence rates did not overlap since the perpetrator categories were mutually exclusive.

Findings

The findings of the PHR study represent the most comprehensive population-based assessment to date of war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses in Sierra Leone. Such quantitative findings contribute

---

[162] Saltzman, L.E., Fanslow, J.L., McJahon, P.M., Shelley, G.A., *Intimate Partner Violence Surveillance: Uniform Definitions and Recommended Data Elements*, Center for Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Injury Prevention and Control: Atlanta, 1999:11. Available at: www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/intimate.htm

[163] Article 3, Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1948, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (*entered into force* October 21, 1950).

[164] International Planned Parenthood Association Western Regional Hemisphere, *Definitions: What is Gender-Based Violence?* Available at: www.ippfwhr.org/whatwedo/definitions.pdf.

8749 4248

TABLE 1:
Demographic Characteristics and Health Perceptions among Respondents

Respondent Characteristics	Respondents* n=991
Age (years), mean ± SE (range)	34 ± 0.48 (14-80)
Marital Status	
Married; living with husband	622 (63)
Widowed due to war	134 (13)
Widowed/divorced/separated	113 (11)
Separated due to war	101 (10)
Never married	21 (2)
Wife Status, n=965	
First wife	430 (45)
> First wife	535 (55)
Tribe, n=989	
Temne	703 (71)
Mende	150 (15)
Kono	39 (4)
Limba	28 (3)
Krio	4 (0.4)
Other	65 (7)
Religion, n=989	
Muslim	814 (82)
Christian	172 (17)
Other	3 (0.3)
Years Since Displacement, n=766	
1-3 years	216(28)
4-6 years	225 (29)
7-10 years	311 (41)
> 10 years	14 (2)
Number of Times Fled Fighting, mean ± SE (range)	4 ± 0.07 (1-15)
Months in Camp/Town, mean ± SE (range)	18 ± 0.53 (.25-120)
Years of Formal Education, mean ± SE (range)	1.9 ± 0.11 (0-16)
Most Commonly Reported Occupations †	
Farmer	500 (50)
Trader	383 (39)
Business	76 (8)
Student	17 (2)
Professional	25 (2)
Homemaker	11 (1)

8150 4249

Perception of General Health in the Last Two Years	
Very good	19 (2)
Good	83 (8)
Fair	629 (63)
Poor	260 (26)
"State of Mind" † Since Displacement, n=988	
Very good	8 (0.8)
Good	48 (5)
Fair	638 (64)
Poor	294 (30)
Suicidal Ideation Since the War	280 (28)
Suicide Attempts Since the War	34 (3)
Assistance That Would Help "State of Mind" ‡	
Humanitarian assistance	960 (97)
Medical assistance	956 (96)
Income generation projects	937 (94)
Religious counseling/support	879 (89)
Skills training	832 (84)
Mental health counseling	714 (72)
Traditional ceremonies	452 (48)
Education	393 (41)
Country medicine/traditional healer	321 (34)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise
† May list more than one
‡ "State of mind" defined as current thoughts and feelings

considerable insight into the nature and extent of human rights abuses among IDPs in Sierra Leone, i.e. the frequency of specific human rights abuses, the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the impact of these experiences and the most urgent needs identified by the victims. Furthermore, a rigorous approach to sampling enables the findings to be generalized to the larger IDP population.

Characteristics of Respondents

Of the 1,048 households sampled, 991 female heads of household participated in the study (response rate = 95%). Seven women were not eligible; 41 were not available at the time of sampling, and eight either were opposed to the survey, refused to participate, or requested the interview be stopped.

Demographics of the respondents are presented in Table 1. The mean age was 34± 0.48 years (range 14-80 years). The majority of the women sampled were poorly educated, Muslim, married, women of either the

TABLE 2:
Reported Human Rights Abuses among Household Members

Characteristics	Household Members Reporting Abuse n= 3759*
Household Members, #, mean ± SE (range)	
Total	9166, 9.37 ± 0.11 (2-30)
Women	5001, 5.18 ± 0.07 (1-17)
Men	3983, 4.17 ± 0.07 (0-17)
Current Age, mean ± SE (range)	24.8 ± 0.33 (1-95)
Human Rights Abuses Among All Household Members, n=9166 †	1157 (13)
Abduction	841 (9)
Beating	618 (7)
Killing	414 (4)
Reported sexual assaults among household members	402 (4)
Sexual assault among respondents, n=991	94 (9)
Sexual assault among household females, n=5001	396 (8)
Sexual assault among household males, n=3983	6 (0.1)
Torture	151 (2)
Forced labor	114 (1)
Gunshot wound	128 (1)
Bodily injury (stabbed, burned, cut)	85 (0.9)
Amputation of limb or digits	21 (0.2)
Destruction of Property	1836 (20)
Alleged Perpetrator †	
Rebel forces	
RUF, Revolutionary United Front	1490 (40)
"Rebels", unspecified	590 (16)
AFRC, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	74 (2)
West Side Boys	82 (2)
Ex-SLA	17 (.4)
Government forces	
SLA, Sierra Leonean Army	39 (1)
CDF, Civil Defense Forces	14 (.4)
Peacekeeping troops	
ECOMOG, Economic Community of West African States	5 (.1)
UN, United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone	1 (.02)
Other	
Don't know	1290 (34)
"Mixed group"	162 (4)

8152
4251

Consequences of Abuse †	
Self reported "depression" or symptoms of depression ‡	837(22)
No consequence	455 (12)
Killed/died after attack	420 (11)
Bodily injury	321 (8)
Stigmatized and rejected	27 (1)
Consequence of Sexual Assault, n=396	
Self-reported "sexually transmitted disease"	79 (20)
Self-reported pregnancy following rape	36 (9)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise
† May list more than one
‡ Symptoms of depression included "sleeping difficulties," "excessive worry," "unhappy," "change in appetite," "crying all the time," "cannot stop crying," "feeling bad," and "feeling sad."

Temne or Mende tribes who most commonly reported their occupation as farmers, petty traders and business women. Nearly one quarter of women were either separated or widowed due to war, had been displaced more than four times since 1990 and had, on average, lived in the IDP camps or Mile 91 Township for eighteen months. Fifty-seven percent of women reported that they had been displaced between one and six years ago, and 41% of women had been displaced between six and ten years ago.

The majority of women perceived their general health (89%) and mental health (94%) as "fair" or "poor"(Table 1). Approximately one third of women (280, 28%) reported suicidal ideation (thoughts or feelings), and 3% (34) had attempted suicide. Women reported types of aid that would help their states of mind the most, including humanitarian assistance (960, 97%), medical assistance (956, 96%), income generation projects (937, 94%), religious counseling and support (879, 89%), skills training (832, 84%), and mental health counseling (714, 72%).

Human Rights Abuses Reported among Household Members [165]

The 991 household representatives reported on the experiences of 9,166 household members, which included themselves and those who lived with

[165] The following 95% confidence intervals (CI) are calculated among household members (N=9166) for all human rights abuses (12.6 ± 0.635), abduction (9.0 ± 0.564), beatings (6.7 ± 0.494), killings (4.5 ± 0.415), sexual assaults among household members (4.4 ± 0.399), captured for less than 24 hours (3.4 ± .307), torture (1.6 ± 0.255), forced labor (1.2 ± 0.221), gunshot wounds (1.4 ± 0.239), bodily injuries (0.9 ± 0.192) and amputations of limbs or digits (0.2 ± 0.097); sexual assault among respondents where N=991(9.0 ± 1.74), sexual assault among household females where N=5001 (7.9 ± 0.717), sexual assault among household males where N=3983 (0.15 ± 0.120). The 95% confidence intervals reported here can be used to calculate the confidence interval for the estimates of abuses of the total IDP population (see Figure 1) using (95% CI X N value).

TABLE 3:
Reported Abuses of Household Members (n=1157), by Offender

Reported Abuse*	RUF	"Rebels"	AFRC	West Side Boys	Ex-SLA	SLA	CDF	ECOMOG	UN
All Abuses, n=2266	1312 (58)	645 (28)	125 (5)	69 (3)	58 (2)	42 (2)	11 (.5)	3 (.1)	1 (.04)
Abduction, n=666	398 (60)	161 (24)	46 (7)	26 (4)	19 (3)	12 (2)	3 (.04)	1 (.1)	-
Beating, n=511	260 (51)	188 (37)	21 (4)	15 (3)	14 (3)	11 (2)	2 (.04)	0	-
Killing, n=335	218 (65)	90 (27)	10 (3)	1 (.3)	7 (2)	5 (2)	2 (.06)	1 (.3)	1 (.3)
Sexual Assault									
Females, n=353	186 (53)	103 (29)	23 (6)	17 (5)	11 (3)	12 (3)	0	1 (.3)	-
Males, n=3	2 (67)	1 (33)	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Torture, n=135	81 (60)	37 (27)	9 (7)	0	3 (2)	2 (1)	3 (2)	0	-
Forced Labor, n=86	48 (56)	22 (26)	9 (10)	6 (7)	1 (1)	0	0	0	-
Gunshot Wound, n=108	75 (69)	29 (27)	2 (2)	1 (1)	0	0	1 (1)	0	-
Bodily Injury, n=49	35 (71)	12 (25)	0	1 (2)	1 (2)	0	0	0	-
Amputations, n=20	9(50)	2(11)	5(28)	2(11)	2(11)	0	0	0	-

*The 2266 abuses represent abuses (1 or more) listed by the 1157 household members who could identify the perpetrator. This data excludes those who could not list the perpetrator.

4252

8154
4253

them prior to their displacement (mean household size 9.4 ± 0.11) (Table 2). Of the 9,166 household members, 5,001 (55%) were females and 3,983 (44%) were males.[166] Overall, there was a total of 1157 household members with specific forms of war-related human rights abuses reported among the 9,166 household members. These included abductions (841, 9.3%), beatings (618, 6.7%), killings (414, 4%), and sexual violence against women (396, 8%) and men (6, 0.1%). Three hundred and sixteen (3%) were "captured" for less than 24 hours, 151 (2%) were tortured, 114 (1%) were forced into labor, 128 (1%) reported gunshot wounds, 85 (0.9%) had serious injuries, and 21 (0.2%) reported amputations. Burning of homes and/or looting of property also was commonly reported among household members (1,836, 20%).

Regarding sexual violence, 9% (94) of the 991 respondents reported one or more war-related sexual violence experiences. Study participants also reported war-related sexual violence among 396 (8%) female and 6 (.1%) male household members. The prevalence of war-related sexual violence among female household members may be as high as 11% (554/5001) if 158 women are included who did not report sexual violence per se, but did report abduction with the likely consequences of sexual violence, and who became pregnant, or experienced vaginal bleeding, pain, swelling, uterine pain, vaginal discharge, or sexually transmitted diseases.

For all abuses reported, the RUF was identified most often (1,490, 40%) as the perpetrator (Table 2). Table 3 and Figure 3 represent the 1,157 household members who reported abuses and could name the perpetrator. These household members had 2,266 incidents of abuse since each victim could have one or more abuses listed; however, this does not take into account those who did not know their perpetrators. In this analysis, the RUF was reported as the perpetrator 58% of the time. The most commonly reported consequences of all abuses reported among household members included "depression" or having symptoms of depression 837 (22%), 420 being killed (12%), 455 reported "no consequence" (11%), and 320 had bodily injury (8%). Respondents reported that 36 (9%) female household members became pregnant as a consequence of the attack. Respondents reported that the majority of the abuses among household members occurred in the last three years with most of these occurring between 1997 and1999 (Figure 2).

Characteristics among Respondents Reporting War-related Sexual Violence

Table 4 presents the characteristics of respondents reporting war-related sexual violence. Nine percent (94 of 991) of the respondents reported a

[166] There were a total of 9,166 household members but the gender was not indicated for 182 persons. Since some of these individuals may have experienced sexual assault but were not included in the analysis, it is likely to have led to an underestimate of sexual violence.

8155
4254

FIGURE 2:
Occurance of Sexual Assaults Among Respondents and Other Human Rights Abuses Among Household Members



personal account of sexual violence (Table 4). The mean number of attackers was 3.2. Sixty-eight percent of the incidents reportedly occurred in the last three years, with more than half (54%) in their home villages, and 22% while fleeing. More than half (60%) of the abuses lasted for one week or less. The majority of the incidents of sexual violence (63, 67%) occurred between 1997 and 1999. In addition, 22 (23%) of women reported being pregnant at the time of the attack with an average gestation of three months. Fifty-three percent of respondents and 47% of female household members who were sexually assaulted reported "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces, compared with less than 6% for any other combatant group.

Overall, 79 (84%) of 94 respondents reported the identity of one or more of their perpetrators (Table 5). Of these, the RUF was the perpetrator 60% of the time (Figure 5). Other perpetrators reported included AFRC, West Side Boys unspecified "rebels", and both SLA and ex-SLA. The UN peacekeepers and CDF militia forces were not identified as perpetrators among respondents reporting sexual violence.

Rape was reported by 84 of the 94 women reporting sexual violence and 31 reported being gang raped. Also, approximately one third of the 94 women reported abduction, being stripped of clothing and being forced to undress. Nine women reported forced marriage to combatants, and six women reported pregnancy as a consequence of the attack. Forty-four percent of women felt the incident of sexual violence had "quite a bit" or an "extreme" effect on relationships with family and friends. The

most commonly reported consequences of the attack included bodily injury/physical disability, sexually transmitted disease, and "reproductive complications" including miscarriages.[167]

The majority (91%) of respondents reported being "quite a bit" (161, 16%) or "extremely" (740, 75%) worried about sexual violence to themselves or family members by combatants (Figure 4). Concern about sexual violence by family members, friends, or civilian strangers was lower (39% "quite a bit" or "extremely" worried). In addition, 91 (9%) of respondents reported sexual abuse (occurring at age 15±1.2 years) by family members, friends, or civilian strangers during their lifetime.

FIGURE 3:
Proportion of Reported Human Rights Abuses by Offender



[167] Female Genital Cutting is reportedly widely practiced in Sierra Leone. Women who are raped and who have undergone female genital cutting are likely to be at increased risk for genital trauma and related complications.

8157
4256

TABLE 4:
Characteristics Among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Characteristics	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assaults* n=94
Reporting Sexual Assault, n=991	94 (9)
# of Attackers, mean ± SE (range)	3.2 ± 0.39 (1-25)
Timing of Abuse, n=92	
Within last 3 years	63 (68)
> 3 years ago	23 (25)
Unsure	6 (6)
Where Abuse Occurred, n=91	
Home village/town	49 (54)
While fleeing	20 (22)
While abducted	18 (20)
Non home village	2 (2)
IDP camp/town	1 (1)
Other	1 (1)
How Long Abuse Lasted, n=91	
Less than one week	55 (60)
One week to 1 month	16 (18)
1-6 months	10 (11)
More than 6 months	10 (11)
# Women Pregnant at Time of Assault	22 (23)
Months Pregnant During Assault, mean ± SE (range)	3.1 ± 0.47 (1-7)
Abuse †	
Rape	84 (89)
Being forced to undress/stripped of clothing	35 (37)
Abduction	31 (33)
Gang rape	31 (33)
Molestation	13 (14)
Sexual slavery	14 (15)
Forced marriage	9 (9)
Insertion of foreign object	4 (4)
Consequences of the Abuse †	
Bodily injury/physical disability	48 (51)
Self reported "sexually transmitted disease"	32 (34)
Self reported "reproductive complications/miscarriage"	19 (20)
Stigmatized/rejected by family and/or community	14 (15)
Fear of STD/AIDS	9 (9)
Self reported "pregnancy" after the assault	6 (6)
Other	19 (20)

Effect on relationships with family and friends, n=89	
Not at all	29 (32)
A little	18 (20)
Quite a bit	15 (17)
Extremely	27 (30)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise
† May list more than one

FIGURE 4:
Proportion of Participants Reporting Fear of Sexual Assault



Characteristics of Assistance Needs among Respondents Reporting War-related Sexual Violence

Of the 94 respondents reporting war-related sexual violence, 61 reported the incident(s) to another person (Table 6). Of those who did not report the attack, the most common reasons were "feelings of shame or social stigma" (18, 64%), fear of being stigmatized/rejected (8,28%) and not having trust in anyone (6, 21%). Fifty women reported seeking help after the attack and 40 of these women reported that they informed a health care provider of the specifics of the attack. On average, these women sought help five months after the attack(s) occurred. Hospitals (25, 50%), traditional healers (20, 40%) and health centers (19, 38%) were the most common places where women sought help after the attacks.

TABLE 5:
Reported Sexual Violence of Respondents (n=79) by Offender

Reported Assaults	RUF	"Rebels"	AFRC	West Side Boys	Ex-SLA	SLA	CDF	ECOMOG	UN
All Assaults, 213	129 (61)	21 (10)	18 (8)	19 (9)	12 (6)	10 (5)	0	4 (2)	-
Rape, n=75	48 (64)	10 (13)	5 (7)	4 (5)	4 (5)	3 (4)	0	1 (1)	-
Abduction, n=34	21 (62)	2 (6)	4 (12)	3 (9)	1 (3)	3 (9)	0	0	-
Stripped of clothing, n=39	22 (56)	3 (8)	4 (10)	4 (10)	3 (8)	2 (5)	0	1 (3)	-
Gang Rape, n=30	16 (53)	3 (10)	3 (10)	4 (13)	3 (10)	0	0	1 (3)	-
Molestation, n=14	8 (57)	3 (21)	0	1 (7)	1 (7)	0	0	1 (7)	-
Sexual Slavery, n=12	7 (58)	0	1 (8)	3 (25)	0	1 (8)	0	0	-
Forced marriage, n=9	7 (78)	0	1 (11)	0	0	1 (11)	0	0	-

4258

8160
4259

Women reported what helped most after the attack was trying to forget about the incident (43, 46%), support of family (33, 35%), a health care provider (31, 33%), and country medicine/traditional healer (30, 32%). Figure 6 shows what respondents felt were the most needed assistance that would help their state of mind and ability to cope with the sexual assault experience.

Beliefs about Justice among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Of 88 respondents, 37 (42%) thought those who had committed sexual violence against them should be punished (Table 7). Of the 51 respondents who indicated that their perpetrator should not be punished, the most common reason given was "in the spirit of reconciliation" (35, 68%), followed by fear of reprisal (13, 25%), no confidence in the system for such punishments

FIGURE 5:
Proportion of Sexual Assault Abuses by Offender



8761 4260

TABLE 6:
Characteristics of Assistance Needs Among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Characteristic	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault* n=94
Told Anyone About the Incident	61 (65)
Reasons for Not Telling Anyone About Incident, n=28 †	
Feelings of shame or social stigma	18 (64)
Fear of being stigmatized/rejected	8 (28)
Do not trust anyone	6 (21)
Fear of rejection by my husband/family	5 (18)
No one asked	2 (7)
Fear of physical retaliation by perpetrator	1(3)
Other	6 (21)
Sought Help After Sexual Assault	50 (53)
Sought Help After Sexual Assault # days, mean ± SE (range)	161 ± 50 (1-1460),
Where Help Was Sought After the Sexual Assault, n=50 †	
Hospital	25 (50)
Country medicine/traditional healer	20 (40)
Health center	19 (38)
NGO	3 (6)
Informed Health Care Provider of Specifics of Sexual Assault, n=50	40 (80)
What Has Helped the Most After Assault †	
Trying to forget about it	43 (46)
Support of family	33 (35)
A health care provider	31 (33)
Country medicine/traditional healer	30 (32)
Discussions with family members	18 (19)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise
† May list more than one

(8, 16%), or they wanted to forget about the incident (4, 8%). Of the 94 respondents reporting sexual violence, punishment was supported by 17 (18%) for "all those involved," 30 (32%) for the perpetrators of the attack(s), and 17 (18%) for the commanders. Thirty-four of the respondents reporting sexual violence believed their attacker's commander was aware of the attack. Thirty-three women believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others. Twenty-two of the 94 women reporting sexual violence to PHR were willing to give their names to the proposed Special Court and/or the Truth and Reconciliation

FIGURE 6:
Assistance That Would Help State of Mind and Ability to Cope with Your Experience



Commission. Given the prevalence of war related sexual violence as reported to PHR, PHR believes that there may be thousands of female IDPs in Sierra Leone who have experienced sexual violence and who may be willing to provide testimony to the Special Court or the TRC.

Attitudes of Women's Human Rights and Roles in Society

More than 90% of women agreed that women and girls should have the same access to education as men and boys (Table 8). More than 80% of women agreed that women should be able to express themselves freely, that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, and that women and girls need more education about their reproductive health. However, more than 80% of women also indicated that a good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees. More than 70% of women felt that family problems should only be discussed within the family, that women have the right to control the number and spacing of their children, and that more should be done to protect women and girls from having sex when they do not want to. More than 60% of women expressed the view that a man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys, and that it is a wife's duty/obligation to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to. The same proportion of women (more than 60%) indicated women and girls need more education about their right to refuse sex.

4262
8163

TABLE 7:
Beliefs about Justice among Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault

Belief	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault* n=94
Who Should Be Punished for Sexual Assaults †	
Perpetrators	30 (32)
Commanders	17 (18)
All involved in attacks	17 (18)
Believe Perpetrator Should Be Punished, n=88	
Yes	37 (42)
No	51 (58)
Reasons Why Perpetrators Should Not Be Punished, n=51 †	
In the spirit of reconciliation	35 (69)
Fear of reprisal/revenge	13 (25)
No confidence in a system for such punishments	8 (16)
Respondent just wants to forget about incident	4 (8)
Other	13 (25)
Believe Perpetrators Commander Was Aware of Assault	34 (36)
Believe Punishment of Perpetrators Will Prevent This From Happening to Others	33 (35)
Willing to Give Name to Truth and Reconciliation Commission or the Special Court	22 (23)

* Values are number (percent) † May list more than one

Comments on Survey Findings

The findings of this study indicate that combatants (primarily, members of rebel forces) have committed widespread human rights abuses against civilians in Sierra Leone, including: abductions, beatings, killings, sexual violence against women and men, being "captured" for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries, and amputations. These abuses were experienced on an individual level by a substantial number of participants and their household members. The respondents in this study reported at least one of these abuses had occurred during the past ten years of conflict among 94% of households surveyed (Figure 7). Recent PHR surveys in Chechnya[168] and Kosovo[169] found abuse rates of 19% and 31% respectively among participant households. The burning of homes and/or looting of property was also

[168] Physicians for Human Rights, *Endless Brutality: War Crimes in Chechnya*, PHR, 2001.

[169] Physicians for Human Rights, *War Crimes in Kosovo: A Population Based Assessment of Human Rights Violations Against Kosovar Albanians*, PHR, 1999.

4263
8764

TABLE 8:
Majority Opinions Among Primary Respondents on Women's Rights and Gender Roles in Society

Shared by more than 90% of women
• Women and girls should have the same access to education as men and boys
Shared by more than 80% of women
• Women should be able to express themselves freely
• There should be legal protections for the rights of women
• Women and girls need more education about their reproductive health
• A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees
Shared by more than 70% of women
• Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family
• Women and girls need more education about their rights to refuse sex
• More should be done to protect women and girls from having sex when they don't want to
Shared by more than 60% of women
• A man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys
• It is a wife's duty/obligation to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to
• Women have the right to control the number and spacing of their children

commonly reported among household members. The majority of these abuses experienced by interviewees occurred between 1997 and 1999. Forty percent of these abuses were attributed to RUF forces; however, of those who could identify a perpetrator, 58% of abuses were reported to be due to the RUF. Fifty-three percent of respondents and 47% of all female household members reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence. Sexual violence was reported by less than 6% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact with any other combatant group.

Sexual violence in war has increasingly been recognized as a means of demoralizing individuals, families and communities[170] and is used as a weapon to disable an enemy by dissolving bonds between family and society.[171] Today, in the context of war, rape and other forms of sexual violence have been recognized as instruments of genocide, crimes against humanity,

[170] Swiss, S., Giller, J.E., "Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective," *JAMA*, 1993;270:612-615; Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch: 1996; Herman, J.L., *Trauma and Recovery*, New York, NY: Harper Collins: 1992.

[171] Goldfeld, A.E., Mollica, R.F., Pesavento, B.H. & Farone, S.V., "The Physical and Psychological Sequelae of Torture," *JAMA*. 1988;259:2725-2729.

FIGURE 7:
Proportion of Households Reporting Human Rights Abuse



means of torture, and crimes of war[172] and can be prosecuted as such.[173] They also constitute crimes against humanity "when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."[174]

To generate population estimates of sexual violence among the IDP and non-IDP females in Sierra Leone, the PHR/UNAMSIL team assumed a total IDP population of 1.0-1.3 million (55% female)[175] and a non-IDP population of 2.7-3.0 million (50% female).[176] By extrapolating the number of incidents of war-related sexual violence reported by participants in

[172] Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1 "FOCA." Available at: www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/index.htm.; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 7/17/98). Available at: untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm.; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*, The Hague, M. Nijhoff Publishers, Distributed by Kluwer Law International, 1997; Askin, K., "Women and International Humanitarian Law," in Askin, K.D. & Koenig, D.M. editors, *Women and International Human Rights Law*, Ardsley, NY: Transnational. 1999. Vol. I.

[173] Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*; Askin K. "Women and International Humanitarian Law"

the sample to the total female IDP population, PHR estimates that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 Sierra Leonean IDP women may have suffered such human rights abuses. The prevalence of sexual violence among IDP women and girls, including war-related or non-war-related, in this study was 17%, or an estimated 94,000-122,000 individuals. If non-war-related sexual violence among non-IDP females is added to the IDP totals (assuming a 9% prevalence rate), as many as 215,000-257,000 women and girls in Sierra Leone currently may have been affected by sexual violence.

This study indicates that war-related rape and other forms of sexual violence were committed on a widespread basis among IDPs in Sierra Leone. In fact, the prevalence of war-related sexual violence (8%-9%) was equivalent to the lifetime prevalence of non war-related sexual violence (9%) among the study participants, increasing Sierra Leone's total prevalence rates to 17%.[177] The lifetime prevalence of rape in the United States is 9%, though the average life span of an American is more than twice that of a Sierra Leonean.[178]

Rates of sexual violence vary based on research methodology and populations surveyed. Studies of sexual violence in Sierra Leone that include non-probability samples[179] or select populations such as clinic patients[180] generally report higher prevalence rates of sexual violence but cannot be generalized to broader populations. The prevalence of war-related sexual violence in this study was less than that reported in Liberia (15%),[181] but

---

[174] Rome Statute; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*; Askin, K., "Women and International Humanitarian Law"; United Nations, Draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915.

[175] United Nations Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), UNOCHA Database: IDP Census (data collected February 2001), UNOCHA, February, 2001.

[176] Norwegian Refugee Council, Sierra Leone Section: Population profile and figures, Available at: www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/1c963eb504904cde41256782007493b8/fdc6d215bab90118c12569dd002b1aec?OpenDocument; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, available at: unhcr.ch/un & ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf.

[177] One percent of participants had experienced both war-related and non-war-related sexual violence.

[178] Crime Victim Research and Treatment Center, *Rape in America*, Charleston, SC: Medical University of South Carolina: 1992.

[179] Coker, A.L., & Richter, D.L., "Violence against Women in Sierra Leone: Frequency and Correlates of Intimate Partner Violence and Forced Sexual Intercourse, *African Journal of Reproductive Health*, 1998; 2(1):61-72.; Giller, J.E., Bracken, P.J., Kabaganda, S., "Uganda: War, Women, and Rape," *Lancet*, 1991;337:604.

[180] Shanks, L., Ford, N., Schull, M. & de Jong, K., "Responding to Rape," *Lancet*, 2001;357:9252; Human Rights Watch, "Women's Rights Project" in: *Human Rights Watch World Report 1998*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch: 1998.

exceeded that found in other population-based assessments of refugees and displaced persons (0-0.1%),[182] including a prior study conducted in Freetown, Sierra Leone (2%).[183]

Physical injuries and self-reported "depression" were among the most common consequences reported following sexual violence. The adverse physical and psychological consequences of sexual violence are described in other studies.[184] The prevalence of sexual violence, including war-related or non-war-related, suggests a serious health burden for individual and community members that cannot be addressed adequately by services that currently exist in Sierra Leone. The assistance needs most commonly identified by women reporting sexual violence included humanitarian assistance, including food and shelter, medical care, income generating projects, and women's support groups. These needs were not significantly different ($p<0.05$) from Sierra Leonean women who did not experience sexual violence but did experience other human rights abuses.

The majority of participants reporting sexual violence indicated the belief that their perpetrators should not be punished and, among these women, the most common reasons cited were "in the spirit of reconciliation" and "fear of reprisal/revenge." This highlights the need to protect survivors of war-related sexual violence including those that come forward to testify. Twenty-three percent of these women indicated an interest in giving their names for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court that are expected to be established in 2002. This may be explained by feelings of shame, and/or fear of being stigmatized or rejected also reported in the study, as well as a desire to put the incident(s) behind them. Such concerns are not unfounded in societies where women are financially dependent on their husbands or extended family and are subjected to structural social inequality on many levels.[185] Being cast out of a community or family can have dire consequences not only for the woman but her children as well.[186]

---

[181] Swiss, S., Jennings, P., Aryee, G., et. al. "Violence against Women during the Liberian Civil Conflict," *JAMA,* 1998; 279:625-629.

[182] PHR, "A Population-based Assessment of Human Rights Abuses against Ethnic Albanian Refugees from Kosovo," *American Journal of Public Health*, 2001;91(12); Physicians for Human Rights, *Endless Brutality: War Crimes in Chechnya,* Physicians for Human Rights, May 2001:1-143; Physicians for Human Rights, *Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan: A Population-Based Study,* Physicians for Human Rights, May, 2001.

[183] de Jong, K., Mulham, M. & van der Kam, S., *Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone: Psychological Questionnaire: Freetown Survey Outcomes*, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières, January 11, 2000. Available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2000/sierraleone_01-2000.shtml

[184] Resnick, H.S., Acierno, R., Kilpatrick, D.G., "Health Impact of Interpersonal Violence, 2: Medical and Mental Health Outcomes," *Behavioral Medicine,* 1997;23:65-78; Schafran, L.H., "Topics for Our Times: Rape is a Major Public Health Issue, "*American Journal of Public Health,* 1996;86(1):15-17.

4267
8168

Despite 80% of women expressing that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, more than half of women reported that their husbands had the right to beat them and that it was a wife's duty to have sex with her husband even if she did not want to. The apparent disparity between such beliefs and international principles of human rights suggests a need for public discourse and education on local, regional and international levels.

Limitations

It is likely that the prevalence of war-related sexual violence in the study was underestimated because of willful non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts to ensure privacy. Reasons for willful non-disclosure often include fear of retribution by an assailant, of being stigmatized and rejected, blamed for the attack, and/or the psychological consequences of disclosure.[187] In addition, the average age of participants (female heads of households) reporting war-related sexual violence (34 ± 0.48 years) was more than twice the average age of females experiencing non war-related sexual violence reported in the study (15±1.2 years). Although interviewers were careful to explain there would be no material or other gain by participating in the survey, the number of abuses reported in the study may have been over or underestimated if IDPs judged that it was in their material, political or psychological interest to exaggerate or conceal claims of abuse.

[185] Ulin, P., "African Women and AIDS: Negotiating Behavioral Change," *Soc Sci Med.* 1992;34(1):63-74; Bruyn, M., "Women and AIDS in Developing Countries," *Soc Sci Med.* 1992;34(3):249-262.

[186] Ibid.

[187] Koss, M.P., "Detecting the Scope of Rape: A Review of Prevalence Research Methods," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence,* 1993;8:198-222.

4268
8769

4269
8/20

IV. QUALITATIVE COMMENTS AND TESTIMONIES OF SIERRA LEONEAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

In order to gain insight into individual experiences of human rights abuses of Sierra Leonean women and their families, the PHR study included qualitative assessments of abuses as well.[188]

Two primary approaches were used to elicit qualitative information. Seven open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire itself, and longer semi-structured interviews were conducted with survivors of human rights abuses that were not survey participants. Throughout this chapter, wherever possible, the exact words of the women and girls interviewed have been used in order to give expression to their individual experiences. All participants were informed of the purpose of the interview and of how the data would be collected and used. In the interest of confidentiality, their names have been changed and identifying information removed.

Case Examples from In-Depth Interviews

Case testimony of survivors of war-related human rights abuses was collected during two separate investigations to Sierra Leone. A PHR delegation visited Sierra Leone in March, 2000 to assess the medical consequences of human rights abuses committed during the war, including sexual violence. During that trip, members of the team with specialized training in sexual violence interviewed more than two dozen survivors of abuses. To mitigate the risk of re-traumatization, most of the testimony gathered during the 2000 investigation was taken from individuals who were already participating in programs for rape survivors. The interviews were semi-structured and covered a range of topics including basic biographical information, the circumstances of violations, details about perpetrators, medical and psychological consequences of the abuses, what types of services had been available and helpful to them, and what their concerns were for the future. The interviews took place at NGO offices,

[188] Quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiries each may have value independent of the other when the research questions address meaningful human rights issues and the studies are designed and interpreted within relevant historical and political context. Using both quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiry also may be complementary serve as one line of inquiry may serve to corroborate, or challenge, another.

UNICEF's headquarters in Freetown, health clinics, IDP camps, and programs for women who had become pregnant as a result of rape.

Testimony was also collected at the time the survey was conducted in February, 2001. Researchers administering the questionnaire were asked to identify women who had experienced human rights abuses who were willing to describe their experiences in more detail. These women then recorded their stories on audio and videotape in a private room in the health clinic on the outskirts of the camp. Most interviews were conducted in the first language of the victim and translated simultaneously by the researcher who first interviewed the woman or a translator, or they were translated at a later date from a tape recording.

A number of testimonies taken by PHR in March 2000 were from survivors of rape who had become pregnant by their attackers. These young women are particularly vulnerable as they must not only recover from the trauma of their ordeals while often facing stigma from their communities, but at the same time must learn to care for and support a baby with few resources. As part of a larger effort to assist rape victims in Freetown after the January 1999 incursion by rebel forces, a local NGO, the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), established a program providing medical, psychological and educational support to these women and their children. A number of the young women participating in the program acknowledged to PHR the importance of the program in helping them to cope with what had happened to them.

Cases of Sexual Violence

Bola N.

In February 2001, Physicians for Human Rights interviewed a fifteen year-old girl, Bola N. Rebels had abducted her four times since 1999. At the time of the interview she told PHR she was two months pregnant and living at an IDP camp in Port Loko. She described her first abduction to the interviewer:

> *When they first attacked the village, we fled to the bushes. When they removed us from our village we were frightened ... they held us, they cut some hands, they killed some, they forced us to be tied, we were taken to the bush where the sexual act was forced on us. ... Nine men raped me. ... My mother was taken away, my things, belongings, taken. I slept three days in the bush after they had raped me. I was unconscious, not myself. ... After they had raped me to their satisfaction, they left me in the bush. I was beaten, bruises on my body, part of my body. Some around were amputated. I was not well.*[189]

[189] PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

4271
8172

As she described her multiple abductions, she wrapped her arms around herself and lowered her tone to almost a whisper:

> *My first captivity was when the nine men raped me. Then I was left in the bush. Second time I was held a little over a month, taken to base. There are many, many combatants there. There are also many other young women held there, too. I was not assigned to just one man, as long as you are good looking, you have intercourse with all of them. In the third captivity they remembered me. They knew me. They use abusive language. I escape during the night. The fourth time was last year: they did an ambush [on an outing of women from the IDP camp]. They came for us, raped us, they asked us to go back to the village to prepare food for them, so we had to escape. We were afraid to go to the village. So we escaped.*[190]

Over the course of her multiple abductions and gang rapes, she had two miscarriages. She had been engaged to one man at the time of the first gang rape, but he left her when he heard of the event:

> *I was just engaged to someone. So when I went to the bush, I was pregnant. Because of the nine men who raped me, I had to abort. So my husband had to resign from continuing the engagement. The husband I have now is a new person.*[191]

She said that this new husband did not know what had happened to her in the bush. She told PHR that she had not gone to a doctor for prenatal care because she did not want anyone to know she was pregnant, although she stated that she would go to the doctor once the pregnancy was visible. She had not gone to the hospital for the miscarriages because they asked for 1,000 Leones (approximately 30 cents) simply to register. The cost for medical care had further prevented her from seeking help for the multiple health problems she had experienced since the abductions.

