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SCSL/04/14/T  
(19036 - 19113)

19036

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**

**In Trial Chamber I**

Before: Justice Bankole Thompson, Presiding  
Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe  
Justice Pierre Boutet

Registrar: Mr Lovemore Munlo, SC

Date: 21 August 2006

**THE PROSECUTOR**

**-against-**

**SAMUEL HINGA NORMAN, MOININA FOFANA, and ALLIEU KONDEWA**

SCSL-2004-14-T

PUBLIC

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**FOFANA MATERIALS FILED PURSUANT TO  
THE SCHEDULING ORDER OF 20 JULY 2006**


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**For the Office of the Prosecutor:**

Mr Christopher Staker  
Mr James C. Johnson  
Mr Joseph Kamara

**For Moinina Fofana:**

Mr Victor Koppe  
Mr Michiel Pestman  
Mr Arrow Bockarie



**For Samuel Hinga Norman:**

Dr Bu-Buakei Jabbi  
Mr John Wesley Hall  
Mr Alusine Sani Sesay

**For Allieu Kondewa:**

Mr Charles Margai  
Mr Yada Williams  
Mr Ansu Lansana

SCSL-2004-14-T

## SUBMISSIONS

1. Counsel for the Second Accused, Mr Moinina Fofana, (the “Defence”) hereby submits certain materials in compliance with the ‘Scheduling Order Concerning the Preparation and Presentation of the Defence Case for the Second and Third Accused’ (the “Scheduling Order”)<sup>1</sup>.

### Witnesses

2. Pursuant to the third order of the Scheduling Order, a list of the witnesses’ names, in the order in which the Defence intends to call them during the eighth trial session, is attached hereto as Appendix A<sup>2</sup>. Pursuant to the first and second orders of the Scheduling Order, comprehensive profiles for each witness, including the previously-filed as well as the newly-requested information, are attached hereto as Appendix B. With the exception of expert witness Daniel J. Hoffman PhD<sup>3</sup> and common witness Abdul-One Mohammed<sup>4</sup>, the Defence does not intend to tender any exhibits through its witnesses.

### Rule 92bis Statements and Materials

3. As noted by the Chamber in the Scheduling Order<sup>5</sup>, the Defence has previously indicated that it intended to present the evidence of witnesses Simon Arthy, Frances Fortune, Tommy Jabbi, and Dema Moseray pursuant to Rule 92bis<sup>6</sup>. However, the Defence now intends to call Ms Fortune and Chiefs Jabbi and Moseray to testify in-person. As noted

<sup>1</sup> *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-2004-14-T-673, Trial Chamber I, 20 July 2006.

<sup>2</sup> *N.B.* Simon Arthy has been removed from the witness list; the Defence no longer intends to call him as a witness. Further, H.E. Foday Sesay has recently informed the Defence that he will not voluntarily appear as a witness. Accordingly, his name has also been removed from the witness list. However, Ambassador Sesay has indicated that he may be willing to produce a statement to be tendered pursuant to Rule 92bis. The Defence will endeavour to obtain and file such statement as soon as possible.

<sup>3</sup> As indicated in his profile, the Defence will seek to tender Dr Hoffman’s expert report as an exhibit.

<sup>4</sup> The Defence may wish to tender certain exhibits listed on its previously-filed exhibit list through General Mohammed. However, at the time of filing, the Defence has not yet had the opportunity to probe such documents with the witness. Once the witness has arrived in Freetown and the Defence has been given such opportunity, it will disclose any potential exhibits pursuant to the thirteenth order of the Scheduling Order. The Defence regrets that it is not able to make a definitive submission at this time. As noted previously, while General Mohammed is a common witness, he has insisted on dealing exclusively with members of the Norman Defence Team.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, at 4.

<sup>6</sup> See *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-2004-14-T-540, ‘Fofana Materials Filed Pursuant to the Consequential Order to the Status Conference of 18 January 2006’, 23 January 2006.


above, Mr Arthy has been removed from the witness list. Additional materials intended to be tendered through Rule 92bis will be disclosed and filed in accordance with the fifteenth order of the Scheduling Order.

### Expert Report

4. Pursuant to the sixth order of the Scheduling Order, the 'Expert Report on the Kamajors of Sierra Leone', prepared by Daniel J. Hoffman PhD and dated 11 August 2006, is attached hereto as Appendix C. A copy of the report was disclosed electronically to the Office of the Prosecutor this morning.

COUNSEL FOR MOININA FOFANA

Victor Koppe



**APPENDIX A****Proposed Order of Witnesses for the Eighth Trial Session**

- 01 Abdul-One MOHAMMED
- 02 Baimba ZOROKONG
- 03 Joseph LAPPIA
- 04 Augustine NGAUJIA
- 05 Mohammed MANSARRAY
- 06 Hassan DECOR
- 07 Morries NGOBEH
- 08 Steven FASSAY
- 09 Joseph LANSANA
- 10 Moriba SELLU
- 11 Mohammed FALLON
- 12 Junisa CONNEH
- 13 Tommy JABBI
- 14 Dema MOSERAY
- 15 Momoh LAHAI
- 16 Billoh CONTEH
- 17 Tejan SANKOH
- 18 Ibrahim TUCKER
- 19 Frances FORTUNE
- 20 Daniel HOFFMAN PhD

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**APPENDIX B**

**Witness Profiles**

WITNESS NO. 01

Abdul-One Mohammed

**BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION**

Date of Birth: Unable to obtain  
Place of Birth: Unable to obtain  
Father: Unable to obtain  
Mother: Unable to obtain  
Occupation: Former Chief-of-Staff to ECOMOG Force Commander Victor Malu  
Address: Jos, Nigeria

**SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY**

Witness, a former Major-General in the Nigerian Army and former ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone, will give testimony with respect to the command and organizational structure of the CDF as he observed it based on his interactions throughout the country with various members of the CDF. For example, witness will testify that command and control of certain CDF fighting forces was largely in the hands of ECOMOG at times relevant to certain charges contained in the Indictment.

As indicated in the submissions at footnote 4, given General Mohammed's inclination to deal exclusively with the Norman Defence Team, the Defence has yet to conduct further proofing beyond its initial off-the-record interview conducted in March 2006. Assuming the witness still intends to appear in September and agrees to meet with the Defence in advance of his testimony, the Defence will be in a position to submit additional details regarding its line of examination-in-chief. Presently, the Defence refers the Chamber and the Prosecution to the 'Expanded Witness Summary of Major-Gen. Abdul One Mohammed', filed by the Norman Defence Team on 14 July 2006 (SCSL-2004-14-T-664).

**RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT**

¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)

**PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY**

Unknown

**PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY**

In person

**PREFERRED LANGUAGE**

English

19041

WITNESS NO. 02

Baimba Zorokong

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 25 March 1959  
Place of Birth: Messima, Pujehun District  
Father: Brima Zorokong  
Mother: Amie Swaray  
Occupation: Former CDF administrative secretary (Kamajor)  
Address: 1 Pademba Road, Freetown

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will provide evidence with regard to Mr Fofana's role at Base Zero during the junta period including his own personal interactions with Mr Fofana. For example, witness will testify that Mr Fofana's activity at Base Zero was limited to settling petty disputes among fighters and ensuring that visitors were fed; Mr Fofana was illiterate; the CDF fighting forces were answerable to their various commanders, some of whom were appointed by the fighters themselves; Eddie Massallay was in charge of the Kamajor base at Gendema throughout the junta period, and attacks were launched from that location.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1-2 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

English

SCSL-2004-14-T

WITNESS NO. 03

Joseph Lappia

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 24 December 1965  
Place of Birth: Taiama, Moyamba District  
Father: Holima Lappia  
Mother: Amie Lappia  
Occupation: Former CDF commander and deputy director of logistics (Kamajor)  
Address: Bo

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to the command and organizational structure of the CDF, especially at Base Zero; the SLPP government's involvement in the conflict and relationship with the CDF, including the provision of funds and logistics; ECOMOG involvement in the conflict and relationship with the CDF, including the provision of command and logistics; the witness's role and functions within the CDF and his interactions with Mr Fofana; Mr Fofana's role and functions within the CDF; Albert Nallo's role and functions within the CDF; and the alleged CDF attack on Koribondo.

For example, the witness will testify that Mr Fofana was a sort of host at Base Zero—he was not born in Talia but he was a well-known figure in Bonthe District. Each time Hinga Norman came with logistics like rice, petrol, kerosene, cigarettes, and matches, he would give them to Mr Fofana to be stored before distribution. Mr Fofana was a storekeeper. There was a small house at Talia used as a store, and Mr Fofana had the only key. When the time came for the cooking of the food, Mr Fofana would call Mr Lumeh to the store and give him the food. Mr Lumeh would then distribute it to the women for preparation. Mr Fofana also settled disputes among the youths and elders. Mr Fofana was a quiet and low-tempered man. Witness does not recall hearing Mr Fofana address any group.

Following the restoration, witness's boss was Kosseh Hindowa, the District Administrator for Bo. Mr Fofana was called the Director of War and had an office in Bo; although, witness doesn't know what Mr Fofana was doing. At this point, the CDF was under the supervision of ECOMOG. Witness saw the name Director of War as a kind of reward for support during the Base Zero period. The War Council awarded names through the appointment committee. However, they were only names, and didn't necessarily mean anything. Mr Fofana was not giving directives nor going to the warfront.

The man who was actually planning the war was Albert Nallo, and witness saw him at Base Zero many times. Mr Nallo would speak directly to the War Council, and witness thinks he was planning attacks. Mr Nallo was considered a wayward fellow and was not well respected. Mr Nallo has cause to speak against the accused because he was sacked from the CDF for bad behaviour. For example, he was accused of stealing 35 goats by force from Bumpeh. Further, witness heard from some boys in Bo that Mr Nallo directed a group of men to ambush a woman to whom he owed money, and the woman was killed.

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RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

2 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende



WITNESS NO. 04

Augustine Sullay Ngaujia

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 15 August 1955  
 Place of Birth: Bo  
 Father: James Ngaujia  
 Mother: Mariama Ngaujia  
 Occupation: Former CDF commander (Kamajor)  
 Address: Bo

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to the command and organizational structure of the CDF, especially in Bo; the SLPP government's involvement in the conflict and relationship with the CDF, including the provision of funds and logistics; ECOMOG involvement in the conflict and relationship with the CDF, including the provision of command and logistics; Mr Fofana's role and functions within the CDF, especially in Bo; the witness's role and functions within the CDF and his interactions with Mr Fofana; and Albert Nallo's role and functions within the CDF.

For example, witness will testify that, after the SLPP restoration, ECOMOG decided to form a battalion in Bo, the 19th Battalion, consisting of Kamajors and acting as an auxiliary to ECOMOG. Witness was appointed as the Battalion Commander, in-charge, working directly under ECOMOG. Mr Fofana, as Director of War, had his own office in Bo when the battalion was formed. However, directives in terms of security in Bo were purely in the hands of ECOMOG, the police, and the 19th Battalion. Mr Fofana was not very active. He had no dealings with the security network in Bo. Witness doesn't know what Mr Fofana and the other CDF administrators were doing, though he suspects they were largely just occupying space in order to receive supplies from the government in Freetown. Witness never saw Mr Fofana planning war throughout witness's time in Bo. Rather, Mr Fofana was "just enjoying" while the Battalion was "doing the dirty work".

Albert Nallo was resentful of Mr Fofana because Mr Nallo felt that, as an educated man, he should have been Director of War. Mr Nallo complained to witness that Hinga Norman and Mr Fofana didn't "love" him.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1-2 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

WITNESS NO. 05

Mohammed Mansarray

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 17 August 1967  
Place of Birth: Talia, Bonthe District  
Father: Idrissa Mansarray  
Mother: Yema Matu Lappia  
Occupation: Former CDF initiator and logistics officer (Kamajor)  
Address: Bo

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to the command and organizational structure of the CDF, especially at Base Zero and Gendema; witness's role and functions within the CDF and his interactions with Mr Fofana, including Mr Fofana's activity in Bo after the reinstatement of the SLLP Government; ECOMOG involvement in the conflict and relationship with the CDF, including the provision of command and logistics; and the SLPP government's involvement in the conflict and relationship with the CDF, including the provision of funds and logistics.

For example, witness will testify that in 1995, Mr Fofana was the Chief Kamajor for Bonthe District. His role was to mediate and settle disputes between Kamajors. Kamajors were loyal to their Paramount Chiefs from whom they took orders. These Chiefs were responsible for hosting and feeding them. After hearing that Eddie Masallay had organized Kamajors at Gendema/Bo Waterside, President Kabbah sent some of his ministers to collect certain Kamajor leaders and bring them to Conakry. ECOMOG facilitated the transport by plane. ECOMOG began to support the Kamajors at Gendema/Bo Waterside with logistics.

In 1997, Hinga Norman and others decided to base at Talia. The government provided a helicopter to transport them. Many chiefs were still at Talia and the Kamajors remained loyal to them. However, the pattern changed a bit due to the influence of the government: Prior to the government's involvement, commanders were appointed based on bravery and proven strength in battle. The government introduced a measure of politics to the process.

At Talia, witness encountered Mr Fofana, who he knew from their days together in Bonthe. Mr Fofana acted as a liaison between the chiefs and the initiators, continuing his role as a mediator. Mr Fofana enjoyed some respect at Talia because he hailed from Bonthe. For the three weeks witness spent at Talia, food, arms, ammunition, medicine, etc. were handed over to Mr Fofana, who would in turn hand them over to the chiefs. The chiefs would then allocate the supplies among their Kamajors. Mr Fofana continued to act as mediator among initiators and sometimes he would call meetings to sort out internal conflicts. Despite the respect shown to him in Bonthe, Mr Fofana had no control over the actual fighting. Kamajors were answerable to their chiefs. When they heard about fighting, they would simply go to the battlefield. While witness was at Talia, he never heard Mr Fofana give any orders to attack.

After the SLPP reinstatement, the Kamajors came under the control of loyal SLA officers and later ECOMOG. ECOMOG was in "effective control". Maxwell Khobe, as Chief of Defence Staff, was actively involved in monitoring all Kamajor operations. Mr Fofana's role was

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limited to maintaining peaceful relations among the chiefs. The goal of CDF was to restore civilians to their homes.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

2-3 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

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WITNESS NO. 06

Hassan Sallu Decor

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 6 August 1961  
 Place of Birth: Gerihun, Bo District  
 Father: Sallu Lappia  
 Mother: Aminatta Lappia  
 Occupation: Farmer (Kamajor)  
 Address: Gerihun, Bo District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness, a former CDF commander from Gerihun, will give testimony with respect to Mr Fofana's role and functions within the CDF, especially in Bo; the witness's role and functions within the CDF and his interactions with Mr Fofana; Albert Nallo's role and functions within the CDF; and the alleged CDF attack on Bo.

For example, the witness will testify that his group of Kamajors was self-motivated, fighting junta soldiers where they sprung up. Witness never received orders from Mr Fofana. Witness knew the man was called Director of War, but he never came in contact with him during fighting.

The attack on Bo was successful, but witness's group didn't see any fighting—by the time they made it to Bo, the junta had left. Civilians told witness that the fleeing junta soldiers had set houses on fire. Civilians also said the fleeing junta soldiers had killed the civilians.

Albert Nallo was coordinating things on the ground in Bo. "His name was all over".

Mr Fofana was recognized as the Director of War in Bo, although witness doesn't know what he was doing. Witness felt no loyalty to Mr Fofana, only some regard for him as his elder. Mr Fofana was an illiterate, and as far as witness was concerned, "didn't know anything". Mr Fofana was aided by David Khobe and Albert Nallo who were "very vigilant" in the office.

Mr Fofana only had the title. The District Administrator in Bo was more notable than Mr Fofana. All supplies came through Kosseh Hindowa. Mr Fofana was "doing nothing but sitting in that office and being dictated to".

