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SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Freetown – Sierra Leone

Before: Judge Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding Judge
Judge Bankole Thompson
Judge Pierre Boutet

Registrar: Mr. Robin Vincent

Date filed: 6 May 2005

THE PROSECUTOR

Against

Issa Hassan Sesay
Morris Kallon
Augustine Gbao

Case No. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T


**FILING OF EXPERT REPORT PURSUANT THE ORDER ON URGENT
PROSECUTION APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME DATED 2 MAY
2005**

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
1. The “Urgent Application for an Extension of Time with the Order on Urgent Prosecution Application for Extension of Time Dated 2 May 2005” filed 5 May 2005 (“the second Application”) detailed the continuing difficulties experienced by the Prosecution in receiving the report of Colonel Iron (witness TF1-301) via worldwide express courier in time to file the document by 6 May 2005.
2. As detailed in the “Urgent Application for an Extension of Time for Compliance with the Order for Compliance of Prosecution with Rule 94bis” filed on 29 April 2005 (“the first Application”), attempts at receiving the report electronically had proved unsuccessful due to the size of files containing graphics.
3. Notwithstanding the second Application, filed to provide the Chamber and the Defence with adequate notice of the difficulties with the courier in case further attempts by the Prosecution to have the document submitted to it via electronic means failed, the Prosecution continued its efforts to receive the document electronically. They have proved successful.


4. Accordingly, the Prosecution hereby files the expert report of Colonel Richard Iron entitled "Military Expert Witness Report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone" pursuant to the Order on Urgent Prosecution Application for Extension of Time dated 2 May 2005 and Rule 94*bis*. Concomitantly, the Prosecution withdraws the application for relief sought in the second Application.

Dated this 6th Day of May

In Freetown,

Sierra Leone



Luc Côté
Chief of Prosecutions

Lesley Taylor
Senior Trial Counsel

ANNEXURES

“Military Expert Witness Report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone” by
Colonel Richard Iron OBE, British Army

Curriculum Vitae of Colonel Richard Iron

Military Expert Witness Report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone



MILITARY EXPERT WITNESS REPORT

on the

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

by

Colonel Richard Iron OBE, British Army

Norfolk, Virginia

April 2005

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PART A
INTRODUCTION

A1. I was first approached by the UK's Ministry of Defence to be a military expert witness in June 2003, to assist in the determination of the extent to which the RUF and other organizations involved in the Sierra Leone War were military organizations with military command and control. Since then I have visited Sierra Leone three times to establish the facts upon which I can make opinions. I have read witness statements and interviewed a number of those who served with the RUF. I have walked the ground with such witnesses, who were able to describe to me first hand what happened and where, and in what context. My discussions with them were almost entirely based on the military events of the war, rather than any particular crime that may or may not have taken place.

A2. This report analyses activities that took place over 6 years ago. Since there are few documentary records, it is primarily based on interviews and is therefore reliant on the personal memory of those that took part. It is inevitable that there are some inaccuracies and inconsistencies, and some details within the report may be inaccurate. It is also inevitable that there are other individuals with different experiences who have a different perspective on some aspects of this report. However, I have built a picture of the entire organization from many such personal perspectives, and although some details may be inaccurate, I am confident that the conclusions I have drawn and judgments I have made are accurate, except where I have indicated there is some doubt.

A3. Approach. In order to establish whether the RUF was a military organization and whether command was effective, I have devised four tests. I then reviewed the available evidence against these tests in order to come to my opinion. In addition to this Introduction, this report consists of:

a. Part B – Methodology. This Part examines the four tests; it explains the theoretical and intellectual basis for each test; and then describes the criteria to be used in applying them.

b. Part C – the Koidu Campaign. This Part is a detailed narrative and analysis of one particular RUF campaign within the war, which I have used as an example to support aspects of the four tests. The assumption is that what is general RUF practice in this campaign can be induced to be general practice elsewhere.

c. Part D – RUF Structure and Systems. This Part is a more general description of how the RUF worked as an organisation, again used to support application of the four tests.

d. Part E – Analysis. This Part takes the methodology explained in Part B and applies it to the evidence, analysis, and judgements made in Parts C and D. It reaches conclusions against each test, and then synthesizes the conclusions to

reach a general opinion as to whether the RUF was a military organization and whether command was effective.

A4. Terminology. In this report, the following terms are used to describe organizations:

- a. 'The RUF' describes the rural guerrilla organization alone, excluding AFRC elements during or after the ECOMOG Intervention of February 1998.
- b. 'The RUF/AFRC' describes the bulk of junta forces following the February 1998 Intervention; but excludes the AFRC faction commanded by SAJ Musa and Gullitt from mid 1998 to early 1999.
- c. 'The AFRC Musa/Gullitt Faction' describes the force predominantly consisting of AFRC fighters that planned and executed the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown, and was led by SAJ Musa and Gullitt respectively.

PART B **METHODOLOGY**

B1. Introduction.

B1.1 To determine whether an armed group is a military organisation in the traditional sense, and whether command responsibility exists, we need to examine four questions:

- Did the group have a recognisable military hierarchy and structure?
- Did it exhibit the characteristics of a traditional military organisation?
- Was there coherent linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical levels?
- Was command effective?

B1.2 It is important to note that absence of one or more characteristics of military organisation does not mean that military organisation does not exist. Similarly command and control that is at times ineffective does not imply absence of military hierarchy. All humans are fallible and no organisation is perfect. Mistakes are common even in well established and ordered armies: orders are occasionally disobeyed; decisions made that are illogical; systems established that are not coherent; some rules kept, and others ignored, for no apparent reason. In particular, personality conflicts are common among senior commanders in war, and can greatly influence decision-making. So, the question is not 'is this a perfect military organisation?'; instead it is 'does this demonstrate sufficient characteristics of a military organisation to qualify as such?'. Thus judgement is required to determine answers to the questions above.

B1.3. To establish a methodology to answer the above questions, I examine the characteristics of military organisations and the nature of military command. I start by establishing why military groups fashion themselves into recognisable military organisations, and why such organisations exhibit similar characteristics. I then examine their structure, both within the hierarchy of command and staff organisation. I list and describe the functions which military organisations typically require to sustain themselves and to succeed in conflict. I finally describe the nature of military command, including the elements of effective command.

B1.4. By comparing the evidence presented against these criteria for military organisations and their command, I intend to form an opinion as to whether the group in question was a military organisation and whether effective command was being exercised. Judgement will be required; it is most unlikely that any organisation will fulfil completely all the characteristics and requirements for military organisation.

B2. The need for military organisation.

B2.1 Conflict is an activity fought by humans against other humans. As a result, the human dynamic is the most important factor in conflict; and since all humans are different and respond differently to stress, fear, and deprivation, conflict is at root chaotic and unpredictable. Usually, victory comes as a result of managing this chaos better than

an adversary, and focussing activity to a common goal. Any person or group who intends to use armed force to pursue an objective therefore has to overcome human individuality through the creation of military organisation. Military organisations exist to achieve unity of purpose, reduce chaos, and mitigate its effects. Military organisation therefore exists in *any* conflict waged between recognisable groups; otherwise it is simply a state of aimless violence.

B2.2 Military organisations tend to exhibit similar characteristics because of the nature of conflict: highly complex, dynamic and adversarial. It is ridden with uncertainty, violence, friction¹, and human stress. Military organisations, and the command and control structures that support them, need to be able to accommodate such complexity: coping with uncertainty and exploiting it where possible; helping humans to deal with and overcome fear; breaking down the complex into the simple so to minimise the effect of friction; and maximising ones own forces' and commanders' willpower while undermining that of the enemy.

B2.3 Note that the *nature* of conflict is regardless of the *type* of conflict. General war and insurgency, whether today or two thousand years ago, have more in common with each other than any other kind of non-warlike activity. It should be no surprise, therefore, that military organisations tend to have recognisable hierarchies and structures.

B3. Did the group have a recognisable military hierarchy and structure?

B3.1 The detailed structure of a military organisation is dependent on its unique circumstances, in particular the complexity of its conflict. However, a general model has evolved over millennia, and is remarkably consistent across cultures and time². It is the result of the human brain's ability to deal with the complexity of conflict: to limit the information the brain has to process, we create hierarchies with any one level of command responsible only for a limited number of subordinates. This is called the **span of command**, and typically consists of 3-5 subordinates in complex and rapid moving situations, maybe many more in static situations where the rate of information delivery is much lower and consequently less demanding on the human brain³. The coherent linkage between multiple levels of commanders is described as the **chain of command**. A typical hierarchical military organisation is shown in Figure 1.

¹ Karl von Clausewitz: "Everything in war is simple, but even the simplest thing is difficult, and these difficulties, largely unforeseen or unpredictable, accumulate and produce a **friction**, a retarding brake on the absolute extension and discharge of violence." *On War*, translated by Col J J Graham and edited by Col F N Maude. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) Book 1, p. 53 and 77.

² This model is common to the Roman legions and the modern armies of the US, Russia, and China. It is also common to less conventional armies, such as the Polish Resistance of WW2, ZIPRA in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe War, and the Provisional IRA.

³ For example, the British Army conventionally has four battalions in a brigade designed for mobile operations. However, in Northern Ireland the operation was more static, and each brigade typically had 8-10 battalions.




Figure 1: a typical hierarchical organisation


B3.2 As well as creating hierarchies to manage complexity in conflict, military organisations are characterised by a number of functions that enable them to live and operate. Some are common to all organisations, military or civilian, such as pay, communications, and provision of food. Others are specifically military in nature (although may also have utility in some civilian fields), such as intelligence and provision of weapons. These functions are described more fully in Section 4 on characteristics of military organisations.

B3.3 The mechanisms for implementing functions are determined by the unique circumstances of the organisation. A function may require complex organisation, or be combined with several others in one man. Others may not exist at all. However, the totality of activities required, even in a simple organisation, is beyond the ability of a single commander. Military organisations have therefore developed **staffs** to assist the commander. They consist of officers, not normally commanders in their own right, given functional responsibility to assist the commander lead, make decisions, and control the force under command.

B3.4 Staff officers are more or less organised into **functional branches**, with branch chiefs who may report to the commander directly or through a **chief of staff**. A variation of standard NATO nomenclature of functional staff branches, used by many armies and guerrilla organisations throughout the world, is:

- G1 – personnel issues
- G2 – intelligence
- G3 – operations
- G4 – logistics
- G5 – civil-military relations

Of course, other military organisations may organise their staff structure in completely different ways, although their functions will be broadly similar. A typical staff structure to support a commander is shown in Figure 2.



B3.5 The role of a chief of staff varies with the culture of the military organisation and personalities involved. However, he is often treated as a close confidant and advisor to the commander, as well as coordinator of the staff supporting the commander. There may in addition be a deputy commander, separate from the chief of staff. Again, individual roles are entirely dependent on personality, even in well established military organisations.

B3.6 Each level in the chain of command will have some form of support for the commander, although the lower the level the more rudimentary the support becomes⁴.

B3.7 Organisations need to adapt to survive, especially when the character of the conflict changes, or when fighting against an organisation that is itself adaptive. An organisation may need to change how it operates⁵, or it may need to change its structure. Such changes may be in its hierarchical chain of command, or its staff structure, or both⁶.

B4. Did the group exhibit the characteristics of a traditional military organisation?

B4.1. Paragraph 3.2 described how military organisations require a series of functions to survive and succeed, in addition to the activity of fighting, which are likely to require dedicated staff within the organisation. Typically, they would be grouped within a headquarters in support of the commander. This section describes these functions in more detail. Not all these functions are required in every situation; absence does not necessarily indicate absence of organisation.

⁴ For example, in the British Army, even a commander of an 8 man section has a second in command, specifically responsible for provision of ammunition and other supplies.

⁵ Such as the German Army in 1917-18, which adopted "stormtrooper" tactics to overcome the stalemate of trench warfare.

⁶ Such as the Provisional IRA's move from battalion to cell structure, to improve security after several British intelligence successes following penetration of the earlier organisation.

B4.2. The Intelligence Process. Intelligence is information on the enemy or environment (terrain, civil population, weather) that has been analysed and ordered so that military decisions can be based upon it. Accurate intelligence is critical to success in conflict; although usually some compromise has to be reached between quality of information against the time taken to produce it. An intelligence process usually consists of some form of collection, communication, and collation and analysis. Collection of information can be by technical means (such as aerial photography and electronic eavesdropping), by espionage, or by observation (such as use of observation posts and patrols). Communications are required to permit the transfer of that information to the organisation that is going to analyse and use that information. Collation and analysis is the process for converting information into useable intelligence; in most regular armies it is conducted by specialist intelligence personnel. So, for example, a sighting by a patrol of a group of armed men moving down a road is an item of **information**; intelligence staff may be able to combine this with other information to assess that the enemy is planning to attack a particular point – this is **intelligence**.