She stated that she was not able to sleep through the night. Every night she wakes up and cries. Her family had been killed. Her first fiancé had left her. She was afraid to tell anyone about the violence she had experienced. When asked if she had told anyone of these events before PHR interviewed her, she acknowledged that she had told her friend who had taken her to the hospital after the first attack, but no one else. No one in her family knew what had happened to her.

Sampa K.

Another woman, Sampa K., had 11 children under her care when the rebels attacked. She told PHR that they abducted her for two years, sepa-

---

[190] PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

[191] PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

rating her from all but one of the children. Some were killed, others were scattered. Sampa described the initial attack:

> *I woke up in the morning about two o' clock and cleaned my house. ... As soon as I lifted a load I was trying to carry, my daughters said, "Mama! The rebels are coming!" I dropped everything. I am ready to flee to the bush with the baby on the back. Then there are so many, I cannot escape. They hit me, they took the baby from my back and threw the baby, the baby is too tired. Then he started to do the act on me - there are many of them.*[192]

During her subsequent servitude to the rebels, she tried in vain to save her infant child:

> *I was now crying with my baby, the baby was crying, I tried to let the baby suck the breast milk. And it was not completely five days, [when] I lost the baby. The baby was having trouble. Everyday I had to sleep with the boys. Every day I sleep with the boys and I cannot refuse - guns all over, they threaten me with guns. Guns all over. And then one says give the breast to the child. And every time I gave the breast to the child, he refused me. And so for three days I did not feed the child.*[193]

She traveled for two years, living as the "wife" of one particular rebel. He kept her compliant by feeding her drugs:

> *Every day this man would give me some tablets to take, some are green, some are blue, some are red. I was using the tablets so that I wouldn't get any problem with the man. The man used to tell me to take this tablet it is good for you.*[194]

Throughout the interview, Sampa kept a blank look on her face, giving the facts of her abduction and sexual enslavement in a straightforward manner. It was not until she was asked what might help her that her demeanor shifted. In response to this question, she described a nightmare she had recently had, in which she was again chased by the rebels. They brandished knives that filled her with fear. They chased her, intending to kill her once they caught her, up to a bridge. The dream ended with her standing on the edge of the bridge, prepared to jump to her death rather than be caught again.

Aminata K.

Twenty-year-old Aminata K. wanted to tell her story, but did not want to be recorded. She was eight months pregnant at the time of the interview. Aminata was captured by the a breakaway faction of the AFRC, the West

---

[192] PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

[193] PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

[194] PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

Side Boys, in Mafore village in the Port Loko area in 1999 and held for almost two years. According to Aminata K., they killed one young man, left some old women and took Aminata, along with one young boy and two other women, to their base. She said she was forced to leave behind her eight-month-old baby. She told PHR that she was held at the base for a year and a month and forced to marry a young member of the West Side Boys called James. Initially she was closely watched and then was forced to go with others to villages to loot, a practice the rebels refer to as "jaja". She saw them burn many houses. The leader was referred to as 'Pape' or 'Sammy'. She said that she escaped by telling the rebels that she was going to wash her clothes and then ran away to her home village where she found her family seeking food. Aminata told PHR that she is pregnant as a result of being raped and now reports feeling depressed and hopeless. Before she was abducted, she was married and had three children. One of her children died, but two are living. Her parents took care of the baby. Since returning from her captivity, her husband left her and they have divorced. She said that after she returned he kept saying, "this is not my child – you are pregnant with child – this is not my child," and after a few months he left her. She wanted to abort using herbs, but her family asked her not to as it might kill her and offered to help raise the new child. She said she is worried, however, because she has no husband or means and is completely dependent. They are currently living in the IDP camp, but they go back to their village from time to time to see if they can rebuild their house – but she does not see much hope for the future.[195]

Kadiatu S.

Kadiatu S. was 16 years old at the time of the PHR interview. She was abducted when she was fourteen years old. She had no formal education, but worked for her mother, a businesswoman in Kono. "The rebels attacked the town and we ran. I was separated from my parents and for nine days I walked in the bush with five other girls to the next town. We were grabbed by rebels. They used me and threatened to kill me with a gun." A commander stopped them from killing her and took her back to the base. ECOMOG attacked the base. An ECOMOG soldier took her for his wife. She traveled with ECOMOG and stayed in Kailahun for approximately one year. She hitched a ride from a car full of rebels. "If you are a willing rebel wife you can get a ride in the rebel cars into town to shop." She told them she was going to visit family in Makeni. They assumed she was a rebel and would return. Kabiatu managed to find her way to Freetown, where she contacted her aunt. She was taken to her uncle, a doctor, and diagnosed six months pregnant. She was devastated. Kabiatu states that she does not cry, though she is

[195] PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

8/25 4274

very sad and angry about the pregnancy. Her mother came to Freetown to collect her.[196]

Hawa

Seventeen year-old Hawa told PHR that she delivered a stillborn baby girl in the bush after carrying her unwanted child for eight months.

> *The rebels burned my father's house and my mother jumped out the window. The rebels shot her in the chest and killed her. My father is too depressed to work. He lives in the house and is making the repairs. The rebels took me to the bush and kept me for six months. I was made a real wife.*[197]

She showed the interviewer the scars on her right thigh – "RUF." She said they had traveled a route from Freetown to Collage, then to Occra Hills and to Makeni. She reported that the rebels starved her for 2-3 days, drugged her with cocaine and infected her with a sexually transmitted disease. She told PHR that ECOMOG came into the bush and rescued her and delivered her to Waterloo camp.

Katmara B.

Katmara B., a 13-year-old girl told PHR she was abducted, beaten, raped and forced to become a rebel's "wife." She said she was released during the latter stages of her pregnancy and now has a baby girl. The story of what happened to her and her family during the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 captures the anarchy of those days which left the capital city and its people profoundly fearful:

> *...that night, houses were being burned down in our neighborhood, so we ran to the local mosque for sanctuary. There were so many people hiding in there. We tried to run away. They began to shoot and killed some people in the mosque. They forced us to sit down on the side and went into the mosque and killed about 15 people in there. I saw them do it. Then they called us to come and look at the bodies. My cousin's father and my aunt were shot. An uncle's hand was hacked off. My mother was inside the mosque, when she saw me, she called out to me, one of them heard her and said "If you call her, we'll kill you." So she didn't call me again. Then they took us outside and told us to change our clothes and gave us combat clothes to wear. We were told that we had to do anything they told us to do. We were told that when they addressed us, we were to respond with "Yes sir". At that point we were given guns and cutlasses, and told that we were to go and cut hands off. On our way to wherever they were taking us, we met up another group*

[196] PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

[197] PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

8796 4275

called "Born Naked". The people in this group roamed the streets naked, the way they were born, and when they met people, they killed them. When the members of "Born Naked" saw us, they told the others that they should kill us since they had been warned not to take any more hostages.

So, on our way to be killed, we were taken to a house with about 200 people held in it. My older cousin was sent to go and select 25 men and 25 women to have their hands chopped off. Then she was told to cut off the first man's hand. She refused to do it saying that she was afraid, I was then told to do it. I said I'd never done such a thing before and that I was also afraid. We were told to sit on the side and watch. So we sat. They chopped off two men's hands. My cousin couldn't watch and bowed her head down to avoid the sight. Because she did that, they shot her in the foot. They bandaged her foot and then forced her to walk. We left the two men whose hands had been cut off behind. We were then taken to a mosque in Kissy. They killed everyone in there...They were snatching babies and infants from their mother's arms and tossing them in the air. The babies would free fall to their deaths. At other times they would also chop them from the back of their heads to kill them, you know, like you do when you slaughter chickens...One girl with us tried to escape. They made her take off her slippers and give them to me and then killed her...one time we came across two pregnant women. They tied the women down with their legs eagle-spread and took a sharpened stick and jabbed them inside their wombs until the babies came out on the sticks...[198]

Isata

Isata, a 15-year-old Mandingo girl, was abducted and gang raped by rebels. She described her experiences and their continuing effects on her health:

...I don't have any children. I was a virgin before. They ruined me. The story is long, much too long. I was at home when they came and kidnapped me...They demanded money. My family has no money. They demanded Le 200,000.00 ($83.00)...they said to my parents, come and see how we use your children. They undressed five of us, laid us down, used us in front of my family and took us away with them. They wouldn't release us, they kept us with them in the bush.....When I escaped, I couldn't walk – the pain. I was bleeding from my vagina. That night, God gave me strength to walk...I can't remember how long I was held...I don't like to talk because of the memories. When I made it back,

[198] PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

8177 4276

my mother couldn't believe it. Since I got back I have been so sick...I never used to get sick like this...I would like to go back to school, but I can't concentrate anymore, I can't do anything...[199]

Binta K.

Binta K., an 18-year-old girl, told PHR she was abducted, beaten, raped and forced to become a rebel's "wife." She was released during the latter stages of her pregnancy and at the time of the interview had a two-month old baby girl. She recounted to PHR:

> *...As the rebels were pulling out of Freetown, they came to our house and captured us. They even killed some of the other girls in our house. I was hiding with some girls when they found us. We were told that if we didn't come with them, they'd kill us. While I was begging them not to take me, a little boy, about ten years old who was with them piped up "If she doesn't want to come, pass her over to me and I'll chop her hands." I agreed to go. I was raped and held there in the bush. I wanted to run away, to escape, but there was no way. If you were caught trying to escape, you were killed or put in a box...*[200]

Later in that same interview, she expressed her sorrow that many of her family members blame her for not having tried harder to escape. She and her baby were living with a girlfriend at the time of the interview.

Zainab K.

Zainab K. told PHR she was abducted when she was seventeen during the January 1999 incursion into Freetown. She recounted her story in English in measured, unemotional language. She had attended school through second form (12-14 years).

Zainab was taken from her home in Wellington by RUF and ex-SLA combatants and then taken to Calaba Town with two neighbors the same age. She said that she was raped by two older men who were very brutal. She was a virgin. They beat her and carved "RUF" on her chest with a knife. She said that she remained in Calaba Town for three days and then walked 20 miles to Waterloo carrying cartons of water. She had to forage for food and ate Cassava plants by the roadside. She stayed in Waterloo for one week and then walked for three days to Masiaka. There, she recounted, the CDF attacked. About 100 girls escaped, leaving 50 with the rebels. From then on, she said, soldiers guarded them and told them they would shoot them if they tried to escape.

They then walked for two weeks to Makeni. She told PHR that she knew she was pregnant because she had morning sickness. She stayed with

---

[199] PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

[200] PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone



The PHR/UNAMSIL team randomly sampled 1,048 households in three internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps (near Freetown, Port Loko, and Kenema) and one community with a large number of IDPs—Mile 91 Township. The camps/locales represented 91% of the registered IDP population.



A total of 991 female heads of households participated in the PHR study (response rate = 95%). Nine percent of respondents reported war-related sexual violence. A striking 53% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence. One third of the women who reported sexual assault reported being gang raped.

8179 4278



Kristina Have Lyons

A striking 94% of 991 households interviewed by PHR/UNAMSIL reported among its members at least one of the following serious abuses during the past ten years of conflict: abductions, beatings, killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, capturing for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries, and amputations. These children were among the many Sierra Leonean children that had their limbs amputated by rebel forces.

8/80
4279



The majority of the women interviewed by PHR/UNAMSIL perceived their general health (89%) and mental health (94%) as "fair" or "poor".



PHR program associate Kristina Hare Lyons (left) interviews a Sierra Leonean woman in March 2000.

8181
4280



Chen Reis

PHR consultants Beth Vann (left) and Yinka Akinsulure-Smith led training sessions for local Sierra Leonean researchers who later conducted the survey.

4281



Chen Reis

PHR/UNAMSIL survey researchers prepare to conduct interviews at an IDP camp.



Kristina Hare Lyons

The Forum for African Women's Educationalists (FAWE) is a pan-African NGO that has been successful in promoting education for girls. FAWE expanded their mandate to respond to the needs of rape victims after the January 1999 incursion by rebels into Freetown and became the primary organization providing medical and counseling services to rape survivors.

8183
4282



Kristina Hare Lyons

The US government and other donors should ensure that women are included in all aspects of planning for peace, demobilization, reintegration and rebuilding and support local organizations working to promote women's full participation and rights.

8784 4283



Kristina Hare Lyons

Sierra Leone's rich diamond resources have largely been fueling the brutal war. Diamonds, discovered in Sierra Leone in 1930, are found in about a third of the country's territory—mostly in the east and southeast. Governments, activists and representatives of the diamonds industry are working to regulate the import and export of the gems.



Cheri Reis

In 2001, Sierra Leone was the least developed country in the world, according to the United Nations Human Development Index. Sierra Leoneans average life expectancy of 38.3 years is the lowest in the world and the under five mortality rate is the highest in the world. Nearly one third of children in Sierra Leone die before their fifth birthday. Twelve percent of children under 14 years of age, such as the orphans pictured here, have one or both parents dead.

8/85 4284



Kristina Hare Lyons

Destroyed buildings in Freetown, such as the one pictured, are still occupied. Sierra Leone's infrastructure has been devastated by the war. Thirty-six percent of Sierra Leoneans do not have access to health care. Thirty-four percent do not have access to clean water. The average per capita income is $448. More than 3,000 communities were destroyed resulting in flight from homes of nearly half the country's population.

8186 4285

one man, Mohammed, who was ex-SLA. She said that she begged him to release her but he said she should stay until she had the baby, so she could leave the child with the rebels. She told PHR that if she refused to have sex he would beat her – though he stopped beating her when she was four months pregnant. No other men touched her after that. Mohammed's boss took care of her and gave her food. From Makeni she was brought to a base in Occra Hills.

One day when she was about six months pregnant she said that she was sent to do laundry by the stream. She left the clothes and took a bush path with another girl. They came to an area where soldiers had surrendered and found transportation back to Freetown. She said that she found her mother who was pleased to see her, but her aunt said her mother should not take her in. She said that her mother, however, insisted and her father has also been supportive. She was scared to go home, but since she went to FAWE and got counseling she feels much better. She came to FAWE two weeks after arriving back in Freetown. A neighbor in Wellington had told her and her mother about the program and brought her to the office. At first she could not sleep and would always wake up at night, but now after the FAWE counseling sessions she is able to relax.

Her baby, Fatmata, was four months old at the time of the interview. Zainab had no problems with the delivery and likes being a mother. She knew she wanted to keep the baby when she was pregnant. She said she is scared Mohammed will come for the baby. Though she does not think he should be punished, she never wants to see him again and wants to try to forget about him. She also has anxieties about what will happen when the program ends. At the time of the interview she was not interested in getting married in the future, but in gaining skills so she can support her child.[201]

Other Human Rights Abuses

The PHR study revealed the severity of human rights abuses in addition to sexual violence experienced by IDPs at the hands of combatants. Ninety-four percent of households interviewed by the PHR/UNAMSIL team were affected by one or more serious physical abuses. The trauma experiences by those who suffered sexual violence must, therefore, be understood in the context of trauma suffered from a range of abuses committed against the individual, her family and community. In addition to the reported levels of trauma and physical abuse experienced, many of those PHR interviewed spoke of loss. This loss went beyond the loss of basic human needs such as housing, food and medical care. It concerned safety, trust, control, self-esteem, and intimacy. Participants interviewed expressed shock, anger, horror, sadness, and a sense of countless additional losses – loss of property, society, family, loved ones, health and a sense of well being. In a society

[201] PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

8187 4286

where the extended family plays an integral function, this primary means of support was irrevocably damaged. Several women who had not suffered sexual violence spoke of the range of abuses they and their families had experienced and the multiple losses they faced. A young woman, Marie K., described to PHR her and her family's experience:

> *...They killed many of us, many people...about 100, we were in an unfinished house when they came and kicked at the doors and demanded to know who was in there. They yelled that if we didn't come out they would kill us or burn the house down. Someone near the door opened it. The rest of us were hiding in a room, huddled together. They came in and began to hit us with their weapons yelling "get out, if you don't come out we will kill you." Those who refused to come out, they lit the house up and burned it with them inside the house...*[202]

Aminata B.

Aminata B., a 21 year-old Limba woman who was 12 years old when the war started, told of the destruction of her family's farm by rebels

> *...I grew up with my parents in the Kenema area – Bahamaconta. When the war came, we had to run away, everything we had was burned down or taken away. My father was killed and we couldn't even bury him, we had to just leave him behind...we don't know whether he was ever buried. My mother, sisters and I fled to Makeni. When we lived in Bahamaconta I used to go to school, but when we fled to Makeni, my mother could no longer afford to send my sisters and me to school. We tried to sell water (put in small plastic bags for drinking purposes) to make money to survive...* [203]

Musu

Musu was abducted when she was 12 years old and at the time she was interviewed by PHR in March 2000 she had twin nine-month-old boys. She told PHR her story:

> *I had gotten up and bathed and was getting ready to go to school when the rebels came. I heard shooting and hid under my bed. They searched my house. They shouted, they'd launch an attack on the house and set it on fire if we didn't go with them. I was so frightened I felt I had to use the toilet – the rebels told me I could relieve myself right there in front of them. They took me out of my house and threatened to kill me if I resisted. I saw a neighbor and warned her to run. She was seated and had already surrendered. I surrendered also. We were forced to walk in*

[202] PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

[203] PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

8/88
4287

the bush for one week and three days. My feet swelled with pain until my toenails came off. We traveled from Kambia to Malal Hill in Makeni. We stayed one week then we trained as commandos for one month and three days, after which we were attacked by government troops. They (rebels) moved out in the middle of the night and traveled on foot to Rotifunk where we all stayed for one year and six months. In 1997, I was with the rebels when they attacked Freetown, but I returned with the rebels because I saw no family there. I never killed anyone. I [lied to them and] told them I had surgery on my eyes and could not see to shoot. They believed me because my eyes were always swollen and red [from crying] because of the things I saw. When the rebels returned to Freetown in 1999 I was pregnant. I convinced a lady to allow me to stay with her. I told her no harm would come to her. I stayed in her house until one day I ran into my aunt on the street. I told her my story and she invited me to come stay with her.[204]

Women's Attitudes about Punishment of Perpetrators

A striking finding from both the in-depth interviews and survey was how many women did not want their perpetrator to be punished. The survey revealed that only 42% of those who responded to this question thought their perpetrators should be punished. Because of the destruction of the war, many Sierra Leoneans do not have experience with a functioning judiciary – this may have been a factor in some women's responses. Some of the women indicated to PHR that what they had experienced was so horrific that they did not believe justice to be possible, others feared retaliation by their perpetrators. Most did not seek justice or revenge, but rather peace and reconciliation, a theme that was echoed in the long form testimonies.

Mary J., 16 years old at the time of the interview, explained her reasoning for not wanting to seek punishment for her persecutors:

...My parents died during the war – they were killed by rebels. I was there and saw it. They captured me and took me with them to the bush. I was a virgin. Two men used me, they ruined me. I escaped when we came near Freetown...so many problems since. I became ill, stomach aches...Finally I was taken to the hospital. I wanted to die. In the hospital, they told me they had to do emergency surgery, my people did not have any money...If they catch them and try to do to them what they did to me, it won't even come near the hell I've been through. So they should just leave them. If they try to punish them, the punishment that I have gotten is more than theirs. I wanted to die during that time. If the emergency operation had not been performed, I would have died...If I

[204] PHR Interview March 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

8189 4288

ask for punishment for them, it will never amount to what I went through, so the best thing is just to leave them so that we can have peace in Sierra Leone.[205]

A desire for a return to peace was also expressed by Fatmata, a 21 year-old woman with two children:

I was dragged out of the house, but when they saw me, they said that they wanted a virgin, even then I was told to undress...a gun was put to my head, I was kidnapped and constantly threatened with rape...I just want peace in the country, I want things to go back to the way they were in the old days...[206]

Madina K., a young woman, was one of the women who expressed a desire to bring one of those involved in her attack to justice:

...They'd wanted to burn the house down with me in it...I was beaten, raped, forced to go with them. They told me to do bad things, they threatened me with death and beat me. Two men raped me. The first one would go and call other men to come and join in. Others intervened and saved me...I don't want revenge. I don't even remember who they were. The only one I want punished is the one who kidnapped me. I want him to be punished for his wickedness...[207]

Some victims revealed that their attackers made explicit threats. A 30 year-old woman from the north was raped and beaten by two RUF members in 1997. Her husband was also beaten and their home burned and looted. She told PHR, "They [the attackers] were saying to me after they raped me if I will say it to anyone, they will come and kill me."

In spite of the risks, women did offer to give their names to the Special Court or the TRC. One victim who agreed to testify said enthusiastically: "I am ready to go anywhere in the world to explain myself."

The PHR survey administered in 2001 concluded with a series of six open-ended questions for those respondents who reported war-related sexual violence to provide more details about their experiences and additional information about their health, their future, and other concerns. All participants were also encouraged to provide additional comments at the end of the interview. The experiences and concerns women described in their answers to these questions are briefly described here.

Identity and Affiliation of Attackers

Participants were asked to provide identifying information about their attackers and their affiliation:

---

[205] PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

[206] PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

[207] PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

8190 4289

Do you know anything that could identify your attackers? Did they call each other by name? How do you know which military group your attackers were with?

Many respondents were able to provide first names of their attackers – both real names and *noms de guerre* such as Blood, Pepper, Nasty, Bullet, Cut Hand, Poison, God Father, Rebel Baby, Dry Gin, Rambo and Commando Around the World. While one woman was gang-raped by eight members of the RUF, she only named one perpetrator: "His name is Body Naked and if I see him now I will identify him." Several women offered the full names of their attackers as well as descriptions of them.

The affiliation of perpetrators was understood primarily through verbal communication, "They call their leader's name, Foday Sankoh and their commander Superman;" "They call themselves West Side Boys and they took me to their base and I was with them until I escaped." A twenty-five year-old woman from Port Loko who was captured by the AFRC in 1998 and whose husband was tortured said that the perpetrators referred to themselves as "our junta the AFRC." Two women specifically identified members of the Sierra Leone Army, though it is possible that they were part of the military that turned on the government: "They said they were the Sierra Leone Military Group."

Dress also played a role in linking individuals to a group in the minds of those who were attacked. One woman told PHR, "They were running after us and they were calling Superman, Colonel Issa, and everybody knows that these people were RUF, because they were always at the bush and wore T-shirts with "RUF" printed on them. I was given one to wear by Gold Teeth." A 16-year-old from Port Loko who was gang raped by five attackers and held for months was able to identify her attackers "because they were wearing Tupac [Shakur] T-shirts, so I know they were rebels." The RUF were identified numerous times as wearing red scarves tied around their heads. "They identify each other by names. One called himself Abdullah, another Mohammed and the last Sorie. They all had red cloths on the forehead. The Ex-SLA wore their uniforms and identified themselves as Ex-SLA," recounted a woman who had been abducted and gang raped. Another woman who had a similar experience in which she was jointly attacked by RUF and Ex-SLA claimed: "They had red cloth on their forehead and call their leaders name, which is Poppeh,[208] meaning Foday Sankoh." Another woman told PHR, "They had red headbands and green uniforms on and said they were fighting for Foday Sankoh (and) that they were going to fight until Tejan Kabbah goes away."

Of the 93 survivors of sexual violence interviewed in the PHR survey

[208] The name of Poppeh, apparently a nickname for Foday Sankoh, was mentioned by many women in the questionnaire. While it was spelled differently by the various researchers, it is reasonable to assume that they are all referring to the same name.

8191 4290

who were able to identify the affiliation of their perpetrator(s) in the PHR survey, the RUF was named 63 times, four of which were in complicity with ex-SLA soldiers. The West Side Boys were named 14 times, the AFRC eight times, Liberians two times, and the Sierra Leone military twice, though it is unclear whether their loyalty was with the government at the time of the attacks. Most attackers identified themselves verbally as well as by their dress, but also, in the incidents perpetrated by RUF fighters, by declaring their loyalty to their leader. Several victims concluded the affiliation of their perpetrators because they were "based near by."

While no direct evidence of command responsibility was provided to PHR, several women pointed a finger at rebel leadership. A 30 year-old woman from the North who was abducted, raped and beaten by RUF stated, "I just know that the leader of the fighters is the fault because if he stopped them, they would never do it – because he supported it – that's why."

Many participants were clear about the affiliation of their attackers. It must, however, be understood that many of the rebel factions collaborating and loyalties shifted at various times of the war. As such, in some cases, it may be difficult to determine perpetrator affiliation with certainty.

Relationship between Victim and Perpetrator

The complexity of the relationship between victim and perpetrator that has on occasion developed in the bush must be noted. It has been reported that some women and girls who were abducted chose to remain with their captors. There are a number of possible explanations. The PHR survey revealed that some who became pregnant as a result of rape consider themselves married to their captors and believe they have no choice but to remain with their "husbands." Other possible factors contributing to the reported phenomena of abductees voluntarily remaining with their captors include: identification with the abductor, drug addiction, the more desirable food options reportedly available in the bush, fear that they will be rejected by their families and communities if they go home, and the fact that many abductees, particularly those who were abducted as young girls are now accustomed to their new way of life and surrogate families.[209]

For example, one 16 year-old girl from the Port Loko area with no schooling was raped and abducted by a member of the RUF. She thinks commanders were aware of the attacks and she "can identify her attacker because she knows his name and he forced her to marry him." While she expressed fear of contracting a disease and of future sexual violence by combatants, she does not think her perpetrator should be punished now because he is her legal husband and they have a child together.

[209] PHR conversations Corinne Dufka of Human Rights Watch, January, 2001 and with NGO representatives who were providing services to returned abductees, March 2000.

A 16-year-old from the Eastern area was abducted by the RUF in 1999 with her sister and forced to marry her captor. She also claims the commander was aware of the attack. She does not think her attacker should be punished because of fear of reprisals and in the spirit of reconciliation:

> *In the bush he was called Lt. Papay, ... He said they were Mosquito's group. That he was pure rebel and would marry me and carry me into the bush and live with me there because they are bad people and want to destroy me and even the country.*

What Perpetrators Said During the Attacks

More than half of the women who reported sexual violence answered the question, "What did [your attackers] say to you, or to each other?" About a fourth of these reported that their attackers explicitly claimed to be targeting supporters of Pa (Tejan) Kabba. Of these, many women were directly told to go tell Pa Kabba about what had happened to them: One woman told PHR 'They told me to go complain to Tejan Kabbah after they have burnt my clothes and house, then raped me." Another reported that "they told me if I refuse to lie down they will kill me and after they finished they told me to go and report to Pa Kabba." This was almost identical to what was reported to PHR by another woman: "They told me they are going to kill me if I refuse to follow them and they told me to lie down. They also used all sort of obscene language at me and they told me to go and tell Tejan Kabba." These remarks suggest that the attacks were politically motivated.

Other women reported comments made by their attackers that suggest political motivation. According to one participant, "they asked me, 'whom are you going to vote for?'" Another told PHR "they said they are coming with their boss Foday Sankoh to take over from Pa Kabbah, and that we should support them." A 22 year-old woman who was abducted by the RUF with her husband's other wife quoted her attackers; "We will never release you until we marry you... Because Foday Sankoh is not president, that's why we are doing this to women." Another told PHR "they said they were fighting because the government was corrupt." A 19 year-old woman was raped along with all seven other female members of her household. "They were saying we are not ready for disarmament until they release Foday Sankoh from prison to come to us."

Many also reported to PHR that they were threatened with violence or death by their attackers if they did not cooperate, as evidenced by some of the statements above. A woman from Port Loko whose husband was beaten, whose sons were abducted and are still missing, and who was raped along with her daughter and her husband's other wife reported the

8193
4292

rebels saying to her "that if I don't allow them to rape me they were going to kill me, so I allowed them."

Why Did Respondents Think Combatants Attacked Women?

In response to the question posed by the PHR/UNAMSIL team, "Why do you think combatants did these things – sexually abusing women and girls – during this war?" the majority of women did not reply or stated that they did not know. Many of those who answered gave the question over to God, saying only God knew why the assailants did those things. Among those who ventured an opinion, most maintained that the combatants targeted women because women are weak, they cannot fight back, or run away. Some women stated simply that the men wanted sex. A smaller, but significant, group of respondents indicated that the men committed acts of sexual violence because they did not respect women or their mothers. Other women cited the sense of omnipotence felt by their attackers. As one woman explained, "They are rebels. They could do anything." Another said, "because they wanted young women and they have money and guns."

Several responses suggested the actions of the perpetrators were strategic: "They use women as human shields in their campaign against the government and whenever they have planned attacks women lead in order to be spies." "They know what they did it for – they hold the gun and their motive was to see women and rape them."

Women's Concerns about the Future and about Their Health

The majority of women who responded to the two questions about their biggest worries about the future in general and about their health referred to the financial and personal insecurity they faced as a result of the war. Women expressed fear that the war would not end and that they would experience future attacks and abuse. They spoke of their lack of livelihoods, homes, and husbands to provide for them. As one woman told PHR "Presently my husband is no more. Who will take care of me in the future? They have looted my properties and I do not have anything for now." A number of women expressed fear about how they would provide for themselves or for their children, including offspring from the rapes they experienced. One woman told PHR, "I am homeless, bankrupt, and where can I get help to take care of my unborn child?"

In their responses about overall worries about the future, some respondents linked their fears about their vulnerability as "violated" women without a male partner or family with concern about their health:

> *There will be no better future for me because I am broken. No man will marry me or take me seriously. I don't want to become sick, to get what they call AIDS. People will begin to say a lot about me if they know what happened to me.*

The concern about having contracted a sexually transmitted disease or AIDS was a prominent concern expressed by several participants in response to the question about specific health worries. Women described experiencing diffuse abdominal and pelvic pains and expressed worry that these represented sexually transmitted diseases. Yet, they were afraid of the stigma associated with seeking help for rape-related health problems:

> *I don't want to have AIDS. I am afraid to go to the hospital. I don't want people to know if it is true that I have AIDS. I don't know whether I have AIDS or not.*

Other women expressed a desire for medical treatment, but spoke of their lack of access to medical assistance at the IDP camps. Many of the respondents, both those who had directly suffered sexual trauma and those who had not, spoke in general terms of being physically and mentally sick, but with little hope of receiving necessary medical care.

In addition to the series of open-ended questions asked by PHR of those who survived sexual violence, all participants were given the opportunity to provide additional comments at the end of the interview.

Many respondents expressed a strong desire for an end to the war so they can return home and resume their previous routine including work, food and housing: "I want the government to help with all possible means to put an end to this war. I am fed up being displaced. I want to go back. I want perfect peace so that our children can go back to school and we would no longer have fear."

Many, however, did not know the state of their homes, which they feared or knew had been burned or looted: "When the rebels attacked us at night, I left naked and ran into the bush. They burned and looted everything in our house." In the camps many women have little to do but gather firewood to occupy their time, which some sell to earn money. Some complained of food shortages and lack of access to medicines: " I worry about my daughter because she never discloses anything about her experience when she was abducted. I want the government to help me with money so that I will be able to take her to the hospital for medical check up since she refuses to talk to me. I need clothes for my children and also for myself." Another expressed her desperation:

> *Since four years back they abducted my son – until now I don't know if he's dead or alive. I want to see him. The condition we are living in is deplorable. We are praying and asking for rapid deployment – we want to return. There is nothing to live on unless the mere bulgur. My sides are paining me from laying on the ground – we have no place to sleep.*

A number of women who had lost their husbands in the war stressed the need for education and skills training for women and assistance in sup-

8/95 4294

porting their children: "Now that they have killed my two children and also my husband is dead, how am I going to maintain the other children as we need assistance?"

> *Now I have lost my husband so I do not have a husband. I have no money. I am also an old woman. All that I had was left to the mercy of the rebels because I had to run when they were behind us. As you can see, my feet are swollen, I cannot walk – I cannot do anything. The first thing is that I do not have money – If I had money I would start doing something. All I can say now is that I wish the war would end.*

Women requested loans for business purposes, as well as a need for assistance with school fees so they could send their children back to school: "We are praying that this war ends. We will also like to see rehabilitation take place in our community. We want our homes rebuilt, but most of all education for our children. We know that once they are educated, they in return will help build our nation." Several women not only recognized the importance of education for the long-term success of the country, but specifically noted education for girls:

> *We want education in our land. The saying goes that when you educate a woman, you educate a nation. We want our girl children to go to school, learn skills – and even we parents, if need be. We want loan schemes because some of us were traders, but today the rebels have suffered us.*

Many of the additional comments could be categorized to reveal the most common concerns among IDP women who did not report sexual violence. The prevailing response was a desire for the war to end (168/424): "My heart's desire now is to see that the war ends so that we can go back home. Those who took the guns on us, we want God to take the guns from them so that we can go to our homes in peace." A quarter (108/424) said that they wanted to return home: "Only begin the perpetrators to come out of the bush and lay down their weapons for us to go home – we're homesick." Education for children was also mentioned (30/424) – and education/skills for the participant by (10/424). A thirty-four year-old woman with five young children who had been displaced since January 1999 and is separated from her husband said that she "needs help from any NGO to set up women's groups for the promotion of women's activities to become self-reliant."

Fifty-eight women expressed a need for clothing, food or other household items including pots for cooking, utensils and bedding. Twenty requested financial assistance and 15 medical assistance. Fifteen requested assistance with building and repair.

Of those who reported sexual violence, 79 provided additional comments. The comments they provided were related to the preceding ques-

tions which focused on details about their perpetrator and their concerns about their health and their future. The most common comments among this group also had to do with a desire for an end to the war and for going home. Other concerns cited in descending order of frequency were: health/medical, schooling/training, clothing, shelter, cooking tools, financial support/loans, child care, food, family tracing, justice, and fear of future attacks. "Help me with school fees as I want to be a lawyer in the future. My mother is poor and do not have money. Protect women also."

Many of these women also asked for assistance to simply begin rebuilding their lives, in some cases their pleas reflect an acute helplessness and desperation more evident among those who reported sexual violence. Many have lost their husbands, their homes, their children, their possessions and in some cases their ability to work due to disability and disease. "I am going to let the human rights people help me for medication. I am slowly dying – please help." "Let the government and other NGOs decide on any help for us." "We have suffered greatly during this war – even something to eat and wear we do not have, so please help us." "Provide enough medicines because only panadol (paracetamol[210]) is available. Rebuild our homes, send doctors who are very well with their jobs." "Please UNAMSIL, help us. We are tired of this war. We want to return back. Please UN come help us with this war – help us return to our homes."

Even those who felt less defeated pleaded for help: "I am thanking all those who ask you people to come and interview us about our experiences in the war in Jesus name. I greet them all. I pray God will touch the heart of the human rights people to think of our plight and bring immediate help for us."