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT	PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY
¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)	1-2 hours
PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY	PREFERRED LANGUAGE
In person	Mende

WITNESS NO. 07

Morries Maada Ngobeh

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 3 May 1972  
 Place of Birth: Poblauwa, Kailahun District  
 Father: Saffa Boima  
 Mother: Batu Boima  
 Occupation: Mobile telephone technician  
 Address: 8 Maria Street, Bo

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will provide evidence specifically aimed at discrediting the testimony of, for example, prosecution witness TF2-017 given on 22 November 2004 with respect to incidents alleged to have taken place at Bo. For example, witness will testify that, in February 1998, junta forces were seen looting major shops in Bo; one of the junta financiers, Dr M.B. Sesay, was reported to have provided Kamajor attire to some junta forces to be used as disguises; also in February 1998, the youths of Bo—unaffiliated with the CDF—were involved in reprisal killings and burning of houses of those known or suspected to have supported the junta.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-28 (Counts 1-7)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1 hour

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

WITNESS NO. 08

Steven Lahai Fassay

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 1952  
 Place of Birth: Jormo, Kenema District  
 Father: Bockarie Fassay  
 Mother: Satta Fassay  
 Occupation: Former CDF commander (Kamajor)  
 Address: 75 Sombo Street, Kenema

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will provide evidence specifically aimed at discrediting the testimony of prosecution witness TF2-223 given on 28 September 2004 with respect to incidents alleged to have taken place at SS Camp. Additionally, witness will testify as to the organisation of Kamajor forces at various locations and his personal interactions with Mr Fofana. For example, witness will testify that SS Camp was a strategic position used to defend Kenema; witness was based there for some time and, while there, never saw Mr Fofana nor any killings; command decisions within the CDF were made, somewhat spontaneously, at the chieftom level; he heard that Mr Fofana was the Director of War but he was not aware of his duties; he never received orders from Mr Fofana; he once heard Mr Fofana tell a group of Kamajors not to burn houses or harm civilians; Eddie Massallay was in charge of the Kamajor base at Gendema where he supplied logistics to the fighters; President Kabbah was responsible for the initial Kamajor mobilisation.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-28 (Counts 1-7)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1-2 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

19050

WITNESS NO. 09

Joseph Bobson Lansana

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 6 December 1969  
Place of Birth: Bonthe Town  
Father: Claude Lansana  
Mother: Gillo Lansana  
Occupation: Farmer  
Address: Sorgia, Bonthe District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to the death of his mother at Sorgia in 1995. For example, witness will testify that on 2 November 1995, a group of Kamajors attacked and captured Sorgia under the command of Kamoh Lahai Bangura. The Kamajors assembled the villagers and accused them of collaborating with the rebels and threatened to execute all of them. They lit all the houses on fire. A Kamajor called Conteh killed witness's mother and threw her into one of the burning houses. Witness was present and saw the killing. Witness has never heard the name Albert Nallo, has never been tortured, and both of his ears are intact. He is the only person called Joseph Lansana in Sorgia.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-28 (Counts 1-7)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1-2 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

19051

WITNESS NO. 10

Moriba Sellu

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: Unknown  
Place of Birth: Sorgia, Bonthe District  
Father: Baiyemie Sellu  
Mother: Mayai Sellu  
Occupation: Section Chief and farmer  
Address: Sorgia, Bonthe District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to the death of Joseph Lansana's mother at Sorgia in 1995. For example, he will testify that he witnessed a Kamajor called Conteh kill Mr Lansana's mother in Sorgia in 1995; he has never heard of Albert Nallo; and he knows no other person called Joseph Lansana in Sorgia. Witness will corroborate the testimony of Mr Lansana.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-28 (Counts 1-7)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1 hour

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende



WITNESS NO. 11

Mohammed Fallon

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 2 January 1978  
 Place of Birth: Kati, Bonthe District  
 Father: Brima Fallon  
 Mother: Minatu Fallon  
 Occupation: Miner (Kamajor)  
 Address: Jembe, Bonthe District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to Albert Nallo's position within the CDF and the death of his brother, Mustapha Fallon. For example, witness will testify that his younger brother Mustapha, a Kamajor, was captured by junta forces in Koribondo. When witness arrived in Koribondo in October 1997, he saw his brother among the captives who were being displayed near the roundabout. Witness saw members of the junta forces kill his brother. Further, witness will testify that Mr Nallo was a big man among the Kamajors and was vying for Kosseh Hindowah's position as District Administrator in Bo. Mr Nallo is untrustworthy: for example, he would tell Kamajors that there were benefits for them, take their money, but deliberately fail to deliver the benefits. Witness knows this because Mr Nallo enlisted him to collect such money from his junior colleagues.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT	PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY
¶ 25 (Counts 1-2)	1-2 hours
PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY	PREFERRED LANGUAGE
In person	Mende

WITNESS NO. 12

Junisa Conneh

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 1964  
 Place of Birth: Baoma-Kpenge, Bonthe District  
 Father: Charles Conneh  
 Mother: Mariama Conneh  
 Occupation: Farmer (Kamajor)  
 Address: Baoma-Kpenge, Bonthe District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to the alleged attack on Baoma and the alleged killing of a Fullah trader there by Albert Nallo. Witness will testify that there has never been a trade fair in Baoma; there is no other town called Baoma in the chiefdom; and that Baoma has never been attacked by Kamajors.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-28 (Counts 1-7)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1 hour

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

19054

WITNESS NO. 13

Tommy Jabbi

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: Unknown  
Place of Birth: Baoma-Kpenge, Bonthe District  
Father: Joe Jabbi  
Mother: Kona Mbalu Jabbi  
Occupation: Farmer  
Address: Baoma-Kpenge, Bonthe District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to the alleged attack on Baoma and alleged killing of a Fullah trader there by Albert Nallo. Witness will, along with witness Dema Moseray, corroborate the testimony of Junisa Conneh.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-28 (Counts 1-7)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

30 minutes

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

19085

WITNESS NO. 14

Dema Moseray

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: Unknown  
Place of Birth: Baoma-Kpenge, Bonthe District  
Father: Steven Moseray  
Mother: Betty Moseray  
Occupation: Section Chief and farmer  
Address: Baoma-Kpenge, Bonthe District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will give testimony with respect to the alleged attack on Baoma and alleged killing of a Fullah trader there by Albert Nallo. Witness will, along with witness Tommy Jabbi, corroborate the testimony of Junisa Conneh.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-28 (Counts 1-7)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

30 minutes

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

SCSL-2004-14-T

19056

WITNESS NO. 15

Momoh Lahai (also known as Momoh Pemba)

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: Unknown  
Place of Birth: Torma-Gbagbaba, Bonthe District  
Father: Manga Lahai  
Mother: Kadie Lahai  
Occupation: Fisherman (Kamajor)  
Address: Torma-Gbagbaba, Bonthe District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will provide evidence specifically aimed at discrediting the testimony of prosecution witness Albert Nallo (TF2-014) given on 10 March 2005 with respect to incidents alleged to have taken place at Dodo Village. For example, the witness will testify that he has never been to Dodo Village; he never went on assignment with Albert Nallo or Billoh Conteh; and he never received orders from Mr Fofana or Mr Nallo.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-26 (Counts 1-4)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1-2 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

19057

WITNESS NO. 16

Billoh Conteh

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: Unkown  
Place of Birth: Mokoligbeh, Bonthe District  
Father: Morlai Conteh  
Mother: Hawa Conteh  
Occupation: Farmer (Kamajor)  
Address: Mokoligbeh, Bonthe District

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will provide evidence specifically aimed at discrediting the testimony of prosecution witness Albert Nallo (TF2-014) given on 10 March 2005 with respect to incidents alleged to have taken place at Dodo Village. For example, witness will testify that he has been to Dodo Village but not during the war; he never went on assignment with Albert Nallo; and he never received orders from Mr Fofana or Mr Nallo.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 24-26 (Counts 1-4)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

1-2 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende

WITNESS NO. 17

Sheku Tejan Sankoh

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 23 June 1947  
 Place of Birth: Kpatama, Moyamba District  
 Father: Ansumana Sankoh  
 Mother: Hawa Sesay  
 Occupation: Former CDF District Administrator for Moyamba District (Kamajor)  
 Address: 39 Sanders Street, Freetown

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will provide evidence with regard to Mr Fofana's role as Director of War as well as his own interactions with Mr Fofana at Base Zero during the junta period and in the Moyamba District in 1998. For example, the witness will testify that: the CDF suffered from poor organisation in Moyamba District; attacks were locally and largely spontaneously organised; ECOMOG provided needed command and logistical support in Moyamba District; Prince Brima credited Moinina Fofana over the radio for things he had in fact not done; and Mr Fofana was a figurehead without authority over the fighters, though at times he was able to successfully mediate disputes.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT	PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY
¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)	1-2 hours
PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY	PREFERRED LANGUAGE
In person	English

190  
[19059]

WITNESS NO. 18

Ibrahim Tucker

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 14 December 1966  
Place of Birth: Yellehwa, Bonthe District  
Father: Rashid Tucker  
Mother: Jennie Yema  
Occupation: Former CDF commander (Kamajor)  
Address: Monrovia, Liberia

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will provide evidence with regard to Kamajor and ECOMOG activities at Monrovia and Bo Waterside, Liberia and Gendema, Sierra Leone during the junta period; the role of Eddie Massallay within the CDF organization; CDF and ECOMOG involvement in attacks on Kenema in February 1998; and the role of ULIMO fighters in the conflict. For example, the witness will testify that certain titles within the CDF were given or taken as a form of reward or self-promotion; Mr Fofana "did not play any role that can class him as a director of war"; Eddie Massallay was in charge at Gendema; a large percentage of commanders operated without the knowledge of those at either Base Zero or Gendema; Mr Fofana was illiterate; tactical decisions were made by battalion commanders without consulting so-called directors; planning for certain attacks took place at Gendema without reference to Base Zero; Gendema was essentially an arms depot where various commanders would come to get logistics, supplied by ECOMOG; commanders from as far as Moyamba and Bonthe came to Gendema; non-Kamajor fighters with experience in the Liberian conflict were working with the CDF.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

2-3 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

Mende



WITNESS NO. 19

Frances Katherine Barclay Fortune

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: 20 May 1959  
 Place of Birth: Hamilton, Canada  
 Father: William Barclay  
 Mother: Katherine Minto Latham  
 Occupation: Director, Talking Drum Studio, Search for Common Ground  
 Address: 13 Garbar Lane, Freetown

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Witness will testify as to Mr Fofana's activities in Bo from 1998 onward. For example, she will discuss his work on a project known as the "Campaign for Peace", which focused on peace-building measures among the various chiefdoms of the country following the SLPP restoration.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT	PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY
N/A (character witness)	1-2 hours
PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY	PREFERRED LANGUAGE
In person	English

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WITNESS NO. 20

Daniel J. Hoffman PhD

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Occupation: Professor of Cultural Anthropology

Address: Seattle USA

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Please see the previously submitted 'Résumé of Proposed Evidence of Daniel J. Hoffman PhD', attached as Appendix C to the 'Fofana Submissions Regarding Proposed Expert Witness Daniel J. Hoffman PhD' filed by the Defence on 16 June 2006 (SCSL-2004-14-T-621).

The Defence intends to tender Dr Hoffman's expert report as an exhibit.

RELEVANT POINTS IN THE INDICTMENT

¶¶ 14, 15, 18-29 (Counts 1-8)

PROPOSED LENGTH OF TESTIMONY

3-4 hours

PROPOSED MODE OF TESTIMONY

In person

PREFERRED LANGUAGE

English

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19062

**APPENDIX C**  
**Expert Report of Daniel J. Hoffman PhD**

19063

# **Expert Report on the Kamajors of Sierra Leone**

prepared for the  
**Fofana Defense Team**

by

**Daniel J. Hoffman, PhD**

**Assistant Professor of Anthropology**

**University of Washington**

**Seattle USA**

**August 11 2006**

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Part G: Appendix 1 – Close Analysis of the Military Expert Report

**PART A:**  
**Introduction: Scope & Overview of the Report**

A.1. This report outlines the research and findings on two questions, one primary and one contingent. First, were there factors of anthropological significance which shaped the structure and function of the Civil Defense Forces of Sierra Leone? Second, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, what bearing might these anthropological factors have on areas of particular interest to the Special Court?

A.2. By "anthropological" I refer to a broad range of social and political factors which are the common areas of study of my discipline. Cultural Anthropology. These may be issues of history, belief, kinship, social transformation, ritual, custom, economy, organization -- as a discipline anthropology takes as its subject matter a host of factors which speak to the context in which the activities of individuals and collectives take place.

A.3. The findings below suggest that there are issues of anthropological significance which shaped how the CDF functioned during the period of concern to the Special Court. It is my finding after more than six years of research into the activities of the kamajors that issues of command and control within the organization cannot be understood without reference to such factors as the nature of the patronage system in Sierra Leone, the significance of nicknames and titles, even the cultural conceptions of childhood. The report examines a number of such anthropologically significant factors and applies them with specific reference to the activities of the CDF.

A. 4. The organization of the report is as follows:

Part B: Methods & Qualifications. This Part explains the methodology used by cultural anthropologists in general, with specific reference to my own research praxis in Sierra Leone since the year 2000. It also details the research done in preparation for this report. This Part (together with the CV submitted to the Court) elaborates my own background and the qualifications I bring to serving as an expert witness for the Court.

Part C: Relevant Socio-political Dynamics. In this Part, I begin with a brief analysis of the meaning of the term "kamajor" and the relationship between that term and the name CDF. I analyze the patronage system which is central to social, political, and economic life in contemporary Sierra Leone. I examine naming practices among Mendes and the meaning of titles. Since one of the key issues in understanding the CDF is the question of local versus central authority, I review the theoretical and empirical work done on the "localization" of conflicts in Africa. Finally in this Part I review the literature on what scholars call the "crisis of youth" in Sierra Leone and related issues of literacy and education.

Part D: Analysis & Implications for the CDF. Having highlighted the relevant anthropological issues, I then apply these to a specific analysis of the CDF. In particular I explore the understandings CDF fighters had of "command" and the role of "commanders," including how ranks, titles, and nicknames were assigned and what they were understood to mean. I look here at how local politics and historical events shaped the way in which people in different regions understood the war and its implications, and in many cases how they used the opportunities created by the war to advance personal or small group objectives.


Part E: Synthesis of Conclusions. In the conclusion to this report I summarize the findings and suggest that the CDF should not be understood as a military organization with military command and control. Rather, it is best thought of as a loosely organized, militarized social network without a centralized military command structure.

Part F: Sources. In this Part I list the literature consulted in the preparation of this report.

Part G: Appendix 1. Although I refer to it throughout this report, the Military Expert Report submitted to the Special Court speaks to many of the same issues I have covered here – though it draws very different conclusions. For that reason, it seemed prudent to include a close reading of that report.

Daniel J. Hoffman, PhD  
Assistant Professor of Anthropology  
University of Washington  
Seattle USA

August 11 2006



**Part B:**  
**Methods & Qualifications**

**B.1.** The defense counsel for Moinina Fofana requested in October 2005 that I act as an expert witness for the second accused in the CDF trial of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The basis for that request is my long period of anthropological research with the kamajors and my familiarity with militia movements in the region. This research has included ethnographic fieldwork and a knowledge of the extensive scholarly literature relevant to issues of concern to the Court. I currently hold a faculty position in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Washington in the United States. The University of Washington is a "Research I"<sup>1</sup> institution. My position entails continued study of this region of West Africa and teaching graduate and undergraduate courses on the anthropology of Africa and the anthropology of war.

**B.2.** War has been integral to the work anthropologists do since the earliest days of the discipline.<sup>2</sup> Violent communal conflict has long been recognized as a fundamental part of the human experience and one with profound implications for how individuals and groups think of themselves, each other, and the world in which they live. Anthropological studies of warfare range from analyses of the ecological dimensions of war in the Amazon Basin of Brazil to ethnographies of male bonding in the United States Special Forces.<sup>3</sup> The anthropologist Jack David Eller notes that the anthropological approach to violent conflict is "holistic, incorporating historical, political, economic, and other data into a complete description" of war.<sup>4</sup> This anthropological approach to the study of warfare is recognized across the disciplines as a critical mode of scholarship. As a recent review article in one scholarly journal put it, "social and cultural anthropologists have been increasingly prominent in the [interdisciplinary] discussions" about violence and warfare in the contemporary world.<sup>5</sup>

**B. 3.** I began researching the kamajors in 1998, and since 2000 have conducted more than 14 months of fieldwork in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. This includes a research trip in April 2006 for the express purpose of writing the current report, though obviously the findings in this report are based on knowledge accumulated over the previous years of study. I would estimate that in my research on the CDF I have spoken to approximately 200 individual combatants and many more people with first hand knowledge of the organization. My April 2006 research trip to Sierra Leone included extensive interviews

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<sup>1</sup> "Research I" is a designation used in the US academy to connote an institution the function of which is both teaching and research. The designation distinguishes it from liberal arts colleges and other institutions the primary function of which is teaching. Faculty at Research I institutions are generally expected to both teach and continue research and scholarly publication.