B4.3. Communications System. Communications are the glue that allows military organisations to work in a coherent way. Without some form of communications system, effective command cannot be exercised over subordinates, nor can operations be coordinated, since military operations typically extend over far larger areas than that which can be controlled within the sight or earshot of one man. Communications can be transmitted by some form of post system, or carried by runners, or done electronically by radio or telephone. Communications need to achieve an appropriate level of reliability, security, and timeliness. **Reliability** is the degree of certainty the sender has that the message will be received and understood: if the system used is inherently unreliable (such as sending runners through enemy territory, with high probability of intercept) then redundancy is often planned (such as sending multiple runners with the same message). **Security** is measured by the degree of difficulty the enemy may have to intercept and understand the message. More advanced armies tend to use secure electronic communications; some others use systems of codes and ciphers. **Timeliness** relates to how long the message takes to transmit and (if necessary) decode. Frequently, its importance is not the total time taken *per se*, but time taken relative to an adversary. So, for example, one day to send and receive a message may be too long if the enemy can do the same in one hour, but may well be timely if the enemy takes two days. Military organisations in conflict frequently attack an enemy's communications system⁷, thereby causing a breakdown in command; effective organisations protect themselves from such attack.

B4.4. Planning and Orders Process. Military activity does not usually occur spontaneously; generally it is the result of a coherent plan that all or parts of the organisation will attempt to implement. The key part is the **decision** – the selection of a course of action. This decision can be made singly by a commander, or may emerge through a more collaborative process: it is discussed in further in Section 6. Once a

⁷ Such attack can be electronic (eg jamming of radio nets) or physical (eg destruction of radio relay stations, or patrol activity to intercept messengers on foot).

decision has been made, it is transmitted to those responsible for its implementation through an **orders** process. This frequently implies cascading orders through the chain of command, although orders can also be given simultaneously to an organisation through a general briefing, in person or by radio. In well established armies, orders for major operations are generally written and frequently supplemented by oral orders. For smaller operations, or where time is short, oral orders only are given.

B4.5. Lessons Learnt System/Doctrine Development and Dissemination. Successful military organisations learn from their mistakes or from enemy successes. Not to do so would risk strategic defeat once an enemy has identified and exploited a particular weakness. Successful learning requires some form of analysis of past operations, and a system for distributing good ideas or lessons. This can be direct to other units, or indirectly through the training system. For example, if one group finds a particularly good method of ambushing an enemy convoy, it will wish to pass on that knowledge to other groups in the same military organisation to increase the effectiveness of the organisation as a whole. It may also pass on the information to any training organisation so all new members of the organisation know the most effective method of ambushing. In this way, we can see that a military organisation tends to build a common doctrine – or *modus operandi* – which is constantly evolving as new lessons are learnt. Frequently, these lessons will be a result of evolution of an enemy, which is also likely to be a learning organisation.

B4.6 Disciplinary System. Conflict causes normal social structures and inhibitions to break down. Soldiers are trained to kill, thus overcoming one of society's strongest taboos. Soldiers are also expected to suffer considerable hardship; including hunger, sleep deprivation, absence from family, and fear. It is not surprising that, given opportunity, soldiers tend to lawlessness and excess. This is regardless of race or culture: British and French armies, after successfully storming cities in the Napoleonic Wars of the early Nineteenth Century, conducted atrocities similar to those seen in late Twentieth Century Africa. Although education can assist prevent such breakdown, the most reliable means of controlling soldiers is through an effective disciplinary system, threatening identification of crime and a level of punishment sufficient to deter wrongdoing. This may involve some form of military police and a military legal system to dispense justice and impose punishment.

B4.7. Recruiting and Training. Recruitment is essential for a military organisation to survive; either to expand, or simply to remain at its current strength to replace casualties, deserters, or others who return to civilian life. Some armies offer inducements to young people to join, others use some form of compulsion; this latter category includes those nations that employ conscription, such as Germany. Once in the organisation, the recruit then has to be trained in military skills, to become an effective member of the organisation. Usually this takes place in specialist training establishments, although it can be done on-the-job within a unit consisting primarily of trained soldiers who pass on their skills to the recruit. Training is also likely to include inculcation of the values and standards of the organisation, so that the recruit comes to believe in what the organisation

stands for. Frequently, there is some form of recognition at the completion of training, such as a “passing-out” parade or certificate.

B4.8. System for Promotions and Appointments. Military organisations are complex bodies, and there are many different appointments to be filled by people with a wide variety of skills. Some may be commanders, others radio operators, and others staff officers. As people gain experience in the organisation many become capable of greater responsibility. At the same time, others become casualties or otherwise leave the organisation; or the organisation expands offering considerable opportunities for new appointments. An effective appointment system seeks to marry the most appropriate skills to the right posts within an organisation, whilst at the same time attempting to meet the aspirations of deserving individuals. Within military organisations, appointments are generally tied to rank, and the most common system of reward is through promotion in rank.

B4.9. Logistic Supply (including Arms Procurement). Armies require considerable quantities of combat supplies to remain effective, typically consisting of water, food, fuel, and ammunition. Some, such as water and food, may be available locally. A light force that has few vehicles has little need for fuel. All forces depend on supplies of arms and ammunition, without which they cannot fight. Unless the military organisation runs some form of arms factories⁸, then it will rely on some form of procurement system to purchase munitions and other supplies from elsewhere. It then needs to transport the supplies into the theatre of operations; and provide some form of tactical transportation system to where they are required.

B4.10. Repair and Maintenance of Equipment. Many armies are reliant on technology and equipment, much of it expensive. Since military usage tends to be heavy, constant maintenance is often required to keep it working. Well developed armies rely on sophisticated repair and maintenance systems; armies less reliant on equipment may only have rudimentary systems for repair, or none at all.

B4.11. Medical System. Effective military organisations care for their injured and sick. They do this partly because they do not wish to waste trained manpower; but also it is to give soldiers the confidence that if they are wounded in battle then they will be looked after. A medical system requires effective evacuation from the point of wounding (often under fire), immediate first aid (to restart breathing or staunch excessive blood loss), and then evacuation to proper medical care, and subsequent recuperation. Essential is provision of adequate medical supplies. Well developed armies have highly effective medical systems⁹, matching the best available civilian standards.

B4.12. Fundraising and Finance. Military organisations usually need money, to pay for procurement of supplies and equipment, and to pay the salaries of its soldiers. Established national armies do this through government taxation and provision of a defence budget.

⁸ Such as the Provisional IRA that built improvised mortars, bombs, and rocket launchers.

⁹ For example, in the British Army the goal is get any casualty to an operating theatre within one hour of wounding.

Others do so through fund raising internally or externally: this could be through voluntary donations; or through exploitation of resources which the military organisation controls or has access to¹⁰. It is likely that sources of funds are likely to be strictly controlled: this also gives control of the supply system; and subsequent control of the military organisation as a whole.

B4.13. Pay or Reward System for Soldiers. Most people expect some form of reward for their labour. In most armies this provided financially through salaries, couple with some system of promotion or appointment reward system. In less well developed armies, or in environments where money has less meaning, such rewards may be in the form of goods, money, or enhanced living conditions.

B4.14 Religious Welfare System. Religion tends to play a significant role in many military organisations. Some military organisations are wholly based around religion, such as medieval Crusader armies; but even when not it is noticeable that in times of stress or high threat, an increased number of soldiers take solace from religion. Military organisations tend to provide opportunity for such religious welfare¹¹, either within the military structure, or permit access to it outside the structure.

B5. Was there coherent linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical levels?

B5.1 Most modern analysts divide conflict into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical¹². War aims and high level objectives are developed at the strategic level; broad approaches are designed at the operational level, to achieve strategic aims; and then individual battles and engagements are planned at the tactical level which, together, achieve operational level objectives. In an effective military organisation, there will be clear linkage between the three levels.

B5.2 An example of clear, coherent linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical levels is Operation OVERLORD in June 1944. At this time the Allied Powers had the *strategic* aim of defeating Germany by opening a second front in Western Europe and invading Germany from both East and West. At the *operational* level, land, air, and maritime force was concentrated in south east England, to enable invasion of Normandy; coupled with *operational* level deception to convince Hitler that any invasion would be in the Pas de Calais. *Tactical* operations were then conducted to clear sea minefields, suppress German defences, and seize beachheads to permit rapid reinforcement.

B5.3 Poor linkage existed for Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of Russia in 1941. The German *strategic* aim was the takeover of the Soviet state through

¹⁰ For example, the warlords' control of poppy production in Afghanistan.

¹¹ Except for noticeably secular organizations such as Communist guerrillas in Malaya 1948-60. Even in such cases it can be argued that secular ideology or nationalism fulfilled the same need.

¹² This categorization first emerged from 19th Century Prussian/German thinking, although it was primarily developed by the Soviet Union between WW1 and WW2, resulting from experience of the Russian Civil War. It was adopted by the US Army in the 1980s, and rapidly became standard military thought in all major Western powers.

military invasion. *Operationally*, they intended a massive blitzkrieg to defeat the Soviet Army, with *tactics* of armoured encirclement. But coherent linkage between levels did not exist. The Soviet Army was too big, and the Soviet Union too large, for armoured encirclements alone to defeat it (a breakdown in linkage between tactical and operational levels). Similarly, defeat of the Soviet Army did not equate to the collapse of the Soviet state – for that Hitler needed to win support of at least some of the peoples within the Soviet system; but his own racist policies would not allow this (a breakdown in linkage between operational and strategic levels).

B5.4 Linkage between the levels of conflict also exists in non-conventional wars. In the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe War of the 1970s, the two guerrilla armies of ZIPRA and ZANLA had the strategic aim of forcing the collapse of the minority white Rhodesian government and replacing it with black majority rule. One of their operational-level objectives was the collapse of the rural economy upon which the wealth of the country depended. They achieved this at the tactical level through attacks on remote white farmers, forcing the abandonment of many farming areas through fear.

B5.5 There is much political, military, and academic debate on the nature of insurgent and terrorist groups, and how they may be different from each other. Both may use terrorist methods, but insurgent groups tend to operate within a military and political framework: simultaneously overcoming the opponent's military structure while building popular support for the insurgency¹³. Terrorist groups generally do not attempt to defeat opposing military forces, but intimidate governments directly into granting political concessions¹⁴. They may conduct tactical operations to have strategic effect, without the existence of an operational level. Terrorist groups therefore have less need of classic military structures; insurgent organisations cannot succeed without them¹⁵. This is not to say that terrorist groups cannot become insurgent organisations over time, indeed they usually aspire to do so; simply that when they are acting as terrorists they do not have the same strategies or structures.

B6. Was command effective?

B6.1 One useful model of command incorporates three overlapping elements: **leadership, decision-making, and control**. These encompass all the activities normally associated with command. In essence, command involves deciding what has to be achieved (decision-making), getting subordinates to achieve it (leadership), and supervising its achievement (control).

¹³ For example, the Viet Cong built up considerable public support for their operations, while simultaneously fighting the South Vietnamese and American Armies: a classic case of Maoist revolutionary theory in action.

¹⁴ Examples are the European terrorist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, misnamed “urban guerrillas”, such as the Italian Red Brigades and German Baader-Meinhof Gang. They consisted of small numbers of terrorist cells, who never attempted to combat the armed forces of their opponents.

¹⁵ The *foci* of Che Guevara and Carlos Marínigella attempted to break this linkage in Bolivia in the late 1960s, by cutting off the guerrilla groups from the population and not build up a popular base for the insurgency. As a result, they were relatively easily defeated by security forces.




Figure 3: the command model

B6.2 Decision-making is the process of deciding what to do. It is the result of analysis, either rational or intuitive, to determine the best way of achieving the goals established by the superior commander. At the highest level, it will be to achieve the strategic objectives of the organisation. Accurate and effective decision-making relies on an understanding of the situation (knowledge of enemy, own forces, and the terrain). Such knowledge requires some form of intelligence organisation, to find out the enemy's dispositions, intentions, strengths and weaknesses; and also a system of reporting status and location of own forces. Knowledge of the terrain comes from maps, personal knowledge, or scouts. Decision-making can be done individually by the commander, or as part of a collaborative activity involving many of the staff and subordinate commanders. The final responsibility for the decision reached, however, remains that of the commander. The output of decision-making is operational plans, articulated in written or oral orders to subordinates.

B6.3 Leadership is an intrinsic part of motivating a force. People are usually motivated through both *physiological* and *psychological* means. Physiological motivators include food, shelter, security, and sex. Military organisations provide all these (except sex, for most armies); but on occasions military service also demands that physiological motivators are suspended, because of danger, hunger, and cold etc. Military organisations therefore also have to provide powerful psychological motivators. This is usually provided in two overlapping ways (although narcotics and alcohol could also be used):

- Belief in a higher ideal/vision: nationalism, freedom from oppression, religion etc
- Leadership: provided through combination of example, persuasion, and compulsion. Its purpose is twofold: to unify to a common purpose (to create cohesion), and to inspire (to build the moral will of the force).

B6.4 Control consists of direction, oversight, and coordination.