[210] Also known as acetaminophen or Tylenol.

8198 4296

CHAPTER 2

VIOLATIONS

2.1 Extra-Judicial Killing

This was rampant from December, 1998 to February, 1999 The main victims were youths accused of rape, robbery and harassment. A considerable number of persons killed in this manner were members of the armed group, especially AFRC Soldiers although some Civilians and RUF Rebel victims suffered in like manner. In certain cases the innocence of the victims were proven after their deaths.

2.2 Torture

People accused of various crimes were tortured before investigations. Thus even after such investigations and they were proved innocent, most suspects would have received punishment in excess of the crimes allegedly committed. Some victims did not survive the ordeals.

2.3 Unlawful Arrest and Detention

The arrest and detention of civilians was carried out by every combatant unhindered. Civilian collaborators used personal vendetta to incite such arrests and detentions in some cases. These were very indiscriminate and occurred on a daily basis.

2.4 Abduction:

The abduction of youths, children and women especially within Makeni by the AFRC/RUF was a common sight during the first three months of occupation.

For instance, on Thursday, 21st January 1999 Two Thousand abducted youths were assembled at the former I.D A. Compound at Agriculture road for final briefing by one Colonel Augustine Gbow before conveyance to various training camps.

Also on the 9th March, 1999 more than three thousand abducted youths rounded up the previous day by one colonel Mende Rambo and his team were also assembled at the premises of the Seventh Day Adventist Mission Primary School for dispatch to training camps.

Also girls and boys were raided from their houses to carry out domestic work for combatants. This plague became the source of agony for both parents and children in the township.

Although abductions were no longer common after the said period random cases outside Makeni continued to be reported and verified.

2.5 Sexual Abuse:

This human rights violation claimed victims from both males and females. A group of sex-starved female RUF combatants at No. 1, Watson Lane constantly raided young men and were forced to go to bed with them, although the victims were sometimes rewarded with financial and other offers.

Their male counterparts on the other hand used brute force to sexually abuse the victims.

There is an infamous case of an RUF combatant who, meeting with a young woman on the way, arrested her and forced the victim to bed in a house belonging to none of the two parties. While he went away, the victim collapsed in tears over her wounded pride before the watching eyes of the stupefied public.

There are also cases of child combatants with two or more wives; all abducted.

2.6 Forced Labour

This violation was as indiscriminate as it was frequent. Combatants seized anybody at any time not only to do domestic work at home, but the able bodied were frequently forced to accompany armed looting teams to steal and serve as human portage for items forcefully seized from their owners. Civilians used for this purpose did not only go without pay, but were equally punished in some cases.

For instance One Hundred and fifty (150) youths from various villages in the Biriwa Chiefdom were rounded up and forced to destroy the Magbonso bridge on the Kamabai-Kabala highway.

Most often, these marauding groups met with resistance, resulting in deaths, including of those forced to join the gangs.

2.7 Conscription:

The Epicurean life-style of combatants, particularly the senior Officers easily revealed their cowardly nature. Youths were therefore constantly rounded up for conscription, especially at the threat of battle at the warfront. It therefore goes without saying that these conscripts were used as human shields.

Equally, the excessive abuse of drugs by youngsters at the time and the economic deprivations suffered by many homes enticed especially girls and young men to the rebel force.

2.8 Extortion:

This violation was committed through the arrest and detention of under-age children in the first instance. A fee of Five Thousand Leones(Le5,000/-) was the standard charge per head for freedom. Also people were forced to provide fees for unhindered

CHAPTER 3

CHILD AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

From the foregone it is clear that children and women have been victims of every violation suffered by the target population in and around Makeni during the specified period.

However, this explanation is not enough for one to appreciate the extent to which the two vulnerable groups fell prey to this social quagmire.

The fundamental truth is that because of their inexperience and physical weakness children have often been easy prey; they have often been trapped where adults escaped.

It is also worthy to note that because of their age(and all other things being equal) they are bound to live longer and hence, unavoidably bear the prolonged disadvantages of whatever violations become their lot: loss of pride, self-esteem, impairment, lack of education/profession and general social degradation etc.

The future of women in this regard cannot be different. One thing that is clearly revealed is that the indignity to which females have been subjected is bound to print a permanent stain on their persons.

Used as sexual incentives and sex objects even the married ones were snatched from their legal husbands to serve as maids to combatants who, under normal circumstances would be condemned as inferior for matrimonial partnership.

In addition to being subdued to this status, assault and insults together with other forms of indignity become a permanent characteristic of their lives. Hardly did one pass by a house hosting a rebel family without witnessing incidents of fighting, hauling of insults etc.

Similarly underage girls were forced into premature marriage with no future. They are abandoned as soon as their so-called superior new 'catches' were won. Most bush wives of combatants were forced out upon arrival in Makeni town, in preference for their town-dwelling counterparts; only for the latter to also suffer same fate afterwards. The vicious circle remained unending with the attendant increasing number of disowned spouses left on the street to face economic strangulation and other ills.

This partly explains the upsurge of prostitution in Makeni with the advent of members of the AFRC and the RUF, and the proliferation of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs)

Thus it is plausible to assert that all articles and protocols guaranteeing the basic human rights of people(The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on The Right of the Child etc) and particularly those of women and children were violated in one form or the other.

Consequently the highlighted plights of the two groups points a brighter light on the image of the totality of violations suffered by the entire community.

CHAPTER 4
SAMPLE CASES

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
		EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLING					
1	Unidentified 29, Mess Road, Makeni	23/12/98		Adult		"	The victim was shot dead by AFRC/RUF forces for being an ECOMOG collaborator. She was suspected of being in love with an ECOMOG Officer.
2	Ballah Janneh 42 Mabanta Road, Makeni	23/12/98	Rice Mill Operator	"	"		The victim was shot in the leg, leading to his death.
3	John Conteh Mayanka Lane Makeni	27/12/98	Diamond Miner	"	"		The victim was shot dead for refusing to surrender his car to AFRC/RUF combatants.
4	Unidentified C/O John Adams Campbell Street Makeni	3/1/99	Unemployed	Youth	"	"	The victim was shot dead for allegedly stealing Palmoil.
5	Anthony Tarawalie	4/1/99	"	"	"		The victim was beaten to death for enlisting in the Civil Defence Force.
6	Fullah Boy	12/1/99	"	"	"		The victim was shot dead for alleged harrassment.
7	Abdulai	12/1/99	"	"	"		Same as above.
8	Unidentified	12/1/99	"	"	"		Same as above.

3983

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
9	Three Youths	13/1/99	Not Available	Youth	"		The victims were tortured and later shot to death at the Military Police Office at Azzolini Highway.
10	Gibril Bangura Campbell Street Makeni	15/1/99	Unemployed	Youth	Male		The victim was shot dead for allegedly stealing.
11	Three Youths	16/1/99	"	"	"		The victims were shot dead for allegedly raping. People could not identify them for fear of repraisals. KWAYOR personnel saw the corpses.
12	Alias Obomi Turn-Table Old Magburåka Road Makeni	19/1/99	"	"	"		The victim was shot dead for allegedly stealing.
13	Unidentified	19/1/99	Tailor	"	"		The victim was shot dead by RUF Combatants because he failed to halt when the latter ordered him to do so. He could only be identified as a tailor.
14	Alusine	19/1/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		An alleged rape victim was reported to have pointed him as one of her absuers. His innocence was proved after he was shot dead at the Makeni Market Square.
15	Ahmed	19/1/99	"	"	"		Same as above.
16	Unidentified Magbonso Village	1/2/99	RUF Combatant	"	"		The victim was shot dead for allegedly raping one Yariba Conteh.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
17	Fatmata Makama Village	2/2/99	Unemployed	Youth		"	The victim was shot dead for rejecting the love proposal of an RUF combatant.
18	Brima Sesay Katombo Village Biriwa Chiefdom	2/2/99	Farmer	Adult	"		The victim was shot to death by combatants in vegeance for the death of a combatant who was earlier killed for attempting to seize properties from the villagers.
19	Tunkuh Mansaray Katombo Village Biriwa Chiefdom	2/2/99	"	Adult	"		Same as above (18)
20	Kendeka Mansaray Katombo Village Biriwa Chiefdom	"	"	"	"		Same as above (18)
21	Mr Bona and 7 others	5/2/99	Civil Servant	"	"		The eight victims were arrested, detained and shot to death for various allegations ranging from fraud, harrassment to rape. The cases were not properly investigated. Two of the eight were under forceful conscription.
22	John Sesay	5/2/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victim was arrested for forceful conscription. When he refused, he was beaten until two of his ribs fractured which led to his death on 5-2-99.
23	Mani Kabba 6 Lunsar Road Makeni	3/3/99	"	Child		"	The victim was shot dead by an RUF Colonel (Banya) who later pleaded with the bereaved family with the claim that it was an unintentional act.

3985

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
24	John C/o Yansama 19 Conteh Street Makeni	3/3/99	"	Adult	Male		The victim was shot dead by armed combatants when the deceased asked for the repayment of his debt.
25	Paul Turay Makama Road Makeni	17/4/99	"	"	"		The victim was shot dead by armed combatants because military wearings were found at his place of residence.
26	Saidu Conteh 8A Back of Ropolon Lane, Makeni	17/4/99	Watchman Makama Institute	"	"		The victim was killed by an armed man because the victim could not offer the sum of Fifteen Thousand Leones (Le15,000.00) which the latter requested.
27	Brima Kamara Alias Nico	25/5/99	Head of Civil Defence	"	"		The victim was shot by the AFRC/RUF highcommand for his role in the Civil Defence Force.
28	Sheriff Koroma 14 Yaide Street Makeni.	31/5/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victim was accused of witchcraft, butchered to death; and pieces of his body displayed to the public at Yaide Street.
		TORTURE					
29	Sahr M Sandi 6A Agriculture Raod Makeni	21/1/99	Development Worker and Journalist	Adult	'		The victim was arrested detained for one month and tortured on allegation of possessing a communication machine. He was released when the allegation proved false.
30	Ali Kargbo Masingbi	26/1/99	Unemployed	Child	"		Arrested, detained and tortured for serving as carrier to a combatant who forcefully abducted him.

3986

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
31	Mr Sidi Bangura 3A Mabanta Road Makeni Alias Nico	5/2/99	Development Worker (CARE)	Youth	"		The victim was arrested detained and torturedfor allegedly possessing a communication set.He was released when proved innocent.
33	Sahr T. Gbeinda Sylvanus Street Makeni	6/2/99	Wireless Operator (CARE)	"	"		Same as above (30)
34	Alpha C/O P.C. Kassanga II Upper Banana Street Makeni	1/3/99	Driver	Adult	"		The victim was tied and assulted to force himto point the location of a vehicle
35	John Fofanah Water Works Area Makeni	11/2/99	Employee of SIERRATEL Mmakeni	"	"		The victim was arrested detained and assaulted for possessing wireless communication machine which allegation was later proved false - leading to his release.
36	Sahr Yongai Makeni	17/4/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victim was tatooed with razor blade on his back with the inscriptions: 'SLA/RUF" by rebel personnel
37	Joseph S. Tholley Makeni Teacher's College, Makeni	17/4/99	Lecturer Makeni Teachers College	Adult	"		Same as above (36)
38	Mrs Mmabinty Sankoh Tendalta Village	17/5/99	Housewife/ Farmer	"		"	The victim was tied and assaulted for planting rice which her assailants condemned as waste of food. She had to point the location of rice belonging to a neighbour in the same Tendalta Village to ensure the release of her mother.

3987

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
39	Pa Kassun Katombo Village	30/6/99	Farmer	"	"		The victim was arrested, and beaten on account of the Katombo incident in case No (18)
40	Mammy Pitt Katombo Village	30/6/99	Housewife	"		"	Same as case No. 39
41	Mr Kanu Batmorie Magburaka	29/6/99	Head Teacher R C Primary Sch Magburaka	"	"		The victim was arrested, detained and tied and assaulted to force him to show the location of a wireless set.
42	Henry Magburaka	29/6/99	Catechist	Youth	"		Same as above (41).
43	Pa Yamba Forna 77, Old Magburaka Road, Makeni	UNLAWFUL ARREST AND DETENSION 21/1/99	Farmer	Adult	"		The victim was arrested, detained for allegedly holding clandestine SLPP meetings at home. He was later released because the allegation was false.
44	Christiana Forna (Nee Baby) 77 Old Magburaka Road	21/1/99	MCH Aid	"		"	The victim was arrested and detained for one month when she enquired about the arrest of her father Pa Yamba Forna above in case No (43)
45	Yei Hawa Sandi	22/1/99	Unemployed	Five months		"	This baby victim was detained with her mother. While in detention RUF Colonel Alpha vowed to force the mother to shoot her baby before he (Colonel Alpha) shoots the mother dead.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
46	Mrs. Mayonette Porter (Nee Aminata Clement 28 Masuba Road Makeni	2/2/99	Housewife	Adult		Female	The victim was arrested, put in car boot anddriven to the Makeni Police Prison she was detained for one month. She was accused of forging documents relating to a consignment of assorted chemical fertilizers. But the victim claimed that the issue had to do with her rejection of a love proposal from one RUF Colonel Titus Tarawallie.
47	Mr. Sam Sesay 3, Lower Mathanko Street, Makeni	5/2/99	Development Worker (ICRC)	Adult	Male		The victim was arrested, detained and tortured on allegation of possessing a wireless communication machine.
48	Abdulai Kuyateh 3A Lower Mathonka Street, Makeni	5/2/99	Journalist	Youth	"		The victim was arrested and detained for expressing his opinion that he did not believe that Mr. Sesay in (47) had the machine in question.
49	Moses Nabay 44, Old Mabantha Road, Makeni	6/2/99	Development Worker (CARE)	Adult	"		The victim was arrested and detained on allegation of possessing a wireless communication machine; which allegation was later proved false.
50	Mr Timbo 44, Old Mabantha Road, Makeni	6/2/99	Development Worker (CARE)	Youth	"		The victim was arrested and detained for accompanying Mr. Nabay in (49) above to the Prison Yard.
51	Fonty Sesay 1, Hospital Road Makeni	7/2/99	Development Worker (C.R.S.)	Adult	Male		The victim was arrested and detained on allegation of possessing a wireless communication machine; an allegation which was later proved false.

3989

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
52	Komba A. Mondeh 11, Ropollon Raod Makeni	23/5/99	Teacher	Adult	"		The victim was arrested and assaulted and detained on allegation of being a Journalist
53	Andrew Kanu Makeni	26/6/99	Teacher St. Francis Sec. School Makeni	"	"		The victim was arrested and harrassed for pointing out that schools in Makeni could not resume because the necessary teaching and learning materials had been looted by individuals, especially soldiers; an act interpreted by the AFRC/RUF High Command as anti-revolutionary.
54	89 Youths (unidentified)	ABDUCTION 7/2/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victims were abducted from their homes to be conscripted into the RUF by force. They spent their first two days in detention without food. A price of Le5,000.00 was put on the heads of those who expressed unwillingness to be trained.
55	Mr Apha Kamara 34, Mabatha Road Makeni	ARMED ROBBERY 13/5/99	Businessman	Adult	"		Armed men broke into the victim's home at night, put him under gun point, tortured him and stole money and other belongings from him.
56	Saidu Koroma 145, Makeni Road Binkolo	ASSAULT 16/5/99	Student	Child	"		The victim was assaulted and wounded on the head when he asked why his grandmother planting materials were being taken away by armed men.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
57	Mr. Sahr M Sandi 6, Agriculture Road	21/5/99	Journalist and Development Worker	Adult	Male		The victim was hit with the but of gun by an armed man who alleged that the victim did not greet him.
58	Sahr Morsay 6, Teko Road	10/1/99	Teacher and Lay Preacher	Adult	"		The victim was slapped in the face by one RUF Combatant for attending divine church service.
59	Alimamy Sankoh (Alias Depor) 4 Francess Conteh Street, Makeni	10/5/99	Student	Youth	"		The victim was shot in the leg by one RUF Combatant for not obeying his order to stop playing chess.
60	Solomon H. Butcher Water Works Compound	24/5/99	Dispenser	Adult	"		The victim was dragged out of a public meeting, assaulted, arrested, wounded on the head and hands, and later detained for 24 hours, for being a member of the ousted Sierra Leone Peoples Party.
61	Maseray Sesay 4 Agriculture Road	25/5/99 Violence related injury	Unemployed	Youth		Female	The victim was assaulted in the face by a disloyal soldier, Captain Joseph Pandawa.
62	Rev. Usman J. Fornah Wesleyan Church Compound Rognaeh Road, Makeni	FORCED LABOUR 31/12/98	Clergy	Adult	"		The victim was forced to push a vehicle looted from the compound of the Wesleyan Mission in Makeni, by armed men.
63	Salifu Kamara Makeni	3/1/99	Unemployed	17 Yrs	"		The victim was seized from his home and forced to serve as a Cook and later trained as a combatant.
64	Abdul Kamara 14, Mabureh Street Makeni	24/12/98	Student Makama Agric. Institute	Adult	"		The victim was seized by Colonel Tamba Yamba to serve as a Cook. He was later forced to join armed looting gangs.

8909

3991

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
65	150 Youths (unidentified) Biriwa Chiefdom	Between 21/1/99 and April, 1999	Farmers	Youths	"		The victims were forcefully mobilised from various villages in the said chiefdom to destroy the Magbonso Bridge at Magbonso Village, Biriwa Chiefdom. Villages in the same community were forced to provide food-for work for the venture.
		EXTORTION					
66	Saio Marah 35 Wallace Johnson Street, Makeni	9/3/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victim was one of more than 3000 youths arrested and detained for conscription. He was released after paying Le5,000.00 for his head.
67	Saran Dabor, 77, Old Magburaka Road, Makeni	9/5/99	Housewife	Youth		Female	The victim was beaten by armed men who put their hands in her private parts to steal the sum of Le60,000.00
		DISPOSSESSION					
68	Tamba E Kemoh 13, Ropollon Road Makeni	20/1/99	Teacher	Adult	"		The victim was insulted and his two bundles of wood forceably taken away from him; his only source of income and livelihood for the day.
69	Rev. Usman J. Fomah Wesleyan Church Rogbane Road Makeni	20/3/99	Clergyman	"	"		He was harrassed by an armed combatant who also took away his sunglasses.

8210
3992

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
70	Mrs. Isatu Sesay (nee Isatu Kanu) 1, Savage Square Makeni	21/6/99	Housewife	Adult		Female	The victim together with other traders were forced out of a vehicle hired by them and full of their wares. After travelling from Gbomsamba to Makeni, the victims were forced to flee from the vehicle under gun-point. Isatu and others lost more than two million Leones (Le2,000,000 00)
71	Mabinty Koroma Makeni	VIOLENCE RELATED INJURY 25/1/99	Unemployed	Youth		Female	The victim was arrested, detained and shot in the foot by RUF Captain Green Snake for carrying arms forced into her hand by other combatants.
72	Alimamy Sankoh (Alias Depor) 4 Francess Conteh Street, Makeni	10/5/99	Student St. Francis Sec. School	"	"		The victim was shot in the leg by one RUF Combatant for not obeying his order to stop playing chess.
73	Maseray Sesay 4 Agriculture Road Makeni	25/5/99	Unemployed	"		"	The victim was hit and wounded in the face by a disloyal soldier Captain Josie Pandawa.
74	Solomon H. Butcher Water Works Compound, Makeni	24/5/99	Dispenser	Adult	"		The victim was dragged out of a public meeting, arrested, strapped naked, wounded on the head and hands and later detained for twenty hours during which period he was also assaulted.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
75	Saidu Koroma 145 Makeni Road Binkolo	16/5/99	Student St. Francis Sec. School	Youth	"		The victim was assaulted and wounded on the head when he asked why his grandmother's planting materials where being taken away by armed combatants.
76	Tamba Samba Makeni Technical College, Makeni	1/6/99	Student Makeni Teachers College	Youth	Male		The victim was wounded and assaulted before his X-Bass Tape Recorder and other belongings were seized from him.
77	Hawa Janneh 14 Yaide Street Makeni	31/5/99	Midwife	Youth		"	The victim is one of eight persons accused of witchcraft, arrested, detained and tortured by the AFRC/RUF establishment in Makeni.
78	Major Francess 14, Yaide Street Makeni	"	Soldier	Youth		"	Same as above No. (78)
79	Mariatu Kamara 14, Yaide Street Makeni	"	RUF Combatant	Youth		Female	Same as above No. (78)
80	Posseh Sesay 14, Yaide Street Makeni	31/5/99	Unemployed	Youth		"	Same as above No. (78)
81	Ramatu Bockarie 14, Yaide Street Makeni	"	Housewife	"		"	Same as above No. (78)
82	Adama Fofanah 37, Sahid Kamara Street, Makeni	"	Unemployed	"		"	Same as above No. (78)

3994

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
83	Hawa Newland Makeni	"	"	"		"	Same as above No. (78)
84	Zainab Koroma Makeni	"	"	"		"	Same as above No. (78)
85	Abdulai Sillah 14 Lady's Mile Makeni	13/1/99	"	Adult	Male		The victim reported being wounded by Kamajors Militia Personnel at Masingbi
86	Pa Yamba Forna 77 Magburaka Road Makeni	HARRASSMENT 13/1/99	Farmer	"	"		The victim's home was broken into at night by armed men who put him under gun-point and forced him to surrender his money and other belongings; after assaulting same.
87	Mr. Andrew Forna 77 Magburaka Road Makeni	"	Teacher	"	"		Sameas above No. (87)
88	Mrs. Adesatu Forna 77 Magburaka Road Makeni	"	Teacher	"		Female	Same as above No. (87)
89	Dauda S. Kamara 18 Makama Road Makeni	15/1/99	Unemployed	Youth			Same as above No. (83)
90	Alimamy S. Marah 35 Wallace Johnson Street, Makeni	19/1/99	Development Worker (KWAYOR)	"	Male		The victim was requested by RUF Combatants for money. When he could not surrender, his sandals were removed from his feet and damaged.

3995

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
91	Sahr M. Sandi 6, Agriculture Road Makeni	21/5/99	Journalist and Development Worker	Adult	"		The victim was hit with the butt of a gun by RUF Major Francis, who alleged that the victim did not greet him.
92	Sahr Morsay 6, Teko Road Makeni	10/1/99	Teacher and Lay Preacher	"	"		The victim was slapped in the face for attending divine church service.
93	Mr. Franklin Syvanus Sylvanus Street Makeni	30/5/99		"	"		The victim was harrassed until he had to abandone his home.
94	Mrs. Franklin Sylvanus Sylvanus Street Makeni	"	Housewife	"		"	Same as above No. (95)
95	Adama Kallon, Kamabai	30/6/99	"	Youth		"	The victim was assaulted by a combatant Thoronka for shouting in his (the combatant's) compound, which the latter interpreted as OVERLOOKING - a local RUF coinage for disregard

3996

1.218

5060
9215

Copyright 1998 AAP Information Services Pty. Ltd.
AAP NEWSFEED

May 10, 1998, Sunday

SECTION: Western Australian Regional; Overseas News

LENGTH: 405 words

HEADLINE: AFR: SIERRA LEONE VILLAGERS TELL OF REBEL **ATROCITIES**

BYLINE: By Clarence Roy-Macaulay

BODY:

FREETOWN, Sierra Leone, May 9 AP - Ousted from power by a West African force loyal to Sierra Leone's president, former junta members hiding in the countryside were wreaking revenge with ethnic killings and maimings.

Aid workers today transported 18 amputees from the northern town of Karina to a hospital in the capital of Freetown after rebel fighters hacked off their hands on Thursday.

The victims said their attackers told them they were being punished because they were from President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah's Madingo tribe. "The rebels told me to use my amputated hands to vote for Tejan Kabbah in the next presidential elections," said Abu Mansaray, maimed Thursday in the northern Bombali district.

Witnesses said another 18 villagers were killed and 30 maimed Friday in similar ambushes by rebels from other ethnic groups.

"A rebel drank the blood of a man murdered in front of us," said one victim, who asked not to be identified, who saw four members of his family killed in the nearby Ndaraya village.

After spending months in exile, Kabbah was restored to power in March after the Nigerian-led West African force known as ECOMOG ended 10 months of rule by fighters loyal to junta leader Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma.

Koroma came to power in a bloody coup last May.

In small villages throughout the country, reports of revenge attacks have intensified.

A private radio station, Radio Mankneh, reported that the northern towns of Karina, Kamabai, Ndaraya and Worodala have been abandoned after attackers killed dozens and torched a number of homes.

Amnesty International yesterday said that it has new evidence of **atrocities** committed by the retreating rebel forces, including the amputations of one or both arms of at least four villagers in the country's Kono District.

The human rights groups accused the rebel forces, the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, of brutalising hundreds of civilians.

Eight West African governments have recommended reinforcing the 10,000-member Nigerian-led force, which was trying to disarm rebel and military groups.

5061
8216

Kabbah has disbanded the army and has asked ECOMOG to train a new national force.

"As long as there are groups of rebels moving about, we will continue to hear about **atrocities** committed against civilians," presidential spokesman Septimus Kai Kai said today.

AP ac

LOAD-DATE: May 9, 1998

About LexisNexis™ | Terms and Conditions | Privacy Policy | Support Identifier
Copyright © 2002 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1.259
00031391 8217

The INQUIRER

VOL. 7 No. 250 Wednesday, January 13, 1999 Liberia

THOUSANDS TRAPPED IN FREETOWN

...Foday Sankoh Flown to Guinea; Rebels Still Burning Buildings

Thousands of Sierra Leoneans and foreign nationals are reportedly entrapped in their various homes in the capital, Freetown, where gun-battle is still going on between ECOMOG troops and retreating rebel forces.

According to reports, the situation is desperate because the rebels are burning everything in sight especially in the northern part of the city where fierce fighting is still going on.

The report said the struggle for Freetown is still continuing because the rebels, who are putting up resistance, are using civilians as human shield thereby creating problem for the regional force to overrun their positions with heavy shelling.

Up to yesterday, there was no clear picture as to the military situation in Freetown but the report said there was continuous billowing of smoke over the city.

Communication with the outside world and electricity have broken down because of the alleged burning down of key installations and other buildings by rebels.

Starvation is said to be at its highest peak in the city compled with the lack of drinking water. The condition of civilians in Freetown is appalling because there is no guarantee of safety for humanitarian workers, thereby putting thousands of lives at risk.

The United Nations is poised to deliver food aid to the city's trapped residents, as soon as it is safe to enter.

As diplomatic efforts continue to end the nightmare, the jailed rebel leader, Corporal Foday Sankor, has been flown to the Guinean capital Conakry, where Togolese Foreign Minister Joseph Kokou Koffigoh and the Foreign Minister of Ivory Coast, Amara Essy, held talks with him. The UN Representative to Sierra Leone was also there.

Reports said the two cont'd on page 6







A woman rescued by ECOMOG troops cries for her son, left in Freetown. Canadian journalist, Ian Stewart injured and American AP journalist Tierney killed in Freetown. PHOTOS, COURTESY OF INTERNET

Support to Sa. Leone Rebels::

Opposition Wants Clarification

...GOL Urges U.S. to Stop Allegations

Opposition parties in the House of Representatives are calling on the government of President Charles Ghankay Taylor to properly address consistent and persistent accusations that Liberia is supporting the combined RUF rebels and the ousted military junta forces fighting the Government of Sierra Leone supported by ECOMOG and the Karmajor militia.

Speaking during the formal opening of the Third Session of the 51st National Legislature Monday, the opposition parties, through the acting Minority Leader, Representative Joseph N. Cornonia, Sr., of Bong County, said the accusations are very serious and if not properly addressed or sincerely put to rest, it may create additional setback for the country to get international support and assistance.

Representative Cornonia, who also represents Unity cont'd on page 4

If Coup Had Succeeded...

By: Bill K. Jarkloh
Court Reporter

The prosecution's fifth witness in the treason trial, equally served in the capacity of deputy chief of staff while one Amos Cheyee was to have served as commanding general.

August.

State Witness Dolley also pointed out how he and General Quiah met with D. Roosevelt Johnson and other supporters of the plot including James Chelley, Edward Slanger, Amnah Youlu, the late cont'd on page 6

INSIDE TODAY

00031392 878

U.S. Gov't Will

cont'd from front page

If Coup Had Succeeded

cont'd from front page

Thousands Trapped

cont'd from front page

Man Breaks Jail

cont'd from back page

INQUIRER Gets

cont'd from front page

Chief Jallah Lone

cont'd from back page

Liberian Gets Top

cont'd from back page

300 Immigration

cont'd from back page

00031393

1.260
849

AB 20433272

The Nation's News Since 1969

The NEWS

VOL. 9 NO. 111 FRIDAY JANUARY 9, 1998 - MONROVIA, LIBERIA Price $30

In fragile societies where "things fall apart"... leaders under attack are sometimes as unpredictable and dangerous as wounded buffaloes

Big Walk Against Polio Today

Taylor, others to form part

By: Robby Tappan

The Liberian leader, President Charles G. Taylor, along with First Lady Jewel Howard Taylor are expected to walk tomorrow against the deadly Polio disease. The involvement of the President and his wife in the exercise indicates that the Liberian Government attaches seriousness to eradicating polio in the country.

Reports say the walk will begin at 8 a.m. from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare on the By-Pass and end at the New Ministry of Health in Congo Town.

The officials of Government, Business executives, representatives of local and international NGOS, Mariners, students as well as the public are also expected to march against Polio on Saturday.

Officially, the National Immunization Days (NIDs) have been set for January 18, 19 and 20. The NIDS be announced through the international community's contribution of US$1.3 million.

Already, massive anti Polio campaigns are being conducted around the country by the musician and cultural unions of Liberia. The campaigns are being done through songs, dramas and culture dances.

Tomorrow's walk will be climaxed with a beef program at the new Health Ministry where President Taylor is expected to make remarks.

Liberia's participation in the anti Polio campaign is part of a global strategy to wipe out Polio world wide. Health experts say Polio only affects humans, mainly children under five years.

Cont'd on Page 6



Pres. Charles Ghankay Taylor
Identifying with the campaign against polio

In Freetown: MORE BLOODBATH

-As Rebels Reject Peace Talk

AS the Sierra Leonean capital bleeds from the ongoing desperate battle for power resulting from the rebel infiltration which has left it virtually divided between the West African Peace Keeping Force (ECOMOG) and RUF rebels, indications are that Freetown is heading for more bloodbath.

Due to the scale of carnage resulting from the reported rebes' use of civilians as human shield



Pres. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah
A difficult moment for a leading democratic president

which has made it very difficult for ECOMOG forces to effectively combat their nuisance, democratically elected President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah yesterday reportedly held talks with condemned RUF leader Foday Sankoh at the Lungui International Airport following which he announced a ceasefire.

President Kabbah also announced that he would be prepared to release Foday Sankoh under certain conditions according to the report which did not specify the condition.

The ceasefire which is expected to last for seven days to allow for a negotiated settlement to the end to the fighting in the capital, was rejected by rebel commander Sam Bockarie alias "General Maskita". "General Maskita" said unless he sees his leader physically and hear from him directly, he will not honor the offer of cease-fire from President Kabbah. He reiterated that his men will continue to attack Freetown until they succeed in capturing the capital, adding "it is too late to talk."

Immediately following their entry into the capital early this week, the rebels and their collaborators, many of whom are believed to be active Sierra Leonean government soldiers, broke through the Pondemma road prison and released all the inmates, most of whom were their colleagues apprehended during ECOMOG's take over of Freetown. They were being held to face trial. Corporal Foday Sankoh who was also detained at that prison was relocated a few days ago following an ECOMOG intelligence revealing plans to storm the prison.

Following a series of claims and counter claims



Johnny Paul Koromah
Where is he now as Sam Bockarie takes centerstage?

about control of the State House, reports from Freetown last night said the city is now divided with

Cont'd on Page 6

00031394

8220

EMINENT PERSONS

effective monitoring and supervision of these institutions. It also placed emphasis on the reunification of abandoned and orphaned children with their families as opposed to institutionalization.

The EPG is expected to work with Health Ministry officials on strengthening the capacity of the Ministry's bureau of social welfare to deliver social services. Health Minister Peter Coleman, who was also present at the meeting, welcomed the EPG efforts.

Also present at the meeting were the UNICEF Resident Representatives, Scholastica Kimaryo and Information Officer, MacArthur Hill.

Mrs. Kimaryo praised the Eminent Persons work for children and urged them to see themselves as a bridge to the future happiness and upliftment of Liberian children. She pledged her support for the EPG efforts and promised UNICEF continued support for the group's work on children's rights, peace and armed conflict.

Meanwhile, Eminent Person James Salinsa Debbah has made a personal donation about one thousand U.S. dollars each to street children and former child combatants of the Don Bosco & Children Assistance Programs.

FALLAH COMMENDS TAYLOR

work along with government to lay the framework that could make Liberian loan scheme instituted.

Fallah Shelloe further noted that contracts awarded to foreigners are always undertaken by Liberians where as foreigners get the bulk of the money and take out of the country.

Mr. Fallah, who specializes in building construction with more than 15 years experience, has worked for Bong Mines, Firestone, the American Embassy and presently doing renovation work at UMARCO compound, St. Paul Bridge for the use by Exotic, a reputable investment company operating in the country.

EX-ULIMO GENERAL CLAIMS

He said it is unfortunate for some Mandingo elements to consider themselves enemies of the government thereby spreading lies about their kinsmen who try to cooperate with government for the reconstruction of the country.

Mr. Sessy threatens to take legal action against anyone who would label him a betrayer and cautioned Liberians to accept the reality of life in post-war Liberia and not continue to hold alienated views about the social, economic and political situation evolving in the country.

CDA REGISTRAR EFFECTS

Mr. Forkpa Karpeh, Director of Field Support and Patrick Karbar, Cooperative Analyst.

Others are Mr. Lloyd Fahnbulleh, Regional Coordinator, Central Region, while Mr. Samuel Tarbolo was appointed Acting Deputy Registrar with the consent and advise of Agriculture Minister Dr. Roland Massaquoi, pending Mr. Tarbolo's appointment by the President of the Republic of Liberia.

MORE BLOODBATH

the rebels controlling the east, while ECOMOG which backs the Tejan Kabbah Government controls the west. Independent sources said the peacekeepers still control the Lungui and Hasting airports as well as the two military barracks around the city. ECOMOG reported yesterday that it had scores of rebel in its custody.

One ECOMOG commander also told the BBC that his forces will not give in to the rebels, adding, "it will be death before dishonor."

It is not clear how the rebels beat ECOMOG intelligence to enter the capital. One rebel spokesman told the BBC yesterday afternoon that they took training in Burkina Fasso. He did not say how they re-entered Sierra Leone after their training to carry out their offences against the Kabbah Government.

Sierra is bounded by Guinea, Liberia and the Atlantic Ocean which is patrolled by ECOMOG naval vessels.

Guinea is a troop country to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and it recently fortified its border with the two neighboring countries, especially Sierra Leone due to rebel threat.

President Kabbah was elected in a democratic election that was sanctioned by the Sierra Leonean people following a referendum. Two of his rivals in that election, former ECOWAS Secretary Abbas Bundu and John Karifa Smart have been accused of supporting the rebels who stand accused of committing untold atrocities against civilians. Abbas Bundu was a brain behind the formation of ECOMOG when the subregion gathered in Banjul in 1990 to find a solution to the Liberian crisis.