<sup>2</sup> Catherine Lutz, "Ethnography at the War Century's End."

<sup>3</sup> See R. Brian Ferguson, *Warfare, Culture and Environment*; Anna Simons, *The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special Forces*.

<sup>4</sup> Jack David Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict*, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Mark Leopold, "Violence in Contemporary Africa Reassessed," p. 685.



with all three of the CDF accused and with approximately 25 former CDF members in Freetown, Bo, Kenema and environs.

**B. 4.** My methodology for conducting this research, as per the norm for my discipline (Cultural Anthropology) includes a range of qualitative techniques for the effective study of human social life and culture. These include formal, structured interviews (prepared questions, with or without recording equipment); semi-structured interviews (free ranging conversation on a predetermined topic in an interview setting); and informal interviews (informant driven interviews meant to elicit what subjects themselves consider to be topics worthy of analysis).<sup>6</sup> In addition, I conducted research as a "participant observer" – living with members of a community and interacting with them in non-interview settings during the course of their everyday routine. These are methods designed to generate insights into how research subjects understand and express their own social and cultural worldviews, and to explore what the pioneering anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski termed "the inponderabilia [sic] of actual life."<sup>7</sup>

**B. 5.** In addition to my own fieldwork in the region, I have drawn here on the expertise of many other scholars who specialize in Sierra Leone. Scholars who work in this region enjoy one of the largest bodies of literature on the history, political science, and anthropology of any African country. The war in Sierra Leone has been intensively studied by academics across these fields and has been the subject of a great deal of fruitful debate and examination. It is important to note that much of this literature is produced by Sierra Leonean scholars. Those works to which I refer directly in this report are listed in Part F of this report, but clearly my own expertise on this topic is a reflection of having engaged the work of many other qualified researchers.

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<sup>6</sup> For more on the interview in anthropological inquiry, see Charles Briggs, *Learning How to Ask: A Sociolinguistic Appraisal of the Role of the Interview in Social Science Research*; Bernard Russell, *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*.

<sup>7</sup> Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, p. 18. For more on participant observation as a fieldwork method in anthropology, see Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Discipline and Practice: 'The Field' as Site, Method, and Location in Anthropology."

**Part C:**  
**Relevant Socio-political Dynamics**

**C. 1. Pre-war (1991) meaning of “kamajor”**

**C.1.a.** The term “kamajor” is an Anglicized version of a Mende term. Prior to the standardization of the spelling and pronunciation “kamajor,” the term appears in multiple forms depending on academic convention and on Mende dialect. The most common forms are *kamajo*, *kamajoh*, *kamajoi*, *kamasoi* (singl.) and *kamajesia*, *kamajoisia* or *kamasesia* (pl.).<sup>8</sup>

**C.1.b.** The term “kamajor” is generally translated into the English as either “hunter” or “traditional hunter.” Both translations are misleading. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1991, and for the first years of the war, a kamajor was a Mende male who possessed highly specialized knowledge of the forest and was an expert in the use of medicines (*hale* in Mende) associated with the bush. At least since the introduction of shotguns to the rural areas, a kamajor was also permitted the use of firearms, which were carefully regulated by local communities.

**C.1.c.** These properties distinguished a kamajor from ordinary hunters, who might be any Mende male pursuing small game in the forest using nets, traps, and/or dogs. A kamajor, by contrast, was responsible not simply for procuring meat, but for protecting communities from both natural and supernatural threats said to reside beyond the village boundaries: elephant, leopard, witches, and sometimes other human beings. In other words, the kamajor provided a security function that was as important as his hunting role, if not more so. The importance of the kamajor to Mende communities is also expressed in the fact that many Mende villages trace their origins to the exploits of these specialized hunters. Villages were often founded at the sites of large game kills, and particularly elephant kills.<sup>9</sup> The Mende oral historian and linguist Patrick Muana has therefore translated the term kamajor (or in his spelling *kamajoi*) as “a past master at doing mysterious things”<sup>10</sup> – a translation which captures the specialization and the power inherent in the title.

**C.1.d.** Whereas any adult male in a Mende community might be called a “hunter,” a given village or town might have only a single or perhaps two kamajors. Because they

<sup>8</sup> For the purposes of this report, I will use the term “kamajor” or “kamajors” as the generic. I use the term “kamajoisia” when discussing the mobilizations of hunters prior to the standardization of the Anglicized term. When citing other authors who use a different form for the term, I retain that author’s choice of spelling.

<sup>9</sup> See Matthew Hill, “Where to Begin: The Place of the Hunter Founder in Mende Histories”; Kenneth Little, *The Mende of Sierra Leone: A West African People in Transition*; Patrick Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency”, p. 85-86.

<sup>10</sup> See Patrick Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency”, p. 78 n.2. Variations with similar connotations can be found in Caspar Fithen, “Diamonds and War in Sierra Leone: Cultural Strategies for Commercial Adaptations to Endemic Low-Intensity Conflict,” p. 11 n.1; and Doug Henry, “Embodied Violence: War and Relief Along the Sierra Leone Border,” p. 39.

possessed the power of the gun and also the power of their occult medicines – powers which made them volatile and potentially threatening to the very communities they protected – local chiefs historically maintained a uniquely close relationship to the kamajors in their communities. Kamajors needed the permission of the chiefs to hunt in a given area of forest, and owed the chief a part of the kill. Requests for the special services of a kamajor frequently came through the chiefs.

**C.1.e.** Although there is some ambiguity about this in the archives, prior to the war the kamajors seem to have learned their craft primarily through apprenticeships rather than through initiations as such. Unlike hunters in other Mande ethnic groupings (Mende is a subset of the larger Mande language group), kamajors were not necessarily part of a hunter “society.” The literature does sometimes refer to a hunters’ guild, but in general kamajors achieved their status by a long process of learning the secrets of their craft rather than through an initiation per se.

## **C.2. Patronage**

**C.2.a.** Perhaps the single most salient factor in social, political and economic life throughout Sub-Saharan Africa is the concept of patronage. Certainly this is true in the Mano River region which includes Sierra Leone. Patronage systems are referred to by a variety of terms often having to do with the scale on which they occur. “Patronage,” “patron-client” or “clientalism,” “patrimonialism” or “neopatrimonialism,” the “big man” system of governance – all point toward roughly the same social dynamic: the centrality of hierarchical personalized relationships over relations defined by business, bureaucratic, political, or even military logics. Establishing residency in a new location provides a clear example of the patronage system at work. In contrast to a more legalistic framework, a person does not simply establish residency by buying property, paying taxes, or applying to a bureaucratic office for the necessary licenses or permits. An individual must be presented to a community and “located” in terms of his or her origins, intentions, and relationships with others. In the same vein, business relationships are never entirely neutral or anonymous. More often they take into account who the contracting partners are related to, what favors or debts may have been accrued in the past, and the future *social* implications of engaging in business with one party over another.

**C.2.b.** What this means in practical terms for people living in the region is that social networks are crucial to everything from employment opportunities to ritual initiations to individual identity. Actions of anthropological significance need to be understood not in terms of individual activities but as the mobilization of social networks. “People here,” writes the anthropologist Charles Piot, referring to West African societies generally, “do not ‘have’ relations; they ‘are’ relations.”<sup>11</sup> In the anthropological literature on West Africa, this is often described as a measure of “wealth in people.” The status of an individual in such contexts is measured by the number of people with whom one has

<sup>11</sup> Charles Piot, *Remotely Global: Village Modernity in West Africa*, p. 18. See also Michael Jackson, *Minima Ethnographica: Intersubjectivity and the Anthropological Project*, p. 3.

relations of dependence or for whom one acts as a patron.<sup>12</sup> A wide social network implies that one can accumulate resources quickly by calling for assistance on those with whom one is connected. It also implies that an individual can be reliably called upon by others in times of need and is able to supply the requested resources. In sum, the capacity to maintain a wide social network (a demonstrable "wealth in people") is the most reliable and acceptable mark of status.

**C.2.c.** For the matters of concern to the Special Court, one of the most relevant examples of the patronage system at work is the Mende understanding of "standing for" others in the community (to "stand for them" or "be for them," *numui lo va*). As the anthropologist Mariane Ferme writes in her ethnography of Mende social practices, "The crucial point, then, was that everyone must be accounted for by someone else – that everyone must be linked in a relationship of patronage or clientship."<sup>13</sup> The person who stands for someone else is responsible for overseeing his or her behavior within the community and providing for his or her basic needs. In other words, for acting as a patron. In return, the patron can expect the performance of favors, a share of any wealth that the dependent or client might accumulate, and a level of respect, support, and privilege. This patron-client relationship can be one of providing mutual security. People who, for whatever reason, do not have someone to stand for them, or who do not stand for others, are highly suspect. Strangers to a community, wealthy elites who are unwilling to assist dependents, young men who resist putting themselves in clientalistic relations to elders, or women who will not marry – all of these categories of person are considered dangerous because they do not fit into these all-important webs of relationships.

**C.2.d.** A common Mende expression exemplifies the importance placed on patronage. *Bi mbei a bi mbeilo?* can be translated in English as "Are you here on your own?" It is correctly answered in the negative. As Mariane Ferme puts it, "one is always 'for' someone else: one's host or landlord, one's husband, the local chief, all the way up to chiefdom and government authorities."<sup>14</sup>

**C.2.e.** The demands of patronage are especially pronounced among youth, who have not yet accumulated the resources to cultivate dependents of their own and are therefore especially dependent on those with whom they have clientalistic relations. I deal with this further in the next section, but for now it is worth quoting a point made by the anthropologist Paul Richards: "In a patrimonial polity, where clientalism is a major means through which intergenerational transfers of knowledge and assets are achieved, young people are always on the look out for new sources of patronage."<sup>15</sup> In other words, the patron is a central figure in the lives of Mende youth, and the individuals who act as patrons may change at any moment.

<sup>12</sup> See for example Caroline Bledsoe, *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society*; Mariane Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone*, p. 172.

<sup>13</sup> Mariane Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone*, p. 106.

<sup>14</sup> Mariane Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone*, p. 106. As Ferme notes in her book, this expression is a tongue twister that is used at least in part to establish the Mende language and cultural fluency of foreigners.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, p. 24.

### C. 3. A Crisis of Youth

**C.3.a.** There is wide consensus that understanding the war in Sierra Leone requires an analysis of the relationship between youth and their elders, the economy, and politics.<sup>16</sup> Some observers have gone so far as to label the war a “crisis of youth.” What this means is that much of the violence of this war was committed by young people at the margins of society and unable to participate fully in the political, economic, and social activities of contemporary Sierra Leone.

**C.3.b.** Youth is defined in Sierra Leone, as in much of Africa, in ambiguous terms. In 2003 the government of Sierra Leone set out a national youth policy which defined “youth” as male or female persons between the ages of 15 and 35 – though it also acknowledged that “this does not exclude any young Sierra Leonean liable to Youth related needs, concerns and influences.”<sup>17</sup> What this policy and its caveat reflects is a general understanding in Sierra Leone that youth is a sociological category that says more about one’s relationships to other members of the community than it does about one’s absolute chronological age.<sup>18</sup> In particular, “youth” are popularly understood as individuals who are the dependents of others and are without dependents of their own. In other words, they are more client than patron in the patronage networks that dominate daily life. Youth are unable for the most part to control or profit from the labors of others, and find themselves beholden to the demands of those above them in the hierarchy.

**C.3.c.** In periods of economic crisis such as have marked Sierra Leone since 1980s structural adjustment (and have grown more pronounced since the end of the Cold War), this means that youth are often subjected to impossible demands by those above them and are unable to accumulate the wealth needed to marry, establish businesses of their own, support children, or provide the loans to others that would help them build patronage networks of their own.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> This is true of both academic and non-academic observers. See, for just a few examples from both popular media and the academy. O. R. Gordon, “The Culture of Work (1)”, p. 2; Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*; Ibrahim Abdullah, “Bush Paths to Destruction: The Origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/ Sierra Leone”; David Keen, “Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths: The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone”; Ishmail Rashid, “Student Radicals, Lumpen Youth, and the Origin of Revolutionary Groups in Sierra Leone, 1977-1996.”

<sup>17</sup> The outline of the Sierra Leone government’s policy, and President Tejan Kabbah’s inaugurating statement, could be found as of June 28 2006 at <http://www.statehouse-sl.org/policies/youth.html>.

<sup>18</sup> Among many works which examine how youth is defined in West Africa in relative rather than absolute chronological terms, see William Murphy, “Secret Knowledge as Property and Power in Kpelle Society: Elders Versus Youth,”; Mats Utas, *Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War*.

<sup>19</sup> See for example Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*; Mats Utas, *Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War*; Achille Mbembe, “The Banality of Power and the Aesthetics of Violence”; Achille Mbembe and Janet Roitman, “The Figure of the Subject in Times of Crisis”.

**C.3.d.** Young people who find themselves in such a marginal position are more susceptible than most to two dynamics of relevance to the Special Court. First, they are more likely to see violence as an alternative means of accumulating the resources necessary for social advancement in a patrimonial system. Second, they are more likely to move from patron to patron when it appears advantageous in the short term to do so.

**C.3.e.** In regards to the first point, participation in the region's armed conflict represented for at least some combatants an opportunity denied by the social system in which they found themselves. This is not to say that the motives for all combatants were identical, regardless of personal history or the faction with which they participated. But even for those fighters who may have been coerced into joining one of the parties to the war, taking up arms promised some access to otherwise unavailable commodities, status, or security.<sup>20</sup>

**C.3.f.** As to the second point, Paul Richards has pointed out that when a patronage relationship works in its ideal form, it is a long term relationship that can weather temporary setbacks or failures.<sup>21</sup> Under the crisis conditions that have predominated in Sierra Leone even before the outbreak of war in 1991,<sup>22</sup> marginal youth may not be able to "weather the storm" of unproductive patronage relationships. They are more likely to seek out multiple patrons and to experiment with new kinds of patronage relationships and new kinds of patrons.<sup>23</sup>

#### **C.4. Meanings of childhood**

**C.4.a.** Related to the understandings of "youth" in Sierra Leone is the question of how childhood is defined. There is now an extensive literature suggesting that the line between these two categories – youth and child – is not universally absolute; rather it is culturally dependent and influenced by a number of social, political and economic factors.<sup>24</sup>

**C.4.b.** What the two terms have in common in Sierra Leone is that they are measured *socially* rather than *chronologically*. In other words, childhood cannot be said to begin at a fixed point in time and end at a specific age. Among many Mendes, for example (especially in rural areas), children move into a more adult status with initiation into one

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, p. 196; Human Rights Watch "Youth, Blood and Poverty: the Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors"; David Keen, "'Since I am a Dog, Beware My Fangs': Beyond a Rational Choice Framework in the Sierra Leonean War"; Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*; Mats Utas, *Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War*.

<sup>21</sup> Paul Richards, *Coping with Hunger: Hazard and Experiment in an African Rice-Farming System*.

<sup>22</sup> For more on how the war represented a continuation of the decline of fortunes for contemporary Sierra Leone see A.B. Zack-Williams, "Freetown: From the 'Athens of West Africa' to a City Under Siege: the Rise and Fall of Sub-Saharan First Municipality."

<sup>23</sup> For more on this point, see AbdouMaliq Simone, "The Visible and the Invisible: Remaking Cities in Africa."

<sup>24</sup> For further discussion on the politics and relativity of the youth/childhood division, see David Rosen, *Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism*, esp. Ch. 5; Mats Utas, *Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War*.

of the “secret societies” such as the Poro for men and Sande for women.<sup>25</sup> The chronological ages at which this might occur are approximate, and vary depending on the numbers of children available to be initiated, the agricultural calendar, the wealth of the families whose sons or daughters are to be initiated, etc. And as the anthropologist Doug Henry observed that during the Sierra Leone war, Poro initiations in war affected areas were often cancelled or delayed due to wartime dislocations and disruptions.<sup>26</sup>

**C.4.c.** Initiation as a moment of transition between life stages (as opposed to an absolute chronological point of transition) stems from a common West African understanding that individuals become adults by better understanding the rules, obligations, and roles that society expects from its members. Unlike the stereotypical Euro-American concept that a child is born “pure” and becomes corrupted or hardened by age, there is a common West African sense that children are potentially dangerous because they have not yet learned how to behave properly as members of a community.<sup>27</sup> It is the inculcation of this knowledge – of how to be a proper husband or wife, of how to cook, defend one’s property or village, properly perform rituals, etc. – that makes an individual not only an adult but a fully formed person. The upshot is that for many in the region, including most Mendes, the level of one’s social knowledge and participation in the rituals and events that mark the acquisition of that knowledge is of considerably more importance in determining one’s “age” than the number of years a person has lived.