- Direction incorporates the communication of a decision once made, through the passage of orders. This can be done face to face, in writing, or by radio/telephone. Direction is not only given at the start of an operation, but may be given during execution, to respond to a changing situation.
- Oversight is the process of ensuring orders are implemented. It requires communications and reporting systems so the commander is adequately informed. Oversight needs to be backed by a disciplinary system: this is normally achieved through a rank structure, investigative system, and punishment.
- Coordination of subordinate activities is required when two or more subordinates are working together in time and/or space to achieve a common goal. Although two subordinate commanders may coordinate together without superior command involvement, this becomes increasingly difficult with a greater numbers. Coordination requires effective oversight: reporting systems and communications.

B6.5 Judgement on whether effective command was being exercised is based on the assessment of the extent to which the three elements of decision-making, leadership, and control were present.

PART C
ANALYSIS OF THE KOIDU CAMPAIGN
FEBRUARY – DECEMBER 1998

C1. Introduction

C1.1. The purpose of this part of the report is to examine an example RUF/AFRC campaign in depth, so to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the RUF/AFRC as a military organisation, in particular the linkages between strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

C1.2. The Koidu campaign was a pivotal event for the RUF/AFRC after the ECOMOG Intervention of February 1998. It started with the organisation in complete disarray during the escape from Freetown, and ended with comprehensive military success against ECOMOG and CDF, and the start of the offensive against Freetown.

C1.3. This military analysis examines the campaign in three broad phases:


- a. The advance to and capture of Koidu.
- b. ECOMOG seizure of Koidu and the subsequent RUF/AFRC encirclement of the ECOMOG garrison.
- c. The planning, preparation and execution of the 16 December attack to destroy the ECOMOG garrison, including an analysis of its part within the wider RUF/AFRC strategy.

C2. Advance to and capture of Koidu

C2.1. When ECOMOG attacked the junta in Freetown in early February 1998, junta forces collapsed after a week long fight. Since ECOMOG controlled the eastern approaches to Freetown, junta forces had no choice but to escape with their families down the south west coast road, as far as Tombo. Most escapees used transport – either civilian cars and pick-ups or army vehicles. North of Tombo the route was blocked by ECOMOG: the original intent was to attack this ECOMOG position, but J P Koroma abandoned this plan when he heard that ECOMOG had constructed minefields around Benguema. The escapees were therefore forced to take the river to by-pass the enemy positions; some with money paid local fishermen to take them by boat, others swam. Senior leaders managed to pay for speed boats (a typical price for one trip was Le500,000) to take them as far as Fo-Gbo. They then walked by paths to join the main Freetown to Masiaka Highway at around Newton, to the east of ECOMOG forces, and then up to Masiaka. The journey from Freetown to Masiaka took about 3-4 days in total for most people.

C2.2. It is important to appreciate the chaos during this retreat: there was no control of retreating forces, no centralised defence, and no organisation of boats at Tombo. Identifiable military units and structures broke down. Nearly everybody had to fend for himself as best he could, and find his own way to Masiaka. The scene at Tombo was of

complete disorder: everywhere there were abandoned trucks, cars, artillery, and stores. Over flying ECOMOG jets contributed to the panic. People coalesced into small groups in almost random fashion, depending on who they happened to be next to, and agreeing to stay together for mutual support. Instances of commanders imposing control were rare, although there are reports that Superman gathered spare weapons and ammunition at Fo-Gbo and organised a truck from Makeni to collect them. There appeared to be no distinction here between AFRC and RUF – small groups consisted of both in shared desire for survival.



C2.3. At Masiaka, the mass of AFRC and RUF fighters and their families, friends and supporters, stopped for several days rest. There is some suggestion that they might be able to negotiate with ECOMOG at Masiaka, but generally it was understood that this was just a stop en route to Makeni. They settled anywhere in and around the town, again without order or system. AFRC and RUF were entirely mixed, and no distinction could be drawn. There appears to have been little attempt to impose any form of order on the forces. Finding food was an individual responsibility. At Masiaka were also survivors of the CDF attacks on Koribundu, Pujehun, and Bo; it is impossible to say how many there were, but they included the brigade commander from Bo, Major A F Kamara¹.

¹ Kamara was one of the 24 army officers later executed in Freetown.

C2.4. There was a detachment of Guinean ECOMOG troops at Masiaka (perhaps 100 soldiers), but they were so out-numbered by the many thousands of AFRC and RUF that they had no choice but to welcome the escapees. So the situation arose that while in Masiaka ECOMOG troops were welcoming RUF and AFRC guests for dinner, ECOMOG jets were attacking RUF and AFRC forces. There was a leadership meeting in Masiaka during this time, although the key issue of discussion was whether to attack the Guineans or not (they decided against it), rather than attempt to re-impose order on the force.



Figure 0 - Masiaka, looking down Freetown Highway from central roundabout. The Guineans lived in the buildings on the right of the road.

night and all day, arriving in Makeni during the second day. Many reached Makeni late in the afternoon and throughout the evening. There were reports of a large number of wounded arriving at Makeni, and taken straight to Makeni Hospital. Those seriously wounded were later abandoned in the hospital when the RUF/AFRC group left for Kono.

C2.6. On arrival, most of the column went straight to Teko Barracks; those who had family or friends in Makeni went to their houses. The barracks covers a large area with many accommodation buildings, and people found it relatively easy to find somewhere to stay or



Figure 0 - entrance to Teko Barracks at Makeni.

C2.5. As ECOMOG advanced, the group set off for Makeni. There doesn't appear to have been any formal order for this to happen, although it may have happened through word of mouth as senior leaders departed. The vast majority of the column was still on foot, although some of the leaders had by now commandeered cars and pickups – mostly from Lunsar² and Makeni, and then driven back to Masiaka to collect the senior officers.

The column marched all

² The Catholic Mission at Lunsar appears to have been the source of much of the transport in the early period at Masiaka.

set up camp. Food was foraged or purchased from the local people, and for the time being Makeni was a comfortable and safe place to be for the ex-junta forces.

C2.7. Before the Intervention, Makeni had been a joint RUF/AFRC base. Although they were still separate organisations during the junta period, the RUF HQ offices were opposite those of the AFRC and there was close daily liaison. In the early days of the junta there had been natural suspicion between these two previous enemies, but both commanders had done much to overcome this; by personal example and through joint social activities (such as football matches). So, when the column of escapees arrived at Makeni on or around 20th February, they entered into an existing RUF/AFRC command structure that worked well. This is likely to have contributed to early re-establishment of organisation of the force. A muster parade was called for the morning after their arrival: men were organised into ranks, and commanders separated from soldiers. The force was addressed by both Superman and, possibly, JPK; the soldiers were told that they were heading for Kono and Kailahun. Muster parades were then held each morning until the force left for Koidu, and a structure for the force created. There appears to have been little difference between AFRC and RUF members at this point, with inter-mingling of manpower within units; although it is likely that people naturally gelled with their own colleagues, so that is probable that units were recognisably majority AFRC or majority RUF depending on the background of the commander.

C2.8. Some time during the stay at Makeni, the commanders and some forces moved north to Kabala, where there was a command group meeting to plan the move to Koidu. It was at this meeting that SAJ Musa appears to have split from the rest of the group; although there is a report that this took place later, during the advance to Koidu. It appears he intended to remain in the Northern Jungle, so as to block any possible ECOMOG advance into Kono using the northern route. His plan is reported to have been agreed by the rest of the RUF/AFRC leadership at the Kabala meeting.

C2.9. The plan was to move from Makeni to Koidu in four groups, each consisting of both AFRC and RUF. It appears that Superman was to command the first group, consisting only of fighters, with the job of clearing the route and capturing Koidu. Other groups were to escort the civilians, including those abducted en route. The four groups were to caterpillar along the road to Koidu: when the first group arrived at Sewafe they were to radio for the second group to move to Masingbi; on arrival the third group would then move to Makali; and the fourth group to Magburaka. The move was to be controlled by radio, with operators checking the net every 10-15 minutes. Each group was to move in an organised way, with an advance guard, main body with the civilians, and rear guard. Although there were not enough vehicles for everyone, many of the fighters by now had transport.

C2.10. The move started at the end of February 1998, with fighters (probably making up the first group) moving direct from Kabala through Makeni onto the Koidu Road. The majority joined at Makeni. The move did not go entirely to plan, with the first group being ambushed by the CDF at Bumpe, when they lost both their twin barrelled AA guns mounted on pickups. They appear to have retreated back to Makali after the Bumpe ambush; reorganised, and attacked again. While this activity was ongoing, the rest of the groups seem to have concentrated at Makali or the area around it, although there are also

reports that some forces withdrew all the way back to Makeni. There does not appear to have been any interference from ECOMOG forces during this move from Karbala/Makeni to Koidu, although they occupied Makeni shortly after its abandonment by the RUF/AFRC.

C2.11. Makali was an existing RUF/AFRC base, and there was some existing command and control infrastructure in the town (although not as large as Makeni). The column




Figure 1 - Makali joint RUF/AFRC HQ during the junta period. This was the base for the column for 2-3 days during the move to Kono, while the first group cleared the road and captured Koidu.

remained here for 2-3 days while the lead group cleared the CDF resistance on the road and at Koidu. Command was established in the existing joint HQ. Defence was organised, with checkpoints on roads leading into the town. Although there were no air attacks, the force adopted a routine to minimise the chance of being seen from the air. There was no movement in the open by day. Vehicles were parked under trees on the edge of the town. At this stage, the column consisted of about equal numbers of fighters

and civilians, many of whom had been abducted en route.

C2.12. On about the third day of the move, Superman's group finally captured Koidu town. It appears the CDF abandoned their ambush at Bumpe after their initial success. On receipt of this news by radio at Makali, the order was passed for everyone to mount up and move direct to Koidu. This was done by whistle blasts, known to be the order to move. This last move into Koidu became something of a race, with all remaining groups becoming intermingled in the rush to get into the town. For those on foot, the march took all day and most of the night, arriving just before dawn.

C2.13. On arrival in Koidu, once again it took time to reorganise the force, after control broke down during the move. On arrival, individual needs for shelter and food dominated, and people settled where they could.



Figure 2 - Koidu, Dabundeh Street HQ, established by Superman on arrival. Commanders met here at 800hrs each morning of the occupation; during air raids they met after dark. The date of destruction of this building is unknown.

Superman established an HQ in Dabundeh Street, behind the Opera Cinema, and in the afternoon on the day after the capture called a muster parade at Tankoro Police Station, on the outskirts of Koidu. At the meeting orders were given for defence of the town, and forces allocated to each of four sectors around the town. Superman is reported to have given orders for looting to stop, and that forces were now to be under control.

C2.14. A routine was established for the force. Each morning, commanders would assemble at the Dabundeh Street HQ for a command group meeting. This would include all the sector commanders, as well as G2, G4, and G5 commanders. The 2IC was Morris Kallon. Following the meeting, commanders would then call muster parades in their own areas to brief their men. The radio operators were the only people who manned the Dabundeh Street HQ permanently; others came and went as necessary. There were about 10 operators at the HQ, manning one set on a single net for both AFRC and RUF in Koidu. Superman personally lived in the HQ building; other commanders and HQ staff lived nearby in Dabundeh Street.

C3. ECOMOG seizure of Koidu and the RUF/AFRC encirclement


C3.1. ECOMOG, aided by CDF forces, continued to expand their control over Sierra Leone and in mid-April 1998 started an offensive to capture Koidu from the RUF/AFRC group. This started with a period of bombing, using Nigerian Alpha Jets. It is uncertain how long this bombing continued for, and how far in advance of the move of ECOMOG ground forces into the area; however, it appears the bombing lasted several days, with perhaps between 2-4 sorties per day. Reportedly, the damage caused and casualties inflicted were relatively light. Those casualties that were suffered were mostly civilians – presumably abductees. The RUF/AFRC group adapted their routine in response to the air raids, limiting movement by day and holding muster parades by night.

C3.2. Although the air raids had a limited *physical* effect, they appear to have had a significant *psychological* effect on the defenders of Koidu. Despite initial plans to defend Koidu from ECOMOG ground attack, they decided to evacuate the town as enemy forces approached and move into the surrounding jungle. This is not atypical – air attack tends to engender a sense of helplessness in those attacked, especially if there is no effective system of air defence. The natural tendency is to attempt to avoid such attacks, and the RUF/AFRC group's move into the jungle where they could hide from aerial surveillance (and therefore attack) is entirely understandable. What is less clear is whether the subsequent strategy of encirclement, wearing down, and destruction of the ECOMOG garrison was envisaged at this time; or whether this evolved more gradually. The suspicion is the latter.

C3.3. The evacuation of the town was ordered as ECOMOG ground forces crossed the Sewafe Bridge, some 40 km west of Koidu centre. Forces were allocated zones in regions surrounding Koidu, to the north, east, and south. No forces were given zones to the west, since this was the ECOMOG axis of advance. ECOMOG's entry into Koidu was therefore unopposed. The depth of the area occupied by ECOMOG around Koidu varied, depending on direction. To the east, the front line between ECOMOG and RUF/AFRC was on the outskirts of the town, only 2 km from Koidu centre. In the north and south it appears to have been some 5-10 km; and in the west it spread back along the

Makeni Highway, to include Yengema. ECOMOG attempted to expand their zone of control, in particular to the south where two major attacks were made by CDF with strong ECOMOG support. At one stage they captured Gandorhun, but this was subsequently re-captured by RUF/AFRC forces.