Up to press time last night, it was not clear whether the battle had intensified following the rejection of peace talks by the rebels, but should the rebels push for the control of the capital, Freetown is in for a bloody night [illegible] Sierra Leonean largely victimized and perhaps polarize the subregion.

The ECOMOG forces fighting for stability and democracy in the subregion are not likely to step aside and see democracy castrated banefully. Their efforts frustrated every attempt in the past to rule Liberia by force of arms and it culminated into the July 19 elections which ushered the NPP led government of President Charles Taylor.

TAYLOR WALKS AGAINST

will continue on February 22, 23 and 24 nationwide.

Some 600,000 children under the age of five are to

PARENTS URGED TO

184 children between the ages of 5-12 graduated. Of that number, 104 were malnourished, 56 abandoned, 34 orphans while 108 of the graduates were males and 76 were females.

She then recommended to the Liberia YMCA for the extension of the program as well as to empowe local parents to sustain beneficiaries of the project.

Mr. Yeagle also urged the YMCA of Liberia t hold Counselling Workshop that would empow parents to better assist their children and to bri about community participation.

Responding, the National General Secretary of Liberian YMCA, Mr. Peter Z.N. Kamie said he grateful to all those that helped to make the prog a success.

However, Mr. Kamie stressed that the new gc the Liberia YMCA is to transform its program emergency relief to that of community empowe that enables people to help themselves.

He focused on the communities for their l unity, adding, "Until we can define our ro decide on where we are heading, no amo money can ever be sufficient for us."

Mr. Kamie said, "the question of what d with these kids from here roots in the purvie Yekepa community and not the YMCA of You must tell us what next and how bes keep these kids in school through our c initiative."

For his part, Mr. David Franklin, Board of the Yekepa YMCA, also praised the e Liberia YMCA, but added that it wa husbands to initiate programs for their w sustain [illegible].

"If families are [illegible] the community reliance is certain," he told t

Happy Birthd

1289

8224

00031411



Votes Counted In S. Leone Amidst Protests

Vote counting in Sierra Leone's [illegible] elections continued in [illegible] evening with no [illegible] of the two-day polls [illegible] by armed men [illegible] the polls.

[illegible] the results yet to be announced, [illegible] presidential candidates have [illegible] of irregularities of the [illegible] which have, however, been [illegible] by international observers as [illegible] free and fair.

Dr. Abass Bundu, leader of the [illegible] People's Party (PDP) and former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, angered the Elections Commissioner Chairman James Jonas with the complaints that the elections were not credible. And the Finance Minister in the overthrown Strasser regime, Dr. John Karimu, a candidate for the National Unity Party (NPP), has also protested about the elections malpractices in several parts of the country. The grand old Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), which has its traditional strongholds in one of the areas now mainly infested with marauding rebels, has not yet made public comments about the conduct of the elections. The party's leader, Mr. Ahmed Tejan Kabe, is widely acclaimed to emerge as a possible winner of the elections.

Voters turned out in their thousands to cast their ballots in what is now known as the country's cracked multi-party elections in 20 years. The elections took two days in the midst of considerable insecurity with gunfies and mortar attacks in the main cities of Freetown and Bo. Some voters did not vote because of the rebel activities of Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front elements, putting the voters at great risks. Several persons were killed and others were maimed. The RUF recently vowed to disrupt the voting fight the new civilian government..

The Elections Chairman James Jonas said results are expected to be out by this afternoon. Results from the western area, Freetown, will be out this morning. He said one major problem was security in the provice. But he said it was a miracle that voters were able to go to the polls. He said the results will reflect the will of Sierra Leoneans.

In the provincial city of Kenema, there were reports that voters chased a pocket of rebels who entered the city to disrupt the elections, a move described by anaysts as the determination of Sierra Leoneans to restore democracy.

Little Brother

(Culled from The Economist)

The new boss of Sierra Leone, Brigadier Julius Amasda Bio, has a problem. It is not just that his West African country-a once fairly prosperous British territory-has been torn to pieces by corruption and bloody rebellion but that an elder sister, who brought him up, is one of the leaders of the rebels: Agnes Jalloh is the most senior woman member of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and wife of Ibrahim Jalloh, its spokesman. The brigadier had no trouble replacing his boss in a palace coup on January 16th. He will find sister Agnes and her friends a bigger problem.

The coup whereby Brigadier Bio replaced Captain Valentine Strasser at the head of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was not unexpected. In the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown, there is widespread suspicion that the British government knew all about it in advance. Captain Strasser had made it clear that he wanted out and said afterwards that he had agreed to step down. A pleasant but naive young man, not yet into his 30s, he has a place booked at a British university.

So why did he not wait and step down after the presidential election promised for February 26th? His error was to agree to stand in it. The NPRC has been trying to turn itself into a party for some time.

To be continued

Taylor

Cont'd From Page 1

Government was now on par with those in the subregion and would not be dictated to

On disarmament, Dr. Boley said there will be "total disarmament" and that "No one should entertain the notion that he can hold us hostage by making conditions. The Councilman's statement is in sharp contrast with Councilman Taylor's recent claims that "there be no total disarmament any where in the world". He said those who believe that the war was necessary because the 1985 elections were rigged must now subject themselves to the democratic process by disarming totally and "unconditionally" for the polls. One of the primary reasons given for war by the NPFL was that the 1985 elections were rigged and that there was a need to remove the military dictatorship. "The war cannot end without disarmament", he emphasized.



CUBA COMPLAINS TO GEN. ASSEMBLY

Cuba has requested the General Assembly of the United Nations to listen of its side of the story in which the US accused Havana of violating international humanitarian law. Cuban military last week shot two privately owned aircrafts over its air space. Cuba has said it gave the Americans warning ever since in 1994 about the illegal flight of Cuban exiles into Cuban air space. Operators of the two planes said they were on humanitarian mission, to rescue people leaving Cuba by sea. They argue it was their rights as free men to do so

SUDANESE PRESIDENT WANTS WAR ENDED

President Omar Bashir of Sudan has called for the end of his country's civil war. He made the call in the Keenyan Capital Nairobi, where he is attending a meeting. The 13 years old civil conflict in Sudan is between Christians in the South of the country and the Northern Moslims who control the government and impose Islamic laws.

PROBED FOR HELPING CRIMINALS

Two French Police officers are presently undergoing investigation on suspicion of helping Algerian Islamic militants in France without correct travel documents. One of the Police officers under probe has been arrested. Police sources in Paris say some of the militants, suspected of being used to enter the country illegally by them between $10,000 to 20,000 dollars for false documents from the police.

1.295
8222

child combatants, should be given the highest priority and concrete steps should be taken to implement commitments made to end the recruitment and use of child combatants in Sierra Leone;

- those responsible for grave breaches of international human rights law and humanitarian law, including the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, should be brought to justice.

The use of child combatants in the internal armed conflict

Children have fought with the various forces involved in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict which began in 1991. These forces include the RUF, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Sierra Leone Army and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The AFRC came to power following the military coup on 25 May 1997 which overthrew the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah elected in 1996. The AFRC joined forces with the RUF after coming to power and remained its ally after the AFRC was forced from power in February 1998 by forces deployed in Sierra Leone by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), known as ECOMOG. With the signing of the peace agreement in July 1999, the AFRC allied itself to the government of President Kabbah but some of its forces continued to engage in hostilities against government-allied forces. Rebel forces who remain in control of parts of the north and east of the country continue to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers. Previously disarmed and demobilized members of the AFRC and those members of the Sierra Leone Army who had remained loyal to the government, including children under the age of 18, have again been recruited and rearmed to fight on behalf of the government since May 2000. Large numbers of children have also been recruited and used in combat by the CDF, the civilian militia based on societies of traditional hunters, such as the *kamajors*, which support the government of President Kabbah.

The involvement of children in conflict has devastating effects on their physical and mental integrity. There have been higher casualty rates among children because of their inexperience, fearlessness and lack of training. Children are considered as particularly useful because their size and agility means that they may be sent on particularly hazardous assignments. Frequently ill-treated or even killed by the commanders, they have no protectors. Adult combatants who commit human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, involve children in those crimes. In addition to the obvious risks of death or serious injury in combat, children suffer disproportionately from the general rigours of military life, especially in the bush, and are particularly vulnerable to disease and malnutrition. As for the severe psychological consequences of active participation in hostilities, with children witnessing and at times also committing atrocities, the full extent of the impact on child combatants as well as society as a whole may only become apparent over a long period.

Former child combatants tell their stories

Those children who have been released or have escaped and who have been disarmed and demobilized provide horrifying accounts of how the conflict has affected them. The names of the children whose testimonies are included have been changed in order to protect their identities. Most were interviewed by Amnesty International representatives during June and July 2000.

Child combatants live in constant fear of being beaten and killed. Many former child combatants describe being threatened, intimidated and severely beaten; others recount the killing of their friends and companions. Former child combatants describe the killings and mutilations of civilians which they carried out while fighting. If they refused, they risked being beaten or killed. Peter, a 12-year-old former child combatant, said: "*When I was killing, I felt like it wasn't me doing these things. I had to because the rebels threatened to kill me.*"

Former child combatants fighting with RUF

Ibrahim is now aged 16 and living at a centre for former child combatants at an internally displaced people's camp at Waterloo, 20 kilometres east of Freetown. He was captured by the RUF in 1992 in Kono District, Eastern Province, and from there was transferred to the rebel stronghold of Kailahun District, also in Eastern Province. He was taught how to use weapons, how to advance and attack the enemy and how to ambush. He described how before attacks, each combatant, including child combatants, was given cocaine and marijuana: "*After sniffing cocaine, I was not afraid of anything. I became bloody.*"

Ibrahim told Amnesty International on 19 June 2000 that when the RUF forces with whom he fought heard that RUF leader Foday Sankoh was going to be tried in 1998: "*We were ordered to kill any civilian that we came across. Any fighter or children suspected of being reluctant to do the killings were severely beaten. We were asked to advance and to do everything possible to terrorize the civilians. It was during this period that people's hands and limbs were cut off, in Kono, Masingbi, Matatoka, Magburaka and Makeni. During that time, one of the children asked the commander the reasons for the killings. He said that the civilians were supporting President Kabbah's government. Sheriff Kabia, who was 17 and known as 'Crazy Jungle', was killed because he asked this question.*" Sheriff Kabia was reported to have been killed in November 1998. Ibrahim also described the death of Mamadu Kamara, aged 14, who was killed because he refused to cut off the hand of someone from his own village.

8224



Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi
© Amnesty International

Abdul, now aged 17, was abducted by the RUF in 1997 during an ambush in Kenema District, Eastern Province. He told Amnesty International on 21 July 2000 that he was taken to an RUF training camp, known as Camp Lion, near Pendembu in Kailahun District where he was trained by both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians. He was taught to use a variety of weapons, including AK47 and AK58 rifles, which he said came from Liberia. "*After the Lomé peace accord, we thought that was the end of the whole war. We were waiting to disarm; there was no fighting. Instead we all went to Tongo Field to mine. Most rebels did that.*" Abdul was then ordered to go to Lunsar, Port Loko District: "*We didn't even reach the front line when we met some wounded colleagues. I wanted to surrender but I was afraid.*" When he gave himself up to Sierra Leone Army forces, his arms were tied tightly behind his back; rope marks on both arms were still visible. He was first taken to Masiaka, some 50 kilometres east of Freetown, where he was hit on the head with a pistol by a soldier and then transferred to

Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown. "*They threatened to kill me. For the first week I was treated badly but then I was given food and water and no one treated me badly. For the first two weeks I was not allowed out of the cell.*" He remained there for more than three weeks before being transferred to an interim care centre in Freetown. "*I want to go back to school but here in Freetown, not in the provinces. I am scared that I'll get taken back to the front line.*"

David, now aged 14, from Bumbuna, Tonkolili District, Northern Province, was abducted in 1996 by the RUF when they attacked Bumbuna. He is now at a centre established to care for former child combatants, known as an interim care centre, run by an international non-governmental organization, in Freetown. When interviewed by Amnesty International on 12 July 2000, he said that after his abduction he was taken first to Kabala, Koinadugu District, Northern Province, and then to Bunumbu in Kailahun District, an RUF stronghold. There he, together with another 40 children, was trained to fight at Camp Lion. "*I had to go through the training and learn to fight, otherwise the RUF people would beat me or kill me.*" Among those killed by the RUF during the training was a boy, aged about 11, with whom David had become friends. He was beaten to death because he refused to continue training. He had complained of being tired - the training was difficult and he was exhausted. He was beaten in front of more than 30 other children and his body was thrown into the bush. Another child, aged 14, was also beaten and killed.

David described how, even under the influence of marijuana and alcohol, he was still afraid to fight, but he did not tell anyone for fear of being killed. David remained with rebel forces for three years until surrendering to forces of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) at Makeni, Bombali District, Northern Province, after the peace agreement was signed in July 1999. Now at the interim care centre, he said: "*I want to become a doctor now and go back to school to learn how to cure people.*"

Many former child combatants with rebel forces have described how they were forced to drink alcohol and take drugs and the effect that it had on them. Among the drugs used were marijuana, amphetamines, commonly referred to as "blue boats", and cocaine. When child combatants refused to take drugs they were beaten and, in some cases, killed.

Komba, now aged 15, was captured by the RUF in 1997 in Binkolo, Bombali, District. Now at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo, he told Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 that he was among rebel forces who attacked Freetown in January 1999: "*My legs were cut with blades and cocaine was rubbed in the wounds. Afterwards, I felt like a big person. I saw the other people like chickens and rats. I wanted to kill them.*"

When interviewed by Amnesty International on 20 June 2000, Gibril, aged 11, said: "*Before battles, I was given white powder which was mixed with rice. It made me brave, it made me think that I could do anything.*"

2000 Hassan travelled to Freetown to purchase drinks for the "West Side Boys". He was not armed and he travelled in a public transport vehicle. At a checkpoint he was recognized as a West Side Boy by members of the Sierra Leone Army and the *kamajors* and ordered to get out of the vehicle. His shoes and trousers were removed but, initially, he was not otherwise ill-treated. He was taken to Benguema military training camp, 20 kilometres east of Freetown, and the following day to Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown. He was interrogated about a recent attack on the town of Masiaka. One soldier, however, beat him severely on his back; three weeks later, in July 2000, deep scars were still visible. The beating was stopped by a more senior officer.

Hassan said: "*At first, I loved being in the bush. I could get money and other things, including vehicles, for free. But then I got tired. Now I want to go home.*"

When interviewed on 24 July 2000 John, now aged 15, from Mokanji, Moyamba District, Southern Province, did not remember when he had been abducted by the AFRC and did not know what had happened to his family. He was threatened that he would be killed if he did not go with the AFRC and was taken to Makeni where he was trained how to use weapons and how to fight the CDF and ECOMOG. John said that he was told not to kill civilians and that civilians were killed in the cross-fire. He was also instructed not to loot property but said that many AFRC members did engage in looting. "*I was not happy living in the bush but I had no way to escape. I asked to leave and was told 'go if you can' but I then saw children being killed - many of them - when they tried to escape to go home. I was afraid of fighting but I was given 'blue boats'. After that I felt like I could do anything. I never refused to take drugs.*"

John recalled that children were punished if they refused to obey orders: "*I was punished after I was asked to be part of an advance team to attack Koinadugu. I was not feeling well; I was feeling sick and had a stomach ache. I said that I could not go and fight. The commander ordered other small boys to beat me. After I was beaten a doctor who had been captured helped me.*"

Isatu, a girl now aged 17, was abducted by AFRC forces from Fadugu, Koinadugu District, in 1998. She told Amnesty International on 24 July 2000 at a centre for former child combatants: "*I did not want to go; I was forced to go. They killed a lot of women who refused to go with them.*" She was forced to become the sexual partner of the combatant who captured her and is now the mother of their three-month-old baby: "*When they capture young girls, you belong to the soldier who captured you. I was 'married' to him.*"

Isatu was trained in a base near Kabala to use weapons, including a bayonet, gun and knife, and fought in the area around Fadugu and Makeni. She admitted that she had cut off the hands of children and adults, and set fire to houses with civilians locked inside. "*There is a law of the AFRC that forces you to kill; if you refuse to, you yourself are killed.*"

Former child combatants fighting with the CDF

Child combatants recruited by the CDF have also recounted their experiences. The parents of 12-year-old Brima, now at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo, gave permission to the CDF to use him as a child combatant in 1998. He continued to live at his home but was active with the CDF in areas around Masiaka, Port Loko and Yele. He was trained to fight by CDF "initiators", those who admit members into the societies of traditional hunters. Brima told Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 that when children disobeyed orders they were beaten unless their parents paid a fine. Brima recalled: "*I was beaten because I became separated from a CDF patrol.*"

Brima recounted that when a rebel is caught, his arms are tied up behind his back. The captive is then interrogated and stabbed to death. "*I saw four executions.*"

Mohamed, also aged 12, from Port Loko, Port Loko District, Northern Province, was recruited by the CDF in 1998. His parents were not informed about the recruitment but they did nothing to prevent it because of the status attached to membership of the society of traditional hunters, such as the *kamajors*, described by Mohamed as "*the supremacy of the society*". In addition to carrying water and machetes for the CDF, he escorted captured rebels to the Sierra Leone Army. He also described to Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 how the CDF executed rebels they had captured or those suspected of being rebels: "*I saw three captured rebels being killed; their heads were cut off. The children had to bring the heads to the SLA [Sierra Leone Army] headquarters to show that the CDF were effective.*"

Rehabilitating child combatants

Until the resumption of hostilities in May 2000 UNAMSIL, including its human rights section, played an important role in negotiating the release of children held by rebel forces and providing logistical support and military escorts to ensure their safe transfer to interim care centres. It worked with a number of non-governmental organizations, both national and international, who have been active in trying to secure the release of children and to provide the assistance they need. In March 2000 UNICEF and non-governmental organizations were supporting more than 700 children in interim care centres; about 80 per cent of these were demobilized child combatants.

Following the July 1999 peace agreement and before the resumption of hostilities in May 2000, specific procedures had been adopted for child combatants. When children presented themselves to a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration reception centre - sometimes simply a table in the middle of the road - those who were not combatants were handed over to child protection agencies and taken to an interim care centre. If, after questioning, it was established that they were combatants, they were transferred to the

children's sections of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps. For those who had fought with the RUF, the AFRC or the former Sierra Leone Army this program lasted for five weeks; for those with the CDF a shorter program was provided because normally the children had not been separated from their families and communities.

At interim care centres former child combatants are provided with medical treatment, food and clothing, psycho-social rehabilitation, education and recreation. Some of the older children, especially those who had spent months or years with rebel forces, have bullet wounds or other injuries. Malnutrition, respiratory and skin infections and other ailments are common, as are sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Some still suffer the effects of narcotic drugs.

When Amnesty International met former child combatants at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo on 25 March 2000, a boy aged 14 who had been abducted by AFRC forces in 1998 said: "*I want to go to school and learn so that I can forget the old times.*" Another former child combatant interviewed at Waterloo on 19 June 2000 said: "*We want to go back to school; we don't want to go back to the bush.*"



Former child soldiers in the interim care centre at Waterloo, east of Freetown, 25 March 2000
© Amnesty International

The psychological effects of the conflict on children have often been severe: many have killed, mutilated or raped or have witnessed such atrocities. During the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 - when at least 2,000 civilians were killed, more than 500 people had limbs severed, and rape of girls and women was systematic - it was estimated that some 10 per cent of rebel combatants were children. Often under the influence of drugs, many of them

"A whole generation of children has already been emotionally traumatized and physically scarred. They'd been told that peace had finally arrived. Now what are we supposed to tell them?" - Johanna van Gerpen, UNICEF representative in Sierra Leone, 10 May 2000.

After the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the RUF in July 1999, several hundred children were released by rebel forces; by the end of 1999 some 800 children, many of them combatants, had been handed over to UNICEF and other child protection agencies. During the first months of 2000 there was a significant increase in the release of children, most of them combatants, by AFRC forces from the Occra Hills to the east of Freetown and from Kabala, Northern Province. By the end of April 2000, some 1,700 child combatants, of an estimated total of 5,000, had been absorbed into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program. According to estimates by UNICEF, about 800 of them had been reunited with their families or placed in foster care, or had run away, leaving 900 in interim care centres. Several thousand children, however, remained in the hands of rebel forces, particularly in Northern Province.

When the political and security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated seriously at the beginning of May 2000, fears of an imminent attack on Freetown by rebel forces intensified and hostilities between RUF forces and forces of the Sierra Leone Army, the CDF and UNAMSIL troops were reported close to the capital and in Port Loko District.

Moves to secure the release of children still held by rebel forces halted. Former child combatants in interim care centres in areas where rebel forces were active again became vulnerable to being abducted and forcibly recruited by rebel forces. UNICEF and the child protection agencies with which it works have tried to ensure adequate protection for these children.

In his Fourth Report on UNAMSIL to the UN Security Council on 19 May 2000, the UN Secretary-General cited preliminary reports which suggested that child combatants were being used extensively as hostilities resumed. UNAMSIL human rights officers who visited Masiaka on 15 May 2000 observed several child combatants, mostly boys, with the CDF, the AFRC and former Sierra Leone Army and the reconstituted Sierra Leone Army. Some 25 per cent of the combatants observed were under 18 and some freely admitted that they were between 7 and 14. Almost all of them were armed. Other reports indicated that RUF forces were using a similar proportion of child combatants at the front line. In his subsequent report to the UN Security Council on 31 July 2000, the Secretary-General reported that both the RUF and forces fighting for the government continued to use children in combat.[5] He expressed deep concern about continuing human rights abuses, including the forced recruitment of children, and urged "*all fighting forces to immediately release all child combatants among their forces and to cease the recruitment of children as combatants*".

[5]Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/751.

8280

Continuing recruitment of children by the RUF

Since May 2000 RUF forces have continued to abduct and forcibly recruit children as combatants, some of whom had previously been demobilized. While some of the children recruited by both rebel and government-allied forces since May 2000 were forcibly recruited, usually after being abducted, others were reported to have volunteered to join the RUF. It appears, however, that in many cases these children had little option but to do so. Reports from Kambia District, Northern Province, during May 2000 described RUF forces going from village to village demanding a quota of men and boys, most of whom were forced to join under duress. Local traditional rulers, known as Paramount Chiefs, were ordered to provide a certain number of recruits and families were forced to hand over children, including those aged under 18. For example, in Madina Junction, Kambia District, 300 men and boys were demanded. Similar reports have been received from the towns of Kambia and Kamakwie. This practice explained the comparatively high number of young men and boys, without their families, who fled across the border into Forécariah region, Guinea, during May 2000. Reports of forcible recruitment were also received from Mange in Port Loko District.

In Makeni, when the RUF first confronted UNAMSIL troops in early May 2000, children were pressed by RUF forces by threats and intimidation into joining them. RUF commanders positioned vehicles at the entrance of an interim care centre, run by CARITAS-Makeni, and repeatedly coaxed the older boys to rejoin them, through enticement and implicit threat. Some of the children were told by RUF forces that their families had been traced and that the RUF would help them return to their homes. It was also reported that the RUF had threatened to kill all those in the interim care centre if the children did not rejoin the RUF. Staff at the centre believed that up to 30 boys aged from 14 to 17 rejoined the RUF; other estimates put the number of those who rejoined the RUF at 40



Lungi interim care centre for former child combatants run by CARITAS-Makeni, July 2000
© Amnesty International

SIERRA LEONE

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

POPULATION: **4,717,000 total 2,370,000 under-18s**
GOVERNMENT ARMED FORCES: **3,000-4,000 active, strength unknown paramilitary (Civil Defense Forces)**
COMPULSORY RECRUITMENT AGE: **no conscription**
VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT AGE: **previously any age with consent; unknown if recent government commitments to an age limit of 18 has resulted in legislative change**
VOTING AGE (GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS): **21**
CHILD SOLDIERS: **indicated - 5,000-10,000 in government and opposition armed groups**
CRC-OP-CAC: **signed on 8 September 2000**
OTHER TREATIES RATIFIED: **CRC; ICC; GC/API+II**

Some 5000 child combatants serve among government and opposition forces, and a further 5,000 are estimated to have been recruited for labour among armed groups.[1] Armed groups typically rely on forced recruitment through abduction and drug use, and are responsible for particularly cruel and degrading treatment of children in their camps, often including the sexual slavery of girls. The Lomè peace agreement of July 1999 included important provisions on the demobilisation of child soldiers, however the resumption of fighting in May 2000 significantly slowed progress. To date slightly more than 1,800 children are reported to have entered disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Underage recruitment, including the re-enlistment of some of those previously demobilised, has continued among all forces.

CONTEXT

Since 1991 Sierra Leone has been in the grips of internal armed conflict between government forces and international peacekeepers, and armed groups including the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Thousands of men, women and children have been killed, raped, wounded or systematically mutilated. The Lomè peace agreement of July 1999 included important provisions on the demobilisation of child soldiers. Just over 24,000 combatants, including 1,700 children, were disarmed before the peace process collapsed in May 2000.[2] Renewed insecurity resulted in further abuses against civilians and massive displacement. A 30 day ceasefire signed in November 2000 held throughout the early months of 2001, however the RUF did not disarm and violence towards civilians, including returning refugees, continued. The RUF still controls large sections of the diamond-rich north and east of Sierra Leone.
Fighting in Sierra Leone has also affected neighbouring Guinea, where some 340,000 Sierra Leonean refugees reside. Since September 2000 rebel fighters have launched a series of cross-border attacks prompting military counter-attacks by Guinean forces.[3] The deployment of an ECOWAS border monitoring force, agreed upon in January 2001, has been delayed for months pending a status of forces agreement between Guinea and Liberia and approval by the UN Security Council.[4]
Liberia is also involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone, having actively supported the RUF since its inception in 1991 through arms and diamond trafficking. Liberia announced its intention to sever ties with the RUF following UN Security Council action in March 2001.[5]

GOVERNMENT

National Recruitment Legislation

The Sierra Leone government has made repeated commitments to raise the legal age of military recruitment to 18, demobilise all underage combatants, and fulfil its obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
There is no conscription in Sierra Leone.[6] In February 2000 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child issued concluding observations on Sierra Leone's initial report, expressing concern over the continued failure to define minimum voluntary recruitment age in national legislation. Rather, Section 16(2) of the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces Act 1961 states that volunteers under "the apparent age of 17_ years" may not be enlisted without the consent of parents or legal guardians. However the Committee welcomed the government's intention to pass legislation raising minimum recruitment age to 18, urging the government to move quickly in this direction and to ensure enforcement.[7]
On 24 May 2000, following reports of children fighting with government-allied forces or remaining in front-line positions, the government issued the statement that "government policy ... stipulates that 18 years is the

minimum age for bearing arms in Sierra Leone". The government further reported that the Acting Chief of Defence Staff was "instructed to ensure that all those below the age of 18 currently involved in fighting on the side of the government should be immediately withdrawn, demobilised and handed over to competent institutions for rehabilitation. Henceforth, any commander who allows a child below 18-years to carry arms within his area of operations or allows children to remain in areas of active conflict will face severe disciplinary action."[8] At the International Conference on War-Affected Children in Winnipeg in September 2000 the government stated its commitment to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child regarding "voluntary recruitment into any fighting force before age 18".[9] However, it is unclear whether this commitment has resulted in appropriate legislative change.

Child Recruitment and Deployment

Government-allied forces comprise a loose alliance of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), including more recently former AFRC members retrained by British forces. Chain-of-command control for these forces is in practice weak. This is particularly true of the largest and most powerful membership of the CDF, the *Kamajors*, which are well known for recruiting children.

It is not clear how far measures to prevent underage recruitment and demobilise child soldiers have been implemented by the various government-allied forces. There is evidence that these forces continued to recruit and use children in combat in 2000 and currently, including some previously disarmed and demobilised child combatants.

New Sierra Leone Army (SLA)

After the Lomè Peace Accord the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) began restructuring its units and training with the aid of foreign forces; UK military personnel are currently training the new SLA. By January 2001 some 6,500 persons, all age 18 or over, had completed training (not all of these soldiers are yet on active duty). Members of the new SLA are also being trained in child protection by UNICEF in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence, child protection agencies and the Ministry of Social Welfare.

Civil Defense Forces (CDF)

Since the war began civilians began forming self-defence militias comprised of various groups of traditional hunters, in particular the kamajors. The government came to rely on these militias, which officially became known as the Civil Defence Forces. The CDF has been accused of serious human rights violations including extrajudicial killings and execution of suspected rebels and collaborators, arbitrary arrest and detention, and induction of child soldiers.[10] However in May 2000 the Deputy Minister of Defence and National Co-ordinator of the CDF, Samuel Hinga Norman, denied the CDF recruited children or "initiated" them into militias comprising the CDF. He claimed children among CDF forces had been rescued or captured from armed groups and transferred to child protection agencies. In mid-July 2000 he further instructed CDF leaders and "initiators" not to recruit children.

While these instructions may reduce the number of children newly admitted into the CDF, it does not resolve the problem of those already in CDF forces. A senior member of the CDF in Kenema, Eastern Province, informed Amnesty International in 2000 that, although he personally opposed the use of children, it was normal practice within the CDF.

"I was beaten because I became separated from a CDF patrol."
Brima, a 12-year-old who became a soldier with the CDF at age 10, explained that when children disobeyed orders they were beaten unless their parents paid a fine.[11]

CDF recruitment of children – including some previously demobilised – is reportedly continuing in Bo, Kemema and Moyamba Districts in Southern Province. According to some reports, villages in Southern Province are expected to provide a certain number of children to the CDF. In some areas there appears to be an attempt to conceal the use of children to guard checkpoints along major roads in Southern Province; aid workers repeatedly report seeing children, some of them openly armed, others concealing arms or hiding themselves in the bush.[12] In other areas an increase in the number of children guarding checkpoints has been observed. In May 2000 a UN assessment mission observed children between 7 and 14 years old comprising 25 to 30 per cent of the SLA/CDF in the town of Masiaka. Militia members claimed the children had volunteered as fighting spread through the villages.[13] The low rate of child demobilisation after May 2000 (see below) suggests that many underage recruits may remain among these government forces.

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

The AFRC was comprised primarily of former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) officers who organised a coup in 1997 and joined forces with the RUF. The AFRC forcibly recruited children and used them to fight against

8233

government forces before the signing of the Lomè Peace Accord. The AFRC was also known to abduct young girls for use as sex slaves.
After the Lomè Accord the AFRC, led by Johnny Paul Koroma, re-joined the government as a political party. Some of its members re-joined the new SLA being trained by British forces.[14] Hundreds of other AFRC members, however, refused to join the government, instead occupying areas outlying the capital or joining an opposition group known as the West Side Boys which are known to include under-18s (see below). On 24 May 2000 Koroma issued a statement voicing his opposition to the recruitment of children and warned "all warring factions to desist from recruiting child soldiers".[15]

"I did not want to go; I was forced to go. They killed a lot of women who refused to go with them... when they capture young girls, you belong to the soldier who captured you."
Isatu was abducted by the AFRC at the age of 15.[16]

"When I go to the battle fields, I smoke enough. That's why I become unafraid of everything. When you refuse to take drugs, it's called technical sabotage and you are killed."
Sayo (age 14, ex-AFRC soldier) described how his skin was cut and cocaine rubbed in the wounds. [17]

OPPOSITION

Currently the opposition group posing the greatest challenge to government forces is the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Opposition groups also include the West Side Boys and, before the Lomè Accord, the AFRC (see above).

Child Recruitment and Deployment
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
In May 2000 a RUF spokesman SWB Rogers was quoted as saying: "The RUF doesn't believe in using children as soldiers. When they are five or six, they are far too young to fight. We only use the older boys, from ten or eleven upwards."[18] The RUF is well known for its abduction and forcible recruitment of children, both boys and girls, for use as soldiers, sexual slaves and forced labour. In 2000 reports also emerged of armed groups forcing children to work in diamond fields under their control since the signing of the Lomè Accord in 1999.[19] The RUF commonly abducts children during attacks. After the January 1999 Freetown attack, in which an estimated 10 per cent of armed forces were children, more than 4,800 children were reported missing.[20] Of these about 60 per cent were girls, who are typically forced into sexual slavery.[21]
Since May 2000 RUF forces have continued to abduct and forcibly recruit children as combatants, often using drugs to induce their compliance and fighting ferocity. Others were reported to have volunteered to join the RUF, however it appears that in many cases these children had little option but to do so. From May through August 2000 reports from Kambia and Makeni Districts, Northern Province, described RUF forces going from village to village demanding a quota of men and boys, most of whom were forced to join under duress. Local traditional rulers, known as Paramount Chiefs, were ordered to provide a certain number of recruits and families were forced to hand over children, including those aged under 18. The RUF has also reportedly killed children who refused to join their forces and frequently extorted money from families of conscripted youths.
Recruits also include hundreds of those who were previously demobilised after the July 1999 peace agreement. Some 200 demobilised children were abducted on their way from Kabala to Freetown in January 2000.[22] In May re-recruitment increased with RUF commanders targeting interim care centres; at the Makeni rehabilitation centre for example, a group of 72 former child soldiers were forced to rejoin.[23] Some of the children were told by RUF forces that their families had been traced and that the RUF would help them return to their homes. It was also reported that the RUF threatened to kill everyone at the centre if the children did comply.[24]
Recent interviews of children staying at transit centres set up in Bo and Kenema as part of the demobilisation programme in 2000 confirmed reports of sexual violence and abuse of children, both boys and girls, by RUF personnel. Three adolescent boys interviewed by an aid worker reported they had been abducted around age 14 and 15 and were sexually abused by female members of the RUF. They also reported being sexually abused by male RUF members, apparently as a form of punishment. Other forms of abuse included being forced to aid and abet the rape of girls. Rape of girls by RUF members was frequently cited.[25]

"By then the rebels had moved from Makeni to Lunsar. They came to our camp and asked some children to join them again and we refused. We have rights to live and play. They encouraged us to

8234

join them. We told the manager of the centre to move us. At that time there were no vehicles; even the NGO's vehicle was not around. We walked along the road to Rogberi Junction where we met the rebels. They told us to return to our camp. We knew that they were killing people around. After that they said, please, come and join us or we are going to kill you people. After that we fled in the bush."
- Former child soldier describes how the RUF tried to lure children back into their ranks. [26]

"I had to go through the training and learn to fight, otherwise the RUF people would beat me or kill me."
David, abducted by the RUF at the age of 10. [27]

West Side Boys
The West Side Boys are an ex-AFRC splinter group aligned with the RUF. Like the RUF they have committed serious human rights abuses including killing, abduction, deliberate mutilation, rape and the forced recruitment of children as soldiers.[28] In September 2000 British troops conducted raids on the West Side Boys, during which scores of child soldiers were seen fleeing into the jungle, likely to have rejoined armed groups.[29]

RELATED ISSUES

In Sierra Leone it is often difficult to distinguish between recruitment into armed conflict versus the initiation process young boys undergo to mark entry as an adult into societies of traditional hunters. For example, some parents may not try to prevent the recruitment of their children by the CDF due to the traditional status associated with membership in groups such as the *kamajors*, which are an important element of the CDF.

DEVELOPMENTS

International Standards
The government of Sierra Leone signed the CRC-OP-CAC on 8 September 2000 but does not uphold the "straight-18" position.