### **C.5. The Politics of Naming**

**C.5.a.** As in many parts of Africa, names and nicknames play a significant social role for many Sierra Leonean Mendes. Names do not simply identify people, or distinguish one from another. Instead, they serve to construct certain relationships. They embody individual and collective histories, and they lay claim to hoped for futures.

**C.5.b.** Proper Mende names tend to be drawn from a relatively limited number of choices. These may be common Muslim names or they may relate to the circumstances of birth – the day of the week on which a child is born or whether it is the first surviving child to its mother.<sup>28</sup> Many children are given the name of a respected or important relative or community member, which establishes a special relationship with that person (*toma*, or namesake in Mende). As the anthropologist Mariane Ferme puts it, “These

<sup>25</sup> This has been described in some detail by Kenneth Little, *The Mende of Sierra Leone: A West African People in Transition*. For a relevant in-depth analysis elsewhere in West Africa, see Simon Ottenberg, *Boyhood Rituals in an African Society*.

<sup>26</sup> Doug Henry, “Embodied Violence: War and Relief Along the Sierra Leone Border.”

<sup>27</sup> For an extended discussion, see Charles Piot, *Remotely Global: Village Modernity in West Africa*, esp. Ch. 4. For a case study from Sierra Leone, see Caroline Bledsoe, “‘No Success Without Struggle’: Social Mobility and Hardship for Foster Children in Sierra Leone.”

<sup>28</sup> Mende naming practices are further described by Mariane Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone*, pgs. 202-209; W.T. Harris and Harry Sawyerr, *The Springs of Mende Belief and Conduct*; Kenneth Little, *The Mende of Sierra Leone: A West African People in Transition*, pgs. 113-115.

discursive practices transform children into potential instantiations of those after whom they are named...<sup>29</sup>

**C.5.c.** The important point is that names are not neutral markers of identity. They can and often do express an aspiration. Naming a child after an important person has the effect of linking those individuals together. This is, as Ferme notes, "a fact that carries consequences for both namesakes."<sup>30</sup> One of those consequences is that granting a specific name is one way to shape an individual's future by invoking the "trajectory" of the previous life and its accomplishments.

**C.5.d.** The same logic can hold true for nicknames. Nicknames are bestowed for many reasons, and any given individual will often have many of them. Nicknames, even more than proper given names, distinguish an individual and say something about him or her and the relationship between those who use nicknames and those who are called by them. Some nicknames are in general circulation, others are reserved for a specific set of relations – for example, those who were initiated together into Poro or Sande or who went to school with one another. Nicknames are significant as a way to distinguish individuals, but they are also significant because they may suggest events in which the individual has participated, traits they are thought to possess, or a future course which they hope to or are predicted to follow. The enduring use of these nicknames is a way of continuously invoking the past and locating the bearer of the name vis-à-vis other people in the community and their shared history.

## **C.6. The "Localization" of Conflicts in Africa**

**C.6.a.** All wars are "local." What this means is that any incidence of communal violence, even at the national or supra-national level, consists of activities that are driven by individual interests which may be tangentially or not at all related to what the war is "about."<sup>31</sup> Thus, an on-going war may be characterized by business rivals denouncing one another as rebel collaborators solely because of a previous financial disagreement; neighbors in conflict over farmland ownership may resort to violence during a civil war when in peacetime they might have settled disputes through the courts or through mediation; rivals for town political office might encourage their supporters to employ violence to weaken their opponents so that when peace is restored they will be unable to run in the next elections. This agglomeration of competing agendas is part of what is invoked by the term "the fog of war." There is simply no way in which anyone can understand all of the individual dynamics in any given conflict because a war is always

<sup>29</sup> Mariane Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone*, p. 198.

<sup>30</sup> Mariane Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone*, p. 198.

<sup>31</sup> For only a selection of the vast literature on this topic, see for example Cynthia Enloe, "All the Men Are in the Militias, All the Women Are Victims: The Politics of Masculinity and Femininity in Nationalist Wars"; Stathis Kalyvas, "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars"; David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence"; Carolyn Nordstrom, *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century*; Scott Straus, "Order in Disorder: A Micro-Perspective on Violence in Rwanda"; Tom Young, "The MNR/RENAMO: External and Internal Dynamics."



an opportunity for individuals to pursue their own agendas by means unavailable to them in peacetime.

C.6.b. This phenomenon – the “localization” of war - is especially pronounced in this region of Africa. There are a number of reasons for this. For one thing, national identity is not of paramount importance for most people, especially outside of the capital city. The nation, as the theorist Benedict Anderson puts it, is an “imagined community.”<sup>32</sup> Individual citizens must be able to picture themselves as part of a collective, with a vested interest in the activities and fates of others within that national community. In the United States, for example, national television news and newspaper coverage help to create the sense that events of importance in California are relevant to citizens of New York. Individuals tend to identify themselves as “American” more powerfully than they identify themselves according to state, city, or county. This national identification is inseparable from the way US citizens understand class (social advancement is talked about in terms of “achieving the American Dream”) and even race (as witnessed by the prevalence of the term “African American” to describe peoples of African descent). As a consequence, when the US goes to war, there is a sense that the entirety of the country is at war. This is not, in fact, the case (the burdens of fighting are borne disproportionately by some economic and ethnic groups) but within the social imaginary, the national collective is involved and affected by the on-going conflict.

C.6.c. In many parts of Africa, and particularly in this region of West Africa, most people do not privilege *national* identity in this way. Certainly it was widely recognized by early African independence leaders that building a sense of national identity was the most important key to the success of their new nations. For example, by Liberian president William Tubman made a concerted effort to bridge the divide between Americo-Liberian elites in Monrovia and the “native” peoples of the interior. Yet these efforts were only partially successful. In Sierra Leone, for many Sierra Leoneans (again, especially outside of the capital) being “Sierra Leonean” is of less importance to their own identity and imagined destiny than being Mende or Temne, being from a ruling or a “slave” family, or being from Bo town or Pujehun District. While all Sierra Leoneans are impacted by the activities of the central government in Freetown, they are (and more importantly understand themselves to be) much more impacted by local chiefdom politics or the relations between regional traders.

C.6.d. The chieftancy system in Sierra Leone also concentrates a great deal of power at the local level. The result is often bitter, violent feuds between individuals, families, and even villages over ascendancy to local office. These political contests tend to preoccupy people outside the capital more than do national campaigns.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, they have a much greater impact on the average person’s daily life.

<sup>32</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.

<sup>33</sup> This has been traced in important ways by Richard Fanthorpe, “Locating the Politics of a Sierra Leonean Chiefdom”; Richard Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone”; and Mariane Ferme, “Staging Politics: The Dailogics of Publicity and Secrecy in Sierra Leone”; Mariane Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone*.

C.6.e. One consequence is that when wars do break out, even at the national level, these more localized dynamics are at least as significant as what the war is ostensibly about or means for the nation as a whole. As the anthropologist Paul Richards points out in his writing on the RUF, the literature on African warfare which analyzes the ways in which "rural insurgencies [tend to be] taken over and reformulated 'from below'"<sup>34</sup> is useful for understanding some of the dynamics of the Sierra Leone conflict. One former kamajor summed it up this way: "African war – it is full of jealousy, hatred. If my father and your father have confusion before [if they had a disagreement], then I'm a rebel. I will rebel on you."<sup>35</sup>

C.6.f. Though I return to this example in the analysis section which follows, there is a striking dynamic from the war in Sierra Leone which illustrates the regional, or sub-national experience of the war. For the first years of the war in Sierra Leone, residents of the capital were largely unaware of events in the countryside. This was a consequence of the poor level of infrastructure and the limited reach of the news media, but it reflects the fact that most Sierra Leoneans outside of the actual conflict area did not feel that the war had a direct impact on them. It was not of *national* concern. Conversely, the AFRC/RUF junta period and the January 6 1999 invasion of Freetown are often described as the most horrific period of the war. But in parts of rural Sierra Leone these events did not register as national tragedies in the same way.<sup>36</sup>

### C.7. Literacy and the Power of Inscription

C.7.a. Literacy and a person's ability to "know book" has been a powerful determinant of social standing in Sierra Leone – and particularly among Mendes – since the colonial period. Under British colonial rule, the education system was designed to train native bureaucrats to perform government functions. Those who completed the education system and secured civil service jobs or positions in business administration were among the best rewarded members of society and quickly rose to elite status. An enduring valorization of literacy and education is therefore one of the legacies of British colonial administration. As Kenneth Little reported in his World War II era ethnography of the Mende, "the meaning of 'civilized'...varies according to whether he [a Mende individual] is literate or not."<sup>37</sup> There remains today a great deal of respect accorded to literacy and advanced education. The ability to read and write is one source of authority, especially in rural areas, because literate peoples can maintain and understand important records such as government documents or business contracts. Unlike illiterate or unschooled individuals they can communicate directly with those far away through letters, and they have the capacity to expand their knowledge through books and other

<sup>34</sup> Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, p. 22.

<sup>35</sup> Author interview, 13 April 2006. Bo, Sierra Leone.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Norimitsu Onishi, "Banana Island Journal: Lovely Spot, Ripe for Toursits! About that War..."

<sup>37</sup> Kenneth Little, *The Mende of Sierra Leone: A West African People in Transition*, p. 262.

print media.<sup>38</sup> In the popular imaginary, one of the things that distinguishes rural peoples from elites in the capital city is access to education and the power to read and write.

**C.7.b.** The importance of access to education, and the impossibility of advancing into elite status without it, is underscored by the reaction to a speech by President Momoh in which he stated that education in Sierra Leone is a privilege and not a right. RUF leaders later claimed that this was one of the catalysts for violence.<sup>39</sup> As the academic and journalist Lansana Gberie notes, literacy was the principal reason behind the rapid rise within the RUF ranks of Gibril Massaquoi, one of that organization's key figures.<sup>40</sup> Though illiterate individuals did rise to prominence within the CDF, their positions were often precarious and their lack of education could be a constant source of tension and ridicule. For example, two of the most important initiators in the CDF, Allieu Kondewa and Madam Munda Fortune were both widely known to be illiterate. By the time of the disarmament proceedings at Bo in late 2001, both had been marginalized within the movement; Kondewa was replaced as High Priest by Kemo Lahai Bangura and Mama Munda had been denied leadership of the CDF Wives, Widows, and Orphans Association. In both cases the reason given by Kondewa, Fortune and their followers was that they had been outmaneuvered by better educated elites based in Freetown. In particular their inability to read important documents meant that they could not maintain the authority required for leadership positions. Because of the power presumed to lie in written records, they could not be taken seriously as administrators without the ability to read and understand official documentation.

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<sup>38</sup> See William Murphy, "The Rhetorical Management of Dangerous Knowledge in Kpelle Brokerage"; Paul Richards, *Coping with Hunger: Hazard and Experiment in an African Rice-Farming System*, p. 53.

<sup>39</sup> See, for example, the RUF publication *Footpaths to Democracy*. Available as of June 29 2006 at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html>. For more on this point, see Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*.

<sup>40</sup> Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, p. 194.

**Part D:**  
**Analysis & Implications for the CDF**

**D. 1.** Having laid out a number of relevant factors of anthropological significance, I turn now to an analysis of the CDF structure and function in light of those factors. I do so in an effort to shed light on the two questions which frame this report: Were there factors of anthropological significance which shaped the structure and function of the Civil Defense Forces of Sierra Leone? What bearing might these anthropological factors have on areas of particular interest to the Special Court?

**D. 2. Kamajors as defenders of the homeland**

**D.2.a.** It was evident early in the war that in many parts of Sierra Leone the government's armed forces were unwilling and/or unable to protect rural villages. The colloquialism "sobel" (soldier/rebel) makes reference to the blurred line many Sierra Leoneans encountered between those whose role was to protect them and the enemy attacking them.<sup>41</sup> This was especially pronounced in the Mende dominant southeast, much of which was both geographically and politically distant from the capital and the seat of government and military power.

**D.2.b.** The NPRC government began the practice of utilizing local hunters as guides and scouts to assist in fighting the RUF. Though this began with the Kuranko tamaboros in the north, the practice quickly spread to the Mende southeast with the assistance of the NPRC, particularly Secretary of State East Lieutenant Tom Nyuma.

**D.2.c.** It is important to bear in mind that this mobilization of kamajors did not have an exclusively military logic. The kamajors' very identity is predicated on the protection of villages. As the war proceeded and the relationship between these irregulars and the state military deteriorated, the kamajors were a logical focal point around which rural communities could organize their own defense. As I described in Parts C1.b-d above, kamajors were authorized to carry weapons and they were entrusted with the defense of the village against threats of the forest. In the early days of the war the RUF was often spoken of in terms used to describe threatening, sometimes non-human forces from the forest.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> The "sobel" phenomenon has been discussed in the Special Court transcripts, such as in the testimony of Samuel Hinga Norman, 26 January 2006, p. 88, lines 2-16. In addition, it is referenced in a number of scholarly works, including Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Paths to Destruction: The Origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/ Sierra Leone"; Arthur Abraham, "War and Transition to Peace: A Study of State Conspiracy in Perpetuating Armed Conflict"; Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*; A.B. Zack-Williams, "Kamajors, 'Sobel,' & Militarism: Civil Society and the Return of the Military in Sierra Leonean Politics."

<sup>42</sup> See Doug Henry, "Embodied Violence: War and Relief Along the Sierra Leone Border," p. 35.

**D.2.d.** As the mobilization of armed combatants became more widespread in Kenema, Kailahun and Pujehun (through such early efforts as the Eastern Regional Defence Committee, established by Dr. Alpha Lavalie in Kenema in 1992<sup>43</sup>), some of the key figures around which these mobilizations developed were men with knowledge of the bush and knowledge of firearms. These were men whose very position in society was defined by exactly this kind of responsibility – in other words, the kamajoisia.

**D.2.e.** It is certainly true that by the period covered in the Special Court indictments the majority of combatants who made up the kamajor segment of the Civil Defense Forces had not been kamajors/hunters prior to the start of the war. What's more, the sodality which that term described had fundamentally shifted: from a loose collection of individuals educated through apprenticeship to a "society" entered through initiation. However, their use of the term "kamajor" was significant. It carried with it the same connotations of community defense, entitlement to carry firearms, and the possession of secret "medicines" (*hale*) that was embodied in the pre-war use of the term. This continuity of terms also signifies the continued importance of local chiefs to the kamajors' understanding of themselves. In other words, they retained the sense that the chiefs were the ultimate authorities to which a true kamajor was beholden, and that community defense was the kamajors' principle responsibility. This is not to say that kamajors did not also intend to benefit personally from their initiation into the movement. Yet it is not contradictory to say that they simultaneously maintained their own sense of defending the community. This is expressed in part in the common kamajor slogan *kamajor baa woteh*. "Do not turn" or "do not turn back" was an injunction against retreat from the battlefield, but it was also a moral command not to betray the community one had been initiated to defend. The implicit contrast here was to the sobels – those who had been charged with defending the community but had instead allied themselves with its enemies for personal gain. In war songs, battlefield chants, and ritual settings, *kamajor baa woteh* was repeated as a way to express to themselves and to others that one of the "laws" of the society was that a kamajor's responsibility to the community remained central to his identity.

**D.2.f.** Because the war also disrupted Poro initiations in many areas occupied by Mendes, kamajor initiation also became synonymous with the responsibilities of adult manhood. (I discuss this further below, in Part D.8.c). In other words, it was not simply an occupational responsibility that a kamajor defend his community. Rather, it came to define what it meant to be a Mende man, especially in rural areas. It was not uncommon during the war years to hear kamajors claim that any Mende male who did not join the "society" was just like a woman or a child – he had failed to live up to a masculine ideal.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> For more on Eredcom, see Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, p. 83; Doug Henry, "Embodied Violence: War and Relief Along the Sierra Leone Border" p. 38. Eredcom is also sometimes referred to in the literature as ERDC or ERECOM.