C3.4. At the time of the evacuation of Koidu, the second split in the RUF/AFRC organisation occurred. A number of senior AFRC leaders (including Gullit and Bazzy) decided to leave the Koidu Group and take their forces into Koinadugu District. They were eventually to team up with SAJ Musa. It is not clear whether this was in response to personality clash or differences in opinion as to the conduct of the war, although it appears that many were upset by reports of J P Koroma's treatment by Bockarie and Issa Sesay at Buedu. However, many AFRC remained in the Koidu Group at soldier and middle leadership level, being absorbed into the organisation so that over time they became indistinguishable from their RUF colleagues. Some groups had mixed command, such as the Tefaya Group which was commanded by Bai Bureh (RUF) with an AFRC deputy.



C3.5. All forces remaining around Koidu were under the operational command of Superman, who established his HQ at the village of Meiyor on the Guinea Road to the



Figure 3 - diamond mining at Koidu. Both ECOMOG and RUF/AFRC controlled mining areas around Koidu.

east of Koidu. At some time in the summer (probably June) of 1998, Superman was despatched by Sam Bokerie to meet with SAJ Musa in Koinadugu District. At this time, Morris Kallon was appointed commander of the Koidu Group. Units in other zones around Koidu were commanded by subordinate commanders. All were on the single RUF radio net.

C3.6. ECOMOG captured many of the diamond mines around Koidu, but RUF/AFRC forces continued to control large mining areas, in particular in the area south of Tombodu

to the north of the ECOMOG enclave. There is evidence that both forces engaged in diamond mining at this time. Although there was some fighting between the forces, there also appears to have been long periods without hostilities. There was more verbal abuse and banter exchanged across the frontline than gunfire. The opposing sides may also have tacitly accepted the others mining activity.

C3.7. During the early months in Meiyor, there was at least one major attack planned and executed on ECOMOG positions, whilst Superman remained in command. This was conducted at night on a single axis of advance from the east, along the Guinea Road, and was led by Superman personally. Although it penetrated deep into Koidu town, the attack was repelled with particularly heavy casualties. ECOMOG armoured vehicles appear to have played a major part in this RUF/AFRC defeat. Superman is reported as being deeply depressed following this battle, although it is doubtful whether he ever had a realistic chance of evicting ECOMOG from Koidu: the strategic situation had not changed materially from that which existed when the RUF/AFRC had abandoned the town, and ECOMOG were still much stronger than the RUF/AFRC forces. It was prior to this attack that a Liberian initiator had been brought to Superman Ground, to be able to grant immunity from bullet wounds to the fighters; some blamed the high losses on the attack to foolhardy behaviour by fighters who thought themselves immune.

C3.8. When Morris Kallon took over, there appears to have been no more attacks until the final attack in December 1998. Instead there were numerous attacks on the Makeni to

Koidu road, to interdict ECOMOG lines of communication. These took the form of ambushes, set by the group based at Tefaya, north of Bagbe River.



Figure 4 - ECOMOG military bus and armoured vehicle on the road from Koidu to Sewafe, destroyed in late 1998 in an ambush led by Morris Kallon. Destroyed and abandoned ECOMOG vehicles still litter the Makeni to Koidu road.

C4. The 16 December attack and destruction of the ECOMOG garrison

C4.1. By late autumn 1998 ECOMOG's strategic position in Sierra Leone appears to have weakened. It is not yet clear what caused this: there have been suggestions of disunity in high command, troop reductions after the initial offensive, and difficulties in their relationship with the CDF. But the force that had swept all before it in February – April 1998 was now on the defensive. In the north, the AFRC Musa/Gullit faction was moving south towards Freetown, and raiding ECOMOG bases almost with impunity. In the east, the ECOMOG garrison in Koidu was also under threat, as the RUF/AFRC encirclement became more effective in isolating the garrison from support. In military terms, the ECOMOG force had reached its culminating point³.

C4.2. Sometime in the late rainy season, possibly in September 1998, a civilian from Koidu was captured by RUF/AFRC fighters and brought to Meiyor for questioning. Interrogation of civilians was one of the principal sources of information for the organisation, and was the responsibility of G5 branch. The captive apparently revealed an ECOMOG and CDF plan to launch a major offensive at Koidu on 24 December, to destroy the RUF/AFRC encirclement. The RUF/AFRC leadership took this information sufficiently seriously to start planning a major pre-emptive attack to destroy the garrison before it had a chance to launch the 24 December offensive.

³ Culminating point: "that point in time and location when the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender", Allied Joint Publication-01(B) *Allied Joint Doctrine*. In the offence, it is the point beyond which an attack can no longer be sustained.




Figure 5 - Sewa River at Sewafe Bridge. This was a formidable obstacle, and Sewafe Bridge was the only available crossing for the ECOMOG line of communication to Koidu. It was one of many good locations for ambushing ECOMOG re-supply convoys.

C4.3. There must be some doubt over whether ECOMOG really intended to launch an attack on 24 December, and that such a plan was well known by civilians three months earlier. Even if the plan did exist in September, the circumstances by December had changed so significantly that it is unlikely that it could have been carried out effectively. Given the constant ambushes on the Makeni Road, ECOMOG would have had difficulty building up sufficient ammunition stocks for

anything more than a token effort. Nevertheless, it appears to have prompted the date for the RUF/AFRC offensive; although in any event it is likely that this offensive would have taken place at some stage during this period.

C4.4. An initial planning meeting was held in Meiyor, and the date for the pre-emptive attack was set for 16 December, some months in advance to allow sufficient resources and troops to be gathered. This operation was to be planned and prepared for carefully, since the RUF/AFRC leadership knew the Koidu position was still a strong one, regardless of any ECOMOG strategic difficulties. The outline plan called for increased ambushes ECOMOG's line of communication over a period of a month before the attack, to isolate the garrison. Over the same period the garrison was to be disrupted by constant patrols and probing attacks at night⁴. Logistic stocks were to be built up over the whole period in readiness for the attack, along the jungle paths from Kailahun and, reportedly, by trade with members of the Guinean Army who were prepared to exchange weapons and ammunition for diamonds and looted goods. Messages were sent for RUF groups across Sierra Leone to concentrate at Koidu for the attack.

C4.5. This preparation period for the attack would have had both a *physical* effect on the Koidu garrison, in particular the interruption of the line of communication as logistic stocks dwindled; and a *psychological* effect, with increasing sense of isolation.

⁴ In some armies these are described as 'jitter patrols', consisting of 6-8 men who infiltrate an enemy position, fire a few shots, and then withdraw. The defenders spend considerable time shooting at imaginary enemies in the night, wasting ammunition and losing sleep.

Historically, this latter psychological effect is usually more important than the physical effect, and is likely to have contributed to the eventual collapse of the ECOMOG garrison.

C4.6. Perhaps as a response to such physical and psychological isolation, ECOMOG appears to have reduced the size of the perimeter of its enclave before the 16 December attack, concentrating on the centre of Koidu town and the western suburbs of Lebanon and Koquima. They continued occupation of the main diamond mining areas to the west of Koidu Town centre. But it is an important indicator that the ECOMOG commander knew that he was in a weak position relative to the RUF/AFRC forces he faced.

C4.7. By 15 December, RUF/AFRC forces had concentrated around Koidu ready for the offensive. By about 0900 hours, the commanders gathered at Meiyor, including Akim Touray from the south (concentrated at 'Yellow Mosque' on the Gandorhun Road) and Alpha Momo from Tombodu in the north, both ordered in by radio. They had gathered at the HQ for an important planning meeting: it was at this meeting that the tactical plan was developed for the final attack on Koidu; the strategic context was also discussed, including what was to be achieved after Koidu was captured (see Paragraphs C4.17 and C4.18).

C4.8. Reportedly, all the RUF senior leadership from Issa Sesay downwards was at the meeting. Sesay had arrived the previous evening, with a large consignment of ammunition. He had earlier instructed that he be met at the Moa river crossing site with 150 men to carry the ammunition to Superman Ground; Morris Kallon and Rambo had gone to the crossing to meet him. Sesay chaired the meeting, held in the usual cleared area in the jungle of Superman Ground. All the commanders gathered round him, either sitting on benches or the ground. Sesay stated that Mosquito had ordered that the attack should take place immediately, and then gave detailed orders for the attack – this was not a meeting where discussion went back and forth, but where orders were given by the commander and received by his subordinates. He had already decided on the plan of attack, presumably in discussion with Kallon who knew the ground and ECOMOG positions well.



Figure 6 - entrance to Sewafe Bridge from west. ECOMOG forces attempting to force their way through would have to fight up this road, dominated by high banks on either side. The RUF/AFRC dug up the road at the end of the bridge to force the attackers to dismount from their vehicles.

C4.9. The plan of attack was relatively complex. The enclave was to be attacked from multiple directions simultaneously, initiated by a strong ambush position on the west side of the Sewafe Bridge. The main attack was to take place from the east, along the Guinea Highway, but there were also to be attacks from north and south aimed at Congo Bridge on the west of Koidu Town; these, if successful, would split the ECOMOG garrison in two, isolating the force in the town from its support in the western suburbs and blocking its line of retreat. The force's heavy weapons, including 120mm mortars, were to follow up the main axis along the Guinea Highway, to provide support to the attack as required. Issa Sesay was operational commander; he would command from an HQ behind the forward elements on the main attack axis.

C4.10. The planning meeting on 15 December lasted most of the morning. Afterwards, Sesay personally distributed ammunition to attack groups⁵. Morris Kallon departed immediately, to lead his men on the long by-pass route to Sewafe Bridge. Other commanders that afternoon briefed their men at numerous muster parades in the jungle all round Koidu. Weapons were cleaned and inspected, and ammunition distributed to fighters. Some fighters managed some sleep that evening, although many others had been instructed to secure the launching points for the attack, so they left the assembly areas early after dark. The remaining fighters were woken in the early hours, and silently led to the attack launching points, where they were all to be in position by about 0300 hours.

C4.11. It is difficult now to know accurately the strength of the ECOMOG garrison. Given the mix of armoured vehicles, artillery and infantry; the importance of the Koidu position; and the scale of the fighting; it was likely to have been based on an all arms brigade, perhaps numbering 2000-3000 combatants with 20-30 armoured vehicles. It is



Figure 6 - one of ECOMOG's howitzers, now a memorial to the end of the war.

possible that the numbers of fighters on both sides were approximately even – there was not a significant advantage in numbers for the RUF/AFRC attack, although ECOMOG definitely had the advantage of heavier firepower and armoured vehicles. The defence was based on two major areas: Koidu town to the east of Congo Bridge and the western suburbs of Lebanon and Koquima (see aerial

⁵ It is reported that Sesay was also the G4 officer with control of ammunition, as well as operational commander.

photograph on page C-15). There was also a string of smaller garrisons stretched out on the Koidu to Sewafe road, including a major base at Bumpe. ECOMOG's defensive plan was essentially static, planning to cause such significant casualties through defensive fire that the attackers would give up. In pursuit of this strategy, they employed their armoured vehicles as static armoured cannon and machine gun posts, rather than as counter-attack forces. They positioned their artillery between the two main concentrations, at 55 Spot⁶.

C4.12. The weaknesses of ECOMOG's plan against the RUF/AFRC attack are immediately apparent:

- a. It is a long thin position arrayed on a west-east axis, with no depth to absorb attacks from north or south.
- b. The pincer attack from north and south on Congo Bridge split the defence in two and isolated the bulk of the defenders in Koidu town to the east.
- c. The artillery and logistic base at 55 Spot was undefended from attack from the west, and quickly neutralized.
- d. The static defensive plan allowed RUF/AFRC forces to mount flanking attacks on each position in turn; in particular their use of armoured vehicles as static strong points allowed them to become vulnerable to RPG attack – most were destroyed in this manner.

C4.13. The Sewafe Bridge ambush and road block group was commanded by Morris Kallon. It probably consisted of between 600-1000 fighters, and was a well equipped and powerful force. Kallon established a 7km long ambush position, starting at the west end of Sewafe Bridge, and extending along the Makeni Highway. He dug up the road at several positions to prevent vehicles from attempting to burst through the ambush position. He established his HQ in a small village on the road, at the western end of the ambush. At about 0300 hours, an ECOMOG convoy attempted to leave Koidu for Makeni: Kallon allowed it into the centre of his ambush position before opening fire, ensuring there was no escape for any of the ECOMOG personnel who were all killed (perhaps about 50?). Subsequently, during the 16th, a force from the ECOMOG garrison at Masingbi attempted to force through the ambush from the west, but were unable to prevail against the very strong position established by Kallon.

C4.14. When the ambush at Sewafe was initiated, the main attack commenced. The fighting took all day, and ended as the remains of the ECOMOG defence withdrew back to Bumpe. The attackers' plan worked: the pincer movement by Rambo in the south and Alpha Momo in the north split the defence, and neutralized any ECOMOG reserves. Given the numerous axes of attack, the ECOMOG commander faced multiple problems, and his static defensive plan left him with very few workable options. As a result it

⁶ Remains of two ECOMOG howitzers can still be seen in Koidu: one is the "War Don Don" monument.