Appeals
The problem of child soldiers in Sierra Leone has attracted significant international and national attention. In January 2000 hundreds of people marched in Freetown to protest the recruitment of children and to demand such children be reunited with their families.[30] Some 40 child protection agencies and NGOs working with government have been constituted into a child protection committee coordinated by UNICEF,[31] and the government of Sierra Leone committed itself to establishing a National Commission for War-Affected Children. In October 2000 the UN Security Council urged the government of Sierra Leone to establish the promised Commission.[32] The Coalition vigorously lobbied for the establishment of a special court in Sierra Leone to try those responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers (see below).

Demobilisation
In 1999 little demobilisation appeared to be taking place. Following the Lomè peace agreement the RUF admitted that 30% of its forces were under 18 but that official demobilisation had not begun. Later that year a mere 111 children were said to have been demobilised. The CDF reported equally small numbers with approximately 100 children demobilising in October 1999.[33]
In January 2000 the pace picked up considerably and by May the UN reported that approximately 1,700 of an estimated 5,000 underage recruits had entered disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.[34] But renewal of hostilities that month derailed the process, and by November 2000 the total number of demobilised child soldiers had only risen to slightly over 1,800.[35] About 138 of these children, between the ages of 8 and 16, were handed over by the CDF in June 2000.[36] The UN Security Council reported in October 2000 that "a significant portion of the rank and file RUF would be willing to disarm but were not allowed to do so by their commanders, who often used brutal methods, including execution, to prevent fighters, including children, from leaving."[37]
Some of the demobilisation since 1999 has come about through self-disarmament, which established programmes were not always equipped to address. But in 2000 efforts were being made to establish reporting and outreach mechanisms that would facilitate the inclusion of such former combatants in disarmament and reintegration programmes.[38] A National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration is expected to be established in 2001.[39]

8235

A particular challenge for reintegration programmes concerns child rape victims forced to live among the RUF. The taboo nature of the subject, the social ostracisation that often follows abuse, and the lack of appropriate government services all present significant obstacles to dealing with such victims of armed conflict. In March 2001 UNAMSIL announced the launch of a skills training project for about 390 young girls who had been abducted by armed groups as a step toward addressing the needs of such children.[40]

Special Court

In August 2000 the UN Security Council set in train the establishment of a special court to try war crimes in Sierra Leone, recommending that this court prosecute those with greatest responsibility for crimes. The Security Council agreed that all recruitment and use of child soldiers be considered a war crime under the Special Court in accordance with statute of the International Criminal Court.[41] Following considerable debate about whether 15 – 18-year-olds should also be eligible for trial, as initially proposed by the UN Secretary General, the Security Council later reiterated that the Special Court should target only those most responsible for war crimes, and recommended that juveniles appear before a separate Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[42]

-

[1] AI, "Sierra Leone Childhood – a casualty in conflict", 31/08/00.
[2] UN Security Council, Fourth report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455, 19/05/00.
[3] HRW, "Guinean Forces Kill, Wound Civilians in Sierra Leone", HRW, New York.
[4] UN IRIN, "ECOMOG capable of defending border, ECOWAS head says", 24 January 2001.
[5] UNWIRE, "Liberia: Council imposes sanctions, calls for end to RUF support", 8 March 2001. Between $25 and $125 million in diamonds are smuggled out of Sierra Leone through Liberia each year.
[6] Report of the secretary-general submitted pursuant to commission resolution 1998/77, "Civil and political rights, including the question of: conscientious objection to military service", UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/55, 17/12/99.
[7] Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Sierra Leone. CRC/C/15/Add.116 24 February 2000.
[8] AI, "Sierra Leone: Childhood – a casualty of conflict", 31/0800, at: http://www.amnesty.ca/library/afr5106900-4.htm
[9] Statement by the Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Shirley Gbujama, at the International Conference on War-Affected Children, Winnipeg, Canada September 2000.
[10] US Department of State, Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999 and 2000. Washington D.C., 2000 and 2001.
[11] AI, "War children tell their story", Amnesty Magazine November/December 2000, pp.7.
[12] Information provided to the Coalition by aid workers, April 2001.
[13] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: Re-recruitment of child soldiers", 23 May 2000.
[14] US Department of State, Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000. Washington D.C., 2001.
[15] AI, "Sierra Leone: Childhood – a casualty of conflict", 31/0800, at: http://www.amnesty.ca/library/afr5106900-4.htm
[16] AI, "War children tell their story", Amnesty Magazine November/December 2000, pp.7.
[17] AI Press Release, "Sierra Leone: action needed to end use of child combatants", (AFR 51/075/2000), 31 August 2000.
[18] Africa Confidential, 26 May 2000. See Radda Barnen Children and War Newsletter, July 2000.
[19] US Department of State, Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000. Washington D.C., 2001.
[20] UNICEF, Child soldier projects: Assistance to Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone, at http://ginie1.sched.pitt.edu/ginie-crises-links/childsoldiers/sierraleone2.html#Demobilisation
[21] AI, "Sierra Leone: rape and other forms of sexual violence against girls and

women", AFR 51/035/2000, 29 June 2000.
[22] Reuters, "Rebels said to kidnap 200 children in Sierra Leone", 21 January 2000.
[23] Reuters, "UNICEF says children rejoined Sierra Leone rebels", 30 May 2000.
[24] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: re-recruitment of child soldiers", 23 May 2000.
[25] Coalition interview of a reliable source that requests confidentiality, Geneva 22 February 2001.
[26] AI, "War children tell their story", Amnesty Magazine November/December 2000, pp.6.
[27] Ibid.
[28] US Department of State, op. cit.
[29] BBC World news, "Sierra Leone: Child soldiers scatter into jungle after hostage release", 14 September 2000.
[30] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: march against recruitment of child soldiers", 22 March 2000.
[31] Statement by the Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Shirley Gbujama, at the International Conference on War-Affected Children, Winnipeg, Canada September 2000.
[32] Report of the UN Security Council mission to Sierra Leone, S/2000/992, 16 October 2000.
[33] HRW, World Report 2000, HRW, New York, 2000.
[34] Fourth report of Secretary General on UN Mission in Sierra Leone, 19 may 2000, S/2000/455.
[35] Save the Children UK, Emergency Update, November 2000.
[36] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: Kamajors hand over ex-child fighters", 13 June 2000.
[37] Report of the UN Security Council mission to Sierra Leone, S/2000/992, 16 October 2000, para. 22.
[38] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: reintegration of child combatants", 14, July 2000.]
[39] Report of the Special Representative of the secretary-general for Children and Armed Conflict to the UN General Assembly, Protection of children affected by armed conflict, A/55/442, 3 October 2000.
[40] UN Press Release, "UN Mission in Sierra Leone sets up skills training for girl victims of war", 12 March 2001.
[41] UN Security Council issued a Resolution, S/RES/1315(2000), adopted 14 august 2000. At: http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1315e.pdf
[42] UN News, "Security Council Says Sierra Leone War Crimes Court Should Target Top Leaders Only" 28 December 2000. At: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sierra/court/001228.htm

1.316
8237

SIERRA LEONE

The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: the protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community

On 30 July 1998 the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, will convene a special conference in New York to galvanize the international community's response to the political, humanitarian and human rights situation in Sierra Leone.

The meeting will bring together representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, intergovernmental organizations, including the UN, the Organization of African Unity, the Economic Community of West African States - which played a key role in restoring the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in March 1998 - the European Union and the Commonwealth, as well as humanitarian organizations.

Continuing atrocities

The international community's commitment to bring peace and security to Sierra Leone and to assist in its reconstruction and rehabilitation must include initiatives which will help to stop the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated by the joint forces of the ousted Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), prevent further abuses and also lay solid foundations for the respect and protection of human rights in the future.

AFRC and RUF forces in the east and north of Sierra Leone are deliberately and arbitrarily killing and torturing unarmed civilians. A deliberate and systematic campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by the AFRC and RUF "*Operation no living thing*" - has emerged since April 1998.

Although the exact number of those killed in recent months is unknown, it is likely to be several thousand, many of them women and children. More than 200 people were killed during an attack on one village alone - Yifin, in Koinadugu District in Northern Province - in late April 1998. Many hundreds of men, women and children of all ages have suffered mutilation and crude amputations of their arms, legs, lips or ears, lacerations and gunshot wounds. Women and girls have been raped or suffered other forms of sexual assault. Survivors of attacks who manage to reach safety and medical assistance recount that many others from their villages were killed or fled into the bush, their fate unknown.

8238

The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, following a visit to Sierra Leone in June 1998, said that the brutal treatment of civilians by the AFRC and RUF was unlike anything he had seen in 29 years of humanitarian work: *"there are no words to condemn this sort of practice..."*.

An Amnesty International delegation which visited Sierra Leone in May 1998 met some of the victims of these atrocities at Connaught Hospital in Freetown. One, a farmer aged 40 from the village of Badala, in Koinadugu District, had both hands cut off when the village was attacked on 3 May 1998. He had arrived at Connaught Hospital four days later. Another, a 15-year-old schoolboy from Koidu, in Kono District, Eastern Province, who had arrived at the hospital on 10 May 1998, had suffered severe lacerations to his right ankle in an attempted amputation. Almost 50 people with him had been killed when they were attacked on 1 May 1998.

Three young women survived an attack on the village of Boima in Bombali District, Northern Province, on 7 May 1998; one had a deep cut to her arm, the other two had been beaten all over their bodies. One of the women had witnessed the killing of several members of her family, including her children. Twelve people, including three of her children, died when their house was set alight. Another child, a girl aged three, was pulled from her back and cut with machetes.

Such gross and large-scale human rights abuses demand an immediate and forceful response from the international community. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), the peace-keeping operation established by the UN Security Council on 13 July 1998 to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, must be given the necessary resources and political support to effectively monitor violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and to make its findings public. In approving resolution 1181 (1998) the Security Council expressed its grave concern about *"the loss of life and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone ... as a result of continuing rebel attacks"*. Effective monitoring and reporting should be an important part of the international community's response.

Monitoring and reporting human rights abuses

Measures taken by the UN so far to address the human rights situation in Sierra Leone, including UNOMSIL civilian staff to monitor and report on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, should be supported and reinforced. The inclusion of reporting on human rights in the Fifth Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Sierra Leone of 9 June 1998 is welcomed and should be developed further in future reports.

The extent of the atrocities in Sierra Leone requires an increased number of civilian staff with human rights expertise within UNOMSIL to report on human rights violations to the UN Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is important that there are adequate resources for UNOMSIL human rights monitors to be deployed in those areas of the country, in particular Eastern and Northern Provinces, where human rights abuses are being perpetrated. Adequate protection must be provided in areas where their security might be at risk.

The special conference will specifically seek assistance from the international community for UNOMSIL and for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Military observers deployed in Sierra Leone should also report, through explicit channels, to the UN Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights any violations of international humanitarian and human rights law which they may witness or receive reliable information about.

Children caught in the violence

Children have been particular victims of the violence and brutality in Sierra Leone. As well as being deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and maimed, thousands of children have been and continue to be abducted by AFRC and RUF forces and forced to fight. Girls and women have been systematically raped and forced into sexual slavery.

Among the more than 350,000 Sierra Leoneans who have either become refugees in neighbouring countries or internally displaced since February 1998 are hundreds of unaccompanied children separated from their families as a result of the violence. Children are the most vulnerable to the acute hardship, disease and malnutrition faced by Sierra Leonean refugees and displaced people. During May and June 1998, 750 people, including children, were reported to have died of disease and malnutrition at Masingbi, in Tonkolili District, Northern Province, where some 15,000 displaced people have sought safety.

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, following a visit to Sierra Leone in May 1998, challenged the international community to respond in a more vigorous and concerted way to the needs of children affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone. In June 1998 the UN Security Council, condemning the abduction, sexual abuse and recruitment and use in hostilities of children, said that it would pay serious attention to the situation of children affected by armed conflict. The needs of children in Sierra Leone are critical. Amnesty International welcomes the work of the Special Representative and endorses his call for Sierra Leone to be made one of the pilot projects for a more effective response in the context of post-conflict peace-building.

8240

Effective institutions for the protection of human rights

Amnesty International urges the participants at the special conference on Sierra Leone, including the UN and international financial institutions, to work closely together to promote post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation which is based on good governance and respect for human rights. The police and army need to be restructured and trained, including in human rights; the legal and judicial systems need to be reformed and strengthened. The international community should assist in creating effective institutions for the protection and respect for human rights, including an independent national commission for human rights.

Ending impunity

Impunity contributes to continuing patterns of human rights abuses. Peace and security in Sierra Leone will not be achieved until there is an end to impunity. It is only when those responsible for human rights abuses are brought to justice for their crimes that a clear message is sent that gross human rights abuses will not be tolerated or allowed to go unpunished.

Amnesty International strongly endorses the joint statement in June 1998, shortly after the conference on the creation of a permanent international criminal court opened in Rome, by the heads of five UN agencies - UNICEF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs - that the atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone are a brutal reminder of the urgent need for an international criminal court to bring to trial those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The delegation of Sierra Leone to the diplomatic conference in Rome repeatedly cited the experience of its country as evidence of the need for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. The international community must assist in establishing accountability for the atrocities in Sierra Leone in order to combat impunity and to bring justice, and also to contribute to lasting peace in Sierra Leone.

KEYWORDS: UN1 / ARMED CONFLICT1 / CHILDREN / WOMEN / INDISCRIMINATE KILLINGS / IMPUNITY / OAU

1.361 8241
5603

African Guerrillas

EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM



ERITREA/TIGRAY/SUDAN/SOMALIA/UGANDA
RWANDA/CONGO-ZAIRE/LIBERIA/SIERRA LEONE

11 IBRAHIM ABDULLAH & PATRICK MUANA
The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat

After waging a brutal and protracted war against three successive regimes, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) triumphantly marched into Freetown on 25 May 1997 amidst anarchy, mayhem and widespread looting.[1] The armed insurgency which began on 23 March 1991 had in six years displaced more than half the country's population and resulted in an estimated 30,000 deaths. A peace agreement, signed on 30 November 1996 by President Ahmad Tejan Kabba of Sierra Leone and Corporal Foday Sankoh of the RUF, failed to bring an end to the war. The RUF leadership subsequently became fractured, as a result of the peace plan – about which its military wing was ambivalent – and its leader was 'deposed' and subsequently incarcerated in Lagos, Nigeria, where he had gone in pursuit of the much-needed peace.

Central to an understanding of the war in Sierra Leone is the role of alienated youth, especially alienated lumpen youth in the urban and rural areas, for whom combat appears to be a viable survival alternative in a country with high levels of urban unemployment, where the economy is dominated by a precious minerals sector in long-term decline. This chapter discusses the evolution of the RUF and the dynamic of the civil war.[2] The analysis is structured in parts: an account of the background and emergence of the RUF; a discussion of the dynamics of the conflict, and an evaluation of the RUF as a guerrilla movement.

[1] On the *coup d'état* of 25 May 1997, see the following: Steve Riley, 'Sierra Leone: the militariat strikes again', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 72 (1997), pp. 287–92; Lansana Gberie, 'Sierra Leone: a "militariat" coup?', in Ibrahim Abdullah and Yusuf Bangura, eds, *African Development*, Vol. 22, Nos. 2 and 3 (1997), special issue on 'Youth Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War'; A. B. Zack-Williams, 'Kamajors, "sobels" and the militariat: civil society and the return of the military in Sierra Leonean politics', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 73 (1997), pp. 373–98; Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Kamajos, "sobels" and the militariat: a critique of Zack-Williams', *Leonenet: A Discussion of Sierra Leonean Issues* (Leonenet@mitumba.mit.edu, 1 December 1997).

[2] See Paul Richards, 'Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: a crisis of youth?' in Oliver Furley, ed., *Conflict in Africa* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995); Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996). For a critique of Richards, see Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Violence, youth culture and war: a critical reading of Paul Richards', *Leonenet*, 19 May 1996; Yusuf Bangura, 'Understanding the political and cultural dynamics of the Sierra [illegible]

The Background to the Rebellion

Youth culture in Sierra Leone

The roots of the RUF lie in Freetown, where a rebellious youth culture began to evolve in the 1940s, based on the lumpen 'rarray boys'. These first-generation lumpens were predominantly foot soldiers for the politicians of the time. Due to defective education and an ill-formed political consciousness, they were hardly aware of their political manipulation. Mostly unlettered, these young lumpens were predominantly second-generation city residents.[3] Their popular resort was the *pote*. *Potes* are peri-urban spaces constructed around the *odelay* (masquerade). Lumpen habitués were known for their anti-social behaviour – marijuana smoking, petty theft and violence – that put them at odds with the community. Their periodic carnivals on public holidays were always under the watchful eyes of the police. Permits were needed to 'pull debel', first from the city officials and later from the police.[4] Revelry and riot alienated them from the sober citizenry; they were a good-for-nothing bunch, best avoided.

This picture of lumpen culture began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when middle-class youths and other participants entered this popular cultural milieu and became key players. The character and composition of the *pote* was transformed, and *odelays* emerged as a more reputable element in the urban cultural landscape. Yet the change was replete with all the contradictory tendencies inherent in lumpens as a social category. Politicians continued to try to control the wilder elements, seeking a ready supply of thugs to do their dirty work, at the same time as the emergence of middle-class youths as keen participants in periodic carnivals transformed the *pote* from an abode of anti-social elements to an arena for a more broad-based political socialization.[5] Most of the middle-class youth element were still in high school but participated in the drug culture and gradually absorbed the mannerisms of the emerging popular culture. Others 'dropped out' of school entirely, following the footsteps of the original 'rarray boys'. This period coincided with the arrival of reggae music, and a definite turn to the political.

The influence of music was at first local – the beat was that of local bands, drugs and political talk, starting in 1971 with Purple Haze, a Freetown group, and Super Combo from Bo, later followed by Afric Jessips, Superb Seven (from Liberia) and Sabanoh '75. Of all these groups in the early 1970s, it was Super Combo that 'became youth champions' of the rebellious culture.[6] The reggae music of Bob Marley, Peter Tosh and Bunny Wailer, and the more directly political lyrics of West African musicians like Fela Anikulapo-Kuti and later Sonny Okosun, added a further dimension to the repertoire of youth rebelliousness. Liberation struggles

[3] Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Context, culture and crisis: changing identities of urban youth in Sierra Leone, 1945–1992', forthcoming.

[4] Masquerade is popular referred to as 'debel'. James Nunley, *Moving with the Face of the Devil* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987).

[5] 'Youths held at ministerial building', *Sierra Leone Daily Mail* (Freetown) [illegible]

inst settler colonialism in Southern Africa also contributed to the development of ulture of resistance'. The *pote* became an arena for political discussions centred on e system'. 'System dread', a refrain from popular reggae music of the period, came a slogan and rallying call for alienated youth, mostly unemployed. The JF leader, Foday Sankoh, recently echoed this discourse in an interview: 'I said ien I come out [from prison] I will organize the system.'[7]

The popularity of marijuana – the drug of choice – brought many participants to *pote*. *Pote* language began to filter into mainstream society. Lumpen youth ture was suddenly at the cutting edge of the development of Krio language, the abulary expanding to incorporate *pote* terms for gambling, petty theft and tling. 'Rarray boy' now became 'service man', complete with a new and eading 'militant' language and iconography of resistance. In the 1970s the group luded many high school drop-outs and a handful of unemployed 'O' and 'A' level ers. Some later went to university (Fourah Bay and Njala College), but the ers joined the city's swelling army of unemployed youth. As a group they knew outline of the history of the slave trade and the dehumanization of the African it ailed, and could make connections between the colonial past and neo-colonial sent, generally espousing some form of pan-Africanism. *Pote* discussions in this iod were spiced with liberal helpings of Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, llace Johnson, and at times Haile Selassie. Some of the *pote* types had read a little ntz Fanon and Walter Rodney, bits of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, llowing undigested passages of Marx and Lenin from cheap or free volumes from Soviet Progress Publishers.[8]

dent politics

the early 1980s the university students in the *pote* had become a respectable rence group for their more unfortunate brothers, their prestige enhanced by n role in the 1977 demonstrations against the All People's Congress (APC) ernment. In the *pote* code of honour, an extension of the *bra–bobor* (patron–nt) relationship) found in the wider society, special regard was given to the *pote*-pienting 'service man' who was also a university student. Their more ortunate brothers listened to them with respect as they preached, smoked and ticized from the safe confines of the *pote*. In this environment, a change from vice man' to *man dem* took place.[9] Camaraderie came full circle; 'one love' and therhood' became the new slogans of the group, apparent in the popular port the students received for their 1977 actions, notwithstanding APC youth g attempts to mobilize the 'lumpens' against the students. Here we have a tage point from which the series of student protests in the 1980s become lligible. Students immersed in the rebellious youth culture became the articulate ithpiece of a disaffected youth cohort attacking APC rule and calling for lamental change.

Interview with Foday Sankoh, 'The war would have started in 1988', in *Concord Times*, 10 mber 1996.

See Ishmail Rashid, 'Subaltern reactions: student radicals and lumpen youth in Sierra Leone, 1992', forthcoming, Abdullah and Bangura, *Africa Development*.

One of the first student groups to organize opposition to the APC was the maligned Gardener's Club, central to a number of demonstrations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1980s, however, other politically oriented student groups had emerged: the Green Book study club, the Juche Idea group, the Socialist Club and the Pan African Union (Panafu). These groups debated strictly political matters and sought to use the student union as an effective medium to channel grievances at national level. Some of these groups eschewed the drug culture, a central feature of the more rebellious world of the *pote*. Students had earlier been involved in political protest – against the One-Party Regime proposal of Sir Albert Margai, for example – but only as foot soldiers. What was distinctive about the events in 1977 is that they were planned and led by the radical students, received popular support, and forced Siaka Stevens to make concessions. The protests exposed the fragility of the regime.

The lesson of student power was not forgotten as the country entered the turbulent 1980s. Dwindling mining revenues, worsened by rampant smuggling, caused a sharp economic downturn, exacerbated by lavish spending on the 1980 Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference. Student scholarships and spending on health and social services declined. The swelling ranks of the young unemployed fuelled subversive discourse in the *pote*. Muted talk of organized protest in 1977 now gave way to open talk of revolution. How this revolution was to be prosecuted was never systematically discussed, nor were other options explored. But talk of revolution, vague and distorted as it was, remained alive in the discourse of rebellious youth. The language shifted from *man dem* to 'comrade', and finally to 'brothers and sisters', symptomatic of change among the *pote* intellectuals as well as among numerous study groups in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Njala and Kono. From this period anti-imperialist slogans became an element in the iconography of youth.

Meanwhile there had been a sharp deterioration of relations between students and the administration on the Fourah Bay College (FBC) campus. Student demonstrations in January 1984 led to a three-month lock-out. A Commission of Enquiry report apparently favourable to the student position was never published.[10] By 1985 the administration had taken upon itself the task of disciplining students on extra-academic grounds to keep state interference to a minimum. The appointment of an ex-police chief, Jenkin Smith, as warden of students reflected the change of policy. It was in this context that a radical student leadership emerged to channel accumulated student grievances. The movement was a coalition of student groups with a populist platform attractive to radicals as well as democrats. The Mass Awareness and Participation (MAP) student union president, Alie Kabba, was elected unopposed, while away in Libya attending the annual Green Book celebrations. MAP was a loose coalition involving members of the Green Book club, the Gardener's Club, Panafu and the Socialist Club. Its fierce, at times adventurist, rhetoric alarmed the administration at FBC. A product of links with the world of the *pote*, the new union leadership was no longer reactive; imbued with a growing sense of the power of youth as a political force, it was prepared to seize the initiative. Anti-government posters and graffiti were spawned all over campus and city. A

8243
5005

people's tribunal adjudicated between students and regulated bad behaviour – an experiment in popular government reflecting alleged 'People Power'. Such activities, along with rumours that the leadership was sponsored by the Libyans, did not endear it to the authorities.

The alleged Libyan link led to the expulsion and suspension of 41 students in 1985. It was claimed that a group of students had held on to their room keys during a university break, intending to encamp Libyan mercenaries in their hostels. Neither the government nor the university investigated the charge. Instead, the college invited the notorious State Security Defence (SSD) on to campus, literally to 'flush' the students out of the hostels. When the college reopened, the authorities were faced with a militant student demonstration over the expulsions, degenerating into widespread vandalism, looting and affray. In the ensuing melée the principal's car was set on fire. Three members of the teaching staff judged 'friendly' to students – Olu Gordon, Jimmy Kandeh and Cleo Hanciles – lost their jobs.[11] Gordon and Hanciles were founding members of Panafu. The Union president, Alie Kabba, and four other students were arrested, detained for two months, and later charged with torching the car.[12]

The students' action might be described as infantile. They were neither politically mature enough nor sufficiently well disciplined to realize the shortcomings of whatever leverage they imagined they might have on administration or state. They appear naively to have believed that rhetoric would deliver 'people's power' without a solid organizational base. Comparing the 1985 leadership with that of 1977, one might say the 1985 group was better organized but less politically percipient, failing to understand the difference between student and national politics. The expulsion of this student group from FBC marked the end of a phase in the making of an informal, youth-oriented, opposition in Sierra Leone. Henceforth the baton passed to the 'lumpen' youths and *pote*-affiliated 'organic intellectuals' (some ex-students of FBC and the second campus of the national university at Njala) in numerous study groups and revolutionary cells scattered around the country.

The Making of the RUF

In addition to Alie Kabba, a number of other radicals attracted to populist conceptions of political action already had some Libyan connections. Some of these groups, mostly unemployed youths, were recruited in Sierra Leone – through networks established by some of the expelled students now resident in Ghana – for guerrilla training in Benghazi, Libya. Among those recruited was an older man, Alfred Foday Saybana Sankoh, once a corporal in the Sierra Leone army, cashiered and jailed in a 1971 for a coup plot against Siaka Stevens. Trained in the army as a signals technician, Sankoh found work on release as an itinerant freelance photographer in the south-east, which was to become the major theatre of war. He later found his way into a radical study group in the Bo-Kenema area, whose coordinator, Ebiyemi Reader, was an organic intellectual from Freetown west end. It was through him that Sankoh was able to make the trip to Libya.

[11] Jimmy Kande took the university to court and won; Hanciles and Gordon were [illegible]

All those who went to Libya for military and ideological training in 1987–8 and later, like Sankoh, became involved in the RUF, returned to Sierra Leone before the launching of the armed struggle. Back in Freetown, an attempt was made to recruit cadres for training at a farm in the vicinity of Yele, a small road junction settlement in Tonkolili District, on the provincial boundary between northern and southern Sierra Leone. The project was abandoned as too risky.

It could hardly be said that there was an organization. 'At the beginning, there was no leadership. All of us were [*sic*] all organizers,' Sankoh has revealed.[13] At this stage the movement was little more than a loose collection of individuals returned from military training in Benghazi. Of the 35 people who were trained in Libya, only three had any form of regular employment. There was a high school teacher, an engineer, and Sankoh, an itinerant photographer. Most of those who took part in the military and ideological training later opted out of the counter-insurgency project, partly because it was too risky. Even the expelled student radicals from FBC who had gone to Ghana to continue their education abandoned the project as a result of their experiences in Ghana and Libya.[14] Their exit from the project, according to Alie Kabba, who was the coordinator, opened the way for the 'wrong kind individuals'.[15] These individuals included Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray, all of whom had gone to Benghazi for insurgency training, via Accra.

Forming a tight-knit group in Freetown, the three embarked on another recruitment drive among 'lumpens'. This time they decided to leave the city and settle in the provinces. From the time they left Libya in 1988 until they entered Sierra Leone as armed combatants in 1991, this trio travelled extensively throughout the country and in Liberia, quietly promoting their dream. In 1988 Sankoh met Charles Taylor, recently released from detention in Freetown. This meeting appears to have been the beginning of Sankoh's links with Taylor. Some RUF members, notably Mansaray and Kanu, fought alongside National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) combatants in Liberia, so that by 1991, when the RUF entered Sierra Leone, they were supported by an NPFL group – 'special forces' – under the command of Mansaray. They were also joined by lumpen Sierra Leoneans resident in Liberia.[16]

Paul Richards has suggested that the RUF planned to imitate a number of features of the initial successful incursion by NPFL forces into north-eastern Liberia, where the local population in Nimba County were ardent opponents of the Doe regime.[17] This could have been the case, for the early RUF appropriated most of its strategy and tactics from the Liberian experience.[18] Sankoh and the RUF obviously hoped to repeat the trick in eastern Sierra Leone, where the Kailahun people in particular were long-term opponents of the APC regime.

[13] Sankoh, *Concord Times*, 10 December 1996.

[14] For details see Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Bush path to destruction: the origins and character of the Revolutionary United Front(RUF/SL)', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1998.

[15] Alie Kabba, *Leonenet*, 19 December 1996.

[16] See the RUF propaganda pamphlet, *Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone*, Vol. 1, (1995), where this group is referred to as 'migrant workers'.

[17] See Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest*.

[18] [illegible]

5006
8244

The Dynamics of War

Insurrection first phase, 1991–3

The RUF entered Sierra Leone from Liberia, at Bomaru in Kailahun District and Mano River Bridge, Pujehun District, on 23 March 1991. Two small forces, about 100–150 in all, captured border towns and villages in what Richards has referred to as a pincer movement intended to encircle Bo and Kenema, the main regional centres in the east and south of Sierra Leone.[19] The RUF failed to take the strategic Moa bridge at Daru, or establish a link between the two groups at Joru south of Kenema. The southern group later pushed across Pujehun District to infiltrate Bo District from the south.

Envisaging support in a border region opposed for many years to the government of the APC, the RUF seized and summarily executed chiefs, traders, village elders, agricultural project workers and other government agents, NPFL style, but also made attempts forcibly to recruit individuals known locally for their opposition to the APC regime.[20] Some of these later became prominent in the leadership of the RUF.

The original insurgency forces which took Kailahun and Pujehun Districts were charged with the responsibility of establishing training bases and securing a swathe of territory, to facilitate the deployment of RUF forces which would advance further into Sierra Leone and bolster the border areas against anti-NPFL United Liberation Movement for Democracy (Ulimo) forces that were being recruited and re-armed by Nigerian and Sierra Leonean instructors.[21] Although forewarned by military intelligence, the APC regime failed to deploy substantial defensive troops and materiel in the vulnerable border area.[22]

The reaction of the civil population amongst whom the RUF hoped to foster their 'revolution' was at best ambiguous, notwithstanding the fact that these two border districts had been the scene of violent political opposition to the APC regime. On one hand alluvial diamond mining and the rich pickings of a parallel smuggler's economy had attracted lumpen youth to these areas, despairing at the malaise of economic and political exclusion but bristling with an overweening determination for self-advancement and prosperity. Here was a reserve army of fighting men who were attracted by the simplistic 'emancipatory' rhetoric of the RUF's ill-defined ideas, and motivated by the acquisition of wealth through looting, and of authority by wresting control from both the local and national political authorities whom they blamed for their predicament and the agony of the nation as a whole. The 'freedom-fighter' mantle – idealized in *pote* culture and given resonance by the RUF's appeal and initial success – coupled with the reversal of social hierarchy through the possession of the means of violence, had long been perceived

[19] Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest*.

[20] This contrasts sharply with the Liberian experience, where individuals willingly joined the invading forces. See Stephen Ellis's chapter in this volume.

[21] P. K. Muana, interview with ex-combatants, October 1996.

in the lumpen world view as a necessary route to heroism and self-actualization. On the other hand, the apprehension of a settled civil population was reinforced by testimonies of brutality from the Liberian crisis, and flight from RUF fighters became the ultimate security option for self-preservation. There was little scope for the transformation of political dissent in these areas into revolutionary fervour. Instead, the empowerment of the socially excluded with access to the instruments of violence and therefore power in a state teetering on the brink of collapse was more conducive to unbridled violence than was consistent with an agenda for revolutionary change.

Young people with some schooling – girls as well as boys – were taken for guerrilla training. Those without education were assigned labouring tasks. The Freetown *pote* culture already present in the hinterland provided a natural recruiting ground for the movement. The number of *potes* in Bo, Kenema and Koidu had increased from three or four in the early 1970s to a dozen or more in the early 1990s. Some, like those in Bo, were controlled by APC youth leaders as potential sources for the recruitment of political thugs. Others, such as those in Koidu and Kenema, had occupational linkages, serving as a centres for unemployed drivers awaiting casual work. As in Freetown, the hinterland *potes* were centres where school drop-outs and the young unemployed converged, took recreational drugs and exchanged political ideas. They also supplied drugs and served as meeting places for illicit diamond miners, locally referred to as '*san-san* boys'. It was from this group of alienated lumpen youths, who were engaged in what was probably the oldest form of collective lumpen resistance in Sierra Leone, illicit diamond mining, that the RUF recruited the bulk of its combatants during this phase. The current RUF strong man, Colonel Sam Bockarie (Maskita) was an illicit diamond miner, before moving to Liberia, where he was recruited by the RUF.

Recreational life in these illicit diamond enclaves reproduced the *pote* culture in the urban centres. In forcibly recruiting barely literate hinterland school children and the likes of diamond-digging *san-san* boys, the RUF had a confident expectation that it would be able to turn a significant number of captives into enthusiastic supporters of the movement, based upon a shared lumpen culture and political consciousness. The evidence is that many captives were quickly convinced by the movement's simplistic political analysis. The RUF's consistent 'political' message to recruits was simply that the country was immensely rich in mineral wealth controlled by a few Lebanese and business men with political connections, that the time for reasoned debate had passed, and that lasting solutions to the country's chronic economic and political problems could be found only through an explosion of destructive violence.

A significant portion of the Liberia border region into which the RUF incursion spilled is forested boundary enclave with considerable scope for clandestine smuggling, logging and diamond digging activities.[23] One of the options for young lumpens seeking a job was to drift into this off-limits frontier area and participate in illicit activities. The RUF pincer movement encircled this zone, and found within it considerable numbers of potential recruits sharing the lumpen worldview of the RUF leadership.

If the RUF was able to garner support from the alienated and uprooted youth ngaged in illicit mining as a result of shared culture and worldview, it could not gain ready acceptance among the settled civilian communities of the region, despite heir political alienation from the APC regime. Any potential civilian enthusiasm for he RUF was stifled by the looting and indiscriminate violence of the Liberian special forces', an integral part of the original invading force. Sankoh, the RUF eader, justified looting by Liberians as 'reward' for their support. His dependence on these Liberians had great political costs for the RUF, since civilians in regions nder RUF control, already alienated from the APC regime in Freetown, quickly ame utterly to detest the RUF as well. This double alienation paved the way for he emergence of the popular Kamajo militia, eventually to prove a decisive factor n the war.[24]

Many captives perhaps only grudgingly accepted the anti-social political violence f the RUF in the first instance, but in order to survive they had little option but to djust to its lumpen vision. Once sucked into the RUF, young border-zone captives ound it impossible to quit. Deserters tattooed with RUF 'ID' risked summary xecution by both RUF and the Sierra Leone army. Throughout the war and into he ceasefire period, those who sought to demobilize themselves were trapped by his suicidal double jeopardy, and by the expectation of revenge at the hands of rural ivilians who judged all members of the movement by the values of its lumpen eadership.[25]

Counter-insurgency operations, 1991–2

The RUF guerrilla operation bogged down in mid-1991 after the failure of early ttempts to take Bo in a conventional military operation and establish a regional entre similar to Charles Taylor's base, Gbarnga. This provided the APC regime with ome brief respite. Lacking confidence in its own army, the APC began to arm anti-NPFL irregulars from among Liberian refugees living in the border region. Some of hese refugees were ex-soldiers in the Liberian army with combat experience against he NPFL in the war in Liberia. The Sierra Leone army also began recruitment of regular forces from among border-zone youth, teaching them guerrilla tactics as leployed by both the NPFL and the RUF. The lead was taken, as early as April 991, in Kailahun, by a young lieutenant from Segbwema, Prince Ben-Hirsch. ome recruited youths had lost parents or guardians in the first wave of RUF attacks nd were keen for revenge. Others were seeking, in military training, a substitute for ducational opportunities disrupted by the conflict. Older recruits were inducted nto the army. Very young irregulars were taken on as 'apprentices', personally loyal o their recruiting officer, without army identification. A combatant refers to this fficer as his or her *bra* (big brother). Like the rebels, the government side also ecruited young girls, some of whom proved highly effective combatants. These uvenile and under-age combatants became the canon fodder in the war, with drugs eing used as 'morale boosters' to get them into action.[26]

[24] See Patrick Muana, 'The Kamajo militia: civil war, internal displacement and the politics of counter-insurgency', in Abdullah and Bangura, *African Development*.