<sup>44</sup> As with any social ideal type, there are always exceptions. Certainly many Mende men did not join the kamajors and were not automatically classified socially as women or children. When asked about these instances, however, informants could always cite extenuating circumstances: the individual in question was training for the Priesthood, was a student, had health problems, or was doing "other tasks." Again, this is a

**D.2.g.** In sum, participation in the kamajor movement (and later the CDF) fit into a sociological category which existed prior to the war. Even if the exact form which the militia eventually took did not resemble the pre-war meaning of a kamajor, the “function” of a war-time kamajor was understood within a logical framework. This suggests that the kamajor segment of the CDF was a qualitatively different form of organization than the RUF, the AFRC, ECOMOG or the SLA. Unlike those factions, kamajors operated according to a much wider, older, and non-military social logic.

**D.3. The Meaning of “Commander”**

**D.3.a.** One of the most commented on dynamics within the CDF in terms of its supposed “military” organization is the overwhelming number of “commanders” – and its concomitant paucity of privates or non-officer ranks. As Col. Richard Iron puts it, within the CDF “[t]here was no established rank system, although it was clear that there was a hierarchy of seniority...”<sup>45</sup> Although individuals claimed the title of “battalion commander,” “company commander,” or “platoon commander,” these titles were not used systematically and did not automatically correspond to a list of duties or a fixed number of subordinate personnel. More often than not they were issued as rewards. Changes in rank did not necessarily signify a change in command.

**D.3.b.** This suggests more than simply that the CDF “was just not a very good [military organization].”<sup>46</sup> It illustrates, rather, that the hierarchy of the CDF functioned according to a different system, one rooted in local understandings of patronage and responsibility.

**D.4.c.** As I have outlined above in Part C2, patronage networks are fundamental throughout the region for all manner of communal activity. All relationships are shot through with questions of patronage and client dynamics. This was no less true for the CDF than it is for any Sierra Leonean, and was no less true during the war than it was before or has been after.

**D.4.d.** The implications for understanding the meaning of the term commander and the dynamics of command are that these relationships should be seen as relationships of patronage rather than of strict military protocol. A former kamajor put the relationship in explicitly patrimonial terms by drawing a familial connection between commanders and their dependents: “The same way I give [orders] to my son, I can give them to [his fighters].”<sup>47</sup>

**D.4.e.** The implication here is that the various titles of command did not correspond to a specified list of duties. In other words, unlike in (for example) the British military, the

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sociological norm: no claim any community makes about itself is ever 100% accurate. But the exceptions tended to be ones which, as the saying goes, went to prove the rule.  
<sup>45</sup> Col. Richard Iron, “Military Expert Witness Report on the Civil Defense Force of Sierra Leone,” p. C-4, Part C3.3.  
<sup>46</sup> Col. Richard Iron, “Military Expert Witness Report on the Civil Defense Force of Sierra Leone,” p. E-9, Part E6.2.  
<sup>47</sup> Author interview, 13 April 2006. Bo, Sierra Leone.

title of "Adjutant" or "Platoon Commander" did not imply a fixed set of responsibilities or spheres of command. Rather, it implied that the individual bearing that title was a patron with client/dependents.

**D.4.f.** As a patron, a "commander" would be responsible for his "clients" in ways not defined by military necessity or protocol. In addition to food, shelter, weapons and ammunition, a patron/commander would be a resource in family emergencies or as an arbiter for disputes among equals. He would be expected to "stand for" those beneath him in cases where allegations were made by local authorities or others within the movement. In return, a patron/commander's dependents would be expected to offer security for the "big man," share a portion of whatever wealth they might accumulate and tend to his needs as necessary. This network of relations extended up and down the movement; at the lowest levels a local commander might have only a handful of subordinate/clients, and in turn was beholden to those above him with much larger networks. Networks of patronage are often referred to in the academic literature as complicated "webs" of relationships, in opposition to strictly linear and well defined "chains" that characterize bureaucratic or military organizations.

**D.4.g.** The multiple layers of these relations are exemplified by the common usage of the term "bodyguard." Important figures within the movement often had varying numbers of "bodyguards," whose role was not only that of a security detail but included performing labor on the patron's behalf and serving in some cases as personal assistants. The patron would in turn be responsible for meeting the basic needs of his (or sometimes her) "bodyguards."

**D.4.h.** These relationships could be quite fluid. Patrons who found they could not meet the demands of those beneath them were subject to losing their dependents to other patron/commanders who could more successfully allocate resources when necessary. Those dependent/clients who might, for example, attempt to secret away cash or commodities from their patrons could expect to be punished or cut loose if detected. This system was not functionally different from the way patronage operates in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in the region during any other period, though it might have worked in a more extreme form in the CDF because of the exigencies and stresses of wartime. In sum, a "commander" is someone able to provide for those beneath him.

**D.4.i.** There are two very simple illustrations of the primacy of patronage over military command. First is the fact that so many "commanders" within the CDF had no military experience whatsoever, but had been important or respected community members prior to the war. Their patron status, and their networks of dependence (their "wealth in people") simply continued from peacetime into wartime. This was certainly the case with the majority of members of the Base Zero War Council, few if any of whom had a military background. In his testimony before the Court, for example, Samuel Hinga Norman notes that Alhaji Daramy Rogers "could be a useful member [of the War Council] at Base Zero" because he was "an Alhaji and a politician."<sup>48</sup> In the same vein, Brima Jolu Kenneh Sei in Panguma, one of the key figures in efforts to retake Tongo during the junta

<sup>48</sup> Testimony of Samuel Hinga Norman, 30 January 2006, p. 55, line 29 and p. 56, line 1.

period. was voted a “commander” by the chiefs and town council because he was section chief of one of Panguma’s seven sections and therefore considered an “upstanding citizen.” Prior to this, he had no military background or training. This was also true of Moinina Fofana, who had no previous military experience but had achieved a degree of status as a local businessman and benefactor for internally displaced persons. This was reflected in the description of Fofana as a “Chief Kamajor” after 1995, when he assisted in the supply of food to refugees and combatants. (“Chief Kamajor” was an honorific title sometimes given to Paramount Chiefs and other important persons;<sup>49</sup> it connoted no specific duties or responsibilities and was not used systematically). This overlap of non-military and military command structures was important in part because combatants needed the support of the local hierarchies to function; local authorities needed to give permission to operate, provide basic logistic support and intelligence, housing, etc.<sup>50</sup> This liaison role was best performed by individuals with a pre-established role as interlocutors with the local hierarchy.

**D.4.j.** A second point which illustrates the primacy of patronage over military command was the relative frequency with which captured RUF combatants were integrated into the CDF and established long term, trusting ties with their new CDF commanders. A large number of CDF fighters<sup>51</sup> were former RUF combatants who switched sides, either voluntarily or when captured by the CDF. To be accepted within the CDF, a former RUF fighter required someone to “stand for” him – to vouch for him as a person worthy of joining the society and as someone for whom the new patron would be responsible. Describing a situation in which he “stood for” a captured RUF combatant, one former kamajor from Bo described how to this day the captured individual comes to visit him and pays him respect as a social elder: “He is always my boy. He’s just like my junior brother now. After I did that for him, his family took me to be part of them.”<sup>52</sup>

**D.4.k.** The upshot of the primacy of the patronage network is that for most combatants, the person of most import was their immediate patron, rather than persons who might be of superior “rank” but to whom they had little if any direct contact.

**D.4.l.** This understanding of the importance of the patronage system nevertheless leaves two questions unanswered: if “commander” does not connote a strict military organization, what does the assignation of various titles imply and why were military terms (or terms that sounded like military terms) used at all?

**D.4.m.** As indicated, the titles given to individuals within the organization did not necessarily correspond to a specific set of duties. There were no fixed definitions attached to specific ranks which codified the duties, obligations or spheres of command

<sup>49</sup> For example, Defense witness Ishmael Koroma notes that a local businessman in Blama was a “Kamasoi chief.” See testimony from 23 February 2006, p. 43, lines 5-10.

<sup>50</sup> Defense witness Ishmael Koroma speaks to this multi-faceted liaison role in his Special Court testimony of 23 February 2006, esp. p. 32, lines 14-20.

<sup>51</sup> There is no way to establish exact numbers, but in the course of my own research I have encountered enough such stories to verify that it was a frequent occurrence. This pattern of RUF fighters joining the CDF has been noted widely in the literature on the war.

<sup>52</sup> Author interview, 13 April 2006. Bo, Sierra Leone.



for specific positions. Terms like “adjutant,” “platoon commander,” “battalion commander,” etc. could mean different things in different parts of the organization or at different times in its history. Most important, it could mean different things based on who held the position. This is exactly the opposite of how such titles work in a strictly military organization, where rank implies fixed roles regardless of the individuals who fill them. To be sure, there were individuals in the CDF with some military training and a desire to see the organization use a rank system more in keeping with an actual army. Those groups of combatants working closely with ECOMOG or made up of ULIMO veterans tended to take the role of rank titles more seriously, though even there the application of a rank system was piecemeal and largely unrecognizable in purely military terms. Rather, the majority understood the use of these titles as a way to “map” patronage networks.

**D.4.n.** In other words, what these CDF “rank” titles indicated was not a fixed set of duties or a chain of command but a person’s status relative to those around him. Titles were awarded to individuals as a way of rewarding them or of verifying that they were “standing for” others. Claiming or being given a title signified to others that one was a person of importance – it did not, however, explain what that importance was or what duties that person was therefore obligated to perform. More elevated sounding titles simply implied that one’s patronage network (one’s “wealth in people” or the number of dependents) was wider than someone whose title implied a lower rank. A “battalion” or “garrison” commander is clearly a person of more important status than a “unit” commander, giving the terms meaning relative to one another but not in terms of absolutely defined duties or spheres of command.

**D.4.o.** In the same vein, the CDF employed terms that clearly implied importance for the office holder but do not correspond to other military organizations. For example, the “National Coordinator,” “High Priest” and “Director of War” are clearly impressive titles, but have no corollary in a professional army. It is therefore hard to say what official military duties a person with such a rank would be expected to fulfill.

**D.4.p.** I take as exemplary the use of the term “adjutant.” This was a relatively common title that Eddie Massalley, a commander in Pujehun, in particular gave to combatants with a small number of client/dependents and to individuals who could read and write and were therefore useful organizers. “Adjutant” is indeed a rank in a number of professional militaries, with various duties depending on the service in question. Yet when asked what duties an adjutant was intended to perform, one of Massalley’s former “adjutants” said he had no idea what the term meant or what duties it implied. Massalley, he said, used to give out titles liberally and named a number of combatants as his “adjutants.” Nevertheless, because Massalley had given it to him it became a nickname by which everyone at Bo Waterside knew him.<sup>53</sup>

**D.4.q.** The second question to be explored is why these particular terms were used at all, if their only function was to establish networks of patronage that were more social than

<sup>53</sup> Author interview, 15 April 2006, Kenema, Sierra Leone.

military? Why not, for example, use such terms as *nu wai* or *kpako* ("big person") -- Mende terms that already imply hierarchy and patron relationships?

**D.4.r.** This is a complex question that points toward a number of responses. Although the CDF was not a military organization per se, certainly there were those in the organization who attempted to make it one or thought of it (incorrectly) in those terms. The use of military terminology is therefore not surprising, even if it is unreflective of the reality of the movement.

**D.4.s.** More important is the fact that these titles are in English rather than in Mende or any of the other languages of Sierra Leone. This is significant for two reasons. First, one of the consequences of Sierra Leone's colonial history is that English terms still carry for many people, particularly in rural areas, an air of power and sophistication. English is the language of government and authority, and English titles confer an extra connotation of authority on their bearers.<sup>54</sup>

**D.4.t.** Second, the fact that these titles did not correspond to designated community roles and did not imply for most people a fixed set of responsibilities also made them subject to manipulation. Some combatants referred to "419" claims (after the Nigerian internet banking schemes), a process whereby combatants would claim a certain rank or title for themselves in the hopes that someone would take them seriously and follow them. In other words, in keeping with the conventions regarding names outlined in Part C.5 above, titles were often used to express an aspiration rather than an actual rank. One of the most notorious "generals" in the Bo area, a former Special Security Division officer under the APC, was widely said to have nominated himself to be a CDF general. (Prosecution witness Albert Nallo makes this point in his Special Court testimony).<sup>55</sup> His "rank" became a reality because no one dared challenge him and he was able to cultivate client/dependents by spreading around the resources he accumulated during the war.

**D.4.u.** For the matters under consideration by the Special Court in the case of Moinina Fofana, this calls into question the use of the term "Director of War" in two ways. First, unlike a professional European army, titles such as this do not come with a specific and codified set of responsibilities, duties or privileges. They refer more to a person's social standing and patronage position than they do to that person's military rank. The title came into use at Base Zero when Fofana was tasked with food distribution, clearly a critical administrative job given the chronic shortages of provisions at Talia.<sup>56</sup> Second, the use of the English term further suggests a lack of fixed comprehensible meaning for most combatants. The term "Director of War" clearly signifies a person of some

<sup>54</sup> Witness the level of disdain engendered by Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma's announcement of the 1997 AFRC coup. Koroma made his declaration of a new government in Krio rather than English, which, as Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana point out, showed his lack of sophistication and qualification for leadership. See Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat." For more on the relationship between rural peoples and the "language" of bureaucracy, see Mariane Ferme, "The Violence of Numbers: Consensus, Competition, and the Negotiation of Disputes in Sierra Leone."

<sup>55</sup> See testimony of Albert Nallo, Prosecution witness TF2-014, 10 March 2005, pgs. 62-64

<sup>56</sup> This is a point made by Col. Richard Iron in the "Military Expert Report," p. C-5, Part C4.2.

importance, but does not specify why. Fofana was referred to most often by combatants simply as "Director," a nickname that would imply respect but would mean nothing to most combatants. What's more, that generic term was used for a number of other individuals, including the various regional Directors of Operation.

**D.4.v.** As detailed in Part C.7 above, the question of literacy is intimately connected to that of CDF leadership. Clearly not all battlefield commanders were literate. As Col. Iron notes, oral communication could be used to ferry messages between locations if necessary. But those with administrative roles placed considerable stock in their education as a justification for leadership and as a tool to maintain power. Records of rice, weapons, and ammunition sent from ECOMOG in Liberia, from Conakry, Base Zero and later Freetown were critical documents and those who knew what supplies were available and where they had gone wielded enormous influence. ECOMOG commanders operating out of Base One,<sup>57</sup> for example, often made local commanders sign for weapons given to their men and account for them in writing when operations were completed. Those who had no access to those documents or who could not read them were in a demonstrably weaker position. In Moinina Fofana's case, his illiteracy was for some a source of ridicule. The term "Director" was sometimes used ironically or in a derogatory manner to underscore the absurdity of someone without education serving in an administrative leadership role.

#### **D.5. From Chiefdom Control to Decentralization**

**D.5.a.** In his "Military Expert" report, Col. Richard Iron describes the trajectory of the CDF. He claims that the movement went from one of tight, local territorial control to a more centralized, military command structure. In his report and in his testimony, Col. Iron implies that over time the chiefs' control eroded, which generated a kind of vacuum which needed to be filled by a military authority.<sup>58</sup>

**D.5.b.** While it is true that the organization changed over time, and greatly expanded in number, this analysis misrepresents both "phases" described by Col. Iron. In fact, the control of chiefs was never entirely dependent on their presence in their "home" territory. In both the historical accounts of the mobilization of the kamajors, and in other testimonies presented before the Court, it is clear that the control of local chiefs was not dependent on them being resident in their "traditional areas." In his early account of the kamajors, for example, Patrick Muana writes that the self-defense militias were organized in "squalid refugee camps situated around the safe urban enclaves of Bo, Kenema and Makeni."<sup>59</sup> A similar point is made by the anthropologist Doug Henry in describing the

<sup>57</sup> Base One refers to Bo Waterside and Jendema on the Liberia border. I discuss this term further in Part D.7 below.

<sup>58</sup> See, for example, the following from his 14 June 2005 testimony (p. 31, lines 22-28): "After the coup, they were driven from many of their traditional areas: the chiefdom structure of the CDF broke down; they were under attack from the AFRC and RUF, who, at this stage, were much stronger than the CDF. So the CDF leadership recognized that they must first preserve their organization and then build up strength so as then subsequently [sic] to counterattack against junta forces."