Figure 6 - view from Congo Bridge looking south across some diamond mines, along the approach taken by Rambo. There were no ECOMOG defences in this area.

appears ECOMOG forces fought where they stood, as isolated positions with little or no mutual support. They certainly fought hard: the fighting along Kainkordu Road in the town centre was particularly bloody with many casualties on both sides, lasting several hours.

C4.15. The RUF/AFRC, on the other hand, fought a well coordinated battle. All commanders had radios, and reported their situations regularly to Issa Sesay on the main axis. Groups worked together to attack ECOMOG positions from multiple directions, such as Rambo's and Alpha Momo's attack on Congo Bridge, and Akim Touray's attack from the south linking with part of the main axis group to defeat a strong point south of the Opera Cinema. Command was strong throughout: although Issa Sesay was the overall operational commander, he did not attempt to coordinate personally the attack on the main axis: this was left to the brigade commander "The Big". This allowed Sesay to concentrate on the overall operation, rather than become embroiled in one single part of the battle (a mistake typical of guerrilla leaders). Sesay also maintained a reserve of ammunition with him, carried by abducted civilians, so he could reinforce any element of the battle.

C4.16. RUF/AFRC discipline remained good through the battle. There are no reports of fighters sneaking to the rear or avoiding fighting. Commanders at all levels appear to have maintained control. The only instance of ill discipline that I can find during this attack is in the treatment of prisoners: prisoners were supposed to be taken back to Issa Sesay's HQ; but it appears to have been general practice for individual fighters to search ECOMOG prisoners for money, and if money was found then the prisoner would be summarily shot to prevent him from telling Sesay that he had already been robbed. Reportedly, many ECOMOG prisoners were shot for this reason.


C4.17. By 1400 hours Koidu Town had been captured, although there was still resistance in the western suburbs. The attackers by now had all linked up, and continued to attack and pursue the retreating ECOMOG further to the west. The last coordinate ECOMOG resistance was at Koikuma, where again determined RUF/AFRC attackers managed to outflank the ECOMOG position to fire an RPG at the static armoured vehicle.



Sometime after dark, the RUF/AFRC attack halted, and ECOMOG forces withdrew back to Bumpé where they appear to have reorganised. It is difficult to estimate how many survivors there might have been; perhaps only 500, given that the majority of the defence had been cut off in Koidu Town. It is also difficult to estimate the number of ECOMOG prisoners taken, since reports are particularly sketchy despite all the prisoners being taken to Buedu. But the indications are that there were fewer than 100 prisoners taken. This indicates that the ECOMOG death toll for 16 December alone was over 1000.



Figure 7 – remains of a Panhard armoured car at Koikuma, the last ECOMOG resistance in the battle for Koidu. This vehicle was destroyed by an RPG which knocked off the turret.



C4.18. The 15 December meeting at Meiyor covered wider issues than just the capture of Koidu. Issa Sesay briefed the commanders that after Koidu the next target should be Makeni. Rambo, attacking Koidu from the west, and therefore on the Makeni Highway, was given the mission to seize Makeni as quickly as possible, in conjunction with Superman who had been ordered to move from the Northern Jungle. Reserve ammunition was assigned to Rambo, to be issued after the Koidu attack, for the Makeni operation. Rambo moved quickly, departing for Makeni on 18 December as other forces followed the retreating ECOMOG troops fleeing south. The battle for Makeni took several days, estimated to be 23-27 December. Superman's initial attack was only at half strength after his group suffered very heavy casualties by air attack. He then linked up with Kallon's group, and together they fought a 48 hour battle for control of Teko Barracks before ECOMOG troops withdrew in the direction of Masiaka.

C4.19. At the same meeting, there was also discussion about attacking Freetown. It was intended to capture Lungi Airport first, so they could prevent ECOMOG reinforcement and interference in the subsequent Freetown operation. It is clear that the campaign to seize Koidu was just part of a larger strategic idea, ending in the capture of Freetown. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Koidu by itself was a position of strategic importance for the RUF/AFRC. Geographically, it gave the organisation access to north and west Sierra Leone, including one of the two principal routes to Freetown, which was not within reach from their border base at Kailahun. It also has large diamond reserves which had strategic significance for whoever held the region. Probably both factors were important in RUF/AFRC strategic decision-making.

PART D

RUF STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS

D1 RUF Organisation

D1.1. The RUF was set up from the beginning of the insurgency in 1991 with a hierarchical structure on traditional military lines. The hierarchy developed over time, as the size of the organisation and the area controlled varied, but it was based on variations of brigades and battalions, organised into active service fronts. The unit structure seems to have been fairly loose, with manpower switching relatively easily to where it is most needed. It also appears that individual fighters had more loyalty to individual commanders, and would identify themselves by being part of that commander's group, rather than being a member of a particular battalion or brigade.

D1.2. Commanders were assigned ranks according to their commands or position in the organisation: for example, Bockarie was a major general¹, Issa Sesay a brigadier², Gibril Massaquoi a lieutenant colonel. After the ECOMOG Intervention of February 1998, AFRC elements were absorbed into the RUF structure, and AFRC officers appointed to positions of responsibility. Some AFRC officers appear to have been received RUF promotions. However, the RUF/AFRC was based on RUF structures and adopted RUF methods: in many respects the RUF/AFRC was similar to the pre-junta RUF. This of course excludes those AFRC forces and commanders who went to the Northern Jungle, and later became the AFRC Musa/Gullit faction.

D1.3. The RUF also adopted a rudimentary staff system. Each group of any size had its G2 (intelligence), G4 (logistics), and G5 (control of civilians) officers. They supported the commander in the execution of their duties, although not in as systematic a way as would be expected in a western army.

D1.4. There were three types of RUF guerrilla: Special Forces (Liberians and Libyan-trained), Vanguard (Liberian trained), and Junior Commanders (Sierra Leonean trained). These were indications of *status*, not rank, or organisation. Status was more important than rank; so for example a Junior Commando of senior rank could not impose his will upon a Vanguard of ostensibly lower rank.

D2 RUF Ideology and Strategy

D2.1 The ideology of the RUF was never fully defined. Trainees had basic ideological instruction, but it principally consisted of: the venality of the existing government; the need for change; and the benefits of military action; rather than making new proposals (eg party systems or nationalisation of key economic assets)³. The main ideological document produced by the RUF, "Footpaths to Democracy", in about 1995 was also weak in providing the ideological framework for the movement. Although it was widely advertised among the movement in Sierra Leone, it was discredited by the fighters as being written by 'the external delegation' (supporters of the RUF overseas, probably in

¹ "Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major General Sam Bockarie" dated 26 Sep 99.

² "Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Brigadier Issa Sesay" dated 27 Sep 99.

³ "Notes on the RUF/L Guerrilla Warfare for the Lion National Training Base", dated February 1999.

London) not reflecting reality in the jungle. Professor Christopher Clapham of Cambridge University Centre of African Studies analysed the document and concluded:

“This reads very much as a document prepared by educated individuals with access to current Western ideas, who were anxious to present as favourable an impression as possible of the RUF, specifically in order to discourage Western support for the regime against which it was fighting. Not only is it written *for* outsiders; it also gives every impression of having been written *by* outsiders, who – even if the authors were themselves Sierra Leonean – had little familiarity with what was actually going on in the RUF-controlled areas of Sierra Leone. It is inconceivable that it could have been written by Foday Sankoh himself, or any of the semi-literate Sierra Leoneans immediately around him; and my guess would be that it derives from members of the expatriate Sierra Leonean elite who were hoping to use it to ingratiate themselves with Sankoh, and thus establish claims to high status positions in the event that he successfully gained power.”⁴

D2.2. This lack of a strong ideological base makes the RUF insurgency unusual: most other insurgencies (in Africa and elsewhere) have clear roots in the ideology of Mao Zedong or other revolutionary leaders or philosophers. The only other modern movement similarly lacking clear ideology appears to be Charles Taylor’s NPFL. This lack of ideology played its part in brutalizing this war: whereas a movement with a clear ideology is likely to adapt its revolutionary methods to fit its ideology (e.g. to win the support of the civil population), the RUF conducted its actions on a utilitarian basis without constraint.

D2.3. Whereas ideology was lacking, the RUF had a clear top-level strategic idea: to rid Sierra Leone of the NPRC (and later SLPP) Government and replace it with RUF leadership. This remained constant throughout the war, except during the junta period when the RUF shared government with the AFRC, and the period of the Abidjan Peace Accord. The military strategy was devised to fulfil this top-level strategic idea: during the period March 1998 to January 1999 operational level plans were developed to: capture the diamond-mining areas of Koidu from ECOMOG; advance through Makeni, linking up with other RUF/AFRC groups in the Northern Jungle; capture Port Loko and close Lungi airport, thereby preventing ECOMOG reinforcement from Nigeria; and then attack and capture Freetown.

D2.4. Who were the major decision-makers in RUF/AFRC during this period? There appear to have been four:

- a. Foday Sankoh, who was under house arrest in Nigeria and had only indirect and infrequent influence in the conduct of the war;

⁴ Christopher Clapham, *Footpaths to Democracy – an appreciation*, July 2004.

- b. Sam Bockarie, who Sankoh had appointed 'battlefield commander' in his absence, and was based in Beudu, Kailahun District.
- c. J P Koroma, leader of the AFRC, who seems to have been consulted on major decisions, despite the apparent humiliation he had suffered at the hands of Bockarie and Issa Sesay on arrival at Beudu. He operated from an HQ in Kangama, near Buedu.
- d. Charles Taylor, by this time President of Liberia. He had supported the RUF from its inception, and was its principal source of arms and munitions.

From the evidence presented, Bockarie oversaw and approved the development of all major operational level military plans; and can be accurately described as the *operational-level commander* of the RUF/AFRC at this time. For strategic level decisions, however, he appears to have ceded authority to Charles Taylor. The idea of seizing Koidu and then advancing to Freetown appears to have been Taylor's. This is unsurprising: as the main supplier of arms and sponsor of the RUF, Taylor was in a powerful position; Bockarie could not thwart him without risking cessation of arms supply, and almost inevitable defeat. Charles Taylor can therefore be described as the *strategic-level commander* of the RUF during this period.

D3 Routine in Meiyor

D3.1. Meiyor is 8km from the centre of Koidu, and was the HQ of the RUF/AFRC encirclement from April to December 1998. It was from here that Superman (initially) and Morris Kallon commanded operations against the ECOMOG garrison in Koidu. It also housed the logistic base, main hospital, and primary abducted labour camp. Furthermore, it was the centre of the largest RUF/AFRC troop concentration arrayed around Koidu, known throughout the operation as 'Superman Ground'. The estimated strength in the Meiyor area alone was 5,000 – 10,000 fighters.

D3.2. Following the air attacks on Koidu town, the leadership adopted comprehensive measures to defend against this threat – principally by avoiding being seen from the air. This required all forces to live within the jungle, rather than in Meiyor or surrounding villages. Vast camps were created under the jungle canopy, consisting of coconut palms shelters. There was no movement outside the jungle canopy by day. Vehicles were ditched, except five for the HQ; otherwise movement was by foot. Cooking was forbidden by day, to prevent telltale smoke trails. Anybody staying in the village had to evacuate it by day and take shelter in the jungle.



Figure 1 - Meiyor. The RUF/AFRC fighters lived under the jungle canopy outside the villages, to remain unseen from the air.

D3.3. A daily routine was established that created order and discipline. Muster parades (known as 'formation') were held twice daily at 0700 hours and 1700 hours, in a large cleared space under the jungle canopy. At the morning parade there was an opportunity for Muslims and Christians to pray, then instructions were given to the group. Finally all weapons were cleaned and inspected. Muster parades were not always taken by Superman or Kallon as commander, but sometimes by lesser ranking officers. Non-scheduled parades were summoned by whistle blasts that would be repeated through the jungle to call all fighters to the parade ground.

D3.4. Battle planning was conducted collectively by the command group, consisting of commanders and senior staff officers based around Meiyor. Typically, the commander would start by stating the objective, and then all present would contribute their ideas to the discussion. Finally, a plan would emerge that all agreed. After the planning meeting, all fighters in the area would be summoned for a muster parade, by whistles, where they would be briefed on the plan. If the plan involved other groups, for example at Tombodu, then the plan would be dictated to the signal operator. He would then encode it and send by radio to the other commanders.

D3.5. Battle casualties were treated by the RUF/AFRC medical system. As an example of the casualties suffered during this period, 25 men were killed and 21 wounded in the first attack on Koidu. The wounded were treated by abducted civilian medical staff (probably nurses) who were enrolled to work in RUF/AFRC hospitals. These were established in the bush, one for each major group. The Meiyor hospital was the main one in the Koidu area, and serious casualties were brought here. Medical supplies were sometimes transported from Kailahun, but mostly were captured during attacks and ambushes. Bodies were either roughly buried where they died (if far from base) or carried back for proper burial. In either event some ritual was carried out, including prayer and possibly sacrifice, however brief.