[25] Interviews with [illegible]

Strengthened by Guinean troops, under a defence pact between Sierra Leone and Guinea, and later by a contingent of Nigerians (deployed in Sierra Leone essentially to protect the rear bases of the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG peace-keeping operation in Liberia), the national army, assisted both by local irregular recruits and by Liberian irregulars later reorganized as Ulimo, began to counter-attack RUF positions from July 1991. Expecting an easy walk-over, RUF units were surprised by this offensive and several times evacuated positions especially in Pujehun District, without a fight. By September, government troops had recaptured Pujehun Town and were in control of main roads and some larger settlements as far as the Liberian border. From early 1992 the RUF was mainly confined to the inaccessible south-eastern corner of Pujehun District (parts of Soro-Gbeima and Barrie Chiefdoms), and that part of Kailahun District north of Pendembu.

Young officers seize power: the military coup of 1992

Exactly a year after the insurgency started, a group of young military officers from the war front trooped to Freetown and seized power. This began as a revolt over pay and conditions by young officers from the front.[27] Calling itself the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), the group declared a 'revolution', and a commitment to end the war, revamp the economy, and restore multi-party democracy. Contacts between the RUF leadership and the NPRC were characterized by general mistrust. Whereas the junta considered the formation of a broad-based and inclusive transitional government, the RUF leadership called for the exclusion of former APC functionaries and a total purge of the civil service. The RUF also demanded the dismantling of all foreign military bases, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and the immediate incorporation of their representatives into the new regime. Fearing a backlash from civilians, and deeply suspicious of the request to dismiss all foreign troops as a precursor to a large-scale offensive by the NPFL in a bid to install the RUF and destroy forces opposed to it, the FIPRC suggested a compromise plan for a phased withdrawal, to be preceded by a disarmament of the RUF forces. But under increasing military pressure from Ulimo forces in Cape Mount and Lofa counties in Liberia, the NPFL is thought to have advised their RUF allies to dismiss the proposal for peace as a foreign ploy to destroy the movement. The RUF leadership declared the ceasefire null and void, and condemned the NPRC as a continuation of the APC regime. Henceforth, they were to be fought like their 'masters'.

The NPRC enthusiasm to end the war waned as the young officers became mired in the very corruption that had characterized the APC regime. The comforts of being in power ensured that the more battle-tested officers were now drawn to Freetown, far away from the war. The replacement of these officers by a group of relatively inexperienced ones turned the tide in the RUF's favour. The RUF mounted several successful raids and ambushes on these inexperienced commanders.

[27] See Cecil Magbailey Fyle, 'The military and civil society in Sierra Leone: the 1992 military *coup d'état*', in Abdullah and Bangura, eds, *African Development*, pp. 123–46; A. B. Zack-Williams and Steve [illegible]

Perhaps disgruntled by their treatment under the NPRC, officers abandoned positions that might have been better defended. Some appear to have paid more attention to diamond mining than to basic defence.[28]

Much more important was the expansion of the army to bring a speedy end to the war, and to reward its predominantly youthful constituency. Those recruited in this hasty exercise were 'mostly drifters, rural and urban unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts and thieves'.[29] They came from the same social group as the RUF combatants. It is therefore not surprising that these lumpen recruits and the irregular elements in the new and expanded army freely admit to living off the brutal exploitation of civilians in the war zone. Control by officers was often minimal. For civilians caught in the war zone, conditions on the government side came increasingly to resemble those for civilians on the rebel side of the conflict. Overnight, the army became indistinguishable from the RUF.

Paranoid about the threat of an AFC counter-coup, the NPRC executed a large group of political detainees at the end of December 1992, provoking a major outcry over human rights, and losing the country international support. The regime also lost local popular support as civilians began to suffer the consequences of a new enlarged, ill-trained, under-paid lumpen army scattered around the country in makeshift barracks and roadside checkpoints. RUF units began to exploit their knowledge of various smugglers' tracks and pathways linking the Kono diamond fields and the Liberian cross-border region where they had their main bases. Several effective incursions in September 1992 were followed by a major attack leading to the capture from government troops of Koidu, the main town in the Kono diamond region, in October 1992. As one of the country's main sources of foreign exchange, control of Kono was hotly contested. The RUF infiltrated the diamond-rich areas of Kono not so much as a way of establishing operational bases deep within Sierra Leone, but as a way of looting the rich bounty in that part of the country.

Outside the actual war zone, civilians quickly came to loathe the lumpen recruits in the NPRC-expanded army, suspecting them of causing as much mayhem as the rebels, and coining the term 'sobel' to account for the criminal behaviour of these ill-disciplined recruits. But in the eastern war zone, close to the RUF main concentrations along the Liberian border, matters were rather different. Here the activities of army-linked irregulars often had the support of local civilians. Civil defence groups were formed, with input from local hunters, and alliances began to develop between army irregulars and civil defence groups. Unable to control civilian enclaves except through coercion and fear, the RUF was denied access to any similar pool of local tactical and combat knowledge, and was dependent on the less certain bush knowledge of dragooned captives.

With the army concentrating its efforts on retaking and securing the Kono diamond fields, the by now well-armed Border Guard and other irregular units, supported by specialist hunters, many by origin from northern Sierra Leone, brought increasingly effective pressure to bear on RUF bases in the border zone

[28] See Arthur Abraham, 'War and transition to peace in Sierra Leone: a study of state conspiracy in perpetuating armed conflict', in Abdullah and Bangura, eds, *African Development*.

during 1993. By the end of the year, eye witnesses describe a bedraggled RUF leadership contingent quitting Kailahun town with a couple of broken-down vehicles, driving a group of displaced civilians ahead of them to spring any ambushes on the road, heading in the direction of the border forest reserves to the south.[30] Here they fetched up in a last redoubt – Nomo Chiefdom, an inaccessible finger of land along the Liberian border, partly cut off from the rest of Sierra Leone by the forested curtain of the Gola North reserve. The country at large, increasingly disillusioned with the NPRC, decided that the war was over, and that only 'banditry, looting, maiming and raping' remained.[31] An army commander echoed similar views: 'there are rebels among us [soldiers], there are mercenaries among us, some of them our own people. The problem is not the RUF alone.'[32] It was widely assumed that lumpen recruits in the national army were reverting to criminal behaviour.

At this point, the RUF leadership contemplated abandoning its struggle to return to Liberia.[33] But after Charles Taylor's attempt to take Monrovia – Operation Octopus, December 1992 – ran up against stiff ECOMOG opposition, this line of retreat was blocked by Ulimo control of the Liberian side of the border zone. To survive as a guerrilla movement, tactics had to be changed. The organization was too weak and poorly equipped to risk direct confrontation with a much better-armed enemy. Small towns were evacuated, vehicles were abandoned, and the leadership adapted to life in a series of secure forest hide-aways. Henceforth, combat operations were limited to ambush and hit-and-run raids. RUF units were instructed to strike 'softer targets' – positions not heavily defended – and seize arms and ammunition. Contact with enemy forces was to be avoided, and RUF units were ordered to infiltrate enemy territory by way of 'by-passes' or bush paths, to raid villages and ambush government forces. Small units began a pattern of deploying knowledge of bush tracks to strike at all parts of the country, apparently at will. Terror tactics, such as hostage taking and mutilation of civilians, were used to signal the desperate determination of the movement to survive and enter negotiation with the regime.

Cheated of its lumpen constituency, the RUF meanwhile opened up the wedge between civilians and the NPRC by disguising many of its own attacks as raids by army personnel, having obtained army-pattern combat fatigues and identity in raids and deals with corrupt army officers. Most weapons and ammunition came from raids on the national army forward supply posts. Some were imported by selling diamonds across the border to Liberia and Guinea.

War without front-line: the second phase, 1994–7

During this period, a reinvigorated RUF duplicated its initial secure border-zone forest camps in strategic parts of the country, connecting them by movements along secured bush trails towards Freetown. This scatter of camps then provided a platform for a second expansive phase of RUF operations: a nation-wide campaign

[30] See Abraham, 'War and transition', Lansana Gberie, 'War and state collapse: the case of Sierra Leone' (MA dissertation, Wilfred Laurier University, 1997).

[31] Chairman Strasser, Head of State, cited in *Vision* (Freetown), 22–29 July 1994.

[32] Brigadier Kellie Conteh, 'Open letter to His Excellency Captain Strasser', December 1995, cited in Abraham, 'War and transition'.

of hit-and-run raids reaching all parts of the country in late 1994 to early 1995. There was no front-line, and the national army was spread thinly across the country.

Key targets included direct attacks on the major hinterland centres of Bo and Kenema at Christmas 1994, a series of ambushes on main roads leading from the hinterland to the capital, and strikes against the Njala campus and the economically vital bauxite and rutile mines in the south of the country. Small raiding parties – at times no more than a platoon, accompanied by unarmed juveniles carrying equipment and stores – carried out hit-and-run raids far and wide, and returned to base-camps with looted items. Captive youngsters, rounded up initially to carry looted items, were inducted as potential new recruits. One long-distance strike on Kabala, a town in the far north of Sierra Leone, was apparently intended to challenge the power of a powerful hunter magician based in Kabala, who had been advising the NPRC war effort in Kailahun. The raiding party encountered two British volunteer workers in a house at the edge of the town who were seized as hostages. Subsequently more foreign hostages were taken, the RUF using negotiations over their release as a means to bring the movement publicity. But the immediate political objective was to make the country ungovernable, and therefore force the military junta to yield and include them in a transitional government. Thus commenced the bloodiest phase in the civil war.

Hit-and-run raids on all parts of the country, including the town of Kambia in January 1995, at the furthest provincial extremity from the RUF's initial point of entry into Sierra Leone, conveyed an impression of remorseless advance across the country towards the capital. So effective was this message that by early 1995 aid agencies began to evacuate personnel from Freetown, apparently convinced the RUF now had the upper hand. The national mood swung from the view that the violence was all the work of disloyal soldiers to a belief that the renascent RUF was all powerful.

There can be little doubt that there was civilian disillusionment with the NPRC military government, aided by the RUF in its renaissance and advance on Freetown. There was much justified public disquiet at the way in which members of the NPRC regime had begun to enrich themselves from the war.[34] The suspicion grew that the regime was prolonging the war in order to create further opportunities for enrichment. This was reinforced by evidence that some war-front officers, perhaps to save their skins in vulnerable forward positions, were fraternizing with the enemy. Some appear to have abandoned materiel to RUF attack, perhaps by prior arrangement and for financial gain. Equally, there seems little doubt that ill-disciplined elements among the junior ranks were routinely harassing citizens and engaging in extensive looting. Civilians in the war zone became familiar with two-phase attacks: first a lightning raid by RUF forces in which weapons, medicines and young people might be carried away, and then a second wave in which defending troops would descend on an area with trucks to carry away heavy items, including zinc roofing materials, abandoned by fleeing civilians. Kellie Conteh and Joy Turay, force commanders under the NPRC, were on record as admitting that the regime did not control large sections of the army. The popular perception was that the country had fallen victim to a new species of armed men – 'sobels'.

Two new strategic factors on the government side began increasingly to make their mark on the conflict from mid-1995. The first was the introduction of a private South Africa-based security firm, Executive Outcomes (EO). The second and more decisive factor was the strengthening of the civil defence units, known as the Kamajo militia. With never more than a few hundred combat personnel in Sierra Leone (and latterly as few as 82), the main significance of EO was to provide training in counter-insurgency to the army, and helicopter air support for pinning down troops close to RUF camps. EO also helped locate RUF base camps by tracking and triangulating rebel radio communications.

The Kamajo intervention appears to have had a decisive impact on the war. The bush knowledge of the *san-san* boys and city lumpens, who were by now in control of the fighting forces, was mainly confined to by-pass routes associated with smuggling and clandestine diamond mining operations. Long-distance raiding parties, although guided by captives from the local area, not infrequently lost their way in trying to stay away from suspicious individuals. Guides with real bush knowledge were often only reluctant converts to the cause, and sometimes led parties up the wrong path only to cut and run. What made a decisive difference to the campaigns against the RUF from 1993-4 onwards was the mobilization of a mass civil defence movement with superior local knowledge of the terrain. This began with the formation of the Eastern Region Defence Committee by the late Dr Alpha Lavalie, and continued on a large scale as a mass movement in 1996, when regent chief Captain Hinga Norman was appointed as Deputy Minister of Defence. These Kamajo forces were groups of local youth with a shared knowledge of local bush tracks and ambush points, often far superior to that of the enemy. Unlike the army and the RUF, they enjoyed the support of local civilians.

By early 1995, displaced people had begun to realize that deserting their respective chiefdoms gave the RUF a huge strategic and political advantage, since their control of the 'footpaths to democracy' was unchallenged. Chiefs and other chiefdom elders decided that they had to occupy and re-settle their vacated chiefdoms in the war zone. Unable to trust the government troops, Pujehun chiefs initially inquired about the availability of Nigerian peace-keeping forces. A more durable alternative was to expand the training of the kinds of Kamajo civil defence units organized by Hinga Norman, which had proved effective in controlling RUF incursions in Gbongor Chiefdom, adjacent to the diamond-rich Sewa area. The idea of resettling chiefdoms accompanied by Kamajo militia forces rapidly became popular among the displaced population of camps in Bo and Kenema. Displaced civilian groups nominated and sponsored many of their own young people for Kamajo training and initiation. Units were organized in such a way that combatants were posted only to their own chiefdoms, to ensure loyalty, discipline and a bush knowledge superior to that of the RUF. The revered and ancient esoteric Mende cult of invincible and heroic hunters was revived as a communal militia, chosen from, trained within, and responsible to the people. Only lightly armed with shotguns, knives and the occasional captured AK47, Kamajo combatants went into battle against the hitherto invisible RUF.[35] Armed thus with social as well as with technical combat skills, Kamajo units began to track and counter-attack RUF groups moving over bush

paths to carry out raids or secure supplies, limiting RUF freedom to organize and exchange supplies.

The Kamajo battle song captures the collective imagination about the war and people's perception of the RUF. In this collective representation the RUF is depicted as a criminal organization that deserves to be fought at all cost.[36]

Who set the *dambi*?
Who set the *dambi* on our forefathers' land?
Who set the *dambi* along our rivers?
Who set the *dambi* in our bushes?
Please tell me, who set the *dambi*?

We set the *dambi*
We, the Kamajo, set the *dambi*

Why did you set the *dambi*?
Please, tell me, for whom did you set the *dambi*?
Which animal do you hope to trap with the *dambi*?
Please, tell me, why you set the *dambi* on our forefather's land?

We set the *dambi* before the rebels
Because the rebels killed our forefathers
Because the rebels killed our mothers
Because the rebels raped our wives
Because the rebels raped our mothers
Because the rebels raped our sisters
Because the rebels have made us into a displaced people.

Tell me, again, why you set the *dambi* before the rebels.
Please tell me why you set the *dambi* before the rebels
Tell me why it was necessary to set the *dambi*
Please tell me again why it was necessary to set the *dambi* on our forefathers' land

We set the *dambi* in order to return to our homes.
We set the *dambi* in order to farm in our forefathers' land.
We set the *dambi* in order to protect our wives.
We set the *dambi* in order to protect our mothers
We set the *dambi* in order to protect our sisters.
And we kill rebels in order to make our land safe

The *dambi* is the Mende word for trap, which essentially portrays how the people see the RUF, or the rebels, as they are locally called. As animals preying on the land of their 'forefathers', they are seen as fair game to be hunted down and killed in order to protect the community.

The Kamajo offensive was so devastating that the RUF had to admit that their enemy was the Kamajo, not the army. It forced the RUF to resort to a series of appalling atrocities intended to break the cooperative link between rural civilians and the civil defence militia. But the evident need to protect isolated groups of civilians from these barbaric attacks only served to boost recruitment and deployment. Supported by more conventional forms of military intelligence provided by Executive Outcomes, the superior bush knowledge of the Kamajo had a decisive impact, in allowing army-Kamajo units to locate and surround the main RUF camps during the latter half of 1996. The RUF headquarters camp, the Zogoda, and several other key camps in the south-east were overrun in September–October 1996, and several thousand RUF combatants killed or put to flight. Many RUF combatants fled over the border into Liberia. Peace negotiations, which started under Brigadier Maada Bio in February 1996, were resumed under the popularly elected government of President Kabba, leading to a comprehensive peace agreement signed on 30 November 1996.

[36] We are grateful to Professor Kelfala Kallon for calling our attention to this song, and for supplying

The RUF as a Guerrilla Movement[37]

Leadership: Sankoh and the War Council

The RUF lumpen guerrilla force was first recruited by a small team: Sankoh, Kanu and Mansaray. At the outset Sankoh was first among equals, claiming the title 'head of ideology', and acting as spokesman for the group in speaking to the BBC African service in London, while disclaiming presidential ambitions. The initial trio was augmented by other leading figures, some recruited in Liberia, but others captured or abducted once the movement was in Sierra Leone. One Philip Palmer from Bonthe District, an engineering graduate from FBC working in Liberia, who fought in the southern (Pujehun) sector in 1991, later emerged as an influential figure in the peace process.[38] Once the war started there were some defections, as the violent impact of the Liberian special forces on Sierra Leonean civilians became clear. The RUF also lost leaders both in combat and through internal dissension. Blamed for military reverses against the NPRC, Rashid Mansaray and 'Commander' Fengbeh were executed in 1992 in Kailahun for 'technical sabotage' (failure to defend a position).[39]

Just as the lumpen guerrilla force was augmented by rounding up potentially amenable *san-san* boys and school drop-outs in the border zone, so the depleted leadership group was later augmented by capturing and enlisting local opponents of the APC regime. Two such figures were I. H. Deen-Jalloh, a lecturer from the rural teacher's training college at Bunumbu, and his wife Agnes Deen-Jalloh, a Sierra Leone school teacher. Another captive recruited to the leadership was Fayia Musa, from one of the Kissi chiefdoms in Kailahun District. Noted from his early school days for his contentiousness, Musa had crossed paths with authority at Njala, where he became a student in the 1970s. Twice failing his exams and repeating years, he was

[37] The information contained in this section is taken from a collective study commissioned by the Sierra Leone Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation: Paul Richards, Ibrahim Abdullah, Joseph Amara, Patrick Muana, Teddy Stanley and James Vincent, *Reintegration of War-Affected Youth and Ex-Combatants: a Study of the Social and Economic Opportunity Structure in Sierra Leone*, 1996.

[38] Palmer led the coup against Sankoh in March 1997; he and other members of the group, all educated, are presumed dead.

[39] Abu Kanu, a leading vanguard and founding member, was executed in 1991 for conspiring with

inally sent down without graduating. When taken by the RUF in 1991, Musa was a low-paid agricultural assistant in a rural secondary school in Kailahun. He claimed that his conversion to RUF-style violent radicalism was precipitated by a speech in which APC president Momoh announced that the government considered education a privilege, not a right. As 'Minister of Agriculture', Musa was in charge of the so-called state farms established in the early phase of the war, which turned out to be a thinly disguised system of slavery.

It is difficult to ascertain how influential these educated members were in the movement in general, or how much leverage they had on the fighting forces. They certainly contributed to its development, particularly in the sphere of public relations and in publicizing the struggle, especially during the hostage crisis and the negotiations in Ivory Coast. But the important question remains: why did they fail to attract any support from the battle group and battle front commanders when they deposed Sankoh for blocking the implementation of the peace proposal? The answer may well be that the civilian members who were not lumpen did not share the world view of the predominantly lumpen commanders. It is therefore not surprising that, apart from Philip Palmer, all of them joined the movement after it entered Sierra Leone. In the absence of Sankoh, who was detained in March 1997 by the Nigerians in growing frustration at the failure of the peace process, the future of the conflict rested solely with the lumpen vanguard battle group commanders, especially Colonel Sam Bockarie and Lieutenant Collins, and their new-found allies in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), formed after the bloody take-over of 25 May 1997.

Officers and other ranks

RUF 'battalions' are made up of combatants in the following categories: 'vanguards' (instructors in RUF ideology, consisting of guerrilla trainers, senior battle group commanders and more junior battle front commanders); Special Forces ('Liberians', latterly perhaps mainly persons of Liberian origin but with a family connection with Sierra Leone, who accounted for a significant number of senior officers in the RUF); *Salon wosus* (rank-and-file combatants, recruited mainly by capture but converts to the cause, trained, and allowed to carry weapons), 'standbys' (captives under training, of unproven loyalty and competence), and 'recruits' (fresh intake).

Any combatant selected to command a mission is known as 'CO'. Those leading attacks on major RUF targets are 'battle front commanders', and typically hold RUF ranks of Lieutenant and Captain. The more senior 'battle group commanders' are responsible for coordination and command of all battle front commanders in their sectors. Holding the rank of Major or above, battle group commanders have a voice on the War Council. Until 1996, the most senior of these commanders was Lieutenant-Colonel Mohammed Tarawallie ('Colonel Zino'), a fair-complexioned man of medium height in his late 20s or early 30s, who was killed when the Kamajo overran the Zogoda.

The 'vanguard' and *wosu* groups contain some female combatants. The greater number of women in the RUF, however, belong to two groups known as Combat

Women in the Wives Unit and later Combat Wives Units were armed with 'sista beretta' (mainly Beretta submachine guns), they were charged with responsibility for policing gatherings of the captive population and occasionally acted as bodyguards. Some were later involved in 'special missions' – infiltrating 'enemy territory', and running 'survival missions' into large civilian settlements behind enemy lines in order to purchase essential commodities and medicine.

The Internal Defence Unit (IDU) is the 'intelligence' arm of the RUF. Tasks include carrying out reconnaissance (infiltration of target areas, procurement of vital supplies), target assessment (estimating army strength and materiel, and prospecting possible routes to targets and new camps from which to mount attacks), general military intelligence, liaison between commanders of battle groups and battle fronts, monitoring movements of civilians and RUF personnel in RUF-controlled enclaves (informing HQ for action), liaison with RUF head of ideology (Foday Sankoh), and monitoring deployment of civilian captives. Headed by I. H. Deen-Jalloh, the unit was once known as G 2, but the name was changed at a conference in Kailahun in 1992, after an operational mix-up with a similarly named NPRC organization. IDU representatives are present in all operational areas, even during combat.

RUF combat groupings

During the 1994 revival the RUF established a national network of six or more main combat groupings or 'battalions', based in camps in isolated and readily defended forest enclaves in strategic parts of the country, as a basis for its attempted advance on Freetown. The main concentrations so far identified were to be found as follows: Malal Hills (overlooking the Freetown–Makeni highway) was responsible for attacks on Kambia District in January 1995, during which a small group of expatriate nuns and a hundred or so children from Kambia Town were taken hostage. Fearing air attack (the NPRC government had at this time acquired the services of two or three Russian-built helicopter transports), the group rebuilt its camp at the other end of the Malal Hills, and then advanced to a new site in the vicinity of Rotifunk, from where the army post at Mile 38 on the Freetown road and villages close to the capital were attacked. Some ambushes on vehicle convoys on the Bo–Freetown road appear to have been made from a forward position at Makeni-Rofula.

Others were located around Kangari Hills, Geima, close to the Liberian border in Kailahun, and at Peyeima, based in the forested country behind Panguma, with access to the Tongo diamond field; the Sendumei-Jui group was located in a forested ridge south of the Kambui forest reserves; the Sulima group was in the south-east of the country where it could control supplies in and out of Liberia and on the coast. In addition, the RUF maintained a headquarters camp, where Sankoh and many of the War Council appear to have been based, at the Zogoda, an elaborate defensive installation in flat forested country east of the Moa and north of Zimmi. Site descriptions from visiting combatants suggest a location in the Gola forest west reserve. It was from here that Foday Sankoh was airlifted by helicopter to begin the peace negotiations in Abidjan in January 1996. The base was overrun and destroyed

5012
8250

nd the Kamajo forces discovered large numbers of severely malnourished civilian aptives and only very limited supplies of munitions. Anti-aircraft guns at the site were non-operational.

Guerrilla operations

The RUF was never a formidable military force. Whenever a position was seriously lefended by the army, as at Daru and Joru in 1991, the rebels ran into difficulty. When operating in remote and lightly defended forested terrain the RUF expanded apidly, not through fighting but through imposing itself by spooking small and solated army units and then controlling civilians through fear. Among the tactics ised, the RUF particularly favoured letters written to village chiefs, warning of lates of attack and consequences of resistance. Alleged opponents of the rebels were ounded up and beaten, tortured or publicly executed. Some of the methods – eheading by knife, for example – were intended to terrorize witnesses. Body nutilation (carving the letters RUF into the skin, or amputation of hands, ears, ingers and genitals) was also used to punish recalcitrants and signal certain kinds of nessages to civilians. Amputations and mutilations were used to deter women from arvesting in areas outside RUF control, to 'punish' civilians for attempting to vote n the 1996 elections, and to 'mark' potential runaways so that they would not discond again. Some specific forms of punitive torture were imported from the Liberian civil war. To *tabay* people meant to tie them so tightly (with wet ropes) that rms and shoulders were permanently damaged. Civilians were also sometimes stripped naked, arms and feet tied, and then beaten from point to point while lying prone, a punishment known as *halaka*.

Post-1993 guerrilla operations emphasized small units making long-distance hit-and-run raids, using RUF command of bush 'by-pass' routes. RUF units were especially skilled at spying out the ground, camping for periods in the bush, and mounting ambushes. A 'relay' system was used, known as 'soldier replaces dead soldier'. Combat reserves were termed 'standbys' (young recruits not yet qualified to carry arms in their own right). On operations, units might make temporary bush camps, with a main section for *wosus* and a separate section for officers. Burning vehicles and seizing and eating cooked food in villages were forbidden (the latter perhaps a measure to avoid poisoning). Commanders were under orders to control rape, looting and drug abuse, and some ruled their potentially unruly lumpen troops with an iron rod of summary execution. The movement's leadership insists it had a well-disciplined guerrilla force at its command, and that RUF discipline prevented unsanctioned rape, looting or drug abuse. Abuses are laid at the door of government troops and 'sobels'. But in many cases it is absolutely clear that commanders sanctioned rape and torture of civilians as a means to control local populations. It is also clear from talking to combatants that both sides in the war tolerated and in some case actually encouraged use of drugs like amphetamines and crack cocaine, as ways of preparing terrified young combatants for battle. Combatants on both sides also report having used marijuana extensively. Before major battles RUF fighters were officially 'de-sensitized' with a concoction of amphetamines and herbal intoxicant in order to eliminate a sense of fear on the

RUF 'civil administration'

After the resurgence of the bush war in early 1994, RUF units avoided residing permanently in villages, especially roadside settlements where the army could counter-attack. Isolated civilian enclaves were controlled from the secure forest camps where the combatants were based. These civilian enclaves were administered under the RUF's so-called 'ideology system'. The head of ideology, Foday Sankoh, reportedly lectured recruits on the reason for the insurrection. At the RUF's vocational secondary school training base at Pendembu, his tirade against the APC regime effectively convinced most recruits to embrace the RUF motto 'arms to the people, power to the people, and wealth to the people'.

The ideology system involved appointing civilian collaborators – often young people with some lumpen sympathies – to act as civil authorities under the RUF. These civilians were known as 'town', 'area' and 'section' commanders, and 'town mothers' (women chiefs), assisted by 'civil police' and 'military police'. Under the ideology system, combatants were reportedly ordered not to take 'even a single needle' from the local population. In spite of this injunction, looting was widespread. Members were instructed to refer to one another as 'brother' or 'sister'. This policy was designed to effect a kind of lumpen bonding to replace the networks which connected members to the wider society. It was reinforced by the total exclusion of RUF fighters from the civilian population in what were referred to as 'Zoe' bushes (militarized camps). Some were even forced to witness or even participate in atrocities against captives or family members in their own towns and villages. The main duties of civil 'commanders' seem to have been to organize agriculture in the RUF interest, and maintain village discipline. They were empowered to oblige civilians to pay tax in kind and provide labour for RUF 'state farms', and could carry out summary executions. Town commanders were also obliged to look out for and return deserting rebel combatants. Deserters were either killed or their bodies marked with tattoos (mutilations in which the letters RUF were cut into the body with a razor and rubbed with lime). Some RUF civil commanders eased their plight by giving daughters to rebel combatants as wives.

The RUF in Comparative Context

The RUF has defied all available typologies on guerrilla movements. It is neither a separatist insurgency rooted in a specific demand, as in the case of Eritrea, nor a reformist insurgency with a radical agenda superior to the regime it sought to overthrow.[40] Nor does it possess the kind of leadership that would be necessary to designate it as a warlord insurgency. The RUF has made history, it is a peculiar guerrilla movement without any significant national following nor ethnic support. Perhaps because of its lumpen social base and its lack of an emancipatory programme to garner support from other social groups, it has remained a bandit organization solely driven by the survivalist needs of its predominantly uneducated and alienated

[40] For a typology of [illegible]

tle front and battle group commanders. Neither the peasantry, the natural ally of ost revolutionary movements, nor the students, amongst whose ranks the RUF- be originated, lent any support to the organization during the six years of ghting.

This lack of support begins to explain the initial isolation of the organization and e lack of knowledge about its activities. As Olu Gordon recently observed, the UF is 'an armed movement with a political objective' not 'a political movement than armed wing'. The RUF has emphasized the importance of military victory her than a solid programme of societal transformation, precisely because it does t have such a programme or the wherewithal to produce one. For what marks the UF is the chronic lack of cadres to disseminate its alleged egalitarian ideology, for ich it has come to depend on the those whom it abducted in the course of the r.[41]

The propaganda pamphlet hurriedly produced by the organization, *Foot Path to mocracy*, is a pathetic and well-worn criticism of the APC regime, culled from an iginal document produced by some of the expelled students in Ghana.[42] Unlike NITA or any of the liberation insurgencies, the RUF does not have any ogramme of societal transformation. All it could do at the peace negotiations in idjan was to make *ad hoc* populist demands about free education, free health care rvices, rural development and a people's budget. The movement does not have e intellectual capital that movements such as Renamo and UNITA had at their mmand, nor does it have a group of dedicated intellectuals; hence its reliance on a w captured educated members to negotiate on its behalf and run its intelligence rk.

The singular importance of the RUF as a guerrilla organization is that it has fied all radical pronouncements about the political importance of the lumpen oletariat in taking political action in its own interest. Originally a product of eetown youth culture, the movement entered Sierra Leone with combatants, stly urban lumpens, who were joined by another group of lumpen Sierra oneans resident in Liberia. Failing to receive the anticipated support from the ople, the RUF turned for support to its natural allies, the *san-san* boys, illicit amond miners in the communities of the south-east, the major theatre of war. his alliance is the secret of the movement's survival and the major reason for the ntinuation of the war. Once the Kamajo militia was formed, the movement lost me of this support, so that it had to depend on another group of lumpens in the litary who shared the same lumpen culture and interest as the RUF commanders: ncertainty about what an end to the war would mean for their collective well- ng. This congruence of interest between the two erstwhile enemies provided the sis for the alliance which led to the overthrow of the elected government of med Tejan Kabba on 25 May 1997.

The RUF's presence in the capital took away much of the mystery surrounding e movement. The ideas of the original vanguard leadership were shaped by the rban lumpen milieu portrayed at the outset of this chapter. This lumpen world was

[41] Olu Awoonor-Gordon, 'A nation held hostage,' in *For Di People* (Freetown), 12 June 1997.

[42] The second volume of this propaganda tract is still not published; some parts of it were taken from

transformed by the specific social conditions of Freetown in the 1970s and 1980s, in which a middle-class student element came into contact with the young un- employed in the *potes* associated with *odelay* masquerade. A lumpen rebellion was hatched as a result. The movement set out to round up and convert rural youths sharing aspects of this lumpen world view, and some isolated and angry individuals opposed to the decadent APC regime. Setting no limits on the use of violence for social destabilization, using techniques imported from the Liberian civil war, the original rebellion failed in its attempts to gain any significant civilian support in the border zone.

But an NPRC military regime, fired by some of the same simplistic views about revolutionary change, was soon mired by the same lumpen violence responsible for the political failure of the RUF. New recruits into a rapidly expanded army became as great a menace to rural civilians as the RUF. This gave the RUF, bogged down in forest reserves on the Liberian border, a second chance. It re-emerged from the forest, driven by the desperate ingenuity of its lumpen leadership and the stop-at-nothing propensity for shocking violence of its young combatants, cut off from a hostile and vengeful civil society and convinced that only victory would secure its readmission to that wider society. Finally, rural civilians came to realize the vulnerability of a movement based on shock tactics but without local support and legitimacy. The civilian Kamajo militia began to better the RUF at its own game of surprise attack based on unopposed movement through the bush. 'Footpaths to Democracy' soon became 'Bush Paths to Destruction' for the RUF.

Despite the limitations and failures of the RUF, the country – indeed the continent – will have to pay more attention to the frustrated energies of its lumpen 'revolutionaries' who are asking a poignant question about how the nation is being governed: 'Is it not more sensible to pull the rug from under such pampered feet by establishing our own self-subsisting habitation?'[43] Establishing their own self-subsisting habitation – that is to say, moving onto the centre stage in the historical process, as opposed to being marginal – is not only a RUF agenda but the lumpen project writ large.

[43] Wole Soyinka, *The Open Sore of a Continent*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 130.

1.401 823

of the organization.

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

5th May, 1992

His Excellency
CIC Charles Ghankay Taylor
President, P.R.L.A.C.
Gbarnga, Liberia

00029778

Dear Brother:

I am thanking you very much for the brotherly help you are rendering me in my liberation struggle. This struggle itself has reached a crucial and sensitive stage wherein I cannot afford to give up. However, there is an urgent need to sit and discuss issues on the current development in Sierra Leone and also on the deployment of ECOMOG at the borders. These events are crucial and we need to address ourselves to them. I am therefore requesting an audience with you before I leave.

I appreciate the five boxes of AK-47 rifle ammunition and the ten boxes of RPG gun rockets which I should receive from you today. But I have just received a radio message from General Bropoo that our men have encircled the Daru barracks and they are awaiting materials to do the final assault. I believe that what you have offered is not enough to carry out the "Operation Capture Daru". So I am asking you in the name of the Almighty God to kindly increase the number of boxes of AK-47 ammunition to (20) twenty and that of the RPG rockets to (12) twelve plus some berretta rounds. This will sustain me for some time while awaiting the long term supply that you have promised me. Moreover, it will boost the moral of my fighters who are in top form to advance on the enemies.

Lastly, today I am a common laughter because of lack of vehicle for my mobility. My only jeep is in the garage beyond repairs. I do ride on a toyota truck for a long distance journey but for lift here in town. Such practices pose a high risk to my security. But I have no alternative. I am asking you to arrest this situation by providing me even a second hand pickup to enhance my mobility.