<sup>59</sup> Patrick Muana, "The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency," p. 78.

origins of the kamajors around Kenema, and by the interviews Krijn Peters and Paul Richards conducted with ex-combatants.<sup>60</sup> In his Special Court testimony, the Prosecution witness Albert Nallo verifies this point:

“Q. Mr. Witness, in your evidence-in-chief you said that each chiefdom to the south, so far as you knew, they had their own local hunters. Is that correct? Each chiefdom had local hunters?”

A. Yes, My Lord. That does not necessarily mean you will be initiated in your chiefdom. You were born in Moyamba and your Paramount Chief was in Bo, you were initiated in Bo because the people were coming from afar [were dislocated].”<sup>61</sup>

In short, there was never a time when “local” [i.e. chiefdom] control over the kamajors broke down as a result of being displaced from their territories of control. In many, if not most cases, recruitment into the kamajors occurred while the chiefs and combatants were already displaced. There was therefore no “vacuum” that needed to be filled with a centralized military structure.

**D.5.c.** This is not to say that the organization did not grow and change over time. It did. In many ways individual CDF combatants became more “professionalized” as they received better weapons, more combat experience, and occasional training from ECOMOG or fellow combatants with military experience. At the same time, however, the organization actually became *less* centralized rather than more. As I explain in Part D.7 below, the involvement of the Special Forces at Base One and other Liberia War veterans expanded the number and impact of CDF forces, but these were forces that were not necessarily answerable to the CDF leadership or anyone at Base Zero. What’s more, as young commanders began to establish themselves and develop patronage networks of their own, they did tend to break away from the elders who were their former patrons. But this did not mean that they turned to the leadership at Talia (Base Zero) for anything more than logistic support. Instead, they tended to operate independently in an effort to establish their own spheres of influence, a point illustrated in the next section.

#### **D.6. Localization**

**D.6.a.** As outlined in Part C.6 above, it would be most accurate to think of the war in Sierra Leone as the conglomerate of many more localized conflicts. Obviously this is true to some extent of any war – a war is comprised of individual battles. However, this localization is especially pronounced in conflicts in Africa and certainly in the fighting which has occurred in the Mano River region. What this means is that most Sierra Leoneans thought of the war in terms of local political, social, and economic (rather than national) concerns.

<sup>60</sup> See Doug Henry, “Embodied Violence: War and Relief Along the Sierra Leone Border”; Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, “‘Why We Fight’: Voices of Young Combatants in Sierra Leone’s Civil War.”

<sup>61</sup> Testimony of Albert Nallo, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 March 2005, p. 50, lines 13-18. See also testimony of Defense witness Ishmael Koroma, 22 February 2006, p. 24-34, 38.

**D.6.b.** I have already mentioned one of the most striking examples of this localization of the war: the fact that so few people in Freetown were unaware of the fighting until the war had almost reached the capital itself. Those who were aware of the conflict tended to think it was an extension of earlier, regional political schisms which had turned violent.

**D.6.c.** Illustrative of this point is the Ndogboyosoi rebellion which occurred in the Mende dominant southeast. The Ndogboyosoi rebellion was a series of mid-1980s conflicts between APC and SLPP strongmen in the Pujehun District, motivated both by party politics and (allegedly) control over trade routes.<sup>62</sup> The RUF found some initial support in the Pujehun region by exploiting the factionalism and resentment still associated with Ndogboyosoi. This led many people in the region, both combatants and observers, to conclude that the RUF invasion was simply an extension of the Ndogboyosoi conflict. In an excerpt from an interview with a combatant who joined ULIMO in 1992 to fight the RUF on the Liberian border in Pujehun, Paul Richards records the following relevant exchange:

Question: "Why did lots of Pujehun people join the war?"

Answer: "The earlier Ndogboyosoi War made them join."

Question: "Why?"

Answer: "Because lots of people were killed, and the others were unhappy. This way they could gain revenge on their enemies."<sup>63</sup>

As Lansana Gberie has pointed out, even the Chief of Staff of the Sierra Leone Army declared in 1993 that the RUF invasion was an extension of Ndogboyosoi.<sup>64</sup>

**D.6.d.** A similar, though even more "local" illustration was mentioned by a number of the author's informants in regards to the fighting in and around Bo. The home of Kenneth Koker, an important kamajor commander in the Kakua Chiefdom<sup>65</sup> was burned during the fighting in Bo. A former SLA soldier, also from Bo, is widely thought to be responsible for the arson. Though Koker's was only one of a number of kamajor houses burned while the junta controlled the town, witnesses described this particular incident as one of jealousy: Koker's family is from a southern ruling house, a source of tension between the two men when they were growing up together. The SLA officer had also initially attempted to recruit Koker into the SLA, and bore a grudge when Koker refused.

<sup>62</sup> Ndogboyosoi is a Mende "bush devil" (see Anthony Gittins, *Mende Religion: Aspects of Belief and Thought in Sierra Leone*). Alternative spellings include "ndorgborwusui" and "ndorbgowusui." The Ndogboyosoi affair and other local conflicts are described in greater detail in Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, p. 66; Jimmy Kandeh, "Ransoming the State: Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror in Sierra Leone," p. 360; David Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*, p. 18; John Massaquoi and Francis Fortune, "Grassroots Peacebuilding in Pujehun," and Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, p. 22.

<sup>63</sup> Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, p. 91.

<sup>64</sup> See Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, p. 66.

<sup>65</sup> Koker carried, among other titles, the rank of "Garrison Commander."

**D.6.e.** In other cases individuals saw the outbreak of war as an opportunity to profiteer in ways that would be illegal under peacetime conditions.<sup>66</sup> The literature on the conflict in Sierra Leone highlights the extent to which non-combatant civilians as well as combatants engaged in looting or violent banditry, sometimes by imitating members of one faction or another.<sup>67</sup>

**D.6.f.** For many youth, the war offered a way to bypass the existing pathways by which one established patronage networks of one's own. This last point is particularly important for matters of concern to the Special Court. Many young men who were referred to as "commanders" at various levels claim to have achieved that rank as a result of distinguishing themselves through their hard work, bravery and trustworthiness.<sup>68</sup> These are individuals who were able to challenge the "normal" routes by which young men achieved status in a community (paying one's dues to another patron until reaching a certain age, marital status, or inheritance to be considered a "big man") by finding an alternative: attracting client/dependents by establishing effectiveness on the battlefield. Because the patronage system which dominated the CDF overlapped so extensively with the patronage networks that operated prior to the CDF, this often meant that young commanders acted independent of more senior men if by doing so they could establish the means by which to secure client/dependents.

**D.6.g.** The case of Brima Sei at Panguma mentioned above in Part D.4.i. is instructive here. A relatively junior person, Musa Junisa, was able to establish himself ahead of the commander at Panguma, Brima Sei, by securing ammunition from Base One and Base Zero. When the junta took power in 1997, kamajors at Panguma had enough weapons but not enough artillery to fight the AFRC/RUF in the Panguma and Tongo areas. Musa Junisa and a few other fighters went first to Gendema, where they were given approximately a dozen RPGs. They then proceeded to Base Zero, where they were given cartridges for AK-47s and G3 rifles. Returning to Panguma, Junisa was able to displace Brima Sei as commander in part through his ability to control this ammunition and therefore create a network of dependents. From February of 1998 his new authority allowed him to claim the title of Director of Operations, Eastern Region.

**D.6.h.** The upshot of this localization is that it is not possible to trace events of this war through a coherent chain of objectives from the upper to the lower levels of the various factions in the same way one would for the Second World War or 19<sup>th</sup> Century Prussian/German conflicts.<sup>69</sup> This is reflected in the often mentioned fact that the war in Sierra Leone was not driven by ideology, "tribalism" or religion and has resisted easy

<sup>66</sup> A point made forcefully by Caspar Fithen, "Diamonds and War in Sierra Leone: Cultural Strategies for Commercial Adaptations to Endemic Low-Intensity Conflict"; and David Keen *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*; David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence."

<sup>67</sup> See, for example, Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, p. 81. See also the testimony of prosecution witness TF2-082, Sept. 15 2004, p. 33 lines 13-25.

<sup>68</sup> This is a theme repeated in almost every interview the author has had with CDF commanders at all levels.

<sup>69</sup> Both examples are cited in this context in Col. Richard Iron, "Military Expert Report," p. B-8, note 12.

classification in the scholarly literature.<sup>70</sup> Certainly it makes the conclusion drawn by Col. Iron in his "Military Expert Report" suspect: there simply was no "clear, coherent linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical levels"<sup>71</sup> within the CDF or any other faction involved in this war.

#### **D.7. Base One: Gendema and Bo Waterside**

**D.7.a.** The kamajor faction of the CDF has quite rightly been associated in the scholarly and popular literature on the war in Sierra Leone with the Mende ethnic group of the southeast of Sierra Leone. While accurate, what this tends to occlude is the significant role played in the CDF's success by Liberians and individuals of mixed Liberian/Sierra Leonean heritage. This is a point of anthropological significance in part because it speaks to the way in which the figure of the kamajor is romanticized as a uniquely Mende figure with paramount importance to Mende identity.<sup>72</sup> Hinga Norman illustrates this romanticization when he says of the kamajors: "My Lords, in this country Kamajors are age old people. They had existed before my own great-grandfather. There is no issue of selecting who to become a Kamajor or who not to become a Kamajor. They're here permanently. They were, they are, they will continue to be."<sup>73</sup> This romanticism has real empirical consequences; namely, the minimization of the role played by ULIMO<sup>74</sup> forces and the Special Forces group which operated out of Base One at Gendema and in close coordination with ECOMOG.

**D.7.b.** Much has been made in the Special Court testimony and in the literature on the war of the call made over the BBC by a CDF commander named Eddie Massalley in the aftermath of the May 1997 AFRC coup. Massalley called for all loyal troops, including irregular militias, to assemble at Gendema/Bo Waterside.<sup>75</sup> This was the main concentration of kamajor and other combatants until the establishment of Base Zero at Talia in September 1997. Base Zero at that point became a more public face for the CDF and its efforts to restore the government, not least because Hinga Norman operated there and because a number of local and foreign journalists were brought to Base Zero to witness the CDF efforts. This public relations savvy may be one of the reasons that Col. Richard Iron incorrectly concludes in the "Military Expert Report" that the mobilization

<sup>70</sup> A point made in, for example, Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Paths to Destruction: The Origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/ Sierra Leone"; Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat"; Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*.

<sup>71</sup> Col. Richard Iron, "Military Expert Report," p. B-8, Part B5.1.

<sup>72</sup> I have already described in Part C.1.c above the role kamajors are said to play in the founding and defence of Mende villages.

<sup>73</sup> See testimony of Samuel Hinga Norman, 02 February, 2006, p. 27, lines 20-24.

<sup>74</sup> United Liberian Movement for Democracy, or ULIMO, formed in Sierra Leone in 1991. ULIMO forces were primarily Mandingoes and Krahs of Liberian descent opposed to Charles Taylor. ULIMO collaborated with the Sierra Leone Army in fighting the RUF. The group split into two factions, ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J. ULIMO is discussed in the testimony of Defense witness Albert Demby, 10 February 2006, p. 5, lines 7-12.

<sup>75</sup> Gendema is on the Sierra Leone side of the border, and Bo Waterside or Bo Njala is on the Liberia side of the border. The Mano River Bridge connects the two. Gendema is also sometimes spelled Njendema or Jendema.

at Gendema/Bo Waterside (sometimes referred to as Base One) was simply temporary and did not last beyond the establishment of Base Zero at Talia. In fact, it became one of the most important fronts in the war, and one which operated with limited oversight from Base Zero.

**D.7.c.** One of the reasons for this was the large number of Liberians or mixed parentage youth with combat experience in Liberia who joined the CDF. As noted in the No Peace Without Justice "Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping Report," former ULIMO fighters assisted the kamajors throughout 1997 and 1998.<sup>76</sup> Few if any of these combatants were at Base Zero. The majority were recruited in Liberia or from Liberian refugee camps in Sierra Leone. They operated initially from Base One, which was easily accessible from the Liberian capital. Unlike most CDF kamajors, many of these veterans had been trained in the use of heavier weapons -- RPGs, mortars, etc. They were more closely allied to ECOMOG, especially the late Maxwell Khobe. There was, for example, a company of between 70-100 men who operated as a Special Forces unit from Base One, under the command of a former ULIMO fighter. It is also well known that expatriate Sierra Leoneans living in Monrovia were actively recruiting Sierra Leonean and Liberian veterans to fight on the Sierra Leone side of the border. Unlike kamajor units who were attached to specific chiefdoms and therefore subject to additional constraints on their movements, these fighters could be more easily deployed wherever needed. For example, they played an instrumental role in the capture of Freetown from the AFRC/RUF and during the January 6 1999 Freetown invasion.<sup>77</sup> They were also directly involved in the capture of Zimmi and other parts of Pujehun, and operated throughout Kenema, Kono, and Kailahun Districts. Informants in and around Bo stated that when they heard about the advances of loyal troops opposed to the AFRC, they heard first about joint ECOMOG/CDF movements coming in from Gendema and the Liberian border (Base One) rather than from the south at Base Zero.

**D.7.d.** A recent Human Right Watch report underscores the importance of such "regional warriors" to the various phases of the war that has spread from Liberia to Sierra Leone, Guinea, and now Cote d'Ivoire. These are a floating population of combatants, many of whom began fighting as children during Charles Taylor's first war in Liberia. Their allegiances tend to be to local warlords able to provide them with a cash payout, logistic support, and the opportunity for self enrichment. In short, they are not necessarily beholden to a central command structure, and are often both more highly trained and more violent than their allies in the various factions.<sup>78</sup>

**D.7.e.** In both cases -- Base One and Base Zero -- it is easy to overestimate the control these locations had on operations in the field. The difficulties in communication have already been noted by Col. Richard Iron in his "Military Expert Report"; poor infrastructure, the enemy presence and lack of communications equipment made contact

<sup>76</sup> No Peace Without Justice, "Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping Report," p. 49.

<sup>77</sup> The Brookfields Hotel was the base of operations for many of these combatants.

<sup>78</sup> See, for example, Human Rights Watch "Youth, Blood and Poverty: the Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors." See also William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*.



with combatants in other parts of the country very difficult.<sup>79</sup> Travel between Base Zero and Koribundu could be made in a relatively short period of time, but locations such as Tongo Field or Daru could not be managed on a daily basis over such distances. Hinga Norman makes reference to this when he acknowledges that while at Base Zero he had little sense of what was happening in Kenema,<sup>80</sup> a relatively short distance but a trip that in the rainy season could take a number of days. In the same vein, those at Base One were close enough to Zimmi to be aware of the situation there, but were much more removed from events at Bo or Moyamba.

**D.7.f.** For many groups of combatants in the field, Base One and Base Zero were locations to which one could travel or send delegates in order to ask for supplies. These journeys are best thought of in terms of the patronage networks already described: those at Base Zero and Base One were thought to have access to material that could help local commanders solidify their patronage networks or help those who hoped to become important commanders develop their own. This ability to dispense material support, rather than to coordinate battlefield activity, made Base Zero and Base One important for the CDF as a whole. The case of the Panguma kamajors outlined above is once again exemplary. Local units in need of supplies would send delegates to one location (usually the closest) to ask for matériel. If it could not be secured at one location, a delegation would then be sent to the other. The RPGs which Musa Junisa received from Base One were clearly insufficient to retake Tongo or hold Panguma, and so he traveled to Base Zero with the same request.

## **D.8. Children**

**D.8.a.** Part C.3 and C.4 above relate some general understandings of childhood and youth common in this region. For matters of interest to the Special Court, it is worth exploring in greater detail what joining the CDF meant in relation to issues of childhood and youth among Mendes.

**D.8.b.** As already noted, chronological age (or the measurement of the life span in terms of years) tends to be of less significance in this region than one's participation in events which mark the transition between life phases. This is reflected in the Court testimony to date by the frequency with which witnesses say they do not know the ages of individuals in question, but can mark their relative age by their accomplishments. (A simple but clear illustration can be found in the testimony of former Sierra Leone Vice-President Albert Demby, who argues that a (male) child is considered a "grown-up child" and responsible for his actions when he "is able to put his hand over his head and touch the adjacent ear"<sup>81</sup>). A young person does not become an adult upon her or his 16<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup> birthday. Rather, she or he moves toward adulthood by experiencing puberty, learning more about proper social roles, and in many cases through initiation into one of the "secret societies" such as Poro, Sande, or Wunde.