D3.6. With so many people living in cramped conditions, hygiene was a major consideration. There are reports of serious outbreaks of dysentery and diarrhoea. Medical staff advised on basic hygiene issues, such as digging of latrines and proper clean areas around potable water sources. These instructions were passed to fighters during muster parades.



Figure 2 - many thousands of shelters were constructed in this jungle, out to a distance of some 5km from the village.

D3.7. Discipline was maintained by the Investigations Unit, headed by Pa Kallon. This was staffed by investigators who assumed the role of provost staff or military police. They investigated crimes and conducted punishments. As a result, they were somewhat feared by the men at Meiyor. Punishment was typically a spell in “dungeon”, a pit dug in the bush, which was guarded by the Investigations Unit. Typical crimes rewarded by such punishment were missing muster parades or hiding diamonds.

D3.8. Abducted civilian labour played an important part in sustaining the RUF/AFRC force in the jungle. Men were used for carrying supplies and diamond mining. In battle, they were used for casualty evacuation, carrying ammunition to forward troops, and re-charging magazines. Women were used for fishing, farming, and cooking. Abducted civilians were the responsibility of the G5 branch, headed at Koidu by Sylvester Kieh. They were established in camps in the bush, and guarded by G5 security men. Security of civilians was important; escaped civilians were regarded as a primary source of information for the enemy, and an escaped civilian was blamed for the one ECOMOG air attack on Meiyor. For each camp there was also a “wives commander” who was responsible for women. The allocation of manpower was done at morning muster parade, where commanders would bid to the G5 for their requirements. Each major concentration of RUF/AFRC had its own camp for civilians, all under the control of the G5. The largest camp was at Meiyor, where there several thousands.


D-4 Routine in Buedu.

D4.1. Buedu was the headquarters of the RUF/AFRC during the period following the ECOMOG Intervention. Reportedly, Bockarie established it as a base during the junta period, having used Kailahun town previously. It is not certain why he chose Buedu, except that it is remote (apart two hours drive from Kailahun) and close to the Liberian border at Dawa for cross-border movement. The actual headquarters was established in and around the house Bockarie had taken for himself. The radio base station was set up in a room at the front of the house, although frequently it was moved outside to a palm leaf shelter at the side of the house.



Figure 3 - general view of Buedu village centre

D4.2. Buedu, like much of Kailahun District, had been under RUF occupation since early in the war. It is a large village rather than a town, and its estimated population is normally 1000-2000 people. Its surviving civilian population had evacuated the area, many to become refugees in Guinea. Most have now returned to their original houses. The RUF took over Buedu in its entirety and established a complete community, as they did in many towns and villages in Kailahun District. Senior commanders took over larger houses for themselves; Issa Sesay and Bockarie lived close to each other, on opposite sides of the street. Other buildings were taken over for the hospital, police post/prison, and for the use of the War Council. Later in the war, Bockarie established an RUF public



radio station called "Radio Freedom" near Buedu, transmitting across the Kailahun District area. It was run by "Hilton 5", a man released from Pademba Road prison on the 6th January Freetown Invasion; he had previous radio experience and trained several others.

Figure 4 - this present-day shop was used by the RUF as the hospital in Buedu

D4.3. Although there was an established RUF War Council present in Buedu throughout this period, there does not appear to be any evidence to suggest it had a major role in RUF decision-making, or was able to influence Bokarie. Its role appears to have been to advise the RUF on civilian aspects on the conduct of the war, but it appears generally to have been ignored.

D4.4 During this period there was ever-present danger from ECOMOG air raids. Like at Koidu, the general practice was to evacuate the village during the day and live in the nearby jungle. Muster parades of fighters in Buedu were held every morning while it was still dark, at about 6am, usually in front of the Bokarie's house. Following the parade soldiers would clean their weapons and then disperse into the jungle for the day. Some time in 1999, an early warning system was set up, whereby a Liberian call sign would inform the RUF radio net that ECOMOG jets were taking off from their base outside Monrovia. It is assumed that Charles Taylor established an observation post outside the ECOMOG airfield to report by radio whenever aircraft took off. Once this system was established, routine relaxed in Buedu; people were allowed in the village by day, and were warned by the radio operator of possible air raids using a bell alarm system

D4.5. There was also an RUF training camp near Buedu, on the track out to the Dawa border crossing point. It appears to have been the main training camp in use by the RUF during this period. Further details of RUF training are given in Section 7.

D4.6. At the Dawa crossing point on the Liberian border, Liberian ULIMO fighters established a weekly market for the RUF. In exchange for cash they would sell toiletries, cigarettes, and other luxuries unavailable to RUF guerrillas in the jungle. Any RUF group going to Buedu from the Koidu encirclement would take orders for such items from those fighters who remained, and carry back their purchases on their return journey.

D-5 The RUF Jungle Re-supply System.

D5.1. By the time of the Koidu campaign of 1998, there was a clearly established line of communication through the jungle to Liberia. Supplies for the RUF flowed from Liberia

to the forward units in Sierra Leone; in return diamonds flowed in the opposite direction. Although there were some other intermittent sources of supply, such as the occasional raid across the Guinean border to capture ammunition, Liberia was the principal source for the RUF.




Figure 5 - Dawa crossing point, looking into Liberia

D5.2. Supplies for the RUF were generally moved from Monrovia by road into Kailahun District. A small convoy would be created, of perhaps 2-4 vehicles. These were, reportedly, military vehicles painted blue, to simulate NGO supply vehicles. They would be driven and escorted by Liberian troops, wearing civilian clothes. They would cross the Liberia-Sierra Leone border at Dawa, near Buedu, in early evening to avoid ECOMOG air attack. From the border it is about 40 minutes drive to Buedu, where the trucks would stop outside Sam Bockarie's house.

D5.3. The convoy commander would meet Sam Bockarie himself, and hand him the manifest for the convoy. This would be handwritten, on an otherwise blank sheet of paper. Sam Bockarie's clerk would then check the boxes of supplies as they were unloaded off the vehicle, and stacked up in the store room in Bockarie's house. This would all happen at night.

D5.4. The Liberian vehicle crews were welcomed in Buedu, and would remain there that night and through the following day. The vehicles were driven under the jungle canopy and camouflaged to prevent detection from the air. After dark, they would then be driven back across the border, presumably to Monrovia.



Figure 6 - Moquito's house in Buedu.

Ammunition was stored in the room with

D5.5. It is unclear whether all the stores remained in Bockarie's store room until it was issued for use, or whether some or all were transferred to the G4's store in a nearby house in Buedu. It appears that any food (mainly rice, oil, and stock cubes) brought by the convoy was issued personally by Bockarie to those he favoured in Buedu, such as his body guards and radio operators. Food was not sent up country to the fighting units. Medical supplies were passed directly to the chief medical officer in Beudu, who appears to have run his own medical re-supply system for the forward units, such as the hospital at Superman Ground.

D5.6. Whether stored in his house or the G4's, weapons and ammunition were kept under the personal control of Bockarie. They were only issued under his orders. It appears that re-supply of ammunitions did not take place on a routine basis, but was conducted for specific missions. So, for example, ammunition was issued for Superman's failed June (?) attack on Koidu; and then subsequently in preparation for the 16 December attack.



aware of when a convoy was approaching, either from Buedu or the Koidu region. The route from Baoma was not motorable during the war (it is now), so ammunition was

D5.7. The line of communication forward from Beudu to the Koidu region was well established. Ammunition was carried by vehicle from Buedu to Baoma, near the Moa river; pick ups or Land Cruisers were used. In daylight this is about a 3 hour journey over very poor roads. An RUF HQ was located at Baoma, responsible for controlling the RUF crossing over the Moa. It was equipped with a radio so it was

Figure 7 - building used as RUF HQ in Baoma to control Moa crossing

carried on foot 3 miles to the village of Yombulu on the river. This village was deserted apart from a few RUF fighters who controlled the canoes for the crossing. Frequently supplies would be carried by RUF fighters, although in later periods abducted civilians were used for this purpose. This part of the journey was through RUF dominated territory, so there was no threat of ambush; consequently movement to the river was in a relaxed fashion, rather than silent tactical movement. Although there was always threat of air raids, the RUF appear to have been happy to move by day, trusting their ability to hear aircraft coming and disappear into the jungle.

D5.8. At Yombulu the ammunition and men would be transferred to canoe. There was one large (15-man) cotton wood tree canoe, and a number of smaller ones. Often, only the large canoe would be used, conducting a number of return journeys until everyone was across.

D5.9. Once across the Moa river the RUF would adopt tactical techniques for movement. Although there was little risk of ECOMOG mounting jungle patrols in this region, there was always risk of minor Kamajor attacks. The standard pattern of movement was to have one squad (of about 15 fighters) as advance guard, moving in single file along the track. After a short while the main body would come with the commander, ammunition carriers, radio operator (if present); all in single file. Finally a squad would act as rear guard.

D5.10 The route from the Moa river was by jungle path to Woromo, then by track north to Sanduru. Although this is motorable, it was all done on foot, mostly by night. From Sanduru the route went due north by jungle path, until it intercepted the east-west "Guinea Highway", between Kainkordu and Koardu. It then led west along the Guinea Highway until it reached Superman Ground at Meiyor.

D5.11. Although there are reports of guerrillas marching the 70km route from Meiyor to the Moa river in a single night, it is more likely that this part of the route would usually take two days or nights.

D5.12. On arrival at Meiyor, the ammunition and other stores would be delivered personally to the commander. During Superman's time in command, it would be stored at his house in Meiyor. Afterwards, when Kallon commanded, it was taken into the bush and stored in a hut made out of corrugated iron. Stores were only issued on the personal authority of the commander.



Figure 8 - Moa crossing. The canoe on the left was used by the RUF; it could carry up to 15 people.


D-6 RUF Communications

D6.1. The RUF operated a country-wide high-frequency radio net throughout the conflict, including through the junta period, separate from the AFRC. After the Intervention, AFRC forces in the northern jungle operated their own net, while AFRC forces remaining around Koidu were absorbed into the RUF communications structure. Both forces monitored each other's nets, although they might not have been able to break their codes. The RUF also monitored the NPFL net in Liberia, and had their own codenames on the NPFL net (Sankoh was 'Toyota').

D6.2. During the period 1998-99, the RUF had 67 radios, although perhaps only 30-40 were on net at any time. The others were spare, to be used by forces going on operations, so they could communicate when away from their base. On any military radio net there is one station who is 'control', responsible for management and use of the net, usually collocated with the overall commander. Throughout this period, control was at Kailahun.

D6.3. The radios had all been captured, mostly from the Army. They were a mix of makes, some of which were man-portable. Power supply was always a problem, so solar panels were used in the jungle. This required frequent switching off of radios to permit batteries to re-charge. A typical routine would be 30 minutes on and 30 minutes off throughout quiet times of the day. For a station to re-charge its batteries, the operator first had to request authority to leave the net from the control station.

were used. This is a typical ex-British Army model.



D6.4. Each station of the net was manned by one or more radio operators, trained in technical and procedural aspects of communications. Headquarters and base stations would have at least three operators, so they could provide 24 hour coverage. They all had to be literate, since important messages were recorded in log books. Spoken communications tended to be in Krio, although occasionally operators would speak in tribal languages if they didn't want others to understand. All important messages were in English, and were logged in English. Log books and code sheets were safeguarded by the operators, and not given even to their commanders.

D6.5. The RUF encoded their important messages, using a substitution cipher. This cipher works by substituting each letter in the alphabet with a one or two digit number, which is then transmitted as a series of number groups. These are written down by the receiving operator, who can then decipher the message and give it in writing to his commander. Ciphers rely on all operators on the net having the same cipher. It was changed between the 1st and 5th of each month, to make it more difficult to break the cipher and limit damage if it fell into enemy hands. This caused the guerrilla movement some difficulty, since the cipher had to be distributed securely on paper. This was the responsibility of the control station, who produced a typed instruction monthly, despatched across the country by runners to distribute to all stations on the net.

Occasionally, if a cipher failed to reach a station, then control would pass it over the radio late at night when they thought it less likely that they were being monitored.

D6.6. Instead of alphanumeric call signs, stations on the net used codenames for commanders and stations – in the RUF these codenames were called ‘appointment titles’, which was standard British Army practice until the early 1980s. Appointment titles were also changed monthly, and were distributed on the same typed sheet as the cipher. Typical appointment titles were: Lion, Crocodile, and Spider. Some of the early appointment titles stuck and became nicknames for individual commanders (such as Lion for Sankoh).

D6.7. This communications system reflects the personal background of Foday Sankoh, who was a signals corporal in the old Sierra Leone Army. It is based on old British Army practice as originally introduced into the Sierra Leone Army, adapted to the needs of a guerrilla movement. In the early days, he trained radio operators personally. He clearly understood that radio communications would play an important part in commanding a dispersed guerrilla movement, and the system he introduced in 1991 essentially remained unchanged throughout the war. The methods he introduced to maintain security are rudimentary by western standards, but seem to have sufficed within the context of Sierra Leone; although a trained code-breaker could, within a few hours, break a simple substitution cipher such as that used by the RUF.