While anticipating your usual consideration, I would be grateful to you for your continued support in my struggle to liberate my people.

Kindest regards,

Yours [illegible],

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

[illegible] Foday Sankoh

8254

PROCLAMATION ~~ORDERS~~ FOR KONO DIST. ~~CAPTURED DISTRICTS/ZONES~~

Assume that All Govt./Private, Properties public utilities be under the Command of RUF. ~~which includes, Kenema,~~ Kailahun and Other parts ~~inclusive~~.

Inview of this, it is necessary for us to set an Economic Recovery Committee. which will be responsible for the Security of the Companies, Govt. and Private Properties. This Committee should Comprise Seven members (4 Kono District Citizens) and 3 Soldiers. The target Commander, ~~the~~ over-all Commdr. and ~~the~~ a member of the High Command which will be appointed by the C.I.C. and the Secretary. SARAN

Functions

1. Secure all properties of the above named Sectors.
2. To ~~advise or~~ make a report to the leader of the Revolution of all Captured items for accountability.
3. To advise on the economy of captured material to the leader of the revolution for prompt ~~re formation~~ redress.
4. To take care of all abandoned mining equipments of both Govt. Lebanese and foreign
5. To allow noone to claim properties of any ~~Captured~~ Kind of remove the Liberated Zone.
6. To mobilize the workers as well as the people

00029779

2.646825



8256







8259



8260



8261



8262



8263



(7)

Witnessed event of Civilian Killed Jan., 6th 1999 in Freetown invasion

G. [illegible] 10/10/03

P0000066

8264



(8)

Witnessed Civilian Killed January 6th 1999 in Freetown Invasion

BMP
10/10/03

P0000067

2.068 8265



8266

8267



8268



8269



8240

8271

8274

8245

8276





8279





8281





8283

8284

8285

8286



8287

8288



8289



8290





168

8292



2.115

00028759

LIBERIA'S RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS OF HER INVOLVEMENT IN THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION,
CULTURAL AFFAIRS AND TOURISM
MONROVIA, LIBERIA
TEL: (231) 226078/22[illegible]62
FAX: (231) 226754

8978

LIBERIA'S RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS OF HER INVOLVEMENT IN THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR AND DISMISSES SUCH ACCUSATIONS AS AN INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY SPEARHEADED BY THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN IN AN ATTEMPT TO INTERNATIONALLY ISOLATE, ECONOMICALLY DESTROY AND POLITICALLY DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA. PRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF INFORMATION, J. MILTON TEAHJAY, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM, JANUARY 26, 1999.

00028760

INTRODUCTION

The Government of the Republic of Liberia has, over the past few months, come under intense international pressure largely spearheaded by the Governments of the United States and Britain asserting, inter alia, that Liberia is fueling the Sierra Leonean crisis by supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels fighting to overthrow the Government of President Tejan Kabbah. Liberia has also been accused of secretly committing fighting forces on the side of the rebels and has allegedly granted safe haven to some top AFRC/RUF officials in Monrovia.

The Liberian Government has categorically and repeatedly denied any military involvement in Sierra Leone. Liberia has also rejected and described as ridiculous the notion that she will be involved in attempts to destabilize any of her neighbours including Sierra Leone. The Liberian Government has gone

beyond mere denials and has proposed numerous options by which the allegations of her involvement could be disproved including, among other things, the constitution of a joint UN/ECOMOG border patrol contingent to monitor troops movement, and the setting-up of an international board of inquiry by the United Nations Secretary-General to investigate these accusations.

At the core of the onslaught against Liberia by the United States and Britain is the demonstrated failure and unquestionable inability of the two countries to evidentially prove their allegations against Liberia. Despite repeated challenges to authenticate their claims, the British and Americans have only relied on rumors, speculations and a massive disinformation campaign intended to internationally isolate, economically strangulate, and diplomatically destroy Liberia and, by so doing, to successfully dis-integrate ECOMOG which has earned the success-story of an African capacity to solve an African military problem in Liberia, culminating in the ushering in of a broad-based democratically elected government headed by Charles Taylor as President.

Interestingly, the Americans and the British have depended only on the unsubstantiated accounts of Sierra Leonean government officials, especially her Finance Minister, James Jonah, a well-connected veteran of the United Nations System, who meticulously uses his connections in the world body to scape-goat Liberia by deliberately ignoring the irrefutable evidence of American and British complicity calculated to

00028761

destabilize Sierra Leone by the use of private firms and individuals.

OBJECTIVES OF DOCUMENT

Fundamentally, the purpose of this document is to carefully provide a detailed account of Liberia's efforts, nationally and internationally, to bring peace to the Government and people of Sierra Leone and remove the existing notion that Liberia is providing arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels. Further, the document intends to undermine future efforts by western countries especially Britain and the United States aimed at playing one ECOWAS country against the other so that, ECOWAS, as a sub-regional economic and political organization, is substantially diminished in its future capacity to cohesively deal with subsequent political and/or military problems in any member-state.

Also, the document attempts to expose the extent to which international conspiracy of disinformation, lies and deceit, spearheaded by stronger powers can destroy smaller and weaker countries even in the face of the lack of material evidence of any kind to prove their allegations against the weaker and smaller nations.

And finally, the document seeks to call the attention of some liberal and reasonable members of the international community to the need to pressure the countries accusing Liberia to go beyond empty, circumstantial and unsubstantiated accusations

8296

by providing material evidence in support of their allegations.

WHO IS SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE AFRC/RUF REBELS IN SIERRA LEONE?

As far as physical evidence available to the international community is concerned, it is Britain, the former colonial master of Sierra Leone, that is supplying arms to the forces seeking the ouster of the Kabbah Government through private British companies and individuals. Using plausible deniability, however, the British Government has successfully disassociated itself from any involvement in the shipment of arms to the Sierra Leonean rebels. Specifically involved in the arms trade on behalf of the British Government are two British firms owned and operated by retired British military generals who, it is alleged, have strong connections with the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. Sky Air Cargo of London and Occidental Airlines, partly owned by a British Pilot are at the center of supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels.

It must be noted that Mr. Robin Cook's involvement in arms trade has a history. Last year, Robin Cook quickly came to the defense of Sky Air Cargo when that company was implicated in arms trafficking to Government forces for the restoration of President Kabbah. Mr. Cook has always been the first in the British Government to put up defense for private arms dealers to the rebels in Sierra Leone when ever such practice became scandalous and publicly embarrassing.

00028762

IS LIBERIA SUPPORTING THE AFRC/RUF REBELS?

The Government of Liberia has consistently and categorically denied providing any form of support, military, political or otherwise, to the AFRC/RUF rebels fighting the Government of President Tejan Kabbah. As a matter of fact, Liberia, at many international forums has repeatedly declared that it recognizes the Kabbah administration as the sole legitimate and constitutional political authority of the Republic of Sierra Leone and, as such, would do nothing to thwart and/or overturn the democratic will of the Sierra Leonean people by subverting their choice of government.

Additionally, except for colonial boundaries dividing Liberia and Sierra Leone, Liberia has consistently maintained that the people of the two countries are one and identical, politically and culturally. The traditional relationship between Liberians and Sierra Leoneans was so vividly manifested by Sierra Leone's acceptance of thousands of Liberian refugees during the Liberian conflict reciprocated by Liberia's acceptance of thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees over the past months.

HAVE THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH PROVIDED ANY EVIDENCE THAT LIBERIA SUPPORTS THE AFRC/RUF REBELS?

The Governments of the United States and Britain, despite international pressure demanding material evidence to substantiate their allegations against Liberia, have been unable

to back their charges. For the United States and Britain, providing material evidence to prove an allegation has been effectively replaced by misinformation, propaganda and war of words. They are attempting to reinvent the universal wheels of justice by replacing the provision of evidence to back allegations by the use of propaganda and disinformation. They believe that might makes right.

Realistically, Liberia is being scape-goated by Britain and America, masking their involvement by using private British firms and secret American military advisors to fuel the war in Sierra Leone. Liberia becomes blame-worthy because the new political authority in Monrovia is not dancing to the dictates of Washington and London. The British and American desperation was so clearly manifested when they, in a rather ridiculous manner, erroneously accused Liberia of making territorial claims against Sierra Leonean territory.

Furthermore, intelligence reports from diplomatic quarters speak of a covert plan at foot to destabilize the Government of Guinea and subsequently blame same on Liberia. Evidently, Liberia is a classic victim of a well-coordinated western contrived international conspiracy calculated to internationally and diplomatically isolate and economically stifle the country's national reconstruction program, hoping that in the final analysis, domestic political discontent will ensue which could lead to civil unrest and thereby make the country ungovernable. The ultimate game-plan of the British and the Americans is to install a puppet regime in Liberia that would look after the

00028763

commercial interests of British and American companies operating in the sub-region should their plan succeed.

PRACTICAL STEPS BY LIBERIA TO BRING PEACE TO SIERRA LEONE

1. In the ECOWAS sub-region, Liberia is the immediate past beneficiary of collective sub-regional initiative politically and militarily after seven years of brutal civil war. A peace plan brokered by ECOWAS and supported by all parties in the then Liberian crisis used DIALOGUE as the foundation for what later became a politically negotiated settlement of the Liberian problem. Drawing from this experience, Liberia has repeatedly and diplomatically encouraged president Tejan Kabbah to engage the AFRC/RUF rebels in a policitcal dialogue since, historically, political problems have never been resolved by military means.

2. In support of Liberia's proposal for dialogue between the Government of Sierra leone and the AFRC/RUF, the Liberian Government proposed, supported and subsequently participated in at least three regional Summits attended by both Presidents Kabbah and Taylor. The first Summit was held under the joint auspices of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and ECOWAS Chairman, Nigerian Head of State, General Abubakar in Abuja, Nigeria. At that summit both Presidents agreed to work together in finding a politically negotiated solution to the Sierra Leonean problem and signed a joint communiqué in respect of their collective disposition.

3. Following the Abuja Summit and based on Liberia's urging for the second time, the Government of the United States represented by President Clinton's Envoy to Africa, the Rev. Jesse Jackson, convened a second meeting between President Taylor of Liberia and president Kabbah of Sierra Leone in Monrovia. The Monrovia Summit was fundamentally intended to achieve two goals: 1. To build more confidence between the two leaders. 2. To ensure that the focus on resolving the problem in Sierra Leone was not lost in the mist of others sub-regional distractions as in the case of the Guinea Bissau crisis. At the Monrovia Summit both presidents signed another communiqué reaffirming their respective commitments in bringing peace to Sierra Leone.

4. In continuation of Liberia's efforts towards resolving the problem in Sierra Leone, a third summit was called in Conakry, Guinea, by President Lansana Conteh within the framework and spirit of the Mano River Union Protocols. At that meeting, President Taylor informed President Kabbah of Liberia's continued disposition to remain actively engaged diplomatically and politically until peace is restored to the brotherly people of Sierra Leone.

5. On the military front, the Liberian border with Sierra Leone has been well-fortified so as to prevent any situation where retreating AFRC/RUF rebels could contemplate the use of the Liberian side of the border to launch hit-and-run military operations into Sierra Leone. Because of this preventive measure, the Liberian side of the border has remained

00028764

absolutely calm from any military activity.

6. And finally, in an attempt to ensure international verification of Liberia's neutrality in the Sierra Leonean crisis, the Liberian Government has invited the United Nations, the OAU and ECOWAS to send a joint observer mission at the border that would monitor the movement of forces both on the Liberian and Sierra Leonean sides of the border. To this date, such verification team is yet to be put in place.

ARE THERE LIBERIANS FIGHTING IN THE SIERRA LEONE?

Unfortunately, yes. There are Liberians fighting on both sides of the military divide, one group on the side of the Government and the other on the side of the AFRC/RUF rebels respectively. The involvement of mercenary Liberians in Sierra Leone appears to be the only concrete evidence being paraded by Sierra Leone to the international community as constituting proof of Liberia's involvement in the war without explaining HOW, WHY, WHEN and WHO invited them.

Up to the present, the Government of Sierra Leone has managed to cleverly evade and deliberately avoid any public explanation as to how these mercenary Liberians got involved, why and who enlisted them into the national armed forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone. Absurd as it appears, one wonders if it is normal practice for a sitting government to recruit the nationals of another country into its national security

apparatus.

During the early days of the RUF incursion into Sierra Leone in 1992, Liberia was already embroiled in a brutal civil war which resulted in massive social dislocation of her citizens into Sierra Leone as refugees. While in Sierra Leone, some of the Liberian refugees organized themselves and formed what later came to be known as ULIMO, one of the factions in the just-ended Liberian conflict. It was claimed that these refugees had organized ULIMO as a counter-balance resistance movement to the then NPFL.

But as the RUF made significant military advances against government forces in the fields, the constitutional government of President Momoh approved a strategic military engagement plan which, inter alia, envisaged a military partnership between generals of a newly-formed ULIMO movement and the Sierra Leonean national army. Operationally, the plan provided for the recruitment and enlistment of some ULIMO generals into the Sierra Leonean armed forces to help prosecute the war against the RUF and, in return, the Momoh administration would give permission to ULIMO for the use of Sierra leonean territory for training and other military activities into Liberia. Interestingly, all this took place while Sierra Leone was ostensively but pretentiously participating in peace-keeping operations in Liberia within ECOMOG with the view of restoring peace there.

In the midst of this military pact, President Momoh was

00028765

overthrown in a military coup by Captain Valentine Strasser who inherited and gracefully embraced the strategic military engagement plan. Captain Strasser retained the ULIMO-Sierra Leonean army pact and used it for continuous prosecution of the war against the RUF. Captain Strasser, after a few years also became victim when he was toppled by Mada Beo who also inherited the situation. And finally, following the election of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, he also took on the military MESS which three of his predecessors created and which ultimately toppled his government and joined forces with the RUF thereby creating what is now referred to as the AFRC/RUF rebellion.

Clearly, Liberians who are fighting in Sierra Leone are there on the account of the Government of Sierra Leone and not on orders of the Liberian Government as is being misleadingly and mischievously floated around the world by the Government of Sierra Leone.

CONCLUSION

The Government of the Republic of Liberia reaffirms its respect for and commitment to respecting all international protocols and conventions to which she is a signatory regarding the conduct of relations between/among sovereign States.

The republic of Liberia recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of Sierra Leone as a Member-State of the OAU ECOWAS and the Mano River Union and the right of its citizen

to self-determination.

The Liberian Government reiterates that it has absolutely no military involvement in supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels fighting the Government of Sierra Leone and has no intention to do so now and in the future.

Liberia also calls on Britain and the United States to immediately stop fueling the war in Sierra Leone through the use of private American and British firms and individuals.

As a matter of national sovereignty and integrity, Liberia will not allow herself to be used as the beach-head to macro-manage and teleguide the politics and economies of the ECOWAS sub-region in the interest of western multi-national corporations.

Finally, the Government of Liberia will remain engaged diplomatically and politically in the search for lasting peace in Sierra Leone through dialogue and negotiation as means of achieving a political settlement of the problem.

LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
16 JANUARY 1999

00028766

5 May: The RUF is now believed to be holding at least 318 U.N. peacekeepers amid unconfirmed reports that rebel fighters are "on the move," U.N. spokesman Fred Eckhard said in New York on Friday. He was unable to say whether any towns had fallen to the RUF, but a diplomatic source in Freetown told the Sierra Leone Web that the RUF was "apparently in Lunsar." "Approximately 208 members of the Zambian contingent which were on their way to Makeni and with whom the U.N. mission had lost radio contact yesterday, were disarmed and detained by the RUF," Eckhard told reporters. A contingent of 24 Indian peacekeepers was also surrounded and overpowered at the town of Kuiva, near Kailahun. This was in addition to the 92 U.N. personnel reported held as of Thursday night, now down to 86 with the release Friday morning of a Russian helicopter crew and their two passengers, Eckhard said. A 100-man Nigerian contingent was detained in Kambia, "but later released, minus their weapons." The spokesman said four Kenyan soldiers were missing and presumed dead and twelve people were reported wounded. BBC West Africa Correspondent Mark Doyle said it was "believed there may well be a lot of Sierra Leoneans" held captive in addition to U.N. personnel, but said there was currently no confirmed information on Sierra Leonean hostages. Eckhard said the rebels had seized 13 of the Zambians' 16 armoured personnel carriers which they were appeared to be using for "military movements." Although it was not clear where they were heading. He said there was "no evidence that there was fighting in the taking of the Zambian armoured personnel carriers," but that "we know from helicopter surveillance" they were in the hands of the RUF. Eckhard said negotiations to free the U.N. peacekeepers were ongoing. "The efforts right now are political in nature, to get anyone who has any influence with Foday Sankoh to convince him to comply with the peace agreement," Eckhard said. "The emphasis is not at this point to go to war against the RUF. "It's to try to find a political solution to a problem that is threatening the peace process at its core...If that fails, I don't want to speculate what happens next." Doyle described the mood in Freetown as as tense. "It's strongly believed here that this crisis has been engineered to time with the formal takeover by the United Nations of this operation (from the ECOMOG force), Doyle said. "It's surely no coincidence that the U.N. takes over and a couple of days after that there's this major and massive power struggle going on between Sankoh and the U.N.

RUF rebels freed a four-member Russian helicopter and two U.N. personnel held in Kailahun since Tuesday, a UNAMSIL spokesman said on Friday. The six arrived at Hastings Airfield near Freetown shortly 10:00 a.m. local time. The Russian foreign ministry identified the helicopter crew members as Vyacheslav Markelov, Alexander Romanov, Vladimir Platonov and Nikolai Vyuzhenkov, who were working under contract with the U.N. Two Russian military observers, including Lt. Capt. Andrei Ufimtsev, are still being detained. The RUF has continued to deny, however, that it was holding U.N. peacekeepers and military observers. "We do not take hostages," RUFP spokesman Eldred Collins told reporters. As of late Thursday, the U.N. said RUF rebels were known to be holding 92 of their peacekeepers in northern and eastern Sierra Leone, but said the actual number could be even higher. The RUF has surrounded an 23-man Indian contingent in the eastern town of Kuiva, while there are unconfirmed and conflicting reports that another peacekeeping contingent has been encircled or detained in Kambia. A U.N. spokeswoman in New York said Thursday afternoon that UNAMSIL had lost contact with some of its units, numbering about 100 troops. Sankoh's Special Assistant, Gibril Massaquoi, suggested Friday that the missing U.N. troops might merely have lost their way. "We want to believe the peacekeepers alleged to have been held by RUF fighters may have got lost in the bush during the fighting in Makeni and Magburaka," Massaquoi said. He added that Sankoh had ordered his field commander, Colonel Issa Sesay, "to organise a search party for the missing U.N. peacekeepers." Meanwhile,

RUF leader Foday Sankoh claimed U.N. peacekeepers had "taken refuge" at RUF barracks in Makeni and that they were free to leave. "In Makeni there was a panic. Some peacekeepers and military observers left the (DDR) camp and took refuge in the barracks that my men have been occupying ever since they entered Makeni," the Agence France-Presse (AFP) quoted Sankoh as saying. "They are free to go anywhere." In a separate interview, the rebel leader warned the U.N. not to reinforce its positions in RUF-held areas. We don't want violence here again. It's provocation. You provoke the man, you make a big mistake," Sankoh told the BBC.



Liberian President Charles Taylor has called on all parties for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Sierra Leone, while warning RUF leader Foday Sankoh not to engage in a fire-fight with the United Nations peacekeeping force. "(Sankoh) assured me that everything will be done to return the situation to status quo," Taylor told the BBC on Friday. " I think it would be foolish for anyone to believe that he can challenge the United Nations and come out right." While Sankoh had complained of problems in implementing the Lomé Peace Accord, Taylor said this was not an excuse for an exchange of fire and injury to U.N. personnel. "I think the first thing that must be done, and I've insisted, and I have told him, and I want to believe he understands, is that United Nations personnel must be protected, even by him, and that these problems can be raised in the proper forum," Taylor said. "But to have a fire-fight with the United Nations is a grave mistake, a very dangerous mistake, and must be stopped." The Liberian leader called on the RUF to provide a "full accounting" of U.N. personnel. "They cannot be shot at. There should be no injury, and everything should be done for cordiality instead of a fire-fight," he said. According to Radio Liberia, Taylor sent former Foreign Minister Mrs. Museleng-Cooper to Freetown to open a dialogue aimed at finding an "amicable solution" to the Sierra Leone crisis. At a news conference on Friday, Taylor told reporters he would support any sanctions imposed on Sankoh by the U.N. or ECOWAS aimed at getting him to release U.N. peacekeepers. "Yes, Liberia will be prepared to support any sanctions that would be taken by ECOWAS states, intended to restore peace in Sierra Leone," he said. "Yes, I am a personal friend of Foday Sankoh. That does not mean my country is a personal friend to Sankoh." The United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo and other sanctions on Sierra Leone's rebels following the 1997 coup, which Taylor's government has frequently been accused of violating. "RUF must understand that seizing U.N. personnel as hostages is not a good thing to do...Working with the U.N. is a better thing to do," he said.

The international community is increasing pressure on RUF leader Foday Sankoh to release U.N. personnel held by his rebel group. Mali's foreign minister arrived in Freetown Thursday and has returned to Bamako, while a Liberian delegation was expected in Sierra Leone on Friday. Meanwhile a diplomatic source told the Sierra Leone Web there were unconfirmed reports that the RUF had reached Lunsar. He said it was possible the Joint Implementation Committee, set up to oversee the peace process, might be convened soon.

A planned demonstration by civil society groups and parliamentarians to protest the RUF's attacks on United Nations personnel has been postponed until Monday, a parliamentary source told the Sierra Leone Web. The march was originally to have taken place in Freetown on Friday.

Britain is preparing to send a team of military experts to Sierra Leone to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations peacekeeping force, a

British foreign office spokesman said on Friday. "We want to help the U.N. and we will be in a better position to consider what we can supply when the team has reported back to us," the spokesman said. "At the request of the U.N., Britain is despatching an advisory team to Freetown to help the U.N. assess the technical support needed to enhance UNAMSIL's effectiveness." The team, from the Ministry of Defence's Permanent Joint Headquarters, is expected to arrive in Freetown on Saturday. "This follows the assurance Foreign Secretary Robin Cook gave to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan yesterday that Britain would do all that it reasonably could to support the UN forces in their mission."

Russia intends to dispatch military helicopters to Sierra Leone, the Russian defence ministry said on Friday. "The military pilots' role will be to carry out flights on behalf of the U.N. peacekeeping forces operating in Sierra Leone," a ministry statement said, adding that the pilots would be armed for their own safety. "The timetable for the dispatch of the helicopter squadron will depend on a Federation Council decision," the defence ministry said.

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on Friday denounced RUF attacks against U.N. peacekeepers. "The behavior of the RUF and its leader



Foday Sankoh is unacceptable," Albright said. "The actions of Sankoh and the RUF need to be reversed immediately. The Lomé Accords represented a package of compromises that provided the RUF an opportunity to play a legitimate political role in Sierra Leone. If the accords are broken, the provisions of that agreement are jeopardized...We join the international community in demanding that the RUF and Sankoh personally discharge their responsibilities to the agreement they signed at Lomé — including disarmament and demobilisation — and that they immediately release all those they are holding."

Britain's new high commissioner to Sierra Leone, Alan Jones (full name David Alan Jones) presented his credentials to President Kabbah on Friday. Jones is a career diplomat, who last served as deputy commissioner in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He replaces Peter Penfold, who left Freetown last week. "Sierra Leone's path towards peace and democracy has not been easy, and you and your people have been obliged to take some very difficult and brave decisions," Jones said. "The time for elections is approaching. It we can all work together to hold a free, fair and transparent election that results in a democratic Government chosen by the people then all the sacrifices will have been worthwhile. We shall work together to see that this happens." Also presenting his credentials Friday was Iran's new accredited ambassador to Sierra Leone, Roshan Samir Jawad. Jawad replaces Ambassador Majid Bismark in the diplomatic post. Iran has no embassy in Freetown, and Jawad will operate from his country's embassy in Guinea.

President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya has expressed concern and sorrow over the deaths of four Kenyan peacekeepers in clashes with RUF rebels in northern Sierra Leone this week. Moi said he was awaiting a full report "regarding the exact circumstances surrounding the deaths and abduction of other Kenyan troops." His comments follow emotional demands by opposition parliamentarians to withdraw the Kenyan peacekeeping battalion from the UNAMSIL force. In his statement, Moi said it was unfortunate that the Kenyans, who were in Sierra Leone as peacekeepers and not as combatants, had to die without a justifiable reason. He appealed to the United Nations to ensure the safety of the peacekeeping force. Meanwhile, the Tanzanian Daily News has reported that a Tanzanian major is among the unarmed U.N. military observers abducted by the rebels.

4 May: U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said Thursday he had asked regional leaders to pressure leader Foday Sankoh into releasing some 92 U.N. personnel now believed held by his RUF rebel faction in northern and eastern Sierra Leone. The secretary-general met with reporters following a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on the crisis in Sierra Leone — the third such meeting in three days. "I have spoken to quite a few leaders who have direct contact and some influence on him and who have sent envoys," including the leaders of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Togo, he said. Annan said Sankoh promised Liberian President Charles Taylor that some of the detainees, including "at least" a four-man Russian helicopter crew, would be freed starting Friday. "We'll wait and see if this happens," he said. He said the U.N. was working to strengthen its force in Sierra Leone "as quickly as possible." Currently some 8,700 U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed in the country out of 11,100 authorised by the Security Council. The remaining three battalions were due to arrive in mid-June. Discussions are now underway to speed up their deployment, Annan said, possibly by enlisting the aid of Western countries such as Britain, France or the United States to transport the troops and equipment to Sierra Leone. He said that while he would like to deploy a rapid reaction force to deal with the crisis, this would only be possible if those with such a capacity were willing to provide it. Annan added that discussions were underway with some member states on the matter. Sankoh signed an agreement late Wednesday to release all U.N. hostages, while at the same time denying his followers were holding them. "Nobody believes him," Annan said. "(The African leaders) have told him to take action. They have told him to release (the hostages). They have tried to impress on him the seriousness of the situation and the fact that he is placing himself in a very difficult situation. He is already isolated and it is going to get worse. All the leaders are giving him the same message. If they thought he were not holding hostages, they would not be acting that way with him."



In a presidential statement read out following Thursday's meeting of the U.N. Security Council, Ambassador Wang Yingfan of China said members supported international and regional efforts to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone, including those of ECOWAS. The Council demanded that the RUF end its hostile actions immediately and immediately release all detainees unharmed, cooperate to establish the whereabouts of U.N. personnel still unaccounted for, and comply fully with the Lomé Peace Accord. Council members expressed outrage at the killing of U.N. peacekeepers and deep concern for those wounded or still not located. The Security Council said that Foday Sankoh, as leader of the RUF, was responsible for the attacks on U.N. personnel, that he had "deliberately failed" to cooperate with UNAMSIL to end the incidents, and that he must be held accountable together with the perpetrators. Meanwhile, UNAMSIL Public Information Officer Philip Winslow pointed out that the amnesty included in last year's peace agreement did not cover acts committed since the signing of the accord. "Those responsible will definitely be prosecuted," he said.



The bodies of four Kenyan peacekeepers have been recovered and are being sent home, UNAMSIL spokesman Osman Lahai told the Voice of America late on Thursday. Three other Kenyans wounded in fighting with the RUF remain at the U.N.'s hospital in Freetown, Lahai said.

The United Nations has revised downward its estimate of the number of U.N. peacekeepers killed in Sierra Leone this week to "four missing and presumed dead," a spokeswoman in New York said Thursday afternoon. The four were reported to have belonged to UNAMSIL's Kenyan battalion. U.N.

4088

spokeswoman Marie Okabe said at least 69 civilian and military UNAMSIL personnel were now believed to be held by RUF — 39 in the Makeni area and 30 in Kailahun. Eight other U.N. personnel are reported to have been wounded. In addition, Okabe said, a 23-man Indian battalion was reported surrounded by RUF troops at Kuiva, near Kailahun. She said UNAMSIL had lost contact with some of its units, comprising up to 100 personnel, but noted that the force was sending reinforcements to Makeni and Magburaka. Okabe said there are currently about 8,700 U.N. troops in Sierra Leone with three additional battalions due by mid-June.

The Missionary Services News Agency (MISNA) has reported that rebels disarmed and abducted a contingent of U.N. peacekeepers in the town of Kambia, near Sierra Leone's border with Guinea, at about 9:00 Thursday morning. The rebels, apparently members of the RUF, had confined the U.N. troops to the centre of town and sacked the local police barracks, MISNA said. U.N. officials confirmed that Zambian troops had come under attack at Kambia late Wednesday, but had no details. Reuters cited unconfirmed reports that 200 of the peacekeepers were encircled, but were said to still have their weapons. U.N. spokeswoman Marie Okabe confirmed said there had been gunfire in Kambia Wednesday night, but that it had died down before midnight. According to MISNA, a team of doctors from the French-based medical charity Medècins sans Frontiéres (MSF - Doctors Without Borders) was forced to flee to Guinea on Wednesday following shooting in the town.

There was sporadic firing in Kambia and Makeni overnight, UNAMSIL officials told reporters in Freetown on Thursday. They said about five U.N. peacekeepers wounded in fighting at Makeni had been evacuated to Freetown, where they were undergoing treatment at a military hospital. The disarmament camps at Makeni and Magburaka, at the centre of the dispute between the RUF and the U.N., have reportedly been completely destroyed and vandalised. BBC correspondent Lansana Fofana reported that the RUF had allowed peacekeepers from UNAMSIL's Indian contingent to provide food for their U.N. colleagues held by the rebels in Kailahun. He said U.N. officials were not planning to confront the RUF in order to secure the hostages' release. "They were saying that all they will do is to continue negotiating with the High Command of the Revolutionary United Front," Fofana said. "They were saying they've had regional leaders talking to Foday Sankoh. They've had government officials talking to Foday Sankoh, and that they are hoping things will turn out positive. But in any case they are expressing grave concern about developments there, because their disarmament camps have been targeted and there is no indication the rebels will not take more hostages."

RUF leader Foday Sankoh has again blamed the United Nations for this



week's fighting between his followers and UNAMSIL in northern Sierra Leone — a charge the U.N. has rejected. "There was a fight Makeni and Magburaka because of the forcible disarmament," Sankoh said. "They forced their way into the barracks to disarm the men, but then started firing. And I think our men with no alternative but to defend themselves." A U.N. spokesman in Freetown insisted Wednesday that the attacks on U.N. personnel were "completely unprovoked," and he dismissed Sankoh's claim his men had been forcibly disarmed as "completely untrue." Sankoh said the RUF had lost six men in the fighting with an unknown number wounded. The RUF leader also denied rumours that he had been placed under house arrest in Freetown, and warned of serious consequences if he were to be detained. "(Wednesday afternoon) we drove around Freetown from my residence to Kissy, going around to Clinetown, Fourah Bay Road, Sani Abacha Street, to

PZ and we (came) back home," he said. "You know they can do anything but it (would) be a big mistake to detain Foday Sankoh. Forget about the combatants. The civilian populace will rise. So I advise and appeal even to President Kabbah not to try it." In a separate interview with BBC Radio 4's World at One programme, Sankoh denied that his men were holding U.N. personnel hostage. "That is fabrication. This is something I really have no knowledge of," he said. "He accused U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan as taking part in an "international conspiracy" with President Kabbah to keep him out of power. "(The U.N.) said the only way they could get peace in Sierra Leone is to use force and they did it by firing at my men and disarming my men forcefully. When commanders arrived to investigate, they opened fire at my men," Sankoh said, adding: "I know I have lost about seven men, but that is all I know. This is something that has been planned to destroy the reputation of the RUF."

UNAMSIL Public Information Philip Winslow rejected Thursday Foday Sankoh's denial that his RUF rebel force was holding United Nations personnel hostage. "Mr. Sankoh has denied on several occasions in the last 24 hours that he is holding any hostages," Winslow told the BBC. "His RUF, the RUF of which he is the chairman, is the group that seized our personnel, the peacekeepers." He added that on Tuesday and Tuesday night the RUF had "launched an attack on the disarmament camp where our people were at Makeni, in northern Sierra Leone." Winslow said negotiations for the hostages' release were ongoing at a number of different levels. "There is quite a lot of international pressure being brought to bear on Mr. Sankoh from various other governments trying to convince him to see the light and have these people released," he said.

Shooting heard in western Freetown Wednesday night was "accidental firing by Sierra Leonean Army personnel," BBC correspondent Lansana Fofana said on Thursday. "(UNAMSIL officials) were saying the Nigerian contingent in UNAMSIL quickly took care of the situation, and within five minutes they had contained it," Fofana said. "But then there was very heightened tension around the city. People were running around and then security was mounted. Vehicles were stopped and rigorously searched, and it actually put people on the edge." As of Thursday morning Freetown was reported to be calm.

RUF rebels have released a Malaysian U.N. military observer, Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak said on Thursday. Razak said Major Ganase Jaganathan was freed Wednesday night. Two other Malaysians, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamzah Bachik and naval Lieutenant-Commander Aminuddin Rashid, were still being held as of midday on Thursday. Malaysia has ten military observers attached to the UNAMSIL force in Sierra Leone. In Moscow, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Thursday he had been given assurances by Sierra Leonean leaders that the hostages would be freed soon. A Russian foreign ministry spokesman said Ivanov was handling the issue personally after it was learned that four of the hostages were Russian members of a helicopter crew working under contract to the United Nations. In London, British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon told the House of Commons that one of the U.N. personnel detained by the RUF in Sierra Leone was a British officer. "We understand that he is safe and well," Hoon said. "No other British citizens have been detained. Negotiations are taking place on the political and diplomatic fronts to secure the safe release of all those who have been detained." A British foreign office spokesman said the British officer, a U.N. military observer, was being held with some 27 other U.N. personnel in Kailahun. "It seems the hostages are being kept in reasonable conditions," the spokesman said. "We are letting the UN take the lead in talking to the RUF but we are in constant touch with them. We are calling on the RUF's leaders to exercise control over their forces."

Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, has condemned this week's RUF killings and abduction of U.N. personnel in Sierra Leone, and has warned of consequences. Holbrooke is currently on a five-day mission to Africa. "I think you are going to see the international community prepare a very strong and swift response against those responsible (for the Sierra Leone attacks), and we all know who they are," Holbrooke said shortly after arriving in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo.



Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon has denounced the "reported killings and kidnappings" of UNAMSIL personnel in Sierra Leone as "heinous crimes for which the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front must take full responsibility." Calling the RUF actions a breach of the Lomé Peace Accord, McKinnon warned that the RUF "should be left in no doubt as to the determination of the international community to stand by the people of Sierra Leone in the defence of their democracy and their legitimately elected government."



British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook issued a statement Thursday "strongly condemning" RUF attacks on United Nations forces, and pledging British support for Sierra Leone's peace process. "The leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, must order an immediate end to current violence and respect for the provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement," Cook said. "He bears a personal responsibility for his followers' actions. The leadership of the RUF is directly accountable for the safety of those U.N. and other personnel who are currently detained. He must ensure their immediate release." Cook said he had informed U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that Britain was prepared to increase its support for UNAMSIL. "In particular, we are willing to provide technical and logistical support to increase the mission's efficiency," he said, adding that he and Annan had agreed on the importance of a rapid deployment of peacekeeping troops not yet deployed in Sierra Leone. "The rebels appear to have chosen the transition between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL to challenge the peace process," Cook said. "They must be stopped. Britain has done more than any other country outside the region to support the peace process. A lot of progress had been made with over half the rebel forces demobilised, and most of the country brought under the control of the U.N. forces. We are determined to see the job done in the interests of the people of Sierra Leone."