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<sup>79</sup> See Appendix 1 for further elaboration on the implications of this for understanding the Military Expert Witness Report.

<sup>80</sup> See testimony of Samuel Hinga Norman, 02 February 2006, p. 66-68, esp. p. 67, lines 10-13.

<sup>81</sup> See testimony of Albert Joe Demby, 10 February 2006, p. 6, lines 18-23.

**D.8.c.** For many Mendes, notably those in rural areas, initiation into the kamajor “society” (and hence the CDF) functioned in similar ways to the Poro initiations – and in fact may have replaced Poro in certain locations because the war made Poro initiations impossible. Thus, many interviewees spoke of joining the kamajors as an obligation of all adult Mende males – the same terms used to describe initiation into Poro. Those who did not join the kamajors would be no different from women and children. They had not, in other words, fully developed as adult men.

**D.8.d.** The upshot is that initiation into the kamajors could also serve to mark an initiate as an adult male regardless of his actual, chronological age. (Initiation here needs to be understood in distinction from simply undergoing the “washing” which was intended to protect individuals but did not necessarily involve actual induction into the kamajors as a group.<sup>82</sup>) But full initiation meant that a kamajor not only went through the rites of passage of membership but that he was entrusted with knowledge that is reserved for initiates and considered too dangerous to divulge to women, children or the uninitiated. In short, for many individuals becoming an adult male meant becoming a kamajor *and vice versa*.

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<sup>82</sup> On this distinction, see for example the testimony of Prosecution witness Albert Nallo, 15 March 2005, p. 9-11.

**PART E:**  
**Synthesis of Conclusions**

E.1. This report is framed by two questions: Were there factors of anthropological significance which shaped the structure and function of the Civil Defense Forces of Sierra Leone? And, if the answer to that question is affirmative, what bearing might these anthropological factors have on matters of concern to the Special Court?

E.2. Clearly there are matters of anthropological significance which shaped the structure and function of the Civil Defense Forces of Sierra Leone. Local naming practices, understandings of childhood, and valuations of literacy all greatly impacted how the Mende kamajor contingent of the CDF related to one another and how they operated collectively. The marginal status of youth in contemporary Sierra Leone, the relative importance of local over national political concerns, and perhaps most significantly the centrality of the patronage system were fundamental to how the CDF operated during Sierra Leone's long and complicated war.

E.3. What these anthropological factors demonstrate is that the CDF cannot be thought of as a military organization with centralized military command and control. Col. Richard Iron is correct when he notes that the CDF "was not modeled on western army structures."<sup>83</sup> In fact, it was not "modeled" on *any* army structures. Instead, CDF members were caught up in a web of diffuse relationships that had political, economic, and most of all social dimensions. Every facet of the organization was shot through with other, non-military considerations, including the very meaning of "command" and "commander."

E.4. Throughout its various manifestations - "vigilantes," "kamajoisia," "kamajors," "tamaboros," etc. - the movement that eventually became known as the CDF is best thought of as a militarized social network. In other words, the CDF was a force without a stable, centralized hierarchy capable of exerting military style command and control. The duties and obligations of CDF members to those above and below them were inseparable from the duties and obligations combatants and "commanders" had as members of their communities. The CDF's "many failings as a military organization" do not mean that "it was just not a very good one."<sup>84</sup> The CDF's logic was always that of a social rather than a military institution.

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<sup>83</sup> Col. Richard Iron, "Military Expert Report," p. E-9, Part E6.2.

<sup>84</sup> Col. Richard Iron, "Military Expert Report," p. E-9, Part E6.2.

**PART F:**  
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**Appendix 1: Specific Responses to "Military Expert Witness Report on the Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone," by Colonel Richard Iron**

What follows is a close analysis of the report by Colonel Richard Iron, OBE, British Army titled "Military Expert Witness Report on the Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone" and dated May 2005. The report was requested by the UK Ministry of Defence and is intended to address "the extent to which the CDF and other organizations involved in the Sierra Leone War were military organizations with military command and control."<sup>85</sup>

I have referred directly to Col. Iron's findings throughout my own expert witness report. Still, I feel that a thorough analysis of his submission may be useful in understanding the nature and function of the CDF. As I have indicated in my earlier references, Col. Iron has correctly identified important facets of the CDF and its role in the conflict. Some of his conclusions, however, are either incorrect or incomplete. This is not surprising, given the relatively short amount of time Col. Iron was able to (as he put it) "walk the ground" with witnesses, and the small and selective group of CDF personnel to whom he had access. Such limited engagement could not be expected to illuminate many critical, relevant issues of context and fact which I believe lead to different conclusions and interpretations as to the nature and function of the CDF. This appendix is intended to highlight some of those issues.

This appendix follows the structure of the "Military Expert Witness Report." Where my comments are relevant to specific assertions made in that report, I have identified the passage by Part and sub-section and/or by direct quote. Where my analysis is more concerned with underlying theoretical or contextual points, I have listed them under that passage or those passages which seemed most germane, but have indicated where they should be applied to the entirety of a section or argument. Since I am concerned with matters of contextualization, interpretation and socio-cultural background, I do not address any of these remarks to Part D of the Military Expert Report, in which its author reconstructs from interviews with a few informants the fighting in and around Koribundu and Bo.

**PART A.**

*Part A1 - reliability of the fieldwork on which the report is based.*

Col. Iron based his report on three visits to Sierra Leone. In his testimony before the Court, he indicated that this amounted to a period of approximately 14 days spent on the CDF report. He also indicated in his testimony that his work on the CDF was the result of having "spent a lot of time with seven people."<sup>86</sup> Otherwise he had no prior experience in, or knowledge of, Sierra Leone.

While Col. Iron is no doubt well qualified to do rapid military analysis based on limited empirical data, it is simply impossible that such restricted fieldwork, conducted so

<sup>85</sup> "Military Expert Witness Report on the Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone," Section A1.

<sup>86</sup> Testimony of Col. Richard Iron, 14 June 2005, p. 51, line 14.

long after the events in question, could cover any relevant issues of context or important local specificities. In other words, the best that could be done under these circumstances is to ascertain how well the organization fits a standard theoretical model (which is Col. Iron's stated goal). Col. Iron concludes that it does, but acknowledges that it does so rather poorly. Without sufficient time or local expertise to account for the discrepancies, however, it would be virtually impossible for Col. Iron to weigh the importance of those factors which do not meet his formula or to hypothesize whether they lead to alternative, more accurate conclusions. Furthermore, what is unstated in the report is how much variation from the standard model could be tolerated before the organization in question no longer fits that model, or how those deviations are weighted relative to one another.

In sum, without more extensive knowledge of the CDF and the war in Sierra Leone it would be impossible to know which points of variance are meaningful. The result is that Col. Iron can conclude the CDF is different from other, more established military organizations but cannot conclude whether these differences are truly meaningful in classifying the organization. As Col. Iron notes, evaluating the issues in question requires judgment calls – but in this case, the basis for those judgments is extremely limited and there is no possibility of alternative findings.

There is an additional concern raised by the fieldwork methodology Col. Iron employed to conduct his research. By conducting his rapid assessment of the CDF at the same time that he conducted similar research on the RUF and AFRC, Col. Iron is prone to bias in his evaluation. This is not an accusation of bad faith or poor practices, but an obvious research design flaw. Given the task of evaluating three fighting factions in a war of which he had no prior knowledge, it is hardly surprising that Col. Iron would be pre-disposed to think of these as similar organizations. Variations between them would be more likely cast in terms of relative deviations from an ideal model rather than evidence of a fundamentally different organization.

*Part A. 4c. "The assumption is that what is general CDF practice in this campaign can be induced to be general practice elsewhere." The representativeness of the Koribundu-Bo campaign.*

Col. Iron conducted a detailed reconstruction of what he refers to as the Koribundu-Bo campaign. He suggests that this "campaign" is representative of general CDF practices. Col. Iron presents no basis for this assumption and no evidence to support it. There is, however, considerable evidence that the attacks on Bo and Koribundu are *not* representative of other CDF activities.

There are logistical and historical factors which make the fighting in and around Koribundu and Bo unique when considered against other CDF activities and even when compared to one another. In regards to the first, the logistical concerns, Col. Iron's own report makes clear that there was a much higher degree of contact between Base Zero and commanders involved in the Koribundu attack than there was on any other front. The relatively short distance between Talia, commanders at Kpetewoma, and Koribundu, and the safety of the road facilitated Albert Nallo's movement by motorbike between

locations. As Col. Iron's analysis makes clear, this contact with Base Zero did not necessarily shift all decision making to the leadership at Base Zero, but it did play a crucial role in planning and coordinating the attack. Communication to other conflict areas was not as simple, due to distance and the lack of security on the roads. One cannot, therefore, assume that the best case scenario (Koribundu) is automatically applicable to any other sector.

In regards to relevant historical factors, both Koribundu and Bo represent unique targets. Local politics make Koribundu an unrepresentative location vis-à-vis the CDF hierarchy and particularly Chief Norman. Koribundu is the "seat" of the Jiama chiefdom which was amalgamated with Bangor chiefdom under Chief B.A. Foday Kai. Hinga Norman's predecessor. The seat of Bangor chiefdom, Telu, was made the seat of the joint Jaiama-Bangor chiefdom, a move which angered some elders in Koribundu. When Chief Sam Hinga Norman became Regent Chief of Jiama-Bangor, he elected to keep Telu as the chiefdom seat. Since that time, there have been hostilities between Norman and some community members in Koribundu, a point raised by Hinga Norman in his testimony before the Court.<sup>87</sup> It is important to note here that chiefdom politics in Sierra Leone, and especially in the Mende dominant southeast, are of primary importance. They affect the everyday existence of those living in the region even more than national politics, and are treated with great seriousness (see Part C.6 of this report). The location of a chiefdom seat is not a small matter, and it is not surprising that this would be a topic of great interest and one capable of generating tremendous animosity.

It is not entirely clear how these local political factors may have influenced the fighting in and around Koribundu, but there is no question that they did. Some soldiers garrisoned at Koribundu during the AFRC junta were known to be ambivalent about the AFRC leadership in Freetown and in some circumstances provided weapons and/or ammunition to the regional CDF and local commanders. This does not appear to have been coordinated by the CDF at Base Zero, but was transacted between individuals who knew one another from Koribundu and its environs.

Bo is also a very particular case within the context of the war in Sierra Leone. Bo is the nation's second largest city, and thus was a symbolically important target for all factions. The war in Sierra Leone was fought in large measure through spectacular demonstrations meant to convince the enemy of one's numbers, strength, and ferocity – regardless of the reality of one's actual military capability.<sup>88</sup> Thus, capturing Bo is not the military equivalent of capturing even a moderate size town, let alone a small village or hamlet. Bo is doubly important for the Mendes who made up the vast majority of the CDF, as it is the major urban center in the Mende dominant southeast. Its occupation by

<sup>87</sup> Testimony of Samuel Hinga Norman, 30 January 2006, p. 43-44, 46.

<sup>88</sup> This is a point made repeatedly in the literature on the war, from journalistic coverage of the conflict (see Matthew Tostevin, "Sinking to the Depths") to scholarly analysis (see Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*; Paul Richards, "War as Smoke and Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991-2, 1994-5, 1995-6." For further analysis from elsewhere in the region, see Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: The Religious Dimensions of an African Civil War*; Mary Moran, *Liberia: The Violence of Democracy*.

the AFRC/RUF forces was particularly discouraging. The planning and effort put into recapturing Bo can hardly be called representative of other CDF efforts.

As I indicate both in the report and below, this privileging of the Bo and Koribundu fighting also minimizes the important role of Base One (Gendema/Bo Waterside).

**PART B**

*Part B.2.1. "Military organization therefore exists in any conflict waged between recognizable groups; otherwise it is simply a state of aimless violence."*

This is a surprising statement given the purported purpose of the report: to establish whether the CDF was a military organization. It would seem to indicate that there is no alternative to military organization, and nothing that wouldn't qualify as a military organization. Criminal gangs, male youth undergoing ritualized rites of passage involving violent raids, even American football teams are all clearly engaging in violence that is not "aimless." According to the parameters Col. Iron has set out here, even these would need to be classified as "military organizations." If the statement were true, there would be no need for Col. Iron's report -- according to this logic, so long as violence has a purpose those committing it automatically fit the definition of a military organization. As with the problems of reliability outlined in Part A1, this would seem to indicate a serious flaw in research design which pre-determined the conclusions.

*Part B.2.3. "Note that the nature of conflict is regardless of the type of conflict. General war and insurgency, whether today or two thousand years ago, have more in common with each other than any other kind of non-warlike activity. It should be no surprise, therefore, that military organizations tend to have recognizable hierarchies and structures."*

This is a deceptively simple declaration. It is not, however, an uncontested point. In fact, much of the recent scholarship in the anthropology of warfare, in political science, even history and economics would suggest otherwise.

Anthropologists, for example, have for a long time argued that war is a social event just like any other. It cannot be easily disentangled from the way the economy functions,<sup>89</sup> from gender relationships,<sup>90</sup> or from the political system<sup>91</sup> of those locations in which war happens. In fact, these factors must be accounted for to properly understand war in any given context.

<sup>89</sup> See, for example, Catherine Lutz, *Homefront: A Military City and the American 20<sup>th</sup> Century*; Carolyn Nordstrom, *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century*.

<sup>90</sup> See, for example, Carolyn Nordstrom, "Deadly Myths of Aggression."

<sup>91</sup> See, for example, Adam Ashforth, *Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South Africa*; Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*; Michael Taussig, *The Nervous System*.

This can be illustrated quite simply by taking three examples. The anthropologist and ethnographic filmmaker Robert Gardner made a study of warfare among the Grand Valley Dani of Irian Barat (now part of Indonesia) in 1961, before Dutch colonial pacification.<sup>92</sup> Gardner explored how the entire Dani value structure was maintained by a continuous process of inter-community wars. Transitions into manhood, satisfying the needs of ghosts and deceased ancestors, even the passage of time was dependent on the continuation of war. Reprisal killings could never go so far as to end the war, but needed to happen sufficiently to continue it. Comparing the Dani case to, for example, the Polish resistance to World War II (to draw from one of Col. Iron's own examples) is inappropriate. Contrasting either of these to the 1994 Rwandan genocide is equally problematic. This clearly was also a "war." Yet the efforts of machete-wielding youth to exterminate an entire ethnic group are nothing like the Dani example or the underground organization of Polish freedom fighters. What's more, the Rwanda case cannot be understood outside of the history of Belgian colonization, the relationships between Hutu and Tutsi, and perhaps most importantly the end of the Cold War and the political/economic machinations of the former colonial powers as part of a global war of position.

Even the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his famous phrase "war is the continuation of politics by other means" drew a distinction relevant only to inter-state relationships: two or more countries facing one another on the battlefield. He was specifically *not* referring to violent activities within an individual state, which would not necessarily have fit his definition of war and could very easily have more in common with other social, political or economic processes.<sup>93</sup> This, certainly, was the case in Sierra Leone, and underscores the need to examine the structure and function of the CDF in light of other social activities.

In short, Col. Iron's claim that any war can be used to understand the nature of any other is clearly in doubt. As a result, the examples to which he turns – World War II most particularly – are of questionable relevance to the Sierra Leone case.

*Part B4.6. "Disciplinary System. Conflict causes normal social structures and inhibitions to break down."*

As with the previous two points raised, this seemingly obvious statement in fact covers up a serious flaw in the research and points toward major debates in the academic literature. The remainder of this section of the "Military Expert Report" details with the problems of maintaining discipline among soldiers. This is no doubt true, and Col. Iron is in a better position than most to speak to that issue. However, he introduces it with this sweeping generalization that implies much more and illustrates the prejudices in the report. Disciplinary problems, and even the erosion of the taboos against killing, are simply not the same as a breakdown in the "normal social structures." The unstated implication in making this assertion seems to be that a military organization must of necessity step into the breach during periods of conflict. However, as has been

<sup>92</sup> See Robert Gardner, *Dead Birds*.