D-7 Training RUF Recruits

D7.1. Most RUF recruits underwent some form of military training in RUF training camps. These were at a number of locations, mostly in Sierra Leone; although there was also at least one training camp in Liberia. During the period of the Koidu campaign, most initial training seems to have been conducted in a jungle training camp set up outside Buedu.

D7.2. One training school was in Kailahun town, at the Methodist Secondary School. In 1992-93 there might at any time be up to 1000 recruits under training, all of whom had been abducted during RUF operations. The age of recruits ranged from 10 to 25; there was no differentiation between age groups during training. There appears to have been no fixed period for training recruits, since it depended on the demand for men from the battle front. Typically, an RUF recruit spent about a month on initial training.

D7.3. Despite being abducted, there appears to have been no serious desertion among the trainees: they had been convinced that Government troops were not interested in encouraging desertion, and would kill any who had been involved with the RUF, however involuntary that involvement had been.

D7.4. In the early years, all trainers were Liberians. There were a limited number of instructors, so a number of the trainees were appointed as “military police”; whose job it was to ensure discipline within the trainees, such as making sure all trainees got up on time and reported on parade for PT.

D7.5. Recruits were initiated into training by having to spend a day and a night in “the shit room”, where they had to sleep amongst human faeces and urine. This was

presumably part of desensitizing training. Trainees were then organised into 15 man squads. There were 4 squads in a platoon; and about 6 platoons in a training battalion. There may have been up to 8 or 9 battalions under training at any one time.

D7.6. Weapons were in short supply for trainees. There were a number of small arms for groups to learn how to strip, clean, and clear stoppages. RUF recruits rarely fired weapons during training, presumably due to shortage of ammunition. Each recruit was ordered to find a stick of the size of a rifle, attach a rope to act as a sling, and then to treat it as his personal weapon throughout training. Anyone who was seen without his weapon, awake or asleep, was beaten. In the early years, trainees were not taught how to use support weapons, such as mortars, cannons, or machine guns. These were taught to those who trained in Liberia, who taught others in the fighting units, not training camps. Subsequently captured support weapons seem to have been more numerous and were available for training within the training camps.

D7.7. The routine for the day started with a physical training (PT) session, organised by battalion. Most PT sessions involved running in two ranks. It should be noted that few RUF fighters had shoes: most ran barefoot, since this was what they were used to as civilians. Commanders ran at the back of their columns, and would beat anyone who fell back.

D7.8. Training also included drill – learning how to stand to attention, march, and salute. The drill was based on US Army practice rather than British, which differentiated the RUF from the AFRC and CDF. This difference is credited to the Liberian origins of the RUF, since Liberian military tradition is American-based. For example, the RUF saluted (“paid complements”) in American style, shading the eyes, rather than the open-hand salute of the British Army. RUF trainees and fighters could expect to be beaten if they failed to pay complements to a senior officer. Drill was not a major part of the syllabus at training camp, although a parade would be held for VIP visits, such as Foday Sankoh who often seems to have visited training camps to explain the rationale of the revolution. Pass out parades were also usually conducted to mark the end of training.

D7.9. Most training time was allocated to jungle fighting tactics. Recruits were trained how to live, move, and operate in the jungle. They were taught how to conduct ambushes, both on roads and on jungle tracks. They were taught how to attack towns and villages; how to avoid air raids; how to move in the jungle, including communicating silently using hand signals and how to avoid leaving tell-tale tracks in the bush. All tactical training was conducted using their mock wooden stick weapons: when simulating firing they simply “fired with their mouths”

PART E **ANALYSIS**

E1 Introduction.

E1.1. The purpose of this section is to analyse the RUF to determine the answers to the four tests posed earlier in this report, in ‘Part B – Methodology’:

- Did the group have a recognisable military hierarchy and structure?
- Did it exhibit the characteristics of a traditional military organisation?
- Was there coherent linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical levels?
- Was command effective?

I address each test in turn, using the methodology laid out in Part B of this report¹. I use the evidence, analysis and judgements presented in ‘Part C – the Koidu Campaign’ and ‘Part D – RUF Structure and Systems’ to draw conclusions for each question. Finally, I synthesise the conclusions to all four tests to provide an overall opinion on whether the RUF was a military organisation and whether command responsibility existed. Military judgement is required for such synthesis, since not all characteristics and requirements can be expected to be met.

E2 Did the RUF have a recognisable military hierarchy and structure?

E2.1. The RUF structure evolved several times during the Sierra Leone War; there was particular upheaval during the immediate aftermath of the Intervention and withdrawal from Freetown in February 1998. After a period of consolidation an effective structure evolved. There were two principal factors that shaped this structure:

- a. The need to maintain physical control of the people and areas still occupied by the RUF, in particular to prevent them from being taken over by the CDF. These areas were principally Kailahun District, part of Kono District, and Koinadugu District; all in the east of Sierra Leone.
- b. The need to create an offensive capability that would be capable of re-capturing Koidu, Makeni, and eventually Freetown. This was the force that encircled and eventually destroyed the ECOMOG enclave at Koidu.

Both these factors were inter-connected: for example, control of much of Kailahun and Kono Districts was important to enable logistic re-supply of the offensive force being built in the jungles around Koidu.

E2.2. The structure that evolved was headquartered in Buedu, deep in the relatively safe RUF heartland of Kailahun. Forces were divided into two types: “territorial forces” and “offensive forces” – these are my names, not those in use by the RUF at the time.

¹ It is advisable to refer to Part B of the report through this analysis.

“Territorial forces” occupied RUF-controlled areas and prevented CDF activity. They were organised on a brigade, battalion and company structure. For example, it is reported that there was a brigade commander responsible for Kailahun District, a battalion commander responsible for Kailahun town, and a company commander responsible for the security for the security of the river crossing site at Baoma. “Offensive forces” were those based around Koidu, and represented the bulk of the RUF’s combat strength at this time. As the campaign developed and RUF forces took over more territory on their advance to Freetown, they had to allocate more forces to the control of territory and fewer were available for offensive operations.

E2.3. The offensive force around Koidu was structured on traditional military lines, with a chain of command and a span of command. For the 16 December attack, for example, Issa Sesay was the operational commander with a span of command of five subordinates: Morris Kallon (commanding the Sewafe ambush), Rambo, Alpha Momo, Akim Touray, and The Big (the brigade commander commanding the main axis of advance along the Guinea Highway). Each of these had subordinate commanders who actually controlled the fighters on the ground.

E2.4. Organisation was affected by the style of command of RUF leaders. Most were hands-on commanders, who took part personally in combat, regarding this as a fundamental aspect of leadership. For example, in the final fighting in Koquima on late afternoon of 16 December, it was Rambo himself who fired the RPG-7 that destroyed an ECOMOG armoured vehicle holding up the advance. The cult of personality was strong, and often soldiers would identify themselves by their commander rather than their unit; for example a guerrilla would describe himself as belonging to Alpha Momo’s group, rather than a particular brigade. Despite this focus on the personalities of commanders, which affected the nomenclature of the components of the hierarchy, it is clear that military hierarchies existed in the RUF similar to any modern conventional army.

E2.5. The other important aspect of structure is the staff structure designed to assist the commander. The RUF adopted a staff structure loosely based on US Army and NATO practice, with ‘G’ branches – G1 responsible for personnel, G2 for intelligence, G3 for operations, G4 for logistics, and G5 for control of civilian abductees: it is only in the G5 branch that the role is significantly different from western structures. However, despite the similarities of title and responsibilities with conventional military staff structures, RUF staff tended to operate in a looser confederation rather than in a well organised and tightly controlled headquarters, where staff from different branches would routinely work together and share information. In the RUF, they would tend to meet only when the commander summoned them together for a meeting: depending on the personality of the commander the staff might then be able to offer advice or simply receive orders. The result would be that the commander would find it more difficult to reach the best decision and would not find it so easy to maintain control over his organisation: this explains why commanders in organisations such as the RUF tend to have such strong and charismatic personalities – they are required to compensate for the day to day control exercised by staff officers in conventional armies.

E2.6. Conclusion. The RUF did have a recognisable military hierarchy and structure, albeit one which emphasised and relied on the personality of the commander.

E3 Did the RUF exhibit the characteristics of a traditional military organisation?

E3.1. Part B of this report identified 13 functions which characterise the operation of a traditional military organisation. This section lists the functions and determines whether each existed in the RUF and if so in what form.

Function	Application in the RUF
The Intelligence Process	The intelligence process within the RUF was rudimentary. Most information (on terrain and the enemy) was gained through questioning captured local people. There doesn't appear to have been any serious attempt to intercept Government or ECOMOG radio communications; and there is no evidence of use of agents within Government forces; nor of the tasking of patrols specifically to conduct reconnaissance. The G2 staff does not appear to have attempted to analyse information gained to develop true intelligence; rather they passed raw information directly to the commander.
Communications System	The RUF relied on radio communications throughout the war. They established a reliable communications net using captured radios and put special effort in selecting and training radio operators. They put much effort into maintaining security of the net: they used monthly changing codes, codenames and appointment titles, all derived from British Army signals procedure. Although this is relatively simple by modern western standards, it was a sophisticated system within the context of the Sierra Leone war. It is a measure of the effectiveness of the RUF system that after the ECOMOG Intervention, AFRC forces used it rather than attempt to set up their own net. The RUF communications system operated at both the operational level (between RUF HQ and operational units) and the tactical level (within an RUF force actually conducting operations); an example was the use of man portable radios during the 16 December attack on Koidu to maintain control within the four attacking groups and the ambush group at Sewafe.
Planning and Orders Process	Most strategic decisions were probably made by Charles Taylor, and transmitted through RUF HQ at Buedu. Operational level decisions and the development of operational level plans appear to have been made primarily by Bokarie and Issa Sesay, both of whom tended to rely on a small group of trusted advisors (such as Morris Kallon and

	<p>Rambo) rather than employ wide consultation within their commanders and senior staff officers. Once a decision had been made and plan developed, orders were given face to face wherever possible. All important operational level orders were given in this way; usually commanders were summoned to RUF HQ and given operational level orders directly (such as the order given to Superman to join SAJ Musa in the Northern Jungle). Tactical level orders for major operations were delivered by gathering commanders for a meeting; for the attacks on Koidu they gathered at Superman Ground, including those commanders from other flanks around Koidu. For orders of lesser importance, or where face to face meetings were impossible, coded messages were sent by radio.</p>
Lessons Learnt System & Doctrine Development and Dissemination	<p>There was no formal system for lessons learnt or doctrine. Nevertheless, successful methods developed by groups spread to other groups; either by direct orders or through recruit training. For example, following an effective government air attack against an RUF base, the RUF developed the general doctrine of concealment in the jungle, rather than attempting to engage over-flying aircraft with AA guns or missiles. This doctrine was employed by all RUF forces, not just the force that had initially been attacked. Jungle routine and movement was taught in recruit training, so all RUF fighters understood, for example, hand signals to allow silent communication in the jungle.</p>
Disciplinary System	<p>The RUF had a well established disciplinary system, with an Investigations Unit, responsible for both policing discipline and imposing justice. Justice ranged from death to physical beating to incarceration. Generally RUF fighters believed that the disciplinary system was hard but fair; it certainly seems to have been effective, since there are few instances reported of lapses in discipline within RUF groups.</p>
Recruiting and Training	<p>The RUF had a simple method of recruiting: they abducted any civilians they wanted, and then inducted them into the RUF at a training camp. Abductees were told that Government forces would kill anyone who had contact with the RUF to reduce the possibility of desertion. Many recruits were under 14 years old, but many others were adults. Effort was made to teach recruits ideology, so to persuade them on the righteousness of the RUF cause; but it is clear that the principle means of recruiting and retaining RUF fighters was coercion. Recruit training was based on standard conventional models, with an initial breaking down of individual social values and then re-building through an ethic of team work. The final "passing out" parade is a standard</p>

	recognition of a rite of passage.
System for Promotions and Appointments	There does not appear to be a systematic approach to promotions and appointments. Promotions in rank were awarded both for valour in combat and results achieved, and appear to be the prerogative of senior officers. Although ranks were loosely associated with appointments held, there appears to be some flexibility – for example a battalion commander may well be a lieutenant colonel, major, or even captain; this kind of flexibility is also common in conventional armies in heavy combat when promotions cannot keep pace with casualties.
Logistic Supply (including Arms Procurement)	Logistic supply was one of the most important systems for the operation of the RUF; without ammunition they could not fight. Most supplies were provided from Liberia, through agents of Charles Taylor. There was a well-established system for supplying ammunition and weapons to the force around Koidu, using human labour on foot trails through the jungle. Logistics were an important aspect of command for the RUF – by controlling the supply of ammunition the command of the RUF could maintain control over the whole organisation, by rewarding those in favour and withholding supply from those who do not obey commands.
Repair and Maintenance of Equipment	There does not appear to have been any system for repair or maintenance of equipment within the RUF; when equipments (usually weapons or vehicles) broke they were discarded and new items purchased, stolen, or commandeered.
Medical System	There was a relatively sophisticated medical system in the RUF, operated by trained doctors, nurses, and medical orderlies who had been abducted. They operated field hospitals wherever the RUF established major bases, and conducted basic surgery, recuperative care, and provided hygiene advice. Medical supplies were provided from Liberia up the jungle re-supply route, or were captured or stolen from enemy forces and civilian pharmacies.
Fundraising and Finance	There is no evidence of a coherent or well established fund raising system for the RUF, apart from the significant exception of diamond mining activities. There is considerable evidence that diamonds were provided to Charles Taylor in payment for weapons and ammunition supplied by him to the RUF.
Pay or Reward System for Soldiers	There was no salary or pay for RUF fighters. Some senior commanders may have benefited personally from diamond mining activity, but there is little evidence that the majority of RUF fighters were in it for profit. Since most were abductees, they probably did not expect pay. Nevertheless,

	cash was important. Cigarettes, toiletries and other luxury items could only be had through purchase during the 7-8 month siege of Koidu: they were obtained primarily from the weekly jungle market on the Liberian border. It is presumed that money entered the RUF principally through looting and theft, such as the robbing of captured Nigerian soldiers during the 16 December battle for Koidu.
Religious Welfare System	The RUF did not seek to exploit the religious make up of Sierra Leone; they purposely united the Christian and Islamic religions wherever they could. Religious leaders from both callings were among those abducted, and they both led prayer in turn whenever the RUF had parades. They do not appear, however, to have had any pastoral or welfare role within the RUF.