National Security Advisor Sheka Mansaray said Thursday that the Sierra Leone government had appealed to the leaders of neighbouring countries and the heads of international organisations to convince RUF leader Foday Sankoh to release U.N. hostages held by his rebel group. Mansaray told the BBC the government was not in a position to use military force to bring about the hostages' release. "Under the Lomé Peace Agreement we have an obligation not to use force here any more," he said. "In fact the government has been the subject of massive disarmament by the U.N. We've disarmed many of our forces, including the regular army." Sankoh "has always believed in shooting his way into power," Mansaray said. He's consistently tested the patience of the government, patience of the international community. He's seen nothing come out of those actions. And I think he's encouraged to continue to do that." Mansaray called for the United Nations to take action against the RUF. "Right now there is a mood of hopelessness because the people feel betrayed," he said. "There's been a number of assurances from all quarters that the people of this country will be protected. We were even encouraged to accept that the ECOMOG peacekeeping force

could go without the security situation deteriorating. It's interesting that the last day the troops spent here was the day Mr. Sankoh started the attacks on the U.N. peacekeepers, because he's always said that what you do to U.N. peacekeepers is start shooting at them and then there'll be a cry for them to be withdrawn. So he's lived up to that kind of reasoning."



OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim condemned the RUF killing and abducting of U.N. peacekeepers in a statement issued on Thursday. "I wish to condemn in no uncertain terms these wanton acts," Salim said, adding that the RUF actions were in violation the RUF's obligations under of the Lomé Peace Accord. He urged the RUF to allow U.N. peacekeepers, humanitarian workers to enter areas under its control, and to pursue the path of dialogue in the peace process. Salim said the OAU would send a representative to Sierra Leone to get on on-the-spot assessment of the situation in the country.



Members of Sierra Leone's Parliament will join civil society groups in Freetown Friday for a protest march against the RUF "for their action against the peacekeeping force in the country," a parliamentary source told the Sierra Leone Web on Thursday. By voice vote Thursday, Parliament adopted by voice vote Thursday a motion expressing concern over what it called "a resumption of hostilities" by the RUF calling it a breach of the cease-fire agreement and the peace accord signed in Lomé, Togo last year. The private members motion, proposed by Hon. A.O. Bangura and seconded by Hon. Dr. Raymond S. Kamara, called on the Sierra Leone government to place RUF leader Foday Sankoh under house arrest and to restrict the movement of RUFP ministers and appointees until the hostilities have ended, and to disarm all combatants within 45 days. The motion called on Parliament to enact legislation suspending "some of the privileges accorded to Mr. Foday Sankoh and other elements of the RUF by virtue of the Lomé Peace Agreement" until the RUF showed "genuine commitment to the peace process." It suggested Sankoh be invited before Parliament to explain the circumstances leading to the RUF attacks on UNAMSIL, and that the RUF leadership be held responsible for further acts of violence "and accountable to the International War Crimes Tribunal." The motion called on UNAMSIL to "forcefully disarm" combatants unwilling to disarm and join the DDR programme within 45 days, to institute cordon-and-search exercises in Freetown and in provincial headquarters "with unusual concentration of ex-combatants, and to restrict curfew hours and limit permits for street demonstrations until security was assured throughout the country. The parliamentarians called on the moral guarantors of the Lomé Peace Accord to "use their influence and good offices" to prevail on Sankoh to respect the peace agreement in view of a "series of co-ordinated attacks against UNAMSIL troops" which, they said, showed Sankoh and his supporters "are not interested in peace but are committed to derailing he peace process and seizing power by force."



RUF leader Foday Sankoh is "definitely behind" attacks this week on U.N. personnel in Sierra Leone, the country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations told PBS Newshour on Thursday. "The United Nations knows this, that he is behind all this new outbreak," said Ambassador Ibrahim Kamara. "His people are the ones. What he does is he goes out and tells the international community, or when he's faced with the cameras, the media, he tells his fighters to disarm, and when the observers leave, he tells them something completely different. He's not a man of peace. The people know it, the U.N. knows this,

the international community knows that this man is not a man of peace." Kamara said Sankoh's motive for the attacks "is rule Sierra Leone by whatever means," adding "But that will be against the wish of the people." The ambassador said the Sierra Leone government had given in to pressure from the international community to sign the Lomé Peace Accord, which gave the RUF a role in the government. "The ball now is in the court of the international community...and we are only waiting to see, because not a small man like Foday Sankoh cannot hold the world to ransom," he said.

The Libyan government said Thursday U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan had requested President Muammar al-Qadhafi to intervene to help free U.N. personnel held hostage by the RUF in Sierra Leone. "As a result, the Great Jamahiriyah had carried out contacts with the parties concerned in the [crisis in] Sierra Leone, where the government said that the RUF had abducted 50 UN troops. However, the RUF Chairman Foday Sankoh noted that he was not aware of the abductions," the Libyan news agency said. "Therefore, the secretary of the General People's Committee for African Unity will leave immediately for Sierra Leone to deal with the issue."

Human Rights Watch condemned this week's killings and hostage-taking of U.N. personnel in Sierra Leone, but noted that civilians had been enduring similar abuses from rebels for several years. "Human Rights Watch opposed the amnesty (provision of the Lomé Peace Accord) because we feared that impunity for such atrocities would only breed more atrocities," the group said in a statement on Thursday. "Events of this week have only confirmed our fears. Peter Takirambudde, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch's Africa Division, said RUF leader Foday Sankoh should be held responsible for the actions of troops under his effective command. He called Colonel Augustine Gbao, an RUF commander in the Makeni region where the U.N. killings took place, one of Sankoh's leading deputies.

8310

ANNEX C

0188

8311

C.1

00015356-00015361

8311

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

THE PROSECUTOR

Against

ISSA HASAN SESAY
MORRIS KALLON
AUGUSTINE GBAO

CASE NO. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T

SOLEMN DECLARATION OF ALFRED SESAY

DECLARANT: ALFRED SESAY
DECLARED AT: FREETOWN
DATE: 7 JULY 2005

On 7 July, 2005, I, Alfred Sesay, an Investigator with the Office of the Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. I have been working with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) since June 8th 2003. Prior to working at the Special Court I was an investigator with the CID. The CID is Criminal Investigations Department.

2. On the 8th May 2000, I was working at the CID headquarters in Freetown. On this day, the Parliamentarians, Civil Society Groups and Women's Organizations organized a demonstration in Freetown at the residence of Foday Sankoh's house on Spur Road to protest against reports that some UN Peace Keepers (UNAMSIL) in Sierra Leone had been arrested by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

3. Whilst this demonstration was going on during the morning hours, I heard the sound of gun shots from the western part of Freetown. I also saw people running helter skelter and some saying that there was a shoot out at the residence of the late RUF leader Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh on Spur Road.

4. On the 9th May 2000, I was given a carton full of documents and I was told by Thomas Lahun, one of the Directors at the CID, that they were seized from the residence of Foday Sankoh. Thomas Lahun transferred to my custody this carton and instructed me to maintain custody of these materials. The documents were thereafter stored in a big cupboard under lock and key at the CID HQ and I remained in possession of these documents. They were locked in a big cupboard and I possessed the only key.

5. At some point in that year representatives from the Sierra Leone Attorney General's Office made copies of these documents. The CID remained in possession of the originals. I do not remember exactly when this occurred.

6. Also, at some point in the year 2000, representatives from the United Nations came to the CID headquarters to inspect these documents. I do not recall their names or which specific department they belonged to. They remained at the CID office and inspected the documents for several hours. They did not take possession of any of the documents. I am uncertain if they made copies of any of the documents. They took personal notes about the documents.

7. On 20 May 2005, Christopher Santora, an attorney with the OTP and Tariq Malik, with the Evidence Unit for the OTP, presented several original documents to me with internal OTP reference numbers marked on each page. To the best of my recollection I recall that these documents were among the set of materials originally turned over to me by Thomas Lahun and were stored in my custody.
    a. ERN00007868-00008048
    b. ERN00008049-00008077
    c. ERN00008078-00008109

d. ERN00008228-00008232
e. ERN 00008251-00008252
f. ERN00008636-00008726
g. ERN00008727-00008903
h. ERN00009645-00009657
i. ERN00009658-00009671
j. ERN00007754-00007755
k. ERN00007802-00007807
l. ERN00007852-00007862
m. ERN00012914-00012927
n. ERN00012875-00012891
o. ERN00009672-00009681
p. ERN00008251-00008252
q. ERN00008253-00008255
r. ERN00007769-00007770
s. ERN00009746-00009764
t. ERN00009765-00009768
u. ERN00007736-00007737
v. ERN00009629-00009630
w. ERN00009772-00009775
x. ERN00007671-00007674
y. ERN00008200-00008207
z. ERN00009636-00009637
aa. ERN00008196-00008198
bb. ERN00008196-00008198
cc. ERN00009489- 0009491
dd. ERN00009485-00009485
ee. ERN00012940-00012942
ff. ERN00012973-00012975
gg. ERN00012912-00012913
hh. ERN00012976-00012976

8314

ii. ERN00012971-00012972
jj. ERN00012955-00012070
kk. ERN00009481-00009484

8. At some point in late 2002, Thomas Lahun, who was at this point an investigators with the OTP arrived at the CID headquarters and requested to take possession of certain documents that were among the Sankoh materials related to communications. He took possession of these documents.

9. On 20 May 2005, Christopher Santora, an attorney with the OTP, and Tariq Malik, the Evidence Custodian for the OTP, again presented several original documents to me with internal OTP reference numbers marked on each page. I have inspected the documents marked below and affirm that these were the documents that Thomas Lahun took possession of from me on behalf of the OTP at some point in late 2002.
   a. ERN00007852-00007862
   b. ERN00012914-00012927
   c. ERN00007868-00008048
   d. ERN00008049-00008077
   e. ERN00008078-00008109
   f. ERN00008228-00008232
   g. ERN00008636-00008726
   h. ERN00008727-00008903

10. Also, at some point in late 2002, I turned over certain documents to investigator from the OTP including one Corinne Dufka, who was an investigator with the OTP at the time. She arrived at the CID headquarters and requested to take possession of certain documents that were among the Sankoh materials. I transferred custody of certain documents to her after her request.

11. On 20 May 2005, Christopher Santora and Tariq Malik again presented several original documents to me with internal OTP reference numbers marked on each page. I have inspected the documents marked below and affirm that these were the documents that

Corinne Dufka and other investigators from the OTP took possession of from me on behalf of the OTP at some point in late 2002.

a. ERN00009645-00009657
b. ERN00009658-00009671
c. ERN00007754-00007755
d. ERN00007802-00007807
e. ERN00012875-00012891
f. ERN00009672-00009681
g. ERN00008251-00008252
h. ERN00008253-00008255
i. ERN00007769-00007770
j. ERN00009746-00009764
k. ERN00009765-00009768
l. ERN00007736-00007737
m. ERN00012940-00012942
n. ERN00012973-00012975
o. ERN00012912-00012913
p. ERN00012976-00012976
q. ERN00012971-00012972
r. ERN00012955-00012070
s. ERN00009481-00009484

12. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true in every particular.

Alfred Sesay
Investigator for the Office of the Prosecutor
The Special Court for Sierra Leone

Declared at Freetown,)
this 7th day of July 2005,)
before me)
)

Wambui Ngunya
Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court for Sierra Leone

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

8318

C.2

00015356-00015361

This solemn declaration can
be found in C.1

00015362-00015364

8158

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

THE PROSECUTOR

Against

ISSA HASAN SESAY
MORRIS KALLON
AUGUSTINE GBAO

CASE NO. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T

SOLEMN DECLARATION OF THOMAS LAHUN

DECLARANT: THOMAS LAHUN
DECLARED AT: FREETOWN
DATE: 11 JULY 2005

On 11th July, 2005, I, Thomas Lahun, an Investigator with the Office of the Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. I have been working with the Office of the Prosecutor since August 2002. Prior to working at the Special Court I was one of the Directors with the CID. The CID is Criminal Investigation Department.

2. On the 8th May 2000, I was working at the CID headquarters in Freetown. On that same day, Parliamentarians, Civil Society Groups, and Women's Organizations, organized a demonstration in Freetown against the reports of the arrest of UN Peace Keepers [UNAMSIL] by the RUF. This demonstration was being held on Spur Road, near the residence of RUF leader Foday Sankoh. During the time of the demonstration, we saw people running all over saying that there was shooting was going on at Foday Sankoh's house on Spur Road.

3. On the 9th May 2000, after our morning meeting at the CID Headquarters, we tasked Assistant Superintendents, Samuel Sanni Sesay and Albert Conteh, to move with a team to Foday Sankoh's house on Spur Road to find out what was happening there as we learned that he had fled the house. They were also asked to see how best the house could be secured, and to also secure any valuable evidence.

4. The team, led by Samuel Sanni Sesay and Albert Conteh, informed us on their arrival at Foday Sankoh's house that the house was looted and that documents were scattered all over in the compound. We advised them to immediately secure whatever documents they could and take them to the CID. Samuel Sanni Sesay then returned later to the CID with a big carton containing documents. I, along with other Directors of the CID and Alfred Sesay received from Samuel Sanni Sesay the documents in the carton.

5. After we viewed some of these documents, I handed custody of the carton of documents from Foday Sankoh's house to Alfred Sesay, who was my Special Assistant to keep it in a cupboard under lock and key in the CID office I was sharing with him, which he did. The documents were under his custody from that point onward.

6. Shortly after my transfer to the Special Court in August 2002, I went to the CID headquarters and inspected the same set of documents from Sankoh's house that were still at the CID under the custody of Alfred Sesay. I was instructed by my supervisors at the OTP to take possession of documents related to "communications." I took possession from Alfred Sesay at CID certain documents that were part of the materials seized at Sankoh's house and were still in the custody and control of the CID.

7. On 20 May 2005, Christopher Santora with the Office of the Prosecutor, and Tariq Malik, the evidence custodian for the OTP, presented several original documents to me with internal OTP reference numbers marked on each page. I have inspected the documents below and affirm that I took possession of these documents and turned them over to the OTP around September or October of 2002.
    a. ERN00007852-00007862

b. ERN00012914-00012927

8. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true in every particular.

Thomas Lahun
Investigator for the Office of the Prosecutor
The Special Court for Sierra Leone

Declared at Freetown,)
this 11th day of July 2005,)
before me)
)

Peter Harrison
Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court for Sierra Leone

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

C.3

00015537-00015538

00015539-00015540

00015541-00015541

00015542-00015543

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE

WITNESS STATEMENT

Family Name: Cuffey

First Name: George Kofa

Maiden Name:

[redacted]

Date_of_Interview[19th June 2005

Location_of_Interview[Tankoro Police Station

Language_during_Interview[English

Name_of_Investigator(s)[Joseph Saffa and Jusu Yarmah

Other_Persons_Present[

Name_of_Interpreter[

Text of Witness Statement

Witness was interview by Joseph Saffa and Jusu Yarmah on Sunday 19th June 2005 at the Tankoro Police Station Kono in respect of RUF Documents in possession of the Office of the Prosecutor.

I am presently the Officer Commanding Gandorhun Police Station. Sometime in 2002 I was the source manager at the Special Branch Headquarters. On a date I cannot remember, I traveled with the Head of Special Branch and other Intelligent Officers to the provinces on a provincial tour. Whilst at Tankoro Police Station, the then Officer Commanding Special Branch in Kono Division, A.S.P. Aiah B. Ansumana showed us one old rice bag (white) full of documents and he explained to Mr. Jalloh that they were documents seized from the RUF interim leader's office in Kono. Then General Issa Hassan Sesay was the RUF interim Leader. The Head of Special Branch Mr. Jalloh then instructed me as source manager to take custody of the bag which I did. I took it to Freetown and kept it in the Source Manager's Office. I did not untie the bag not did I go through the content of the bag or documents. Some time in March 2004, I was transferred to

Warning

This document is the property of the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone and cannot be distributed outside the Office of the Prosecutor without permission from the Prosecutor.

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE

WITNESS STATEMENT

Tongo and I handed the bag in the same form to my successor Sergeant 553 Bangura I.Z . That is all.

Prepared by: _Jusu Yarmah_____ Approved by:_____

Warning

This document is the property of the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone and cannot be distributed outside the Office of the Prosecutor without permission from the Prosecutor.

Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

For Official Use Only

8324

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE

WITNESS STATEMENT

Family Name: **Ansumana**

First Name: **Aiah Bamba**

Maiden Name:

[redacted]

Date_of_Interview[**20th June 2005**

Location_of_Interview[**Tankoro Police Station**

Language_during_Interview[**English**

Name_of_Investigator(s)[**Jusu Yarmah**

Other_Persons_Present[

Name_of_Interpreter[

Text of Witness Statement

Witness was interview by Jusu Yarmah on Monday 20th June 2005 at Kono in respect of RUF Documents handed to the Office of the Prosecutor.

I am the operation Officer at the Special Branch Headquarters Freetown. Sometime in 2001, I was the Special Branch Officer in Kono. I was in a group of criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D) personnel led by the late Abu Mansaray from Tankoro Police Station who conducted a search at a premise at Koakoyima. The said premise was the Mines Office of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). One Alhaji Musa Kamara was in charged of the office as he was the RUF diamond valuator. During the search, we discovered documents pertaining to the RUF movement. I collected all the documents and placed them in an imported rice sack and took them to my office at Tankoro Police Station. I went through the documents and found out that they were useful documents and that they could be needed in the future. The documents were RUF documents mainly on RUF diamond mining activities. I tied the documents up in the sack and kept them in my Office. In early December 2001, the Head of Special Branch Mr. M.K. Jalloh

Warning

This document is the property of the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone and cannot be distributed outside the Office of the Prosecutor without permission from the Prosecutor.

Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

For Official Use Only

8325

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
WITNESS STATEMENT

(CSP) and the source manager then Mr. G.K Cuffey (ASP) came on a routine visit to Kono. I showed them the documents and they became interested. I gave them those documents and they took them along. Since then the documents have been in the custody of the Source Manager. Alhaji Musa Kamara was using the said office along side with other RUF officers. One such I remember was one Conteh who was working as Mines Monitoring Officer. That is all.

Prepared by: __Jusu Yarmah_____ Approved by:_____

Warning
This document is the property of the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone and cannot be distributed outside the Office of the Prosecutor without permission from the Prosecutor.

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE

WITNESS STATEMENT

Family Name: Poraj-Wilczynski

First Name: Joseph

Maiden Name:

[redacted]

Date_of_Interview[30th June 2005

Location_of_Interview[OTP

Language_during_Interview[English

Name_of_Investigator(s)[Jusu Yarmah

Other_Persons_Present[

Name_of_Interpreter[

Text of Witness Statement

Early in 2005, I think it was February I was speaking with Mr. Philip King the Police Advisor on the Commonwealth Advisory team with the SLP. Mr. King said that at the SLP Special Branch Office there were some documents that originated from the RUF Headquarters in Makeni. He asked if the Special Court wanted them. I asked him to deliver them to the court so that they might be assessed. Next the documents were delivered by the SLP in two rice sacks. I handed the sacks over to Mr. Gilbert Morissette then the Deputy Chief of investigation serving in the Office of the Prosecutor.

On 30 June 2005 I was shown these documents by Jusu Yarmah and I recognized them (because many are marked as originating in the RUF H/Q in Makeni fact I noted at the time they were handed tome earlier this year as the documents transmitted to me by Mr. Philip King.

Prepared by: _Jusu Yarmah_____ Approved by:_____

Warning

This document is the property of the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone and cannot be distributed outside the Office of the Prosecutor without permission from the Prosecutor.

Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

For Official Use Only

8328

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE

WITNESS STATEMENT

Family Name: Bangura

First Name: Ibrahim Zidyankay

Maiden Name:

Interview Data

Date_of_Interview[13th June 2005

Location_of_Interview[OTP

Language_during_Interview[English

Name_of_Investigator(s)[Jusu YARMAH

Other_Persons_Present[

Name_of_Interpreter[

Text of Witness Statement

Witness was interview by Jusu Yarmah on Monday 13th June 2005 at the OTP in respect of RUF Documents handed to the Deputy Chief of Investigations.

Witness said he is a police officer attached to the Source Management Unit at the Special Branch. He said some times in July 2003, he was posted to the Source Management Unit. He said when he went to the Office; he saw one old rice bag containing some documents. He said he didn't know the content then. Witness said he asked the then Source Manager, Inspector G.K Cuffey about how the bag came to be in the office. In reply witness said Inspector cuffey told him that the bag contained documents that the police got from a search conducted in the RUF Office at both Makeni and Kono. Mr. Cuffey according to the witness did not tell the date these searches were conducted into the RUF Office at both Makeni and Koidu. Witness said however Mr. Cuffey did not take any action on the documents. Witness said in the same month of July 2003, he was appointed to head the Source Management Unit. When he took over, the Witness said he suggested to the head of Special Branch Mr. M.K. Jalloh who told him to go through the bag and

Warning

This document is the property of the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone and cannot be distributed outside the Office of the Prosecutor without permission from the Prosecutor.

Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

For Official Use Only

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
WITNESS STATEMENT

see if there was any one of security interest. Witness said as he was going through the documents, Mr. Philip King a British Police Consultant came into the office and he grew interest in the documents. The following day, Mr. Philip King instructed Witness to hand over the bag and its contents to him. On the approval of the head of Special Branch, Witness said he handed the whole bag and its content to Mr. Philip. Witness said he came with Mr. King to the Special Court gate together with the bag. Witness said Mr. King then took the bag from him, entered the court premises and handed the bag to Mr. Joe Poraj Wilcynk who works for the Special Court. Witness said the documents contained in the bag were many but that if he sees them he could remember some of them. Witness said he was not on the search when the documents were found. Witness said he could not tell how the documents came into bag, all he knows is that he found them in a rice bag and Mr. Cuffey told him that they got them from an exploitation in the RUF Offices at Makeni and Kono. Witness is requesting that he will want copies of these documents sent back to them to see those of security interest to the state. Having looked at the documents, Witness confirmed that they are the same documents that he handed to Mr. Philip King. Mr. Philip King was the Common Wealth Security Safety Project Special Branch Consultant/Adviser to the SLP.

Prepared by: _Jusu Yarmah_____ Approved by:_____

Warning
This document is the property of the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone and cannot be distributed outside the Office of the Prosecutor without permission from the Prosecutor.

Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

8329

8330

C.5

00028335-00028338

00028754-00028755

00029356-00029357

8330

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

THE PROSECUTOR

Against

06028335

Charles Ghankay Taylor

SOLEMN DECLARATION of Phillip Ross

I, Phillip Ross, of Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, do solemnly and sincerely declare the following:

1. That I am a member of the Cape Breton Regional Police Service, currently seconded to the Office of the Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and as such I have knowledge of the facts and matters hereinafter declared.

2. That on February 28thth, 2007 I attended at the Temple of Justice, Monrovia Liberia and met with Sheriff Fofia Kamara who provided me access to the Evidence Room located at the Temple of Justice in order to photograph the area and manner in which exhibits seized under warrant in March of 2004 from White Flower were stored.

3. That on Wednesday February 28th, 2007 I obtained digital photos of Sheriff Fofie Kamara standing in the exhibit locker, pointing specifically to a (not plugged in) deep freezer located in a corner of the room. Sheriff Kamara also removed a clump of wet, paper, from within the said freezer, destroyed beyond recognition, and allowed me to photograph it, confirming that some unknown quantities of documents were damaged by water.

8332

4. That I downloaded these pictures from my digital camera to my computer, pasted them, 2 on a page adding a written narrative to each picture, and printed them in color, signing and dating each photo prior to entering them into evidence.

5. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true in every particular.

Declared before me at Freetown, Sierra Leone on the 7th day of March, 2007.

Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court for Sierra Leone

Phillip Ross 07/03/05
Phillip Ross

06028336

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

2/4 25

8332

8833



07/02/05

Photo showing **Sheriff Fofia Kamara** pointing to the non - operational deep freezer in the evidence locker in which the exhibits were stored.



07/03/05

Photo showing **Sheriff Fofia Kamara** next to the deep freezer.

3/4 BS



Photo showing **Sheriff Fofia Kamara** pointing to some of the many pieces of damaged documents found at the bottom of the deep freezer.



Photo showing a piece of water damaged cardboard and papers removed from the deep freezer.

8385

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

THE PROSECUTOR

00028754

Against

CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

CASE NO. SCSL–2003-01

SOLEMN DECLARATION OF RUTH MARY HACKLER

I, Ruth Mary Hackler, of Arlington, Texas, United States, do solemnly and sincerely declare the following:

1. That I am a contractor with the Office of the Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and as such, went to Monrovia, Liberia on February 27, 2007.

2. That on February 28, 2007, I accompanied OTP investigators Phillip Ross, Christopher Morris, Magnus Lamin, and Joseph Saffa to the Temple of Justice in Monrovia, Liberia. We met with Sheriff Fofie Kamara, who gave us access to the documents and materials seized under warrant in March 2004 from White Flower and The Executive Mansion.

3. That on February 28, 2007, I used my digital camera to take photos of those documents and materials which we determined were relevant from amongst the items seized. Christopher Morris also took pictures of the relevant items using his digital camera and mine.

4. That I watched Christopher Morris download the photographs from my camera into his computer on March 2, 2007 and that he gave me a complete electronic copy of all pictures taken on February 28, 2007, both from my camera and his.

8385

5. That on February 28, 2007, I photocopied documents that we determined were relevant from the seized items. Some of the documents that were photocopied were not photographed, and some of the documents that were photographed were not photocopied. However, I made two complete sets of everything I photocopied. The photocopies were made at the UNMIL offices under the supervision of Liberian National Police Captain Sumo, who accompanied us from the Temple of Justice to the UNMIL offices and back.

6. That upon returning to the Temple of Justice from the UNMIL offices, we gave one set of the photocopies to County Counselor Jacobs to retain at the Temple of Justice as a record of what we copied. All of the original seized items were returned to Sheriff Kamara at approximately 6:45 p.m. on February 28, 2007.

7. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true in every particular.

Ruth Mary Hackler
Consultant

Declared in Freetown, Sierra Leone)
this 26th day of March, 2007)
before me)
)

Office of the ~~Prosecutor~~
Special Court for Sierra Leone
WENDY VAN TONGEREN
TRIAL ATTORNEY

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

8337

00029356

Office of the sheriff

Temple Justice
MONROVIA

February 28, 2007

To: Whom It May Concern:

IN RE: *Exhibits seized from white flower in March of 2004.*

The Exhibits that were seized from White Flower under a Writ of search and seizure warrant No. 826 in March of 2004 were stored in the warehouse of the Monrovia City Court, Temple of Justice Building, Monrovia, Liberia from March of 2004 until July of 2006 at which time the exhibits were accessed to be examined by the special court for Sierra Leone. At the time, it was discovered that a portion of the said exhibits were destroyed by water, etc.

The remaining exhibits were removed from the warehouse and stored in a secured area at the rear of the court room and locked up by the sheriff, Capt. Fofie V. Kamara.

No person /s have had asset to these exhibits other than the Special Court for Sierra Leone from March 2004 until today February 28, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

Capt. Fofie V. Kamara
SHERIFF

MONROVIA CITY COURT
TEMPLE OF JUSTICE
REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

8338

8338

00029357

DECLARATION OF CUSTODY

This statement certifies that the documents that were seized from Whiteflower in March 2004 and were thereafter stored in the Temple of Justice, Monrovia, Liberia, were taken from the Temple of Justice by personnel from the Special Court for Sierra Leone on February 28, 2007 to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) offices for purposes of copying. County Counselor Jacobs gave his permission for this process. Sheriff Fofia Kamara, who was in charge of the evidence, assigned Captain Sumo of the Liberian National Police to accompany the SCSL personnel to the UNMIL offices and to ensure that no documents were altered or compromised in any way.

Captain Sumo oversaw the photocopying done by Ruth Mary Hackler of the SCSL and certifies that two sets of copies were made of the documents selected by SCSL personnel. One set of copies was kept by the SCSL to take back to Freetown. The second set of copies was given to County Counselor Jacobs to maintain at the Temple of Justice. The originals were returned to Sheriff Fofia Kamara at approximately 6:45 p.m. on February 28, 2007 at the Temple of Justice.

This statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Capt. Sumo
Captain Sumo, Liberian National Police

Sheriff Fofia Kamara

8338

8339

C.6

00029780-00029780

00029781-00029783

8338

00029780

8340

May 21, 2005

To whom it may concern,

The attached letter from Sierra Leone RUF Leader Foday Sankoh to Liberian leader Charles Taylor was given to me in late 2000 while I was in Freetown, Sierra Leone on business.

The letter was given to me by a gentleman named John Benjamin who was a local business leader and later became a government official in the Kabbah Administration.

I was told by Mr. Benjamin that he received the letter from someone who went to Foday Sankoh's compound in Freetown, Sierra Leone after it was abandoned by Sankoh. This was sometime after May 8, 2000 when Sankoh's gunmen opened fire on a crowd of protesters outside his compound.

Sankoh later escaped into the hills outside of Freetown and left many documents in his residence. I was told by John Benjamin that this document was retrieved by a friend of his. John Benjamin gave me the document and asked that I try and do what I can to get it "in the hands of the right people."

In May of this year, I posted a short column and PDF file of the original letter on a news and commentary site at www.techcentralstation.com. I was then contacted by a special investigator at the United Nations asking for a copy of the letter which I am enclosing.

I contacted the UN War Crimes Tribunal on one other occasion in approximately 2001/2002 and offered the letter as evidence but was never contacted again.

Sincerely,

W. C. Hudgins

William Coles Hudgins
3617 Legation St. NW
Washington, DC 20015

District of Columbia : SS
Subscribed and Sworn to before me
this 24 day of May, 2006
Ruth M. Schmitz
Notary Public, D.C.

My commission expires
Ruth M. Schmitz
Notary Public, District of Columbia
My Commission Expires 5/14/2011

0758

8340

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
JOMO KENYATTA ROAD • NEW ENGLAND • FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
PHONE: +1 212 963 9915 Extension: 178 7000 or +39 0831 257000 or +232 22 297000
FAX: EXTENSION: 178 7366 OR +39 0831 257366 OR +232 22 297366

834

SOLEMN DECLARATION OF TARIQ MALIK

Declarant: TARIQ MALIK
Declared At: FREETOWN
Date: 30 MARCH 2007

00029781

I, Tariq Malik, do solemnly and sincerely declare to the best of my knowledge and belief as follows:

1. I have been employed as Chief, Evidence Unit in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the Special Court for Sierra Leone since 28 April 2003.

2. On 13 June 2006, Ms. Harpinder Athwal, then employed at the Special Court for Sierra Leone as the Special Assistant to the Prosecutor, deposited an artifact in the Evidence Unit which comprised of a signed document dated 05 May 1992, purporting to be a letter written by Sankoh of RUF to Charles Taylor, encased in a brown glass frame. This artifact has remained in possession of the Evidence Unit from 13 June 2006 to this date.

3. Accompanying this framed document was a one page affidavit from Mr. Williams Coles Hudgins, dated 21 May 2005 and sworn before a Notary Public on 24 May 2006. The affidavit provides information as to how Mr. Hudgins came into possession of the document inside the frame. This affidavit has been entered into the Evidence Unit and stamped the Evidence Register Number (ERN) 00029780.

4. The glass face of the framed artifact showed the front side of a double-sided single page signed original document set against an off-white matting board. It was evident that the back side of the document contained some handwritten text but the casing of the frame prevented one from being able to turn over the page and read it.

5. The rear side of the framed artifact was sealed with a brown sheet of paper. Affixed to the brown sheet of paper with scotch tape was a handwritten document titled "Proclamation for Kono Dist.". This appeared to be a facsimile of the back side of the document inside the frame and was apparently affixed to the rear side of the frame in order to show the handwritten text which otherwise could not be seen without dismantling the frame (see paragraph 4 above). I made a further copy of the facsimile found affixed to the rare of the frame and the Evidence Unit stamped ERN 00029779 on the copy.

1/3

H88

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
JOMO KENYATTA ROAD • NEW ENGLAND • FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
PHONE: +1 212 963 9915 Extension: 178 7000 or +39 0831 257000 or +232 22 297000
FAX: EXTENSION: 178 7366 OR +39 0831 257366 OR +232 22 297366

6. On 13 March 2007, I dismantled the frame and removed the enclosed document from its casing. The document was affixed to the off-white matting board using three pieces of double-sided adhesive tape. It is impossible to separate the document from the matting without tearing or damaging parts of the document. Because of the manner in which the document is glued to, and set on the matting board, it is not possible to copy or scan either the front or the back side of the document.

7. In the period since the back side of the document was affixed to the matting, the adhesive tape has 'bled' through from the back to the front of the document, which has resulted in there being three rectangular-shaped patches visible near the top part of the front page of the document.

8. Due to the back side of the original document being permanently affixed to the matting (see paragraph 6 above), it cannot be viewed in its entirety. However, approximately three-quarters or more of the rear side of the document is visible. I have compared the facsimile document bearing ERN 00029779 (see paragraph 5 above) to the back side of the original signed document. I have determined that ERN 00029779 is a true copy of the back side of the original document found inside the frame.

9. On 09 March 2007, Ms. Ruth Mary Hackler, a consultant employed by the OTP, forwarded an e-mail to me which related to the abovementioned framed document. This e-mail was sent on 30 March 2006 by John Petrie, a former staff member of the OTP, to John Berry, presently employed as Investigations Commander in the Office of the Prosecutor, and contained an attached document named 'sankoh_letter.pdf'.

10. On 27 March 2007, I opened and printed the document named 'sankoh_letter.pdf'. The Evidence Unit stamped ERN 00029778 on the printout of 'sankoh_letter.pdf'.

11. I have compared ERN 00029778 (printout of 'sankoh_letter.pdf') with the front side of the original document found enclosed within the framed artifact and determined that, with the exception of the three rectangular-shaped adhesive patches (see paragraph 7 above), 00029778 is a true copy of the front side of the original document inside the frame.

8343

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

JOMO KENYATTA ROAD• NEW ENGLAND • FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
PHONE: +1 212 963 9915 Extension: 178 7000 or +39 0831 257000 or +232 22 297000
FAX: EXTENSION: 178 7366 OR +39 0831 257366 OR +232 22 297366

12. It is my determination that the two pages entered in the Evidence Unit and assigned ERN 00029778-00029779, represent true and accurate copies of both sides of the original document contained in the glass framed artifact brought to the Evidence Unit by Ms. Harpinder Athwal on 13/06/2006.

Tariq Malik
Chief, Evidence Unit

Declared at Freetown,)
This 30th Day of March, 2007)
before me)
)

Peter Harrison
Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court Sierra Leone

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

3/3

8458

8344

Prosecution's Motion for Admission of Material Pursuant to Rules 89 (c) and 92 *bis* of Material Intended to be used During Opening Statement

Media List

EXH. #	ERN
1.125	D0000057
1.128	D0000060
1.129	D0000061
1.132	D0000067
1.219	V0000041
1.298	D0000066
1.330	D0000064
2.047	D0000049
2.074	EV0059
2.083	EV0125
2.091	EV0146
2.219	EV0155
2.220	EV0157
Doc. 3.060	Not Available

8344