<sup>93</sup> See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude*, p. 6.

demonstrated throughout this report, the CDF was organized according to the logic of the "social structure" among Mendes and others in Sierra Leone at the time of the war. There is an extensive literature on similar case studies, in which the social logic of a given locality serves to structure the "logic" of violence and the organization of those who exercise it.<sup>94</sup>

*Part B5.1, B5.2, & b5.4. The division of conflict into strategic, operation and tactical levels.*

As with comments from Part B2.3 above, the Military Expert Report here makes generalizations which simply are not relevant to post-Cold War African conflicts. Footnote 12 states that "This categorization [into strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation] first emerged from 19<sup>th</sup> Century Prussian/German thinking...It was adopted by the US Army in the 1980s, and rapidly became standard military thought in all major Western powers." As has been asserted above, there is now ample evidence that many wars in sub-Saharan Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War represent a particular form of conflict. Although there has been debate among scholars as to exactly the causes and nature of these conflicts, there is no doubt that we are witnessing something fundamentally different from the examples Col. Iron deploys to make his argument: the Soviet experience in WWI and WWII, the Russian Civil War, Operation OVERLORD in 1944 and Operation BARBAROSSA in 1941. By contrast, Sierra Leone's conflict has been identified by some scholars as a "resource war"<sup>95</sup> or as an example of "warlordism."<sup>96</sup> In both cases, the sequence of short-term objectives of control over resource extraction locations would call into question whether there was any level of "strategic" or "operational" thinking above and beyond the "tactical" level of immediate access to resources. If the proof of a military organization is the presence of all three analytical levels, then it seems that the military structure of all parties to the Sierra Leone war might legitimately be called into question. What's more, much of the commentary about the war in Sierra Leone has focused on its lack of ideological underpinning<sup>97</sup> – again suggesting an absence of at least a "strategic" level of military thinking and hence military structure.

Col. Iron asserts in Part B5.4 that even in non-conventional armies a linkage exists between the levels of conflict he identifies (strategic, operational and tactical). Yet the examples he deploys to support that statement are of a very particular variety: the anti-colonial struggle of the guerrilla armies ZIPRA and ZANLA in the

<sup>94</sup> For only a few of many examples from other African contexts, see Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: The Religious Dimensions of an African Civil War*; Carolyn Nordstrom, "Requiem for the Rational War,"; Christopher Taylor *Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994*.

<sup>95</sup> See, for example, Paul Collier, "The Market for Civil War."

<sup>96</sup> See, for example, William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*.

<sup>97</sup> See Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Paths to Destruction: The Origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/ Sierra Leone"; Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat"; Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*. Col. Iron himself makes this point in regards to the CDF in Part C2.1 of his report.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe war. This is a very different case study from that of Sierra Leone, and for the reasons stated above it is questionable just how relevant it might be.

Indeed, Col. Iron suggests as much when he makes reference to individual CDF operations for which he can find no discernible logic based on what he claims are the CDF's strategic and tactical goals.<sup>98</sup>

*Part B6. Was command effective?*

Throughout this section, the Military Expert Report outlines a general theory of decision making and leadership control. While these are no doubt relevant to understanding military organizations, it bears mentioning that these descriptions would fit virtually any social organization. "[D]eciding what has to be achieved (decision-making), getting subordinates to achieve it (leadership), and supervising its achievement (control)" are as common to business, city government, even wedding planning as they are to military organizations, and the presence of these processes does not prove that any particular organization is necessarily a *military* organization.

**PART C**

*Part C1.6. Establishment of bases at the Liberia border and at Base Zero.*

The Military Expert Report states the following about the CDF bases during the junta period (25 May 1997 to April 1998): "After an initial attempt to open a base on the Liberian border near Zimmi, they decided on Talia, a village in the south of Bonthe District." This is misleading for a number of reasons. First, when Col. Iron refers to a base on the Liberia border near Zimmi, he is apparently referring to "Base One" at the Mano River Bridge joining the towns of Bo Waterside (Liberia) with Gendema (Sierra Leone). This was the original gathering point for the CDF in the wake of the AFRC coup, when Eddie Massalley issued a call over the BBC for all of the various pro-government militias to assemble and fight the junta.

In his testimony, Col. Iron mistakenly says "the key to the CDF lay in its offensive capability in Talia [Base Zero]."<sup>99</sup> However, Base One was more than an initial attempt to establish a base. It was a significant location throughout the junta period from which attacks were launched on Zimmi and throughout the east. It was a major conduit of weaponry from ECOMOG and the site from which a large number of kamajor combatants were deployed throughout the region. Most significantly, it was the location from which large numbers of so-called "Special Forces" troops were deployed. These were veterans of the Liberia war, many of them of mixed parentage (Liberian and Sierra Leonean). They represented some of the most highly trained fighters in the CDF forces, having a greater level of combat experience and a higher degree of training in heavy weaponry. Most importantly, these were troops more closely allied to ECOMOG and not as closely tied to the CDF leadership which eventually emerged at Base Zero. In fact,

<sup>98</sup> See, for example, "Military Expert Report," p. C-2, Part C1.9.

<sup>99</sup> Testimony of Col. Richard Iron, 14 June 2005, p. 43, line 29.



according to sources within the CDF, Chief Norman left Base One to go to Base Zero after a disagreement with Eddie Massalley and others at Base One regarding the fighting around Zimmi and the provision of weapons.<sup>100</sup>

In sum, as the original site of mobilization and the point of departure for some of the most highly trained CDF troops, the Mano River Bridge location (Base One) was arguably more important to the conduct of the war than Base Zero. And it operated largely independent of Base Zero.

*C1.7. & c1.8. "Fighters from areas occupied by the junta retreated to Base Zero as a safe haven...By the end of 1997, it [the CDF] felt strong enough to go on the offensive."*

This statement misrepresents the relationship of many fighters in the field to Base Zero. The Expert Military Report suggests that kamajors came to Base Zero and remained for an extended period of time where they were armed, trained, and organized. This is true up to a point, though mostly for those living in and around Bonthe District. But many more kamajors, especially those from further north and east, came to Base Zero only for a short period of time to collect arms. In many cases, these might be thought of as exploratory visits by delegates of kamajor units fighting up-country: having heard that weapons were available at Base Zero, kamajors made the often dangerous journey to Talia to see what supplies they could procure there. They then returned to their home regions where others were currently fighting. This high degree of traffic to and from Base Zero calls into question the impression of a singular push from Base Zero implied in the report, particularly in Part C1.8 in the discussion of Black December. In fact, Black December was only one operation going on at that point in time. Simultaneous pushes from Base One and other locations around the southeast were not technically part of Black December and not under its auspices, but no less significant for the conduct of the war.

*Part C2.2. "So although there was no ideological base to the CDF, it had a clear top level strategic idea: to protect its homelands from the junta forces and regain control over territories occupied by the junta."*

Col. Iron states here that the CDF's "strategic" goal was essentially its own survival. It was clear, as he points out in Part C1.3 that when the AFRC invited the RUF to join its "People's Army," and when Johnny Paul Koroma announced that all kamajors should report themselves to local police stations, that the junta would be targeting kamajors and their supporters. Col. Iron's other examples of "strategic" military goals are much more precise: the defeat of Germany by Allied Powers in Operation OVERLORD by opening a second European front and invading from the east and west; the German takeover of the Soviet state through invasion in Operation BARBAROSSA. To equate these with the CDF's "goal" of surviving -- a goal that could only be met by overthrowing the junta -- seems to be comparing qualitatively different imperatives. Once again it calls into question whether the standards of measure by which the CDF is being judged a military organization are truly accurate.

<sup>100</sup> The name "Base Zero" was allegedly an attempt to signify priority over the already named "Base One."

*Part C3.3. "CDF Military Structure" and the role of ranks.*

As Col. Iron correctly points out here, the CDF was unlike other guerrilla organizations in that it did not "model its structure on traditional military lines." This statement would seem to undermine the conclusions of the entire report.

It is worth drawing attention to the final statement at the end of this paragraph. "There was no established rank system, although it was clear that there was a hierarchy of seniority; people were addressed by their appointments, such as National Director for Norman, Director of War for Fofana, Director of Operations for Nallo etc." This statement is correct, but only if we substitute the term "title" for "appointment." There was no fixed rank system; there was a hierarchy of seniority (though as I have argued it was a social rather than a specifically *military* one); and there was a system of address. But in the absence of a fixed military hierarchy, there simply could be no such "appointments." Instead, titles were given as honorifics and to establish relative relationships rather than a list of specific job responsibilities as implied in the term "appointment."

*Part C3.4. CDF Tribal System. "The CDF was a national organization...However, it fell to the Mende to become the core of the CDF during its period of strategic retreat and re-building."*

The war in Sierra Leone was not a so-called "tribal war." However, the relationships between ethnicities played a much more complicated role than is suggested here. It was not, in other words, a simple "accident of geography" that the Mende dominant south west of the country was the safest place for the CDF to base itself.<sup>101</sup> The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) has long been thought of as a Mende dominant party. The military, by contrast, long been thought of as an institution dominated by the northern ethnic groups. One of the key motivators behind the AFRC coup was a fear of marginalization by the SLPP, which was elected only the year before.<sup>102</sup>

The phrasing of the Military Expert Witness report suggests that ethnic tensions were irrelevant, again underplaying the social dimensions of the structure and function of the CDF in favor of a purely military logic for the organization. In fact, it would have been inconceivable for the CDF to have operated from the north or northwest of the country (rather than from Base One and Base Zero) because the Mende dominant organization would not have had the social infrastructure in place to support its activities.

*Part C4.2. CDF Logistics – control over disbursement and the role of captured weapons.*

This is perhaps the most important single point in the "Military Expert Report." As Col. Iron states, logistics and the ability to provide supplies (weapons, ammunition, food, medicine, etc.) are critical to the maintaining control over a "loose knit organization" such

<sup>101</sup> Testimony of Col. Richard Iron, 14 June 2005, p. 73, lines 26-29.

<sup>102</sup> See A.B. Zack-Williams, "Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-1998."

as the CDF. In fact, he writes that Chief Norman's control over logistics was "absolutely fundamental" to his control over the CDF.

Yet in the very same paragraph, Col. Iron writes that "the organization depended greatly on captured supplies as well." In his summary of "Logistic Supply (including Arms Procurement)" on pg. E-4, Col. Iron claims that "most weapons were captured from junta troops" and that "this was certainly the source of most of the CDF's ammunition." This is a crucial assertion. The fact is that weapons, ammunition, food, even medicine utilized by the CDF came from a variety of sources throughout the time that the CDF was active. Besides the cutlasses and farm implements which many fighters used in lieu of firearms or heavy weapons,<sup>103</sup> CDF combatants were frequently armed with weapons captured from their enemies. The most common form of attack in this war, as has been widely noted, was the surprise ambush, the purpose of which was to cause the enemy to abandon his (or her) position and materiel.<sup>104</sup> When asked, ex-combatants with the CDF suggested that in the earliest days of the movement the vast majority of their weapons were captured from the enemy:

"At that time [before the intervention by ECOMOG], these kinds of attacks were common. I would take my boys, we would go to where they [AFRC soldiers] sit, their checkpoints, and we would attack them. When they ran away we would take their weapons."<sup>105</sup>

Even by the late junta period when ECOMOG was regularly supplying the CDF, estimates ranged from 25% to more than 50% of weapons utilized were captured from the enemy.<sup>106</sup>

In addition to captured weapons, individual CDF members and units often obtained weapons on the black market, independent of the CDF operations at Base Zero or elsewhere. Along the border regions around Base One some CDF fighters reported purchasing weapons and ammunition directly from ECOMOG in return for diamonds, and there was a market for ammunition in Guinea border towns.<sup>107</sup> There is reason to believe this practice was more widespread than has previously been reported. Kamajors who were active in the area around Koribundu during the junta even recount that they were able to secure weapons and ammunition from soldiers who were profiteering and/or were not sympathetic to the AFRC leaders in Freetown.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>103</sup> This is a significant number. In his analysis of the so-called Koribundu-Bo campaign -- which undoubtedly was more highly coordinated than other CDF attacks, Col. Iron estimates that in one unit only about half of combatants even possessed a firearm at all. See Part D4.4 of the Military Expert Report.

<sup>104</sup> In fact, this was exactly the case in the Koribundu campaign described by Col. Iron in the Military Expert Report. As he correctly notes in Part D5.10, the CDF did not draw a distinction between what was "abandoned" by the enemy versus what was "captured" by the CDF.

<sup>105</sup> Author interview, 13 April 2006. Bo, Sierra Leone.

<sup>106</sup> Author interviews, April 2006. Freetown and Bo, Sierra Leone. For one illustration of this kind of attack, see testimony by Defense witness Kenneth Koker, 20 February 2006, p. 83, lines 9-12.

<sup>107</sup> Author interview, 18 April 2006, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

<sup>108</sup> Author interview, 17 April 2006. Bo, Sierra Leone.

Within the CDF various individuals used the provision of weapons as a means by which to garner and maintain support. However, this power was not vested in only one or even a handful of individuals. Respondents noted that at various points in time Daramay Rogers, George Jambawai, and Albert Nallo each traveled to CDF held areas and dispensed weapons and ammunition. These activities should not simply be seen as carrying out the duties of position; rather, they were efforts to obtain "clients" and establish patronage relationships in a highly competitive and diffuse field. Where a supply officer of a certain rank in the British military may be charged with distributing logistics to the field, within the CDF an individual would as likely be considered an "officer" (i.e. person of importance or rank) by first having demonstrated his ability to procure and distribute logistic supplies.

In sum, the importance of logistics is not in dispute. But these logistics came from a variety of sources and flowed through numerous, diffuse networks largely independent of Base Zero.

*Part C4.4. CDF Training in and around Base Zero.*

The Military Expert Report recounts a two week period of training conducted at Base Zero in the period immediately preceding the Black December campaign of 1997. The impression given by this account is that of a centralized organization implementing a top-down training regimen – a model in keeping with the claim that the CDF had a centralized, institutionalized military command structure.

Yet the fact is that such "trainings" were commonplace throughout the period of CDF activity. They ranged in scale from village level tutelage by retired soldiers or experienced hunters to the larger scale trainings which took place in Telu or by ECOMOG at Base One. Any person with prior military experience or with knowledge of firearms might be called upon to give training to CDF groups of various sizes.

**Part E**

*General remarks regarding the summary of evidence and conclusions.*

Part E of the "Military Expert Report" repeats the observations made earlier in the report and uses them to draw the conclusion that the CDF did constitute a military organization. The details of this analysis – and its limitations – have been dealt with above. I conclude with a summary regarding the overall conclusion that the CDF was in fact a military organization, albeit, as Col. Iron puts it, "not a very good one."

Col. Iron's analysis suggests that the AFRC junta disrupted the territorial (chiefdom) basis of hunter militias such as the kamajors and resulted in the consolidation of the CDF under a central military style command. He writes in Part E2.2 that the CDF was made up of two types of forces: those operating at the chiefdom level in their home districts and those operating out of Base Zero.<sup>109</sup> His assumption seems to be that once

<sup>109</sup> See also the testimony of Col. Richard Iron, 14 June 2005, p. 29, lines 6-7.

away from their villages, kamajor combatants automatically fell under the command of the hierarchy at Base Zero. This misrepresents both what was going on at the village level and the relative importance of Base Zero.

In the former case, it is true that the kamajoisia, the pre-junta hunters were closely allied to the chiefdom structure. It is also true that during the junta many CDF units remained closely associated with the chiefdom authorities. But this sense of loyalty to the chiefdom was not specifically territory dependent. As has been pointed out in at least two separate accounts of the recruitment of CDF combatants,<sup>110</sup> many combatants were recruited from the displaced persons camps around Bo and Kenema. These units continued to operate under chiefdom authority even if they were not located within the chiefdom itself, undermining Col. Iron's equation of local cohesion with specific geographic location.

More important is the total erasure of Base One and the role of Special Forces and other units from this account. Again, these were units which out of necessity (poor communications) and/or design (poor relations) did not have close ties to Base Zero and could hardly be said to exist under its control. They had independent means of accessing logistical support. They often undertook operations which served local tactical goals rather than anything which could be thought of as CDF strategic or operational goals. Even within the very narrow scope of activities Col. Iron pursues in his analysis – the analysis of one military campaign – there were at least two major activities which suggest that they were taken on the initiative of local commanders and had no place in any operational CDF schema (the attacks on Gondama and Sembahun).

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<sup>110</sup> See Patrick Muana, "The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency"; Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, "'Why We Fight': Voices of Young Combatants in Sierra Leone's Civil War."