E3.2. **Conclusion.** Of the 13 functions identified that characterise the operation of a traditional military organisation, in the RUF only one – the communications network – can be described as existing in the same form as that of well established armies. However, a further ten functions are recognisable although in different form: they fulfil the same purpose as traditional functions and have simply been adapted to the particular circumstances of an African guerrilla organisation. Only two functions are missing entirely: a system for care and maintenance of equipment; and a pay or reward system for soldiers. In this case, neither was necessary. Therefore **the RUF had most, but not all, of the functional characteristics of a military organisation.**

E4 Was there coherent linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical levels?

E4.1. This is one of the most important tests to indicate not just the presence of military organisation but also effectiveness of command throughout the organisation. If the organisation is coherent with clearly delineated command systems working to common goals, then it should be possible to map all tactical activity to operational level objectives, and then to strategic aims.

E4.2. The strategic aims varied throughout 1998-1999. There were three broadly identifiable shifts in strategic aim:

- a. February – March 1998: Strategic Defence. The strategic aim was the survival of the RUF/AFRC.
- b. April – December 1998: Strategic Consolidation. The strategic aim was the building of the combat power of the RUF/AFRC in order to launch a strategic offensive.

- c. December 1998 – May 1999: Strategic Offensive. The strategic aim was the capture of Freetown and the re-establishment of RUF/AFRC junta government in Sierra Leone.

E4.3. Below is a matrix charting how operational objectives and tactical activity connect to strategic aims.

Date	Strategic Aim	Operational Objectives	Example Tactical Activity
Feb-Mar 98	survival of the RUF/AFRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Escape from Freetown • Establish safe areas in Kono and Kailahun 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cross Tombo to Fo-Gbo • Secure Makeni as temporary mounting base • Clear road to Koidu • Capture Koidu
Apr-Dec 98	building of combat power in order to launch a strategic offensive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build up counter-attack force • Weaken ECOMOG garrison of Koidu 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secure lines of communication to Koidu • Import munitions • Increase recruitment and training • Siege Koidu garrison • Ambush Makeni to Koidu road
Dec 98 – May 99	the capture of Freetown and the re-establishment of RUF/AFRC junta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capture Koidu and eliminate ECOMOG garrison • Secure axis of advance through Makeni and Lunsar • Prevent ECOMOG reinforcement by capture of Port Loko and Lungi • Invest and capture Freetown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Block Makeni-Koidu road at Sewafe Bridge • Split Koidu garrison in half by capture of Congo Bridge • Destroy ECOMOG garrison of Koidu • Clear route to Makeni • Expel ECOMOG garrisons at Makeni, Lunsar and Masiaka • etc

E4.4. The tactical activities shown are simply examples; of course there were many activities at this level, some of which may not be coherent. So, to establish whether the totality of tactical activity fulfils operational level objectives, and therefore whether the organisation is truly coherent, I examined one operation in detail – the 16 December attack on Koidu – in Part C of this report. This analysis showed a comprehensive and well thought out plan to achieve the operational level objective of the capture of Koidu and elimination of the ECOMOG garrison. It was executed with considerable determination and discipline. There were no tactical activities undertaken that did not directly or indirectly support achievement of the operational level objective. From this example, we can induce that the rest of RUF/AFRC activity in the timeframe achieved similar levels of coherence.

E4.5. Conclusion. The RUF demonstrated high levels of coherence between strategic, operational and tactical levels. This is not surprising: it was largely

successful for much of its 10 year life; if it had not been coherent it would not have survived or achieved the successes it did.

E5 Was command in the RUF effective?

E5.1. The model of command being used for this analysis incorporates decision-making, leadership, and control. This section analyses each in turn for the RUF, looking principally at command in general, but where necessary drawing specific tactical examples from the 16th December Koidu attack.

E5.2. Decision-making was mainly intuitive within the RUF. There was no formal methodology for making decisions, so commanders did what they thought was right in the circumstances. This often proved to be effective: by 1998 RUF commanders were highly experienced and generally knew what worked and what didn't. The information upon which they made their decisions (knowledge of the ground and enemy) was based principally through questioning of civilians, or guerrillas who came from that local area. Frequently decision-making was a collaborative effort, coming as a result of discussion at a meeting with staff officers and subordinate commanders; but there are many examples of commanders making decisions individually. For example, the plan for the highly successful 16th December attack appears to have developed by Issa Sesay alone, probably based on information on the situation given him by Morris Kallon and Rambo.

E5.3. Leadership had to be strong in the RUF. There were few physiological motivators for the guerrillas, since most had to be self sufficient for food and shelter and there was no pay; so psychological motivators were used. Although there was some attempt to create an ideological commitment amongst the force, this was haphazard and the ideological framework of the RUF was weak. So leadership tended to be based on the strong and charismatic personalities of the commanders, backed up with a strong measure of compulsion. Commanders were in large measure selected for their leadership abilities (rather than, for example, their intellect); and the disciplinary system was strong. Apart from the RUF civil war in the second half of 1999, I have not come across evidence where leadership broke down and guerrillas did not obey their orders. Even in the civil war, guerrillas remained loyal to whichever leaders were in charge of their groups.

E5.4. Control has three elements: direction, oversight and coordination. RUF commanders generally gave strong **direction**: usually this was by giving orders face to face, although it could be by radio. Orders tended to be simple and clear; there is little evidence of subordinate commanders being confused over what is expected of them. **Oversight** was more difficult for the RUF, given the dispersion of guerrilla groups in the jungle. Although commanders did visit subordinate groups, it was a timely business when all movement was on foot. The principal means of enforcing control was through the application of the disciplinary system at a junior level; and through control of ammunition supply at a more senior level: errant subordinates commanders were starved of ammunition by the RUF leadership while loyal subordinates were rewarded with sufficient to maintain their operations. Although many guerrilla operations were independent, commanders **coordinated** the efforts of their subordinates when necessary.

At the tactical level this was achieved by radio communications, such as during the 16th December attack when attacking groups on different axes of attack were coordinated by Issa Sesay. It also occurred at the operational level, such as the order for both Superman and Rambo to attack Makeni together; Superman moved from the Northern Jungle and Rambo moved from Koidu.

E5.6. **Conclusion.** For a guerrilla organisation, **the RUF had developed a very strong command capability**, both at tactical and operational levels. Commanders were experienced and able to make sound decisions; their leadership was strong; and they managed to maintain a high level of control over their forces, despite the difficulties caused by dispersion in the jungle.

E6 Synthesis of conclusions.

E6.1. It can be seen that the results of the four tests of whether the RUF was a military organisation in the traditional sense, and whether command responsibility exists, are:

- a. **The RUF did have a recognisable military hierarchy and structure.**
- b. **The RUF had most, but not all, of the functional characteristics of a military organisation.**
- c. **The RUF demonstrated high levels of coherence between strategic, operational and tactical levels.**
- d. **The RUF had developed a very strong command capability.**

E6.2. It is clear that although it was an unconventional force, the RUF modelled its hierarchy and rank system on those of professional well established armies. It evolved its functional characteristics to improve its effectiveness; and although there is little evidence to suggest that these were modelled on regular armies, the needs of military organisations are similar and it is no surprise that they evolved on similar lines. The absence of a small number of functional characteristics can be expected, and does not detract from the overall opinion. For me, the most telling test is the high level of coherence between strategic, operational, and tactical levels: this demonstrated that the chain of command was effective and working to a common purpose. The RUF also had a strong and effective command, based around capable and charismatic commanders. **It can therefore be concluded that the RUF was a military organisation, and effective command was being exercised.**

Curriculum Vitae of Colonel Richard Lion

COLONEL RICHARD IRON (OBE)

MILITARY SERVICE

UK National Liaison Representative at NATO HQ Allied Command Transformation (2005), Norfolk, Virginia

- Lectures on insurgency and counter-insurgency to military and non-military audiences, drawing on experiences and study of conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, the Far East, and Northern Ireland.

Assistant Director Land and Warfare (Doctrine) (2002-2004)

- Involved detailed understanding and development of: the contemporary strategic environment; the dynamics of both conventional and unconventional conflict; how military organizations work and are structured; and expertise in the area of command and control. In this latter post, deployed to the Coalition Land Component HQ in Kuwait in 2002-03, leading a UK/US planning team. Also responsible for the British Army's subsequent analysis of the Iraq War and the subsequent Iraq insurgency.

Instructor at the UK's Joint Service Command and Staff College (2000-2001)

- Responsible for development of campaigning concepts. This included the development of ways to view the complex modern environment of both traditional and insurgent/terrorist threats, and determining the most appropriate military and non-military responses to such diverse threats. Promoted to Colonel.

Commanding Officer 1st Battalion King's Own Royal Border Regiment (1997-2000), Northern England

- Commanded an armored infantry battalion based in North England. Served in the Balkans twice, first in Bosnia; and then in Macedonia commanding the British military contingent supporting the Kosovo Verification Mission in 1998-99 which observed the guerrilla war waged between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian Army. Awarded OBE for service in Bosnia.

Staff Officer (1996-1997)

- Responsible for specifying acquisition requirements for infantry weapons.

Staff Officer (1994-1995), HQ Infantry Warmister, UK

- Responsible for infantry tactical doctrine where developing British peacekeeping doctrine.

Company Commander (1992-1993), Kenya

Major (1992-1993), Londonderry, Northern Ireland

- Worked 18 months on counter-insurgency operations.

Chief of Staff 33 Armored Brigade (1990-1991), Paderborn Germany

Operations Officer 39 Infantry Brigade (1986-1988), Northern Ireland

- Primary responsible for developing the counter-terrorist surveillance network in South Armagh. Transferred to the King's Own Royal Border Regiment, with whom he served with the UN in Cyprus; conducted an analysis of the 1950s EOKA terrorist campaign against the British Army.

Company Commander (1983-198), Oman

- On loan to Sultan of Oman's Land Forces

Troop Commander Royal Engineers (1980-1982), Osnabruck, Germany

EDUCATION

1995-1996 Attended US Army Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Command and General Staff Course.
Studied the US experience of countering guerrilla war, in particular in Vietnam.

1988-1989 Attended Staff College, Camberley.
Studied British counter-insurgency doctrine and practice, including Malaya, Mau-Mau in Kenya, Aden, and Northern Ireland. Conducted an analysis of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict.

1983 Arabic language training.

1977-1980 Attended University of Cambridge, BA in Engineering.

1975-1976 Attended Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Royal Engineer Young Officer Course in Chatham.

ACHIEVEMENTS IN DOCTRINE

Chairman NATO'S Land Operations Working Group (2002-2005). Responsible for development of all land doctrine for use by NATO nations, including capstone publication *Allied Joint Publication-3.2 Allied Land Operations*. This includes, for the first time, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist doctrine in NATO operations.

Lead author and editor-in-chief of the British Army's top level doctrine publication *Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations*, including counter-insurgency operations.

Supervisor of publications. Overseeing the production of numerous other British Army doctrine publications, including *Army Field Manual Formation Tactics* and *The Military Contribution to Operations in the UK* (including counter-terrorist operations)

Led the British Army's analysis of the recent Iraq War and the subsequent Iraq Insurgency; published the official report of the UK's General Staff.

Developed new approach to campaign planning, incorporated into UK operational-level doctrine. Contributed to UK capstone joint doctrine, including *Joint Doctrine Publication 01 – Joint Operations*, specifically in the areas of how to understand complex and non-traditional enemies, such as insurgent and terrorist groups.

Various contributions to professional publications, including *Joint Force Quarterly* (USA) and the *British Army Review*, including articles on how to understand non-traditional types of enemy.